

DIVERGENT **PATHS**

HEGEL IN MARXISM AND ENGELSISM

VOLUME 1: THE HEGELIAN FOUNDATIONS OF MARX'S METHOD

NORMAN LEVINE

Divergent Paths

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Hegel in Marxism and Engelsism

Volume 1: The Hegelian Foundations of Marx's Method

Norman Levine



LEXINGTON BOOKS

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A division of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.
4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200
Lanham, MD 20706

PO Box 317
Oxford
OX2 9RU, UK

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Levine, Norman, 1931–

Divergent paths : Hegel in Marxism and Engelsism / Norman Levine.
p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN-13: 978-0-7391-1047-8 (cloth : alk. paper)

ISBN-10: 0-7391-1047-0 (cloth : alk. paper)

ISBN-13: 978-0-7391-1304-2 (pbk. : alk. paper)

ISBN-10: 0-7391-1304-6 (pbk. : alk. paper)


1. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770–1831. 2. Engels, Friedrich, 1820–1895.
3. Marx, Karl, 1818–1883. 4. Socialism. 5. Communism. I. Title.

B2948.L385 2006

335.4'092—dc22

2005023620

Printed in the United States of America

™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48–1992.

To the memory of my mother

Alice Levine

Who DNA'd my love of words

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Introduction

I originally intended to cover the entire relationship between Georg W. F. Hegel and Karl Marx in a tortuously long but individual volume, but as my research progressed, I became aware that the subject was too vast to be dealt with in a single monograph. Hegel was a presence in Marx's mind from 1837, the date of his verse on Hegel entitled "Epigram on Hegel," until his death in 1883. To map the intellectual symbiosis between these two geniuses over the span of forty-six years not only required a mastery of the thought of Marx but also of the philosophy of Hegel, and this was a project that could not be encompassed in a single volume.

I therefore retreated to a fall back position: I would publish single volumes that investigated the Hegel-Marx relationship at important junctures, or defining moments, over these almost five decades. It was impossible for a single monograph to store the plethora of data relating to Marx-Hegel, and so the original design exploded into a series of books. United by an overriding thematic, each book of this multi-volume series will inspect a particular moment of the history of the Hegel-Marx connection.

The entire series is called *Divergent Paths: Hegel in Marxism and Engelsism*. The book the reader is now holding is volume 1, and it is entitled *The Hegelian Foundations of Marx's Method*. Additional volumes will be published in succeeding years.

The Hegelian Foundations of Marx's Method contains three chapters: "The Historiography of the Marx-Hegel Relationship," "Engels's First Appropriation of Hegel," and "Marx's First Appropriation of Hegel." The primary focus of this book falls on Marx, and I will explain below why such a study includes a chapter on Friedrich Engels.

Five themes form the orchestration of this present volume: Marx's appropriation of Hegel falls into two periods; Engels's appropriation of Hegel falls into two periods; the differences between Marx and Engels; the various schools of Hegelianized Marxism; and the author's conclusions. I will explain each of these schematics in the following paragraphs.

1) MARX'S APPROPRIATION OF HEGEL FALLS INTO TWO PERIODS

As I explain in greater detail in chapter 1, for many years I advocated the position that Marx's relationship to Hegel fell into two periods, from 1837 to 1850 and from 1850 until his death. Another scholar who also articulated this argument was Alfred Schmidt.

I refer to the years 1837 to 1850 as Marx's First Appropriation of Hegel and to the years after 1850 as Marx's Second Appropriation of Hegel.

However, the period of Marx's First Appropriation of Hegel itself divides into two segments. The first segment spans the years 1837 to 1841, and the second segment covers the remaining years from 1841 until 1850.

This volume, *The Hegelian Foundations of Marx's Method*, deals with only the years 1837 to 1841. Its concern is with only the first segment of the first period of Marx's Appropriation of Hegel.

Following studies will deal with the second segment and carry the story to 1850, or the conclusion of the first period of Marx's Appropriation of Hegel.

Succeeding investigations will then explore the years from 1850 to 1883, or the second period of Marx's Appropriation of Hegel.

2) ENGELS'S APPROPRIATION OF HEGEL FALLS INTO TWO PERIODS

Similar to Marx, Engels's appropriation of Hegel separates into two divisions: the first period of Engels's Appropriation of Hegel runs from 1837 until 1850, and the second period covers the years 1850 until Engels's death in 1895.

Again, because of the complexity of the material, it is necessary to split the first period of Engels's Appropriation of Hegel into two segments: the first segment runs from 1837 until 1842. This is one year longer than Marx's corresponding first segment because in 1842 Engels left the continent to go to Manchester, England, and this departure makes for a convenient demarcation line. The second segment of the first period of Engels's Appropriation of Hegel will consequently run from 1842 until 1850.

This present monograph, *The Hegelian Foundations of Marx's Method*, contains a chapter "Engels's First Appropriation of Hegel," which analyzes Engels's approach to Hegel during this first segment.

Following volumes will deal with Engels's second segment and carry the story to 1850. Additional investigations will then navigate the years from 1850 to 1895, or the second period of Engels's Appropriation of Hegel.

3) THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MARX AND ENGELS

In chapter 2 I provide a chronology of my belief that significant differences separated the thought of Marx from that of Engels. I maintain that Marx and Engels gave birth to two contradictory schools of thought, one called Marxism and the other labeled Engelsism.

In the course of my reading into Marx's approach to Hegel from 1837–1841, I also looked at Engels's writing on Hegel during the same years, and it became apparent to me that the vision of Marx and Engels of Hegel were dissimilar. The discordance between Marx and Engels in their understanding of Hegel served to validate my larger thesis regarding the divergence between Marxism and Engelsism. Since Engels's studies of Hegel during 1837–1841 acted as authentication of my thesis regarding the bifurcation between Marxism and Engelsism, I decided to include a chapter on Engels's First Appropriation of Hegel in the present work. This chapter not only illuminates the differences between Marx and Engels during this first segment but demonstrates the uniqueness of Engels's approach to Hegel in contrast to the Young Hegelian movement.

4) THE VARIOUS SCHOOLS OF THE HEGEL-MARX PROBLEMATIC

Even though this book does address the Engels-Hegel relationship, its major point of concentration is Marx and Hegel. Consequently, the largest amount of analysis and exposition is devoted to Marx's incorporation of Hegel.

In chapter 1, "The Historiography of the Hegel-Marx Relationship," I offer a general narrative of the twentieth-century perception of the Hegel-Marx connection. This overview was not intended to be a study in depth but rather an effort at delineating some of the more important schools. Through the study of schools of thought and of the outstanding individuals who represent those schools, it is hoped that an accurate portrayal of the complexities of this subject will be explicated for the reader.

This labyrinthian subject will be placed into better focus by dividing the material into two subdivisions: the twentieth-century re-Hegelianization of Marx and the twentieth-century de-Hegelianization of Marx.

A.1) The Twentieth-century Re-Hegelianization of Marx: First Epoch

By the term re-Hegelianization I refer to those philosophers who recognized the continuity between Hegel and Marx. From their own perspectives, these intellectuals set forth a literature showing the exact categories of Hegelian thought that Marx incorporated. These twentieth-century re-Hegelianizers broke with the nineteenth-century interpretation of the Hegel-Marx association as represented by Engels, who offered a totally corrupted version of Hegel, divorced Hegel and Marx, and invented dialectical materialism. Engels gave rise to philosophical Stalinism because Stalinist theory was predicated upon both *Diamat* and the sundering of Hegel and Marx.

At this juncture it is necessary to distinguish historical materialism from dialectical materialism. In the Marxist lexicon, historical materialism relates to his theory of historical development. Historical materialism is a theory that proposes to explain the evolutionary patterns of social systems. In the Marxist dictionary, dialectical materialism is a metaphysical view of the natural universe. It claims to have discovered the three fundamental laws of the cosmos: the transformation of quantity into quality, the unity of opposites, and the negation of the negation, and on the basis of these three laws, it asserts that it can account for both the movements of nature and social systems. Dialectical materialism is a universal logic that must be obeyed by both intellectual and physical entities within the solar system: it is metaphysics.

Georg Lukacs, Herbert Marcuse, Jean Hyppolite, and Alfred Schmidt, although each had his private visions, belonged to this first epoch of the twentieth-century re-Hegelianization of Marx. All rejected Engelsism and dialectical materialism

Lukacs's version of re-Hegelianized Marxism concentrated on the principle of subjective activity in both Hegel and Marx. An adherent of Bolshevism, an apologist for the revolutionary aspirations of the European proletariat, Lukacs emphasized the Hegelian themes of labor and praxis and showed how both of these continued in Marx. A member of the Frankfurt School of Social Theory, Marcuse was absorbed in the development of critical theory. Marcuse argued that Hegel was the inventor of the critique of social institutions and that Marx followed this Hegelian program. Hyppolite saw the themes of alienation and estrangement as central to Hegel and Marx.

Taking the *Phenomenology of Spirit* as the core of Hegel's work, Hyppolite proposed that the themes of alienation and estrangement also formed the center of gravity of Marx's work. Schmidt saw Marx as a combination of logical and historical explanation. The historical dimension arose from Marx's study of socioeconomic systems, while the logical side derived from Hegel's *Science of Logic*. According to Schmidt, Marx incorporated Hegelian logical categories as instruments to account for societal evolution.

A.2) The Twentieth-century Re-Hegelianization of Marx: Second Epoch

The work of Christopher Arthur and Tony Smith is emblematic of this second epoch. Both of these men labor in the twentieth-century tradition of re-Hegelianized Marxism, but they move this heritage in a more extreme direction. Arthur is aware of this radical inclination and gives a new name to his own and Smith's work. Arthur calls his and Smith's contributions "The New Hegelian Marxism," thereby affirming that he and Smith put forth a new edition of the re-Hegelianization of Marxism, something outside the parameters of the Lukacs-Marcuse-Hyppolite-Schmidt canon.

The New Hegelian Marxism is distinguished by two characteristics: it takes Marx's method of explanation as totally derived from systematic logic and it relinquishes almost all claims to linear explanation. According to Arthur and Smith, the methodological principle that fuses Marx and Hegel is organic development. Explanation in Hegel, whether in terms of logic, history, or philosophy always proceeded on the basis of organic evolution.

Organic evolution formed the inner architecture of Hegel's logic of explanation. Every holistic system contained a dominant essence, a category that formed the core of the organic system. Systematic dialectic referred to a method of explanation in which the development of a system was defined by the control of the dominant category, or the process by which the dominant category determined the operation of local categories. To explain meant to explicate the unfolding of categories.

Arthur and Smith drew a close parallel between Hegel's *Science of Logic* and Marx's *Das Kapital*. Just as systematic dialectic formed the explanatory structure of *The Science of Logic*, so systematic dialectic was the explanatory methodology of *Das Kapital*.

A casualty of the New Hegelian Marxism is linear explanation, or the historical narrative. Arthur and Smith are primarily concerned with logical consistency and not historical evolution. They stress logical coherence and not societal development, and therefore statements regarding the direction of societal progression is of secondary importance to them.

The works of Arthur and Smith are indicators of the nature of the debate within contemporary Marxism. The debate is not sociology but philosophy. The prime interest is not the movement of social structures over time but rather the logical plausibility of statements within Marxism.

B.1) The Twentieth-century De-Hegelianization of Marxism: First Epoch

In this section no attempt will be made to explain the de-Hegelianization attempted by Soviet Stalinism. Contrary to the wishes of Nicolai Lenin, as explained in his *Philosophical Notebooks*, KGB philosophy detached Marx from Hegel and adopted the *Diamat* first articulated by Engels. Since *Diamat* was a corruption of the thought of both Hegel and Marx, I will not spend any time describing its logical content.

The first serious attempt to de-Hegelianize Marxism in this first epoch was the work of Louis Althusser. Althusser's corpus was a response to the twentieth-century re-Hegelianization of Marxism. According to Althusser, re-Hegelianized Marxism suffered from two mortal defects: first, its increasing involvement with questions of philosophy as opposed to politics, and second, its break with the Leninist tradition. While Althusser broke with Stalinism, he still considered Leninism a viable revolutionary strategy that was perpetuated in the thought of Mao Tse-Tung.

In order to combat the political defects of re-Hegelianized Marxism, Althusser proposed the de-Hegelianization of Marxism. The de-Hegelianization of Marxism was necessary if Marxism was again to assert the primacy of the political, or if revolution took priority over philosophy.

Weaponized by this theoretical strategy, Althusser put forth the following interpretive schematic: Marx and Hegel were pulled apart by an "epistemological break"; Marx's and Engels's *The Holy Family, 1844-1845* was the initial statement of this break; there was no Hegelian influence on Marx after *The Holy Family*; and freed from Hegel, Marx drifted into the orbit of Benedict Spinoza.

A primary indicator of the epistemological break was Marx's divorce from Hegel's organic method of explanation. Hegel applied an organic model in explaining various periods in historical, philosophical, and religious development. Hegel saw historical or philosophical periods as organic totalities that possessed an inherent tendency to evolve.

Influenced by French Structuralism, Althusser rejected this Hegelian organicism and instead returned to Spinoza, whose method of explanation was based on the idea of structures without subjects. Althusser carried on the tradition of social totalities but de-Hegelianized the idea of totality. Totalities

were not organisms but structures without subjects, or structures without an inherent telos. Rather than a Hegelianized Marxism, Althusser advanced a Spinozist Marxism.

Althusser's entire corpus was an act of intervention. Following the philosophy of knowledge as enunciated by French Structuralism, Althusser carried out a political intervention into the formulation of Marxism in the second half of the twentieth century. Wishing to sustain Leninist revolutionary tactics, being a Communist conservative, Althusser proposed a method of explanation that contradicted Hegelianized Marxism. By contradicting Hegelianized Marxism, Althusser sought to found a Marxist method of explanation that was Leninist and cemented in the world proletarian movement. The method must support the politics, or politics must create a method that sustained the politics.

Another representative of the first epoch of the twentieth-century de-Hegelianization of Marxism was Theodor Adorno. Two connecting links, Adorno asserted, drew Hegel and Marx together: an eschatological view of history and the assumption that reason was the determining force in history.

The first stage of Adorno's de-Hegelianization proposed that Hegel and Marx were children of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The first stage of de-Hegelianization was to establish their unity, and they were joined because both were convinced that reason was the propellant force in history and that history manifested an eschatological goal. The improvement of the human condition stemming from the application of reason to society was infinite.

The second stage in Adorno's de-Hegelianization program was to demonstrate that the two primary beliefs that were common to both Marx and Hegel had disappeared in the twentieth century. Marx was de-Hegelianized because the beliefs that bound Marx and Hegel together were proven false, the common glue evaporated, and the men were decoupled. The three events that invalidated the teleological view of history and the salvationist view of human rationality were Hitlerism, the Holocaust, and Stalinism. Hitlerism demonstrated that the *Philosophy of History* was wrong, the reign of Freedom had not come into existence in the twentieth century, and Stalinism was a totalitarianism and not a communist utopia.

The de-Hegelianization of Marxism was a product of the twentieth century because the Age of Totalitarianism disproved the philosophical foundations of Hegel-Marx. Rather than historical utopianism, the twentieth century brought the antipodal to the fore. Adorno interpreted Hegel's dialectic as a paradigm of the contradictory. Rather than the unity of subject and object, Adorno focused on the antithetical: subject and object were never joined.

The re-Hegelianization of Marxism rested on the principle of the unity of subject and object. The de-Hegelianization emerged out of the thesis that

subject and object were always aporetic. By changing the interpretation of Hegel, Adorno de-Hegelianized Marx. By pinpointing the contradictory in Hegel, Adorno showed the impossibility of the Marxist utopia of a classless society.

B.2) The Twentieth-century De-Hegelianization of Marx: Second Epoch

The works of John Roemer and Jon Elster fashion one school of the second epoch of the twentieth-century de-Hegelianization of Marx, and what makes this school unique is that it approaches the Hegel-Marx relationship from philosophic traditions that are completely distinct from either Marxism or Hegelianism. The debates that Roemer and Elster carry on with Hegel and Marx are not dialogues internal to these traditions but rather confrontations from traditions external to both Marxism and Hegelianism. They do not attempt to reinvigorate either Marx or Hegel but for the most part to bury them.

Both Roemer and Elster approach the Hegel-Marx problematic from the school of Anglo-British Analytic Philosophy. They seek to apply Analytic Philosophy to the realm of explanation in the social sciences and from this perspective isolate two logics of social analysis, methodological individualism and rational choice theory. They also reject the idea of functional explanation, claiming that it is a residue of Hegelian organicism.

Methodological individualism is a logic that denies the existence of any social collectivity. It rejects the thesis that society is composed of groups and classes and seeks to explain social developments in terms of individual choices. On the highest level, methodological individualism is a refutation of organicist explanation found in both Hegel and Marx. There are no social aggregates, only private subjects.

A second logic employed by Roemer and Elster is rational choice theory. Similar to methodological individualism, rational choice theory rebuts any claim that personal choices are determined by group mentalities. Subjective decisions are not made on the basis of a collective consciousness of any kind but rather in terms of benefits that will accrue to the individual. Rational choice theory is an annulment of Marx's class analysis. Individuals do not act in terms of group consciousness but rather on the calculation of private rewards.

Roemer and Elster recognize the Hegelian influence on Marx, and to this degree they acknowledge that Marxism is Hegelianized Marxism. They acknowledge the major thesis of the re-Hegelianization school, but they additionally argue that the Hegelianization of Marxism was a major reason for the

errors of Marxism. While Roemer and Elster assent that Marxism was Hegelianized, they convict the Hegelianization of Marxism as the culprit in the distortions contained in Marx's theories.

By detaching Hegel and Marx, both Roemer and Elster de-Hegelianize Marx. Their claim that Hegel and Marx operated on false philosophical premises gives them grounds to detach Hegel and Marx. The evaporation of the erroneous philosophical postulates that connected them is the basis for their delinking. De-Hegelianization was the function of the removal of common, although incorrect, theoretical principles.

However, one crucial idea that Roemer and Elster inherit from Marx is the concept of exploitation. The Left philosophy of these two men is an attempt to demonstrate how exploitation can be accounted for on the basis of methodological individualism and rational choice theory.

Roemer and Elster are exemplars of contemporary radicalism. Except for the idea of exploitation, they jettisoned the entire architecture of Marx's socioeconomic analysis. But they seek to keep the idea of exploitation alive by showing how methodological individualism and rational choice theory ultimately confirm the existence of economic expropriation.

The literary products of Gerald A. Cohen and Philippe van Parijs also belong to the second epoch of the twentieth-century de-Hegelianization of Marx, but the philosophic postulates by which they address this problem are vastly different from those employed by the Roemer-Elster school.

The fundamental difference between the Roemer-Elster camp and the Cohen-van Parijs coterie is the issue of functional explanation in the social sciences. Whereas Roemer-Elster negate functional explanation, Cohen-van Parijs adopt it.

The differences between the two camps extend to the logics of methodological individualism and rational choice theory. The Cohen-van Parijs camp cancels both these Roemer-Elster canons of social explanation.

Nevertheless, similarities also exist between the two sides, as both reject Hegelian and Marxist organicism. Both sides also agree that the Marxist prognosis that capitalist society would produce class polarization and that the industrial proletariat would emerge as the majoritarian collectivity was proven false by historical developments.

Even though Cohen-van Parijs de-Hegelianize Marx by annulling the Hegelian idea of organic development, their de-Hegelianization did not result, as in the case of Roemer-Elster, in their abnegation of Marxism. The Cohen-van Parijs de-Hegelianization did not lead to a refutation of Marxism. Indeed, in their work, functional theory was a lifeline to Marxism.

In his book *Karl Marx's Theory of History*, Cohen put forth a defense of Marx's theory of the relationship between the means of production and the

mode of production in terms of functional logic. Van Parijs later adopted this Cohen strategy.

Differentiating between a soft and a hard functionalism the Cohen–van Parijs alliance maintains that the substructure determines the superstructure, or that the ownership of the means of production exerts a determining influence on the socio-intellectual consciousness of a society. When Cohen–van Parijs adopt their position, they provide logical justification for the major arguments espoused in Marx's *Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy* and thus perpetuate for the contemporary period the continued relevance of this aspect of Marx's thought.

The retention of the relationship between the means and the mode of production sanctions the functional logic to provide Marxist interpretations about the internal organization of a socioeconomic totality. Assuming the correctness of functional explanations, it is possible to describe the benefits the capitalist owning class receives from a pro-capitalist superstructure and thus allow incentives for the substructure to shape the superstructure. Similarly, functional logic buttresses linear explanations in history. The dependency of the mode upon the means of production or any clashes that emerge from a momentary imbalance of these forces serves to illuminate the course taken by history. The movement of history becomes clarified if one assumes that one of the more important triggers of development is the continuity/discontinuity between means and mode of production.

The work of Cohen–van Parijs by de-Hegelianizing Marx, by freeing Marx of Hegelian organicism, acted as a force for the survival of Marxism. By moving Marxism away from organicism and resurrecting Marxism in terms of functional logic, they established the conditions for the prolongation of Marxism. Not every specificity of Marxist thought has persevered in their work, for they have removed the peripheral but maintained the core.

5) THE AUTHOR'S CONCLUSIONS

My own approach to the Hegel-Marx problematic must be broken down into two categories: The Scholarship of Re-Hegelianization and The Epistemology of De-Hegelianization.

The Scholarship of Re-Hegelianization

From the point of view of the history of ideas I was always convinced of the crucial role that Hegel played in Marx's thought. My research always took the Hegelian presence in Marxism as a point of departure.

From the scholarship side, I argued the case for the re-Hegelianization of Marxism because I was convinced that Marx and the historical facts warranted such a thesis. My argument for re-Hegelianization was that it must be accepted because it conformed to the facts. I was not making a statement of agreement but rather prosecuting the case of historical evidence.

The Epistemology of De-Hegelianization

There is a difference between evidence, and correctness. While the evidence supports the shaping presence of Hegel in Marx, this does not mean that Marxism is more epistemologically valid because of the Hegel-in-Marx. The proof by evidence of the Hegel-in-Marx does not allow the conclusion that Marxism is more epistemologically valid because of the inclusion of Hegel-in-Marx.

My own belief is that the Hegelianization of Marxism was a major source for many of the errors of Marxist speculation. While the Hegelianization of Marxism was one of the determinants of Marxist thought, while the re-Hegelianization of Marxism is the correct historiography of Marxism, the correct epistemology of Marxism requires that Marx and Hegel be decoupled. A Marxism exists outside of Hegel, and to reclaim that Marxism, it is first necessary to decompose the Hegelianization of Marxism.

The fact that a Marxism exists exclusive of Hegel does not in itself mean that this Marxism offers valid insights, but functional explanations do put forth a method of analysis that furnishes Marxist insights into the nature of contemporary society. Marxism, predicated upon functional explanations, supplies analytic tools by which to comprehend the internal structure and linear movement of present day capitalism.

Throughout this book I used the phrases the young Marx and young Engels for two reasons: as signs of demarcation for a particular period in the intellectual development of both Marx and Engels, and in subsequent volumes in this series, as I deal with the mature Marx and mature Engels, I will refer to these men as the old Marx and old Engels in order to categorize the later evolutionary stages of their thought.

Chapter One

The Historiography of the Hegel-Marx Relationship

This is the first volume of a multi-volume study about the intellectual influence that Georg W. F. Hegel exerted on Karl Marx. The entire series is called *Divergent Paths: Hegel in Marxism and Engelsism*, and the thesis of the whole enterprise is that Marx incorporated into his own work a large number of Hegelian methodological categories, or that Marx's method of historical analysis is constructed upon the logical methodology of Hegel. This first volume of the series, *The Hegelian Foundations of Marx's Method*, focuses on the years in which Marx wrote his doctoral dissertation, *The Differences Between Democritus's and Epicurus's Philosophy of Nature*.

A brief presentation of the historiography of the Hegel-Marx problematic is in order at this point as it will help the reader place this present work within the clashing schools of interpretation. The historiography offered below is not intended as an exhaustive study of a huge bibliography but is rather an exercise in location. By scrutinizing a few but pivotal and representative schools of interpretation the site of this book within the historiographical debates will be accurately positioned.

Two broad camps of historiography exist: those who wish to maintain the Hegelianization of Marx, and those who seek to de-Hegelianize him. The exact placement of Hegel in the work of Marx is a nodal point that shapes the interpretation of Marx. Although any schematization does violence to the uniqueness of any object, there is much truth to the statement that those who advocate the re-Hegelianization of Marx are inclined to a phenomenological approach to the social sciences based on the unity of subject and object and the application of specific Hegelian logical forms as explanatory devices in the study of society, while those who advocate the de-Hegelianization of Marx tend to eliminate the phenomenological, methodological, and subject-object influences of Hegel.

It will clarify matters further if, at the beginning, I state my own position in this debate: this entire study defends the need to de-Hegelianize Marx. By indicating the extent to which Marx was indebted to Hegel the book wishes to illuminate the degree to which Marx must be detached from Hegel.

The statement that I belong to the de-Hegelianizing camp should not be interpreted to mean that my own presentation of Marx is positivist. The de-Hegelianization of Marx does not automatically mean the scientization of Marx, nor does it mean that it is necessary to completely abandon Marx.

My de-Hegelianization is not intended as an opening for the annulment of historical materialism. I wish to perform an act of surgery in order to save the patient. My de-Hegelianization consists of two steps: 1) to identify the Hegelian methodological formulas that Marx selected to transfer into his own work; 2) after identifying these formulas to begin the process of removing them on the presupposition that a core of historical materialism will survive. My book stands as a refutation of Louis Althusser's claim that Marx underwent an "epistemological break" with Hegel and that the significance of *The German Ideology* was a point of rupture.⁽¹⁾

The creator of Hegelianized Marxism was Marx himself. Marx's dialogue with Hegel lasted throughout Marx's life, and the subsequent volumes of this work will isolate this discourse in the areas of methodological categories. In Marx's lifelong dialogue with Hegel there were periods of content annulment and periods of form transformation, but a complete break never occurred.

By the term *content annulment* I mean a moment at which Marx rejected significant Hegelian methodological contents; such a moment existed in 1844 when Marx wrote *The Paris Manuscripts*. In these essays, Marx negated Hegel's view of civil society as presented in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* and claimed that contrary to Hegel's interpretation alienation was not an inevitable condition of man but a socially engendered state that could be superseded. By the term *form transformation* I mean a period in which Marx modified Hegelian methodological forms, in which he borrowed the form of these categories but changed their content, in which he exercised the Feuerbachian transformative method. This form transformation started with Marx's doctoral dissertation and continued, for the most part, for the remainder of his life. The viewpoint of this entire series is that the discourse with Hegel was continuous; it was never totally ruptured, although it alternated between periods of content annulment and form transformation. When an intellectual problem arose that Marx could not solve without recourse to Hegel, Marx was in a period of form transformation, and when an intellectual problem surfaced that Marx resolved without making a move toward Hegel, Marx was in a stage of content annulment. The presence of Hegel was always evident, and Marx's vacillation was determined by intellectual need.

Since this complete series is a study of Marx's reception of Hegel, it is unnecessary, at this point of the analysis, to comment on the origins of Hegelianized Marxism. Unfortunately, Marx concealed his full indebtedness to Hegel, he never wrote a detailed confession of what he borrowed or rejected of Hegel, and my complete investigation is intended to fill this vacuum, to uncover Marx's form of Hegelianized Marxism. Friedrich Engels did articulate his own vision of Marx's reception of Hegel, and the nineteenth century form of Hegelianized Marxism was advanced and popularized in the work of Engels. Engels filled the lacunae left by Marx, and the Hegelianized Marxism which circulated in the nineteenth century was the form of Engelsian Hegelianized Marxism.

The interpretations of both Hegel and Marx offered by Engels were distortions and debasements. Chapter 2 of this book is a study of the young Engels's misunderstanding of Hegelian philosophy. However, it is impossible to discuss in any comprehensive fashion Engels's perversion of the thought of Marx. The reader who wishes to pursue this particular aspect of the Hegel-Marx problematic in greater depth is advised to read the chapters "Dialogue within the Dialectic" and "The Destruction of the Dialectic" in my book *Dialogue within The Dialectic*.⁽²⁾ Most of the early works of Marx, such as his doctoral dissertation, the *Paris Manuscripts Of 1844*, his *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, his 1837 letter to his father, or the later 1857–1858 *Grundrisse*, or those works in which Marx's early engagement with Hegel are most clearly formulated, were not published until after 1930, more than three decades after Engels's death. Due to Marx's silence on Hegel, the historical task of interpreting Marx's reception of Hegel fell to Engels. Although Engels presented a corrupted interpretation of this relationship, he was the first, nevertheless, to call attention to the centrality of this issue in the understanding of Marx and Marxism.

Engels provided the most detailed account of Hegelianized Marxism, as he understood it, in four works: *Anti-Dühring*, 1877–1878; *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, 1880; *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, 1888; and *The Dialectics of Nature*, which Engels began to write in 1873 but never completed during his lifetime and which was posthumously printed in the Soviet Union in full in 1927. All of these works are expressions of the Age of the Second International.

Engels began his career in the 1830s as a journalist, and he remained a popularizer of ideas throughout his life.⁽³⁾ As the socialist movement grew in the Age of the Second International, as socialism transformed itself into a proletarian movement and not simply a protest of disaffected middle class intellectuals, it was necessary to simplify the ideas of Marx and make them accessible to a mass working class audience. Marxism must be codified in a form that was understandable to the proletariat, and Engels performed this

function for the Second International. This was a task that Marx himself could not perform; he always remained an academic, and even when asked to simplify the first volume of *Das Kapital* so that the industrial laborers could comprehend it, and even though he tried to do this in the third edition of the work, his efforts were failures and his magnum opus remained too arcane for the uneducated factory workers.

The period of the Second International was also the age of materialism or the accelerated development of the natural sciences. Whereas Marx made himself the master of economics and the social sciences, Engels specialized in the area of the physical sciences. The intellectual challenge for Engels was to demonstrate how the laws of nature showed the validity of Marx's historical materialism. Just as Marx proved that economics, properly understood, showed the validity of communism, Engels's mission was to prove that physical universe operated in terms of the same dialectical laws that Marx outlined. Natural science was to become a part of the Marxist Weltanschauung.

In addition, Second International socialism was threatened by a revival of conservative philosophical idealism. A private docent in Berlin, Eugen Dühring wrote several books attacking Hegel and claiming that German Idealist philosophy was inherently politically conservative. Engels was called upon to also fend off the philosophical assaults by Idealist conservatism upon the socialist movement. This theoretical strategy, to show that the German proletariat was the legitimate heir of eighteenth century German Idealism and of Hegel, was the program of Engels's book *Anti-Dühring*.

Engels was the chief ideologue of the Second International in a cultural war. He attempted to establish the legitimacy of the German proletarian movement by demonstrating that it was the true heir of Hegel and of German Idealism in general. Engels's mission was to demonstrate that neither Hegel nor German Idealism was politically conservative, but rather both were intellectual precursors of the revolutionary movement.

The service that Engels performed for the Second International was to beat back any revival of conservatism, either in the form of Idealist philosophy or in the form of natural science that lent credence to a conservative politics. The mission of Engels was to rescue Marxism from a Right Wing, either in the form of natural science or of philosophical Idealism that invalidated socialism. He sought to preserve the Left-Wing tradition of Hegelianism by creating a Left-Wing science as a means of legitimizing the revolutionary proletariat. Engelsian Hegelianized Marxism is a fusion of materialism and dialectics.

The essay *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*(4) is the most precise expression of Engels's programmatic intent. Engels wrote this book to defend Feuerbach against the attack of C. N. Starke, whose book *Ludwig Feuerbach* attacked Feuerbach as an Idealist. The collaborator

of Marx refuted the charges of Starke and presented Feuerbach as an advocate of the revolutionary proletariat.

In response to Starke, the collaborator of Marx presented Feuerbach as a materialist, but distinguished between two types of materialism. One type flowed out of eighteenth century French Enlightenment materialism, and Engels referred to this as mechanistic materialism, by which Engels meant the view that nature was essentially static. Mechanistic materialism did not look upon nature as evolutionary or developmental but rather as fixed.

The great accomplishment of Feuerbach was the End of Classical German Philosophy. He demonstrated that science and materialism transcended philosophy.

In *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, Engels went further by asserting that it was not only materialism that sounded the death knell of philosophy but also economics. It was no longer necessary to speculate over the course of human society because Marxian economics, which was a science, offered irrefutable proof of the movement of history. Marx's theory of value had triumphed over the Hegelian spirit in *The Philosophy of History*.

Feuerbach solved the riddle of the relationship between Being and Thought.(5) All previous philosophy assumed that Thought was antecedent to Being, that Thought provided a structure for Being. Feuerbach began a new age of science and materialism by showing that Being was antecedent to Thought or that sense perception and Being were equivalents and therefore just as sense-perception gave rise to ideas, so Being was the point of origination of Thought.(6)

This replacement of philosophy by materialism was joined by Engels to the Hegelian notion of process, and this marriage created *dialectical materialism*. Engels believed there were two parts of the Hegelian tradition, an Idealist conservative half and the half that stressed dialectic and was therefore revolutionary.

The Idealist elements of Hegel led to *political conservatism*, and a justification of the autocracy of the Prussian monarchy. The elements that stressed process and development in Hegel led to the dialectic. Engels interpreted the Hegelian dialectic as an extension of Heraclitus: the dialectic meant historicity; all things existed in the river of change.

Dialectic materialism was this fusion of historicity and materialism. Just as nature was ruled by the law of evolution, so was society. Dialectical laws, or process and mutability, governed the natural and social sciences.

According to Engels, Marx was the originator of this fusion of Heraclitus and materialism. Just as science had replaced philosophy, so the capitalist system must also pass away. Since the fundamental law of the physical universe was mutability, then the capitalist system was only temporary,

and so the proletariat was justified in acting to overthrow the private property system.

This brief summary of the thinking of Engels on the Hegel-Marx problem was not intended to offer a comprehensive analysis of the entire spectrum of Engels's thoughts on this relationship. *Anti-Dühring*, *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, and *The Dialectics of Nature* contain many ideas that are not appropriate to discuss at this point.

One of the roles that Engels fulfilled was to begin the historiography of the thought of Marx. Engelsian Hegelianized Marxism was a school of interpretation that he introduced to the historiography of Marxism.

The fact that Engels originated a significant school of interpretation of Marxist thought still leaves open the question of how this school is to be evaluated. The evaluation of Engels's contribution to Marxist thought also lies outside the parameters of this book; nevertheless a brief statement of assessment is needed. Engels completely misappropriated the thought of Hegel. His understanding of Hegelian thought was amateurish, and his transformation of Hegelian dialectical methodology into a natural philosophy was a simplistic distortion. Rewriting the dialectic from consciousness into a philosophy of nature resulted in the malformation of Hegelian ideas.

Having misconstrued Hegel, Engels then advanced to the misapprehension of Marx. When Engels argued that three laws of physics, the negation of the negation, the transformation of quantity into quality, and the interpenetration of opposites, not only governed the functioning of nature but of human history as well, he led to the malformation of Marxism. Whereas Marx stressed human praxis, whereas Marx drew his inspiration from Hegel's portrayal of the labor of consciousness in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, Engelsian Hegelianized Marxism eliminated the element of human activity and replaced it with the metaphysics of natural philosophy.(7)

Engelsian Hegelianized Marxism became, for the most part, Stalinism. Even though the *Diamat* of the Soviet Union rejected the influence of Hegel on Marx, it nevertheless remained loyal to Engels's three natural dialectical laws. Engels contributed to the rigidity of Soviet Marxism, a rigidity which led to the collapse of communism in Soviet Russia.

Paradoxically, regardless of the fact that he was the primary ideologue of the Second International, Western European Socialism did not adhere to Engelsian Hegelianized Marxism after Engels's death in 1895, and after his passing, the Second International, in its western branch, moved in Kantian and Darwinian directions. In a speech in 1883, Engels compared Marx to Charles Darwin, and although Engels's greatest originality lay in his fusion of dialectics and nature, the post-Engelsian ideologues of the Second International

turned a blind eye to Hegel and gravitated instead to the theory of evolution: They remained loyal to the scientific paradigm, but moved away from physics to biology. In its western branch the Second International marked the first period of the de-Hegelianization of Marxism.

The Second International dissolved at the outbreak of World War I in 1914, and even though Nicolai Lenin lived until 1924, he belonged to the age of Karl Kautsky, Georgy Plekhanov, and Rosa Luxemburg. Bolshevism came to power in Russia three years after the demise of the Second International, but Bolshevism was born in the Russian Revolution of 1905, and so Lenin was a rebellious child of the Second International.

Primarily a political tactician, Lenin nevertheless did speculate on philosophic issues. Lenin's philosophic speculations were essentially divided into two periods, one marked by the publication of *Materialism and Empirico-Criticism* in 1909 and the second by the writing of his 1914–1915 *Philosophical Notebooks*, which were not completely published until 1933.

Lenin's first attempt at philosophy, *Materialism and Empirico-Criticism*, was an expression of the de-Hegelianization of Marxism. *Materialism and Empirico-Criticism* presented Marxism as a philosophic materialism; it was an expression of the scientization of Marxism and illustrated the rule that Marxism as mechanistic materialism is hostile to a philosophy of praxis as contained in Hegelianized Marxism.

Lenin's second philosophical period began in the library in Bern, Switzerland, between the years 1914 and 1915, where Lenin for the first time read the following books of Hegel: *The Science of Logic*, *The History of Philosophy*, *The Philosophy of History* and the "Small Logic" of the *Encyclopedia*. While he was reading these works Lenin copied extensive passages from the books and also made copious personal comments, and the passages he copied as well as his own commentaries make up the *Philosophical Notebooks of 1914–1915*.⁽⁸⁾ These notebooks mark Lenin's first encounter with Hegel. They are the point of origin of Leninized Hegelian Marxism. Great differences separate Leninized Hegelian Marxism from Engelsian Hegelian Marxism.

Whereas Engels sought to ontologize the notion of process, Lenin was more concerned with the logical apparatus of Hegel. Like Marx, Lenin attempted to separate Hegelian logic from Hegelian metaphysics and then to apply this formula to the study of history. Engels remained an empiricist, believing that experimental knowledge could supply human beings with an appropriate picture of the "thing-in-itself." Engels did not believe in the epistemological unity of the subject and the object, but maintained that external reality supplied the subject with a "copy" of the external world. Conversely, Lenin was Hegelianized in the epistemological sense because in his *Philosophical Notebooks* he recognized the unity between subject and object as the basis of the concept.

Whereas Engels believed the subjective mind was a passive photograph, Lenin borrowed the Hegelian idea of an active subjective mind as it penetrated into the objective world by means of the concept in order to impart a structure to external phenomena. An enormous gulf separated the Lenin of *Materialism and Empirico-Criticism* from the Lenin of *The Philosophical Notebooks*. In *Materialism and Empirico-Criticism*, Lenin still worked within the confines of Engelsian epistemology, the Kantian distinction between the subject and object, while five years later in his *Philosophical Notebooks* he had jettisoned the Kantian formula and embraced a Hegelian position.

Within the twentieth century Lenin was the first to re-Hegelianize Marxism.⁽⁹⁾ Whereas Engels was the founder of Hegelianized Marxism in the nineteenth century, Lenin was the initiator of re-Hegelianized Marxism in the twentieth century. Lukacs was the heir of Lenin.

Lenin redefined the Hegelian tradition inside Marxism. He moved it in a new direction, away from the Engelsian form of placing the dialectic in nature to a form in which the dialectic became a theory of knowledge. Lenin made a correct placement of the dialectic, and like Hegel, associated the dialectic with a theory of cognition. The dialectic was again a part of a theory of subjectivity.

The *Philosophical Notebooks* reasserts the centrality of subjective consciousness. Lenin, like Hegel, recognized the power of the concept, the fact that the concept was a constitutive force in the appearance of the external world. It is possible to overstate Lenin's comprehension of Hegel, for on a philosophical level Lenin never approaches the sophistication of the social ontology of Georg Lukacs or the critical theory of Herbert Marcuse. Nevertheless, Lenin marked a decisive shift in the Marxist apprehension of Hegel by once more stressing the importance of theoretic praxis.

The *Philosophical Notebooks* were written at the outbreak of World War I and reflect Lenin's understanding of the interconnection between the European war and its global ramifications. The global war, the international dimensions of imperialism revolving around the European war as the general axis for a proletarian revolution in Russia, were perfect historical exemplifications of Hegel's idea of the interdependence of the universal and the particular, or the interpenetration of opposites.

The first twentieth century re-Hegelianization of Marxism under Lenin set the stage for the second de-Hegelianization in the twentieth century under Josef Stalin in the 1920s. Totally illiterate in matters of philosophy, Stalin debased Marxism in the Soviet Union by turning it into mechanistic materialism. Stalin returned to the project of the Second International by fusing Marxism and scientism. Understanding philosophy as a form of political partisanship, Stalin also launched a cultural crusade inside Bolshevism to rid it of any trace of Hegelianism. Ignoring the return of Lenin to Hegel as depicted in the *Philosophical Note-*

books, Stalin was primarily responsible for destroying the Lenin heritage of Hegelianized Marxism in the Soviet Union. He dismissed Abram Deborin, an advocate of Leninized Hegelianism, from the Institute of Philosophy and then supported his handpicked Mark Mitin in imposing mechanistic materialism on Soviet cultural life. Another lieutenant of Stalin, Andre Zhdanov, referred to Hegel as a bourgeois reactionary and attacked Lukacs for the writing of *History and Class Consciousness*. Facing ostracism from the Communist movement unless he recanted, Lukacs bowed to the totalitarianism of Zhdanov and thereby kept his membership in the world of Communism. Two other Soviet professors also faced oppression because of their advocacy of a Hegelianized Marxism inside Soviet philosophy in the 1930s. One of these philosophers was Mark Rosenthal and the other was his student Evald W. Iljenkow. I am particularly indebted to the work of Iljenkow who first made me aware of the internal dialectic in Marx, a concept I will explain in later portions of this book.

At the outset of this chapter I stated that it served as a brief presentation of the entire historiography of the Hegel-Marx problematic. Thus far I have defined some terminology, set some conceptual paradigms, and established the foundations of the Hegel-Marx discourse by offering lapidary comments on the work of Engels and Lenin. No effort was made to follow an in-depth chronology of the Hegel-Marx historiography.

The following sections of this chapter will follow a different strategy. As a means of demonstrating the multitude of perspectives in the Hegel-Marx discourse I will discuss four pairs of philosophers who participated in this conversation: (1) Georg Lukacs–Theodor Adorno; (2) Louis Althusser–Alfred Schmidt; (3) Jean Hyppolite–Herbert Marcuse; (4) Jon Elster/John Roemer–Gerald Cohen/Tony Smith.

The commentary that I put forth on these four pairs is not intended as an exhaustive study of each of these men, nor am I suggesting that these ten individuals form the sum total of all those working on the Hegel-Marx problem. I paired these scholars because they hold conflicting views, and by juxtaposing one against the other I hope to illuminate the varieties of interpretation which surround this issue and to better situate my own work in this plethora of schools.

GEORG LUKACS–THEODOR ADORNO

Georg Lukacs

Although Lenin was the founder of Western Marxism, Lukacs was its most significant proponent, and his 1923 book, *History and Class Consciousness*, is generally looked upon, albeit mistakenly, as the point of origin of this

school of Marxism. I think *History and Class Consciousness* has received excessive acclaim and that his later work, *The Young Hegel*, completed in 1938, published for the first time in Switzerland in 1948, with a second edition appearing in the German Democratic Republic in 1954, was his most potent advocacy of Hegelianized Marxism.(10) Profound differences separated the Hegelianized Marxism of *History and Class Consciousness* from *The Young Hegel*. The powerful currents that flowed from the Lukacsian Hegelianized Marxism of *The Young Hegel* was impossible without a bibliographical revolution. The differences between *History and Class Consciousness* and *The Young Hegel* stem not only from the disparity of historical periods in which they were written but more importantly from the bibliography that was available to Lukacs at the time he wrote these distinctive works.

The Lukacs of *The Young Hegel* had the advantage of four factors over the Lukacs of *History and Class Consciousness*: (1) the revival of Hegelian studies represented by the Hegelian centenary organized at the University of Berlin in 1931(11); (2) access to Marx's *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*; (3) access to Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks*; (4) access to Hegel's early writings, specifically *Das System Der Sittlichkeit*, and the *Jenaer Realphilosophie I* and *II*.(12)

1. The study of Hegel underwent a renaissance in Germany in the 20th Century. This revival of interest in Hegel culminated in the First Hegel Congress organized by Hermann Glockner on the occasion of the centenary of Hegel's death. In 1930 Lukacs was in Moscow, but in 1931 he was sent to Berlin at the time of the First Hegel Congress but actually attempted to organize a counter-Hegel conference which would present a Marxist interpretation of Hegel in contradiction to the bourgeois form presented by Glockner. Lukacs did not succeed in actualizing his conference, but in 1932 he did lecture at Frankfurt University on Hegel's lengthy commentary of Sir James Steuart's *Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy* and so contributed to the rebirth of Hegel studies.(13) A reinterpretation of Hegel was already in progress, and Lukacs joined the movement at its early stages.
2. Although not yet published, Marx's *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* were in the archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Moscow. With the approval of the Director of the Institute, David Ryasanov, Lukacs read these documents. He was perhaps the first central or western European scholar to read these groundbreaking texts.
3. Stalin suppressed the publication of the complete *Philosophical Notebooks* until 1933, and so Leninized Hegelian Marxism was a victim of the needs of political dictatorship. Lukacs was fortunate because Ryasanov,

the Director of the Institute for Marxism-Leninism, allowed him to read the entire *Notebooks* when Lukacs was in Moscow in 1930. *History and Class Consciousness* was published in 1923 before Lukacs was familiar with Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks*, but these speculative sketches of Lenin were important to and incorporated in the later work of Lukacs, *The Young Hegel*, published in 1952.

4. The early writings of Hegel, specifically *The System of Ethical Life* and the *Jenaer Realphilosophie I* and *II* remained unpublished until the twentieth century. *The System of Ethical Life* was only published in 1923, and the *Jenaer Realphilosophie I* and *II* only appeared in 1931.(14)

The System of Ethical Life and the *Jenaer Realphilosophie* formed the core of Hegel's thinking on economics, capitalism, and civil society. They remained unknown to Marx and Engels and Lenin, and so Hegel's thinking on economics was lost to these pivotal figures. These early writings of Hegel had as great an impact on the revision of twentieth century interpretations of Hegel as the *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* had on the twentieth century reinterpretation of Marx.

The System of Ethical Life and the *Jenaer Realphilosophie I* and *II* were available to Lukacs as he started his preparation for *The Young Hegel*, and *The Young Hegel* was a blend of these previously unknown Hegel manuscripts and Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks* and Marx's *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts Of 1844*. This proved to be an explosive mixture, an amalgam which served as the chemistry for Western Marxism.

Another difference which distinguished *History and Class Consciousness* from *The Young Hegel* was that each of these works drew its basic inspiration from separate texts of Hegel. Three Hegelian texts, *The Science of Logic*, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, and *The Philosophy of Right* play paramount roles in the constitution of Hegelianized Marxism. Those students who see a continuity between Hegel's logical methodology and that of Marx find *The Science of Logic* to be the text which had the most influence on Marx's methodology; those students who see the ideas of subjective praxis and social ontology as the link which binds Hegel and Marx judge *The Phenomenology of Spirit* as the crucial Hegel text; those who compare Hegel's and Marx's views on politics, the nature of civil society, and the foundations of the state, weigh *The Philosophy of Right* as Hegel's primary text. The text that pervades the pages of *History and Class Consciousness* is *The Science of Logic*, while the text that lies in the immediate background of *The Young Hegel* is *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. In 1923 Lukacs's major concern was the outlining of a Marxist methodology, and the guidance he drew from Hegel came from *The Science of Logic*, while in 1938 Lukacs's foremost intent was the fighting of

European Fascism, the roots of Fascism that lie in irrationalism and Romantic conservatism, and he drew guidance from the ideas of theory-practice and the social ontology of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*.

In addition, both *History and Class Consciousness* and *The Young Hegel* were shaped by the historical context to which they responded. The historical conditions of 1923 in which the essays of *History and Class Consciousness* were written were vastly different from the historical circumstances that confronted Lukacs in 1938 when he wrote *The Young Hegel*.

The essays collected in *History and Class Consciousness* were written between the years 1919 and 1923 and reflect the thinking of the Communist left during these years. The Third International was formed in 1919, but the revolutionary wave in central Europe came to a halt in 1923. *History and Class Consciousness* is a work of transition in which the essays of 1919 reflect the utopian hopes of world revolution of the Third International, and the later essays try to overcome the despair of the proletariat as the revolutions in Germany, Hungary, and Italy all failed. A member of the ultra-left of the Third International, Lukacs wrote *History and Class Consciousness* as an exhortation to the proletariat never to lose faith in revolutionary activity.

Simultaneously, *History and Class Consciousness* is an example of the conflation of Marxism and philosophy. The Second International devoted its intellectual energies to economics and political strategy, but with the passing of the revolutionary wave in 1923, as the possibility of proletarian revolution receded, Marxism increasingly retreated to philosophical speculation. One of the features of Western Marxism has been its imprisonment inside philosophy, its failure to innovate a new political strategy. Defeat made Marxism a monopoly of the academy.(15)

The primary intent of *History and Class Consciousness* was to claim Hegel as a precursor of both Marx and the proletarian revolution. Lukacs was aware that Hegel was a bifurcated figure, composed of conservative and revolutionary sides. The conservative side of Hegel was an outgrowth of his objective idealism, and in this appearance Hegel defended Hohenzollern autocracy. The revolutionary side of Hegel was represented by dialectical thought, and this revolutionary side made Hegel a forerunner of Marx.(16)

Working for the most part out of *The Science of Logic* Lukacs accentuated the ideas of the unity of subject-object, and human praxis became the instrument by which the object became a reflection of the subject. For Lukacs, Hegelian dialectical thought was typified by the themes of subjective consciousness and praxis. The dialectic related to the transforming powers of human agency.(17)

The fact that the object was constituted through human praxis served to emphasize the historical aspects of the dialectic. Historicity became synony-

mous with the dialectic. If human praxis perpetually modified the world, if the nature of subjectivity was constantly to transform, then the human condition was ruled by becoming.(18)

Lukacs situated the dialectic in history. The principles of subject-object, theory-practice, related to human activity in socio-economic formations. The fusion of the dialectic with history was an anti-Engelsian move, for whereas Engels associated the dialectic with nature, Lukacs associated the dialectic with social labor. Lukacs overthrew Engelsian natural philosophy with social ontology. The attack on *The Dialectics of Nature* had begun, and Lukacs was one of the first to identify the difference between Marx and Engels.

Lukacs's refutation of the alliance between dialectics and natural science passed far beyond his negation of Engels to an assault on bourgeois thought in general. One indication of his contra-bourgeois approach was Lukacs's use of the term *method* to describe Marx's analytic procedures. The Hungarian philosopher did not refer to Marxism as a logic because he sought to avoid any connection with a Kantian logic—that is, eternal logical forms that dictated the shape of thought. Following Hegel, Lukacs opposed this transcendental logic and referred to Marxism as a method, a manner of analyzing society which preserved the becoming of economic forms. Method was not rigid, did not have frozen forms, but rather method was a procedure, a protocol that assumed the historicity of the sociological object. Lukacs was aware of Hegel's discourse on method contained in the chapter on the "Absolute Idea" in *The Science of Logic*.(19)

Lukacs's attack on bourgeois thought in general is most succinctly contained in the long essay "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat" in *History and Class Consciousness*.(20) In this essay Lukacs bifurcated the world of ideas into bourgeois and proletarian camps. Only two world views were possible: the bourgeois, which was politically conservative, and the proletarian, which was revolutionary and humanist.

Section Two of "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat" is entitled "The Antinomies of Bourgeois Thought," and Lukacs located these contradictions between the bourgeois vision of nature as determinist and the bourgeois vision of society as beyond the determination of citizens.

The typical bourgeois view of nature was of matter governed by mathematical laws. The determination of nature was controlled by the laws of physics or mathematics and operated independently of the human species. The bourgeois vision of society also denied the self-determination of humanity, asserting instead that natural law controlled society and so humans could not constitute their own social environment. For example, capitalism was built on estrangement and exploitation, but the modification of the social order was immune to the intent of people. Self-constitution was not a feature of human existence.

The historical environment of *The Young Hegel* was vastly different from the historical circumstances of *History and Class Consciousness*. While the essays in *History and Class Consciousness* were speculations on the advance and retreat of the Bolshevik revolution in Central and Eastern Europe, *The Young Hegel* was fuel in the cultural fight against Hitlerism. *The Young Hegel* was completed in 1938, approximately five years after the coming of Hitler to power, and the task of the book was to co-opt Hegel and German Idealism as precursors of the German proletariat. German Idealism was not an uninterrupted march toward Fascism but rather a continuous stream which flowed into plebian democracy. Lukacs wanted to depict the proletariat as the true heir of Classical German philosophy,(21) and in this intellectual strategy Lukacs followed in the tradition of Engels.

The Young Hegel proved the obsolescence of *History and Class Consciousness*. The new materials that became available to Lukacs, Marx's *The Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts Of 1844*, Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks*, and Hegel's *The System of Ethical Life*, *Jenaer Realphilosophie I* and *II*, as well as Hegel's extended commentary on Stuart and his knowledge of Adam Smith, became sources for the supersession of *History and Class Consciousness*. The possession of these new sources demanded that Lukacs present a new vision of Hegel, and he did. They also demanded that he offer a new vision of Marx as well as a new formulation of Hegelianized Marxism, and he did.

Relying upon these new bibliographical sources, Lukacs painted a "young Hegel" who sympathized with the French Revolution. Indeed, Lukacs sketched a "young Hegel" and a mature Hegel, and while the mature Hegel ended as an Objective Idealist and a defender of the Hohenzollern crown, the "young Hegel" displayed Jacobin loyalties. It was the "young Hegel" that Lukacs presented as anticipating historical materialism and as an ancestor of the revolutionary proletariat.

Lukacs also described a "young Hegel" who admired the political life of the Greek polis. The tyranny that ancient Greece exerted over German thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has been well documented,(22) and both Hegel and Marx were two examples of this tyranny.

Hegel looked upon the Greek polis as offering the proper corrective for excessive individualism. Radical individualism, for Hegel, was a sign of cultural decay, for it disconnected the personality from the community. A major theme in *The Philosophy of Right* was a search for a mechanism to recreate the spirit of the polis in modern forms, to reestablish the primacy of the community over the individual as a means to cement social cohesiveness, or the ethical.

Although Marx did not know the early writings of Hegel, the material that became available to Lukacs, he was familiar with *The Philosophy of Right*, and it was from these pages that he surmised Hegel's approach to political

Athens, as well as from the pages of *The History of Philosophy*. *The Philosophy of Right* acquainted Marx with Hegel's critique of nineteenth century capitalist society, its bourgeois atomization. Hegel referred to the bourgeois order as "civil society," or the realm of the ethical, and described it as an egoistic and selfish struggle between individualities.

The spirit of Athens transferred to Marx via Hegel lived on in Marx's vision of communism. In Marx, communism was a means for the reemergence of the communitarian ethos of the polis. Although Marx defined community in a different form than Hegel, Marx wished to abolish private property while Hegel wished to perpetuate it, polis communitarianism was the core of Marx's definition of communism. Hegel was the nodal point through which the Athenian political ideas were transmitted to Marx.

The Young Hegel shifted the center of gravity of Hegel studies from *The Science of Logic*, *History and Class Consciousness* and *Ludwig Feuerbach and The End of Classical German Philosophy* to *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. When Lukacs engineered this shift, a new dictionary of concepts entered into the Marxist vocabulary. The Hegelianized Marxism of Lukacs was nurtured above all from the pages of *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, and when Lukacs made this step he initiated an original lexicon of Marxist grammar.

The new syntax of the Western Marxism to which Lukacs gave birth was the concept of social ontology. In the *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts Of 1844*, Marx was the first member of the Hegelian Left to focus upon the idea of labor in *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, but Marx criticized Hegel for characterizing labor as an activity emanating solely from Objective Spirit. In the *Paris Manuscripts* Marx performed an act of surgery: He detached the concept of labor from its Hegelian confinement to Objective Spirit and placed labor in a social context of productive economic praxis. Lukacs did not need to follow the same methodological trajectory as Marx, for based on Hegel's *The System of Ethical Life* and the *Jenaer Realphilosophie I and II*, and the commentary on Stewart's *Inquiry Into the Principles of Political Economy*, as well as his knowledge of the Scottish School in general, Lukacs demonstrated that the "young Hegel" had already applied the concept of labor to the economic realm. In *The Young Hegel* Lukacs proved that Hegel already fused dialectics and economics, was already embarked upon the Marxist enterprise approximately three decades before Marx began to make the same journey.

In addition to the idea of social ontology, Lukacs also borrowed the syntax of objectification, externalization, alienation, and reappropriation from *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. Lukacs borrowed the entire apparatus of Hegel's phenomenology of labor, but whereas Hegel saw the apparatus as an expression of Objective Spirit, Lukacs, rediscovering and imitating Marx, saw the apparatus as a function of economic praxis.

Lukacs presented a social ontology. Providing for common sustenance was the basis of society. Activity was the first stage of objectification, or new objects were brought into existence as a result of social labor such as windmills, or wagons, or trains. Objectification, or externalization, referred to the process by which human labor, social praxis, allied to consciousness, brought forth objects which helped sustain or improve the social existence of communities.

Depending upon the structure of the society in which humans labored, the capitalist economy, for example, the objects made by social labor could be alienated from social man. Alienation referred to the process by which an object made either individually or in a group was expropriated from its producers. It was hoped that the reappropriation of the object by the creator would take place. Reappropriation meant that alienation could be undone, or that the creator could again gain control over the use of the benefit of the object the laborer constituted. The communist revolution was seen as a titanic act of reappropriation, the replacement of a society, capitalism, that condoned alienation with a society that was predicated upon labors, just reappropriation of its own powers of constitution.

Lukacs returned to the domain of ontology but not to the existential ontology of Martin Heidegger. Existential ontology was predicated upon the discussion of Being, a metaphysical Being independent of social reality. Lukacs spoke of a social ontology, of social being, of an initial situation in which man and society were interdependent. Lukacs's phenomenology of labor assumed that man and society were coexistent or that being was a social category.

Since Being was a social product, Lukacs emphasized the notion of historicity. Activity was inherent in the human species, and so the species must constantly predicate and by predicating objects lead to the development of society. The fact that man was inherently a constitutive agency meant that society must develop as new objects were molded, and this process of ceaseless predication assumed the historicity of social being.

Wilhelm Dilthey influenced the development of Lukacs because Dilthey was one of the first to begin the separation of philosophy from natural science. In his writing on the nature of history, Dilthey drew a distinction between the natural and the social sciences. While the natural sciences deal with the static, the repetitive, history concerned the ever changing, the unique, the individual. Lukacs was influenced by this insight of Dilthey's, and just as Dilthey and the Marburg School of Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert divorced history and natural science so Lukacs connected philosophy and economics.

Lastly, the Hungarian Marxist was a representative of the Hegel revival of the early twentieth century: *History and Class Consciousness* was published in 1923, in 1927 Martin Heidegger issued *Being and Time*, in 1932 Herbert Marcuse wrote *Hegel's Ontology and the Theory of Historicity*, in 1938

Lukacs completed his first draft of *The Young Hegel*, and from 1933 to 1939 Alexandre Kojève offered seminars on Hegel at the Sorbonne. The novelty of Lukacs's Hegelianized Marxism was his flight from existential ontology as witnessed by his disagreement with Jean-Paul Sartre and his redeployment of Hegel's idea of Being into a social category and his repositioning of the dialectic as a socio-economic force which eventuated in history. Lukacs looked upon Dilthey and Heidegger as representatives of nineteenth century irrationalism, which led to Fascism, and so Lukacs's Marxism was also an antidote to irrationalism as well as an attempt to define Marxism as a fulfillment Enlightenment rationalism.

Theodor Adorno

One of the founders of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, Theodor Adorno did not participate in the Hegel Revival of the early twentieth century nor was he a Marxist partisan. He did contribute to the re-Hegelianization of Marxism, but as an opponent of both of these men his writings sought to reduce their influence on western philosophy in general. Nevertheless, Adorno's thought will be briefly outlined here, not to juxtapose him against Lukacs but rather as an introduction to post-Marxist radicalism. Adorno espoused a form of critique devoid of any input from either Hegel or Marx, and a study of his thought will act as the scaffolding upon which a western radicalism was constructed once the totalitarianism of Stalinist Russia became apparent. The social critique of Adorno is an interesting illustration of the form radicalism assumes when it is simultaneously de-Hegelianized and de-Marxized.

Adorno's position in history helps explain why he sought to reconstruct a critical theory of society from non-Hegelian and non-Marxist presuppositions. Born in 1903, he witnessed both the rise and collapse of Hitlerian Fascism, and the rise and debasement of Marxism in Russia under Stalin. Adorno observed the politicization of historical utopias, either in the form of racial superiority or in the form of dictatorial egalitarianism.

Lukacs wrote *History and Class Consciousness* after the revolution of 1917 in St. Petersburg and in the aftermath of a heroic but failed attempt to extend Bolshevism to Central Europe. He wrote *The Young Hegel* as the Second World War loomed in order to claim the German humanist tradition for the revolutionary proletariat in order to show that the progressive forces in the world were represented by Jacobin-Leninist democracy. Adorno published *Negative Dialectic* in 1966 with Auschwitz as a ghost and from the vantage point of Politburo authoritarianism in Moscow. Lukacs wrote his books from the perspective of hope, from the belief that the proletarian revolution was the promise of the future. Adorno wrote his work from a perspective of historical

failure, from the belief that all historical grand narratives end in disaster. Adorno looked at the world through the window of aesthetic pessimism.

Adorno recognized the connection between Hegel and Marx but interpreted this continuity as the decay of western philosophy. The corruption of philosophy in the western world since the Enlightenment was endemic, and Hegel and Marx shared common features because they were symptomatic of this corruption.

The infection neither Hegel nor Marx could escape was the rise of instrumental reason. In the attempt to cleanse the world of myth and superstition, the eighteenth century Enlightenment gave rise to the ontology of reason. *The Dialectic of the Enlightenment*, written by Adorno and Max Horkheimer, narrated the history of reason from its first shape as ontology as the belief in the rationality of the universe to its polluted form as instrumental reason, or reason as a tool of domination, as a technology of totalitarian control over nature and man.(23)

Negative Dialectic(24) is an anti-Hegelian diatribe, a historiography of reason since the Enlightenment in an attempt to locate the origins of the corruption of reason, and it presents Hegel as the arch proponent of this decay. Hegel's major flaw was his commitment to the ontology of reason. Whereas Western Christendom placed God as the spirit of the universe, the Enlightenment and Hegel judged reason as the spiritual substance of existence.(25)

The rational ontology of Hegel assumed a philosophy of identity. Since reason was the spiritual substance of existence then subject-object, universal-particular, essence-appearance, and theory-practice were ultimately manifestations of this primary substance. These four pairs were never separate, never distinct, but rather the particularities of one substance. The objective Idealism of Hegel assumed that all opposition in the final analysis ended in unity.(26)

Adorno's farewell to Hegel was also encouraged by the systematic nature of Hegelian thought. All of Hegel's books offer an analysis of particular parts of his universal system, or each of the particular parts function and develop in strict accordance with the general principles of spirit. *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*(27) is composed of three parts: *The Logic*, *The Philosophy of Nature*, and *The Philosophy of Mind*, and each of these three divisions evolves in perfect duplication of the universal procedures of reason; or logic, nature and man mirror in particular sections the encompassing evolution of reason.(28)

Hegel's idealistic ontology of reason was also the rationale for the emergence of reason as an instrument of domination. Since reason was the source of the philosophy of identity, since it was the substance upon which unity was created, reason controlled existence.

Negative Dialectic was written as a contradiction of Hegel, because Adorno saw Hegel as a precursor for the malignancy afflicting reason in the twentieth century as historicized in the *Dialectic of the Enlightenment*. Ac-

cording to Adorno, when Hegel turned reason into a form of domination he prepared the way for Fascism, either in its racist form under Hitler or in its proletarian form under Stalin.(29)

The twentieth century witnessed the appearance of instrumental reason, and by this phrase Adorno meant the domination of reason, not over nature but over man. Instrumental reason was a phrase which presented reason as the tool of capitalism or technology, or politics, which turned man into a slave. Instrumental reason showed reason not as emancipatory but as enslaving, a device at the service of politics or technology, which rendered man an automaton. Whereas Hegel portrayed reason as a preparation for Freedom, the twentieth century overturned this German Idealist formulation and demonstrated how reason could be transformed into the inventor of gas chambers.(30)

According to Hegel, history was another domain in which the "phenomenology of spirit" manifested itself.(31) The last chapter of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* was entitled "Absolute Knowledge," and narrates reason's conquest of self-consciousness, which Hegel referred to as spirit and which was the realm of Freedom.(32) The systematic nature of the Hegelian ontology of reason meant that Hegel subscribed to a grand narrative, the view that the domination of reason led to the perpetual improvement of the human condition.

Dialectic of the Enlightenment and *Negative Dialectic* are nullifications of Hegel's utopian visions of history. These two books by Adorno are condemnations of all attempts to conjure a philosophical history because such system building fertilized the onset of authoritarianism in Germany and the Soviet Union. Totalizations are the seedbeds of totalitarianisms.

Negative Dialectic, in particular, was Adorno's demolition of the Hegelian form of the dialectic.(33) The intent of dialectical thought within a philosophy of identity was to create unity out of contradiction, synthesis from plurality. Hegel identified several pairs of opposites: subject-object, universal-particular, essence-appearance, whole-parts, theory-practice, and argued that within his dialectical system identity replaced contradiction. At the end of the Hegelian dialectical process a synthesis always replaced contradiction.

Negative Dialectic is intended as a substitution of the Hegelian dialectic. Adorno planned this book to be a transcendence of Hegel. Rather than a philosophy of reconciliation Adorno argued for a "negative dialectic," or a dialectic that did not end in identity but in particularity and difference. Rather than the reconciliation of opposites, "negative dialectic" assumed the antonymic, the fact that particularity would always escape the systematic and the synthetic. "Negative dialectic" meant that existence was characterized by dissonance, the aporia, and the heterogeneous, or the existence of dissonance and heterogeneity were the best defenses against historical grand narratives and Fascism of all varieties.(34)

The manner in which Lukacs and Adorno related to Hegel's epistemology of reconciliation illustrates their different approaches to both Hegel and Marx. Lukacs appropriated Hegel's epistemology of reconciliation and turned it into a new methodology of Marxist analysis. Adorno disavowed and shunned any attempt to formulate a new Marxist methodology; Adorno did create a new methodology of the "negative dialectic," but this methodology was the complete annulment of Marxism.

Continuing the Hegelian philosophy of identity, Lukacs did not abandon the Hegelian dialectic but sought to transform it on the basis of a social ontology. Lukacs appropriated the Hegelian opposites, subject-object, universal-particular, essence-appearance, whole-parts, theory-practice and demonstrated that social labor could act as the ground upon which they could be reconciled. Whereas Hegel looked upon subjective consciousness as the medium by which unity would overcome disparity, Lukacs judged social labor as the medium for substituting identity for contradiction. For both Hegel and Lukacs the world was an objectification of either reason or labor, or the world was fashioned in the image of man.

The new methodology Lukacs created arose when he transferred the dialectic from Hegelian consciousness to social labor. Lukacs carried out a materialist cooption of the Hegelian dialectic because he showed how this Idealist dialectic could be transformed into a method to understand socioeconomic formations.

Discontinuing the Hegelian dialectic, Adorno did not appropriate the Hegelian theory of reconciliation; rather he exploded the Hegelian philosophy of identity and replaced it with a metaphysics of irreconcilability. Hegel and Lukacs argued that unity was the final result of opposition, but Adorno counterposed that the true dialectical method resulted in disjuncture and heterogeneity.

The method of Adorno, or the "negative dialectic," was the process of the disjointed. The book *Negative Dialectic* offered a new method of social analysis based on the assumption that subject-object, universal-particular, theory-practice, whole-parts, essence-appearance always remained discontinuous and that fragmentation was the only way to perceive reality.

The theme of heterogeneity is the central idea behind Adorno's book *Hegel: Three Studies*. While Adorno embraces the Hegelian idea of totality, he does so in an entirely unHegelian fashion. In *Hegel: Three Studies*, Adorno wrote:

But he neither derived a metaphysics from the abstract principle of totality nor glorified the whole as such in the name of the "good Gestalt." He does not make the parts, as the elements of the whole, autonomous in opposition to it; at the same time, as a critic of romanticism, he knows that the whole realizes itself

only in and through the parts, only through discontinuity, alienation, and reflection . . . through, in short, everything that is anathema to Gestalt theory. If Hegel's whole exists at all it is only as the quintessence of the partial moments, which always point beyond themselves and are generated from one another.(35)

Adorno rewrites Hegel. Even though temporary, totalities exist in Hegel. Even though momentary, the union of subject and object did occur in Hegel, and it was out of the conjuncture of subject and object that a totality emerged. Although he employs the word totality, Adorno uses it in a completely un-Hegelian manner. Totality, for Adorno, was distinguished by its dissonance, by its antonymic quality. A social or philosophical Gestalt became, but it was distinguished not by its unity but by its heterogeneity.

Likewise, Adorno accepted the concept of the dialectic, but defined it in a thoroughly unHegelian manner. In *Hegel: Three Studies*, Adorno stated:

Only through the process whereby the contradiction becomes absolute, and not through the contradiction becoming alleviated in the absolute, could it disintegrate and perhaps find its way to that reconciliation that must have misled Hegel because its real possibility was still concealed from him. In all its particular moments Hegel's philosophy is extended to be negation, but if, contrary to his intentions, it becomes negative as a whole as well, it thereby acknowledges the negativity of its object.(36)

In Hegel the dialectic does achieve a momentary synthesis, and individuality is a point of reconciliation. In Hegel's dialectic the universal is confronted by the particular, but this antagonistic moment is subsumed into the unity of the individual. Adorno abandons the Hegelian model, and instead of synthesis he proposes the nonidentical. Dialectic, for Adorno, is always negative; it is always discordant.

Adorno's intervention into Hegelian thought resulted in an un-Hegelian product. Although he was cognizant of the genius of Hegel, his intent was to dismantle the Hegelian system. He turned the weapon of negative critique against Hegel so the final outcome of Adorno's Hegelianism was an anti-Hegelianism.

Historiographically, Adorno rebelled against the Hegelian thesis of the progressive development of history; that history was the march of freedom. A witness to Nazism and Stalinism, Adorno maintained that these catastrophes sounded the death knell of all historical utopianism. Adorno believed that historical utopianism was the link that joined Marx and Hegel, and he therefore re-Hegelianized Marxism, but because Adorno denied any form of historical eschatology, he also refuted not only Hegel but also Marxism. Adorno's re-Hegelianization of Marxism was meant to disprove Marxism.

Adorno's attack on Hegelianism was the voice of the incomprehensibility of the Holocaust and the Gulag. Auschwitz and the Purge Trials proved the irreconcilability of the particularities of twentieth century history and the utopian visions of the Enlightenment grand narrative. Adorno embraced Nietzsche and not Condorcet.

When Adorno re-Hegelianized Marxism he did so with the purpose of showing that since Hegel was wrong then Marxism was also erroneous. Since Marxism was the child of Hegelianism, then the infirmities of the father were inherited by his offspring.

Marxism carried on the same teleological view of history as Hegelianism. The Enlightenment gave rise to grand narratives, and in Hegel the historical telos led to the realization of Freedom, while in Marx it ended in the establishment of communitarian solidarity. Indeed, in *Negative Dialectic*, Adorno demonstrated his complete misunderstanding of Marx by referring to him as a "social Darwinist." (37)

But Adorno also opposed Marxism in itself. He denounced the systematic *sui generis*. This meant that he not only criticized all attempts to uncover the final goal of history but all collective units such as group, party, workers' unions. Adorno was an apologist for the individual, the particular, the non-systematic, and he took sides with Nietzsche against the increasing collectivism of the age. Adorno saw the greatest threat to mankind in the forces of conformity and understood the strongest defense against mind-deadening conformity to lie in the unique, the fragmentary, the refusal of synthesis. Adorno denounced the concept of essence.

Looking upon conformity as the major threat to contemporary humankind led Adorno to devalue the political. Groups of all kinds were anathema to him, were expressions of the systematic, and consequently Adorno was skeptical of all forms of political or working-class solidarity. Obedience to a political party and commitment to a proletarian organization were not means to the overthrow of capitalism but rather examples of the loss of individuality and the descent into automatization. Whereas Marx looked upon politics both as the articulation of democratic will, and as a lever for the overthrow of capitalism, Adorno saw politics as another example of mass control, as a tool which buttressed an expanding totalitarianism. Politics was emancipatory for Marx, but for Adorno it was another form of mass enslavement.

Adorno's attitude toward politics reflected the defeatism of a member of the German intellectual elite when the German political establishment proved impotent to halt the rise of Nazism, and he was an outspoken critic of the Marxism of the German Social Democrats. In his *Minima Moralia*, a personal memoir, Adorno wrote:

The decay of the workers movement is corroborated by the official optimism of its adherents. . . . Yet the further the rational expectations diminishes that society's doom can really be averted, the more reverently they respect the old prayers: masses, solidarity, Party, class struggle. While not a single idea in the critique of political economy is firmly believed any longer by the adherents of the left wing platform; while their newspapers daily and witlessly trumpet forth theses that outdo all revisionism yet signify nothing, and can be replaced at will tomorrow by the opposite, the ears of the faithful party-liners show a musicians sensitivity to the faintest disrespect for slogans that have jettisoned theory.(38)

Not only did Adorno criticize the leadership of German Social Democracy but also the German working class itself. The laboring classes in Germany suffered the same fate as all members of advanced technocratic capitalist society; it was caught in the malaise of conformity, standardization, and passivity in the face of a rationalized bureaucracy. According to Adorno, Germany in the 1930s proved that the proletariat as a revolutionary cadre had disappeared. *Minima Moralia* contains the following observations:

Why despite a historical development that has reached the point of oligarchy, the workers are less and less aware that they are such, can be surmised from a number of observations. While objectively the relation of owners and producers to the productive apparatus grows ever more rigid, subjective class membership becomes all the more fluctuating.

Sociologists, however, ponder the grimly comic riddle: where is the proletariat?(39)

Adorno's disillusionment with Marxism did not mean an acceptance of capitalism, and he can be described as both anti-Marxist and anti-capitalist. His attacks on the capitalist system are best understood as deriving essentially from Max Weber and Friedrich Nietzsche. Although he accepted the fundamental principle of Marxist political economy that the labor of the working class was expropriated by capitalism, he drew most of his anti-capitalist sentiments from the Weberian idea of the increasing bureaucratization of society and from the Nietzschean principle that bourgeois society crushed individuality.

Adorno's assaults on bourgeois society did not spring from party strategic or political economic concerns, but rather his attacks were directed at bourgeois philosophy and culture. He symbolized the decline of political Marxism, of the flight of radicalism from politics and economics, and the evolution of post-modern anti-capitalism.

In "The Culture Industry Reconsidered,"(40) and "Culture and Administration,"(41) Adorno detailed the relationship between the domination by the bourgeoisie of the productive agencies of contemporary culture and the content of this popular culture. Mass culture hypostasized bourgeois forms of

life, provided no alternatives to the mode of bourgeois existence. Mass culture produced mimetic behavior in the populace; since mass man was convinced of the hypostatic nature of the bourgeois style of life they saw no option but to imitate that lifestyle. The intent of mass culture was to induce conformity, standardization, passivity, and imitative behavior. The bureaucratic control of the bourgeoisie redefined the nature of culture. Whereas in the eighteenth century culture meant the presentation of alternative lifestyles, in the post-modern era culture was merely a disguise for the imposition of consent carried out by the authoritarian administration of the bourgeoisie.

Two terms, however, that Adorno borrowed from the Marxist lexicon were “reification” and “ideology,” and these frequently appear in his writing. Adorno looked upon bourgeois cultural production as a form of propaganda, as a disinformation campaign to convince the masses that capitalist modes of existence were eternal. Adorno’s agreement with Marx in the condemnation of capitalism, the syntax of reification and ideology, does not obscure the fact that on fundamental issues Adorno sought the deconstruction of Marxism. Not only did Adorno expect that his “negative dialectic” would lead to the decomposition of Marxism but his definition of critique came from different sources and had other purposes than Marx’s usage of critique.

Marx’s anti-capitalism was rooted in a deep sociological analysis of class structure and the determining role of social labor. The essence of society came from social labor, and Marx’s diagnosis of capitalism intended to show how this social labor was expropriated from the producers themselves. In order to make clear the mechanisms of this alienation, Marx conducted a sophisticated diagnosis of the class nature of society.

Adorno’s anti-capitalism was philosophical and cultural. Although Adorno was aware of the expropriation of labor, the master-slave relation between owner and worker, the ultimate cause of the diseases of capitalism was not class structure but the genealogy of reason.

Critique in Marx was based on the contradiction of essence and appearance. The essence of a social formation was social labor, but the appearance of a social formation was inequality based on the expropriation of this social labor. For critique to fulfill its mission the appearance of a society must be made commensurate with its essence, or the structure of society must mirror the equality of social labor.

Following upon his definition of “negative dialectic,” Adorno looked upon critique not as a social but as a philosophical enterprise. Adorno did not believe in the unity of essence and appearance but rather in their disparity. Critique fulfilled its purpose when it exploded the systematic, the ontology of instrumental reason, and in the place of totality left the eternal contradiction between the individual and the universal.

Marxism was a theory of emancipation, it was filled with the utopianism of the French Revolution that citizens could be liberated from the causes of their oppression. Adorno did not believe in emancipation but in dissonance. He believed that the best way to protect individuality against the threat of the authoritarianism of mass culture was to uphold dissonance, the asymmetrical, and the nonsimultaneous.

Adorno is an example of post-modern radicalism. Whereas Marx looked upon the expropriation of social labor as the source of human enslavement, post-modern radicalism saw the culture of consumerism as the enemy of individuality and self-fulfillment. Whereas Marx saw critique assuming the form of political revolution, the *11th Thesis on Feuerbach* as defining critique as political praxis, post-modern radicalism defines critique as the survival of the private against the bureaucratic, and denies that political activity is the most efficacious way to change reality but rather the cultural antonymic is the contemporary means for social renovation.

LOUIS ALTHUSSER–ALFRED SCHMIDT

Louis Althusser

The intellectual strategy of disconnecting Hegel and Marx found its major advocate in Louis Althusser and the school of French Marxist Structuralism. In order to understand Althusser's approach to Marxism in general, it is necessary to place him in his historical context.

The Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party was a transforming event in his life. Nikita Khrushchev's "Crimes Of Stalin" speech publicly acknowledged what many independent communists such as Lukacs recognized for a long time, that Stalinism was the debasement of Marxism. One challenge that Althusser faced, the challenge of the Right, was to advance the de-Stalinization process by creating a non-Stalinist form of Marxism.

Politics was primary to Althusser, and he decided to remain within the French Communist Party in the post-1956 world. In this regard, Althusser followed the same path as Lukacs, a communist dissident who chose to remain in the movement, as opposed to Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty who made early post-World War II exits from the French party. From the political aspect, Althusser defined himself as a partisan, while from the intellectual aspect he saw the need to totally reconstruct the theoretical apparatus of that party. A contradiction existed in Althusser's relation to the French Communist movement, for he was disloyal to its theoretical superstructure, staunchly advocating the need to de-Stalinize it and yet simultaneously maintained his loyalty to the party as an institution and as a cadre.

In addition to his Stalinist enemies on the Right, Althusser did battle with enemies on the Left, i.e., Existentialism and Hegelianism. Specifically, he opposed the subjectivism, humanism, and historicism that formed the core of these schools of philosophy.

Subjectivity was the axis of Existential philosophy. The Existential Marxism of Sartre was anathema to Althusser because in it the “I” emerged as a sovereign, and to Althusser this meant destroying the idea of class in Marxism. Just as Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche employed the idea of individuality as a weapon against Hegel’s concept of totality, so the notion of the supremacy of the individual destroyed the notion of proletarian solidarity in Marxism, and for Althusser this entailed the simultaneous eradication of all revolutionary strategy.

Althusser also found the humanism of the *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* a danger to Leninist revolutionary Marxism. Left Marxism was heavily influenced by the humanism of the *Paris Manuscripts*, and Althusser hoped to expunge the influence of these 1844 notebooks from the contemporary extrapolation of Marxism.

The humanism of Marx evolved out of a belief in a species being, of an anthropological universalism. Humanist Marxism carried on the tradition of Hegelian Idealism, for it used the language of human essence. Althusser was an enemy of the grammar of essence because it violated the idea that man was ultimately shaped by his environment, by the social totality in which he lived. The contradiction between essence and social conditioning was a primary reason that Althusser gave rise to the idea of an “epistemological break” between mature Marxism and the youthful Marx of the *1844 Manuscripts*. The *Paris Manuscripts* were Feuerbachian and Hegelian, they were indebted to the language of species being, and they contradicted the historical materialism of the mature Marx. The strategy of the “epistemological break” was intended to sever the Hegelian-Feuerbachian Marx from the historical materialism of the post-*German Ideology* Marx. The 1845 *German Ideology* was the temporal moment of the “epistemological break.”

Left Marxism was also marred by historicism, or the Hegelian idea of historical teleology. Like Theodor Adorno, Althusser disavowed that history was guided by any grand narratives. The driving force in history was not eschatology but class struggle.

The politics of Althusserian theory called for the negation of both the Right and the Left and the construction of a Marxism in the tradition of Lenin. Althusser abandoned Stalin and the ideas of subjectivism, humanism and historicism and sought to perpetuate a philosophy that continued the Leninist heritage, which meant providing the proletariat with a theory that helped the struggles of the exploited classes. Philosophy was to become an instrument of

Leninist politics, and Althusser pointed to Mao Tse-Tung, the French student rising of 1968, the Ho Chi Minh victory in Viet Nam as indications that revolutionary classes still existed in society. Althusser believed that the history of Marxism was characterized by an alliance between the proletariat and the intelligentsia, and that the substance of this union was formed when the intelligentsia provided the working class with a theory of the uprising.

Althusser's project of reconstructing Marxism on Leninist principles as defined by Althusser was abetted by a philosophic development which spanned his lifetime, the rise of linguistic and anthropological structuralism in the work of Ferdinand de Saussure and Claude Levi-Strauss. These two social theorists applied the notion of structures to the study of language and anthropology, and explanation in de Saussure and Levi-Strauss was conducted by understanding a particularity as an expression of a totality.

Althusser's conversion to structuralism was eased by his reading of Benedict Spinoza and his defense of functionalist explanation. Spinoza invented the phrase *structural causality*, and Spinoza was a major influence on Althusser.(42) In order to defend the idea of structural causality it was necessary for Althusser to also justify the idea of functionalism. A totality assigned a specific role to a particularity, and the totality could exist only as long as the particularity performed its function.

In order to achieve a new Marxist-Leninist synthesis, Althusser needed to sever the Hegel-Marx connection. The phrase "epistemological break" became a slogan for the belief that in the *German Ideology* Marx bid farewell to Hegel, and this is a contention against which this book and the entire series is dedicated to refuting. Althusser's flight from Hegel led him to impose a form of explanation on Marxism, which was antithetical to the method of Marx and led Althusser to fashion a Spinozist Marxism that violated all textual evidence and factuality. The method that Althusser ascribed to Marx was contradicted by the texts of Marx, by a proper reading of *Das Kapital*.

The announcement of the "epistemological break" was made in 1965, the year in which Althusser published two of his most significant works, *Reading Capital*.(43) and *For Marx*.(44) Both *Reading Capital* and *For Marx* were works of combat, counterattacks to the Existential Marxism launched in 1960 with the publication of two books by Sartre, *A Critique of Dialectical Reason*.(45) and *Search for a Method*.(46) Indeed, as early as 1947, Althusser already saw the danger looming for a Leninist Marxism by the twin assaults of Existentialism and the Hegel revival, and in a short essay, "Man, That Night," published in 1947, he attacked the Hegelianism of Alexandre Kojève,(47) while in a 1950 essay, "The Return to Hegel," he briefly synopsized the Hegel Revival in France.(48) French twentieth century Hegelianism is the background against which Althusser's *For Marx* and *Reading Capital* must be understood.

In "The Return to Hegel," Althusser summarized the resurrection of French Hegelianism in the following paragraph:

The affair began in the France of the 1930s, timidly, with Jean Wahl's dissertation on *Le Malheur De La Conscience*, Alain's discussion of Hegel in *Idees* (1931), and the special issue of the *Revue De Metaphysique* (1931), with articles by Hartmann and Croce. It found its continuation in Kojève's course at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes (1933–39), attended by a group that semi-silent in those days has become rather voluble since (Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Raymond Aron, Father Fessard, Brice Parain, Caillos, etc.). Kojève spoke of Hegel's religious philosophy, the phenomenology of spirit, master and slave, the struggle for prestige, the thing-in-itself, the for-itself, nothingness, projects, the human essence as revealed in the struggle unto death and in the transformation of error into truth. Strange theses for a world beleaguered by fascism! Then came the war years, during which Hyppolite brought out his translations (*The Phenomenology Of Spirit* in 1939 and 1941; *Introduction To The Philosophy Of Right* in 1940) and the post-war period, which saw the appearance of Hyppolite's 1946 dissertation, *Genesis And Structure Of Hegel's Phenomenology Of Spirit* (1947). . . . The consecration followed: Hyppolite instated at the Sorbonne; Hegel recognized, via his commentator, as one of the masters of bourgeois thought; commentaries in the windows of all the book shops; the "labor of the negative" in every term paper; master and slave in every academic talk; the struggle of one consciousness against another in Jean Lacroix; our theologians discoursing on the "lesser Logic"; and all the to-do connected with the academic and religious jubilation over a reviving corpse.(49)

Althusser attempted to build a demarcation separating this tidal wave of Hegelianism from Marxism, and as he took this defense upon himself, he prepared by writing a master's thesis on Hegel. Titling it "On Content in the Thought of G.W.F. Hegel" and writing in 1947,(50) Althusser decided that if he were to slay the dragon of Hegelianism it was best to know one's enemy, to arm oneself for this intellectual battle.

The dissertation is a prelude to *Reading Capital* and *For Marx*; it is a preparation for the mature structuralism of his middle period.

The dissertation contains the following statement:

It is concrete historical totality. We owe this conception of history as the basic element and signifying totality to Hegel. It is likewise owing to him that we are able to identify the rational nature of this totality with the nature of human totality. But this is a truth touched on in passing and buried in the *Phenomenology*; Hegel himself failed to draw its major inference to say that the historical human totality is the totality to which all else must be referred, and the a priori condition of all human activity, is a truth as abstract and empty as the domination of the transcendental would be in Kant, in the absence of the table of cat-

egories. In the fundamental structure of human totality, Marx gives us the table of human categories that govern our time. *Capital* is our transcendental analytic. Such would seem to be the significance of Marx's work: the discovery and appropriation of the human categories in the socio-economic structure of our day.(51)

Although Althusser was initially influenced by the Hegelian idea of totality, he discarded this idea by the time he wrote *Reading Capital*, and *For Marx*. In these works of his middle period, Spinoza replaced Hegel. Rather than speak of a totality propelled forward by an essence, Althusser in 1965 spoke of "structural causality" in Spinozist language. The Spinozist definition of "structural causality" referred to a dominant architecture which "overdetermined" its local sites in which particularities were functions of the whole. Althusser's dedication to Spinoza is captured in the following words written in *Reading Capital*: "For another example, Spinoza's philosophy introduced an unprecedented theoretical revolution in the history of philosophy, probably the greatest philosophical revolution of all time, insofar as we can regard Spinoza as Marx's only direct ancestor, from the philosophical standpoint."(52)

Althusser also renounced the idea of essence, which had a double articulation for him. In one meaning essence referred to the "species being" of Feuerbach, or qualities that were universal to all humanity, and Althusser rejected this Feuerbachian usage of essence. In the second meaning, essence referred to necessary development, and this was the Hegelian usage. Influenced by Aristotle, who defined essence as telos, Hegel applied essence to totality and argued that totalities were propelled forward by their essence, by an immanent force. Althusser abandoned Hegel's definition of a totality as caused by an essence and redefined totality as structure, as an amalgam of interactive regions of production.

Althusser also surrendered the Hegelian notion of historicity, by which he meant that history was a teleological process. In his *Philosophy of History*, Hegel defined human history as a march toward Freedom, but Althusser rejected these eschatological expectations. For Althusser, grand historical narratives did not exist, and the linear concept of history was erroneous in itself. Later paragraphs in this section will describe how Althusser reformulated the concept of history.

In addition to negating the Hegelian ideas of totality, essence, and historicity, in his 1947 dissertation Althusser also disowned the Hegelian concept of subjectivity. For Hegel, substance, or Spirit, became the subject, or the individual was a product of the Spirit. In this regard, Althusser was true to Marx, who found that Hegel inverted the notion of predication. Marx believed that in Hegel the source of predication was the Spirit, and that the individual was only

the outcome of Spirit's activity. Marx revised this equation, argued that the individual or concrete was the ground of predication, and substituted materialism for Idealism. Althusser went further and denied that the individual had any predicative powers or causal potential, rather assigning causal potency solely to the structure, and repeated Spinoza's claim of "structural causality."

In the works of his maturity, Althusser elaborated and refined the ideas found in his dissertation. Fortified by structural linguistics and anthropology, Althusser looked upon modes of production as holistic. "They present themselves as totalities whose unity is constituted by a certain specific type of complexity, which introduces instances that, following Engels, we can very schematically reduce to three: the economy, politics, and ideology." (53)

Within these global structures, individuals are merely conceived of as sites. Individuals thus perform functions that are needed to sustain regional subordinate structures, and this is what Althusser meant by the phrase "overdetermination." By eliminating the constitutive potency of the individual, Althusser displays his anti-humanism, thus ridding Marxism of any interest in subjectivity, essence, alienation, estrangement, all of which he considered aspects of bourgeois ideology.

Althusser defended functional explanations, and a synonym he used for functional explanations was "expressivist." (54) (Althusser's use of the term "expressivist" must be distinguished from Charles Taylor's use of the same term found in his book on Hegel; for Taylor's use see chapter 3 of the present volume.) By the term "expressivist" Althusser meant that within a total structure each individuality was an "expression," a local representation of the whole. In Althusser, functional explanation clarified the particularizing process of a holistic unit. Functionalism for Althusser was synonymous with "overdetermination," or the process by which singularities were determined by a "global structure."

Marx's theory of global structures amounted to an "epistemological break," a phrase that Althusser borrowed from Gaston Bachelard, which meant a sudden rupture in a scientific worldview. Bachelard's phrase was initially coined within the context of the history of science and was synonymous with Thomas Kuhn's "paradigm shift," referring to a radical departure from a given scientific tradition and the inception of a new scientific *Weltanschauung*. Althusser used the phrase "epistemological break" in two senses: to account for the disjuncture between Hegel and Marx and to account for the fact that Marx was the beginning of a revolutionary scientific paradigm, the discovery of the "continent of history."

Althusser was not only a Marxist but a philosopher who specialized in the theory of science. The key to understanding his structural Marxism is to first grasp his theory of science, and in this regard Althusser acknowledged his in-

debtedness to Bachelard, Jean Cavaillès, Michel Foucault, Georges Canguilhem and Jacques Lacan.(55) All these men indulged in a “reading,” and so the title of the book *Reading Capital*. The term “reading” meant that a theory, a rational construct, was always applied to an object, or that an object was a product of a “reading” or an intervention.

Three books define Althusser’s mature period, and it was from the mid-1960s until the mid-1970s that Althusser made his most significant contributions to Marxist theory. The three books are: *Reading Capital*, *For Marx*, and *Essays in Self-Criticism*.

Althusser commences his reconstruction of Marxism from the perspective of the theory of science. By reconstructing the theory of science Althusser prepared the way for the reinterpretation of Marxism, and so Kuhn and Bachelard set the stage for Althusser’s innovations.

In *Reading Capital* Althusser categorizes science, or knowledge, as an intervention.(56) An investigator intervenes in a contemporary knowledge structure and offers a unique configuration of a data field. The word intervention means to break with a previous school of thought and impose a new theory on a data field. Scientific theories are interventions; they are products of a new formulation of a data matrix.

All knowledge is contemporary.(57) Since a knowledge is a result of an intervention, then a knowledge will always reflect its contemporary moment. Every intervention is motivated by a contemporary need and viewpoint, and so the knowledge an intervention produces will itself be contemporaneous.

Althusser’s theory of science is fashioned according to a productivist model. Knowledge, or theory, must be produced. The initial stage of a new theory is the intervention of an interrogator, but the interrogation brings with it information from the various scientific disciplines such as economics, history, political science, physics, etc. Informed by these various knowledge reservoirs, imposing a “break” on a contemporaneous data field, the interrogator uses these knowledge reservoirs as raw materials and out of them will produce a new hypothesis of reality. An interrogator will always possess raw material upon which to work; these raw materials are previous theories, and out of these past theories the interrogator will indulge in a productive process of a “paradigm shift.”

In *Reading Capital*, Althusser stated that “science” was the “theory of the history of theoretical practice.”(58) He meant that since all knowledge formations were products of a contemporary theory, knowledge itself was the succession of theoretical interventions. Althusser believed that historicity was fundamental to knowledge, but he used the concept of historicity in a non-Hegelian sense. Historicity, for Hegel, meant that history displays a telos, an immanent movement to Freedom, but for Althusser, historicity did not display a goal, an inevitable end, but merely the succession of theoretical paradigms.

Das Kapital was the epistemology of the contemporary period, or the contemporaneity of the “epistemological break” rested on employing the paradigm of *Das Kapital* as the interpretive hypothesis of the present intervention. Marx’s labor theory, his unveiling of class structure and class warfare, formed the indispensable material out of which contemporary theory needed to be produced. The productivist theory of *Das Kapital* provided the presupposition for the productivist theory of knowledge.

Based upon this new theory of science, Althusser was emboldened in his attacks on Hegelianism, and Althusser’s categorization of the theory of science was completely anti-Hegelian because it dispensed with the idea of Spirit, or the totally self-conscious subject. Hegelianism, Existentialism, and Feuerbachian humanism all presupposed an active subject, in the form of a universal Spirit (Hegel), or in the form of an isolated self (Existentialism), or in the form of an anthropological essence (Feuerbach). In his intellectual combat against these heretical philosophies, Althusser needed to abolish the subject.

Althusser’s theory of science must eliminate the subject as a constitutive agent. His theory of science demonstrated that the production of new paradigms proceeded without a subject that predicted. The search for a theory of development without a subject led Althusser to expound a new view of causality. Althusser required a device by which to explain how societal development occurred minus a predicative subject.

In his *Essays in Self-Criticism*, Althusser stated the intent of his own intervention:

Marxist philosophy must break with the idealist category of the “Subject” as Origin, Essence and Cause, responsible in its internality for all the determinations of the external “Object,” of which it is said to be the internal “Subject.” For Marxist philosophy there can be no Subject as an Absolute Centre as a Radical Origin, as a Unique Cause.(59)

If it could be reduced to an Origin, an Essence, or a Cause (even Man), which would be its subject . . . a subject, a “being,” or an “essence,” held to be identifiable, that is to say existing in the form of the unity of an internality, and (theoretically and practically responsible identity, internally and responsibility are constitutive among other things, of any subject), thus accountable, thus capable of accounting for the whole “phenomena of history.”(60)

Althusser’s quest for a theory of subjectless causality led him to Spinoza. Althusser’s desire to free himself from Hegelian Idealism, to discover a causality-without-a-subject, found its consummation in Spinoza.

In order to account at one and the same time for Classical Political Economy’s “mistakes” for the Relations of Production, and even for fetishism (but I did not

do so: the theory of fetishism always seemed to me ideological) . . . and to herald, by the term structural causality (cf. Spinoza), something which is in fact an “immense theoretical discovery of Marx but which can also, in the Marxist tradition, be termed dialectical materialist causality.”(61)

I defined “knowledge” as “production,” and affirmed the interiority of the forms of scientificity to “theoretical practice,” I based myself on Spinoza: not in order to provide THE answer but to counter the dominant idealism and, via Spinoza, to open a road where materialism might, if it runs the risk, find something other than words.(62)

Althusser substituted the term “overdetermination” for the Spinozist phrase “structural causality.” Overdetermination was the theory that a social structure determined the activities of its subjects, or structures possessed causal priority, and antecedence. According to Althusser, social structures were composed of a plurality of local sites, each local site replicated the universal social structure, and the confluence of universal and local structures was the origin of causality. Overdetermination was based on the theory that history, or development, derived from myriad structural sites in a social totality. In order to explain the development of a social totality it was only necessary to refer to the internal organization of a social entity, or structures produced causes.

The theory of overdetermination signaled Althusser’s Spinozist displacement of Hegel. Althusser reconstituted historical materialism on Spinozist principles. Spinoza allowed Althusser to overcome the Hegelian problem. Rather than speak in terms of Marx’s indebtedness to Hegel it was now accurate to stipulate Marx’s indebtedness to Spinoza. A Spinozist Marxism replaced a Hegelian Marxism.

Althusser continued to employ the terms “historical materialism” and “dialectical materialism,” but he did not use them in an Engelsian or Stalinist sense. Althusser continued to use nineteenth-century Marxist terminology but redeployed these phrases from a Spinozist perspective.

By the phrase historical materialism Althusser meant Marx’s theory of the evolution of economic systems, but the explanation of historical change took place in Spinozist terms. The movement of economic systems was accounted for by the logic of structural causality, or Spinozist Marxism was the explanatory methodology of historical materialism.

By the phrase dialectical materialism Althusser referred to the epistemological dimensions of Marxism, or the Marxist account of how knowledge was produced. On this score he broke completely with Stalinism, or *Diamat*. The epistemological ideology of the Soviet Union, based on Engels’s *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, abided by the “copy theory” of truth. According to Engels, and according to Stalin, the external

world imprinted “copies” of its objects onto consciousness, and thus subjective thought had accurate images of the thingness of the external world.

Althusser’s theory of knowledge, or production, was a total rejection of Stalinist epistemological ideology. Rather than a “copy theory” Althusser proposed a structuralist interventionist theory, knowledge as a product of class warfare. Althusser’s rebuff to *Diamat* philosophy was an additional dimension to his reaction to Khrushchev’s 1956 “Crimes of Stalin” speech. Just as Althusser agreed that Stalinism was a debasement of Marxism, that Stalinist politics was a distortion of Marxism, so he understood Stalinist philosophy as a further corruption of Marxism, and so he attempted to reassemble the Marxist theory of knowledge which escaped any pollution of the dialectical materialism of the Kremlin.

Althusser’s relation to Engels was tortured and confused. On the one hand, he rebuffed the dialectical materialism of Engels’s *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*. On the other hand, he still regarded Engels as a faithful interpreter of Marx. Althusser never demonstrated how it was possible to condemn the dialectical materialism of Engels, which he claimed was a distortion of Marxism, while at the same time claiming that Engels was an accurate interpreter of Marx.

In all probability Althusser wished to avoid becoming ensnared in the debate over the Marx-Engels split. The disjuncture between Marx and Engels became more visible for those who argued for the Hegelianization of Marxism, or viewing Marx through Hegel threw a spotlight on the disconnection between Marx and Engels. Althusser was fearful that certifying the disjuncture between Marx and Engels would politically maim the Leninist movement. Philosophically, Althusser sought to cleanse Marxism of the Hegelian ghost, he sought not to agree with the Hegelian intrusion, and so his anti-Hegelianism blinded him to the need to dissemble Marx and Engels. For Althusser to concede that Marx and Engels offered differing interpretations of historical materialism was to submit to Hegelianized Marxism.

But Althusser did separate Lenin from Stalin. Freed from Stalinism, Leninism was the theoretical substance of the global revolutionary movement of communism. Leninism was the core around which the post-1956 communist movement could revitalize itself. Leninism was a politics, and as such it was a productive instrument for knowledge.

Leninism understood that knowledge was a paradigm manufactured from a class position. Lenin embodied the idea that knowledge evolved from an intervention into reality, and this intervention was an expression of class warfare.

Althusser’s dedication to Leninism was manifested in his adherence to Marx’s *11th Thesis on Feuerbach*. For Althusser the primary goal was to change reality, and in order to modify reality it was necessary to make poli-

tics into the soul of theory, or political ends must direct the means of inquiry. Revolutionary action was the purpose of theory, and in the same way that Althusser embraced Lenin so he embraced Mao Tse-Tung.

The theory-practice modality that Althusser incorporated was another anti-Hegelian instance: in other words, Althusser's Leninist definition of the theory-practice category was an inversion of the Hegelian form of this category. When Hegel spoke of the theory-praxis nexus he assumed that theory was the basis, or that a proper theoretical understanding was the foundation for further theoretical practice. Hegel could not break out of speculative circularity. However, the Left-Hegelians did. Bruno Bauer as well as Karl Marx understood the relation between theory and practice in a different manner. Whereas Bauer and Marx began with theory as the basis, the end result of theory was action that changed reality. Hegel, Bauer, and Marx all maintained that theory was the antecedent. But whereas Hegel believed that the goal of theory was further speculation, the re-education of mankind, Bauer and Marx changed the goal of theory and made the end a changing of reality: not the continuing education of mankind but the actual modification of the material conditions of existence.

Althusser inverted this Hegel-Bauer-Marx codification. Althusser sought to make politics, not theory, primary. For Althusser, then, the goal became primary. Whereas Hegel thought the end to be the outcome of theory, Althusser thought of theory as the outcome of politics. Politics became the foundation, and theory the instrument, and this amounted to an abandonment of the Hegelian-Bauer-Marx protocol. Leninism was a contradiction of Hegel as well as of Marxism.

In his middle period, Althusser established the "primacy of politics by showing that all the levels of social existence are the outcomes of distinct practices,"(63) and that the construction of knowledge is "a theory of the different specific levels of human practice (economic practice, political practice, ideological practice, scientific practice)."(64)

The productive process was a complex of three generalities: Generalities I, or the thoughts which make up the raw material of theoretical practice or the great chain of ideas which provide the building blocks for theoretical production; Generalities II, or the current conceptual machinery, drawn from the economic, political, ideological, and scientific regions which acts upon these existent building blocks; Generalities III, the product of this theoretical practice. This model of Althusser was patterned on the productive process of *Das Kapital*, in which Generalities I was patterned on the raw materials provided by nature to man, Generalities II was the labor process pictured as an intellectual endeavor, and Generalities III was the use-value which issued from this labor process. Althusser's model imitated the Marxist paradigm for production; appropriation, labor process, objectification.

The generation of a theoretical construct in Althusser was modeled upon Marx's idea of the metabolism between nature and man.

A knowledge, a theoretical construct, never fully copied the object. Knowledge was not the outcome of the constitutive subject but was always an expression of the determinations of the structure. In his later period, Althusser modified the positions he took in his middle period. While the middle period accentuated the determination of the global structure in the production of a philosophy, the later period decentered the structure and emphasized the political. In his 1971 *Lenin and Philosophy*, Althusser argued that political praxis was the determining factor in the production of philosophy.

Lenin and Philosophy contains these two sentences:

1. Philosophy is a practice of political intervention carried out in a theoretical form.
2. All philosophy expresses a class position, a "partisanship" in the great debate which dominates the whole history of philosophy, the debate between idealism and materialism.(65)

Toward the end of his career, Althusser now believed that political intervention should establish the goals for class activity and that philosophy must provide strategies to achieve these goals. Since political intervention meant the *11th Thesis on Feuerbach*, meant that reality must be changed, then the task of theoretical production was to supply theoretical tools by which reality could be transformed through class struggle.

Althusser was fighting a rear guard action, an attempt to preserve Marx and Lenin and communism but jettisoning Stalin. Western Marxism, Sartre, Marcuse, were both anti-Stalin and anti-Soviet, and were not partisans of the communist party with the exception of Lukacs. Althusser made his own private intervention into philosophy: abandon Stalin, but remain a French Communist party partisan.

Since Althusser's "political intervention" called for him to be a loyalist to the French Communist Party, and since Western Marxism, though Hegelian, kept a political neutrality, Althusser turned against Western Marxism and against Hegel. Althusser's "class position" required that he surmise an "epistemological break" between Hegel and Marx as a way of salvaging the French Communist Party and the communist movement generally.

Althusser was a casualty of his own definition of philosophy as political interrogation, for in his interrogation of Western Marxism he was led to falsify objective textual evidence, the irrefutable documentary proof of Hegel's presence in the work of Marx post-1845.

Alfred Schmidt

Alfred Schmidt's book *History and Structure*, (66) initially published in Germany in 1971, attacked the structural Marxism of the school of Althusser. Rather than proposing the discontinuity between Marx and Hegel, Schmidt advanced the continuity thesis, the idea that major categories of the Hegelian method were utilized by Marx. Schmidt wrote of a "materialist Hegel reception," (67) of the attempt to incorporate Hegelian methodology as the explanatory priority of historical materialism or of the materialist cooption of Hegel.

Schmidt was not the only representative of the "materialist Hegel reception," for the origin of this school lies in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. While this is not the place to write the history of the "materialist Hegel reception," two Soviet scholars deserve to be recorded for their pivotal work in this regard, Mark Rosental (68) and Evald Iljenkow (69). The relationship between Hegel and Marx was a major problem within Soviet philosophy, bequeathed to the intellectual tradition of Russian Communism by Lenin himself when he wrote in his *Philosophical Notebooks* that it was necessary to read Hegel's *Logic* in order to understand Marx's *Das Kapital*. (70) In the twentieth century, Lenin was the founder of the school of the "materialist Hegel reception" and this methodological current was continued by Abram Deborin. (71) However, Stalin and Andrei Zhdanov thought Hegelianized Marxism to be a threat to the needs of Soviet ideology, and the school of Deborin was exorcised from official Russian communism. Zhdanov not only ostracized the Deborinites, but Lukacs as well when Zhdanov condemned Lukacs's *History and Class Consciousness*. Regardless of the Stalin-Zhdanov repression the tradition of Leninist-Hegelian Marxism survived in Muscovite communism, and the writing of Rosental and Iljenkow were emblematic of the perseverance of the philosophical heritage of the Lenin of the *Philosophical Notebooks*.

Stalinist *Diamat* became the state-sanctioned philosophy of Politburo communism, but Leninist Hegelianized Marxism penetrated into the Eastern European periphery of the Soviet Empire. Hegelianized Marxism in Eastern Europe was an oppositional philosophy to the official *Diamat*, an intellectual dissent against state dictated ideology. In Czechoslovakia, the dissent of Hegelianized Marxism was perpetuated in the work of two scholars, Karel Kosik (72) and Jindrich Zeleny. (73)

Schmidt was familiar with the work of Zeleny, and refers to the Czech philosopher's book *Die Wissenschaftslogik Bei Marx Und Das Kapital* in his own work *History and Structure*. (74) Schmidt's school of a "materialist Hegel reception" was a philosophical ancestor of the Lenin-Deborin-Rosental-Iljenkow-Kosik-Zeleny line of development.

Another book by Schmidt, *Beiträge Zur Marxistischen Erkenntnistheorie*, (75) is a collection of essays and an early attempt at deciphering the logic of Marx's method. It represents a particular form of Hegelianized Marxism, a specific location within Western Marxism. Schmidt differed from the Hegelianized Marxism of Lukacs, and this illustrates that Hegelianized Marxism is a composite of various positions. Succeeding paragraphs will draw the distinction among Schmidt, Althusser, and Lukacs in an effort to distinguish among at least three intellectual positions.

The diatribe between Althusser and Schmidt was, on a deeper level, a conflict of national cultures. Althusser was a product of French culture and politics during the 1960s, which was heavily influenced by the linguistic and anthropological structuralism of de Saussure and Levi-Strauss as well as the political exigencies of the French Communist Party, which drove him into an anti-Hegelian posture. Schmidt was a product of Germanic culture, deeply immersed in the debate over self-consciousness in which the Hegelian revival continued as a powerful force, witness the post-WWII influence of Marcuse, Lukacs and Ernst Bloch. Zeleny's book was published in a German translation in East Berlin, Schmidt was an heir to the Lenin-Deborin-Rosental-Iljenkow-Kosik-Zeleny discourse, and a dialogue already existed in which Schmidt's own locutions found an established vocabulary.

Schmidt was one of the founders of the "logico-historical" interpretation of Marx, a reading of Marx based on the "materialist Hegel reception," a reading which assumed that Marx incorporated Hegelian methodological categories as the explanatory coda of social explanation. Marx took Hegelian methodological formulas, initially presented in an Idealist format in Hegel, and showed how these categories could be materialized, the materialist cooperation, by using them to explain the activity of social formations.

The logico-historical school was a creation of a generation of German scholars, and Schmidt was a member of its ranks. In his book *The Actuality and Consequences of the Philosophy of Hegel* Oskar Negt described this avant-garde as those "in the Marxist intellectual left opposition who were persuaded by the dialectic-revolutionary aspects of the thought of Hegel." (76) Although a complete listing of this school is unnecessary, in addition to Schmidt, others who made vital contributions to this school are Negt, Manfred Reidel, Helmut Reichelt, Hans-Jürgen Krahel, and Hans-Georg Backhaus. The mission of this school was to unearth the philosophic presuppositions of Marx's economic theory, and they found these speculative axioms in the philosophy of Hegel. This was a generation of German innovators who moved to the left of Adorno.

Krahel's essay, "Considerations of the Relationship Between Das Kapital and Hegel's Logic of Essence," (77) is a contribution to Negt's anthology *The*

Actuality and Consequences of the Philosophy of Hegel. With Hegel's *The Science of Logic* as a background, Krahel was one of the earliest iconoclasts to claim that Hegel's doctrine of essence was the substance of Marx's *Das Kapital*. Krahel further contends that the Marxian concept of value is the Hegelian concept of essence, and that value is materialized in the commodity, and that the Hegelian logic of contradiction finds its representation in *Das Kapital* in the splitting of the commodity into use value and exchange value. Another category from *The Science of Logic* which Marx appropriated was the dialectic of essence and appearance, since for Marx essence is value which finds its appearance in the commodity. In the interpretation of Krahel, *Das Kapital* becomes the logic by which to understand contemporary society.

In another study of the relationship between the logical and historical in Marx, *Materials for the Reconstructing of a Marxist Theory of Value*, (78) Backhaus points out that Marx's theory of capitalism is an amalgam of economics and philosophy. Backhaus recognized that Marx's theory of value derives from the left-Ricardians but also notes that it is impossible to separate the labor theory of value from the Hegelian categories of essence and appearance. According to Backhaus, Marx's theory of capitalism prioritizes the logical over the historical, and he is also critical of Engels's interpretation of Marx because Engels presented Marx's economic theory as a mirror, a copy, of the movement of reality. Backhaus validated the thesis that Engels distorted Marx.

The school of logico-historical Hegelianized Marxism displaces *The Phenomenology Of Spirit* and substitutes *The Science of Logic* as the axis of Marxism. In other words, the connective link between Hegel and Marx is not the *Phenomenology* but the *Logic*, and therefore the continuity between Hegel and Marx is not human predication but explanation in the social sciences.

Whereas phenomenological Hegelianized Marxism, Lukacs, devoted its exegetical resources to the *Paris Manuscripts*, "logico-historical Hegelianized Marxism prefers a deep analysis of *Das Kapital*. Whereas phenomenological Hegelianized Marxism defends the unity of subject-object, logico-historical Hegelianized Marxism seeks to define the method by which Marx analyzed societies, and it assumes not the unity of subject-object but the discontinuity between the subject and object.

The textual centers of gravity of logico-historical Hegelianized Marxism are *Das Kapital* and the 1857–1858 *Grundrisse*. Published for the first time in East Germany in 1939(79) the *Grundrisse* played no important role in Lukacs's assessment of Marx, and this demonstrates the split between these two wings of Hegelianized Marxism, the phenomenological wing, which is concerned with human productive powers, and the materialist cooption of Hegel, which seeks to analyze the structural presuppositions of the 1867 *Das*

Kapital and in this search returns to the 1857–1858 *Grundrisse* for early clues and presentments.

The disparities between Marx's 1859 *Critique Of Political Economy* and the 1857–1858 *Grundrisse* offers additional evidence of how different textual magnets led to divergent interpretations of an author. The 1859 *Critique Of Political Economy* highlights the clash between the means and mode of production and is seized upon by those who wish to decouple Hegel and Marx as Marx's most precise statement of his dialectical method. The contradiction between the means and mode of production is for the most part free of Hegelian methodological apparati, and the opponents of Hegelianized Marxism assume that this text puts forth the clearest encapsulation of Marx's philosophy of science. On the other hand, the 1858 *Grundrisse* is rich with many allusions to Hegelian methodology, or the adherents of the schools of Hegelianized Marxism will refer to the *Grundrisse* as the definitive exposition of Marx's philosophy of science. Lukacs did not seek to juxtapose the *Critique Of Political Economy* against the *Grundrisse*, but many other Marxologists do so, and the *Grundrisse* has emerged as a methodological proof of Hegelianized Marxism.

The divergence between phenomenological and logico-historical Hegelianized Marxism was widened by the publication of the *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe (MEGA)*,⁽⁸⁰⁾ a publication which began in 1976 and which will eventually print every scrap of writing of both Marx and Engels. When new texts come to public view they normally bring about an explosion of previous scholarly opinion, and this chapter showed how the retrieval of Hegel's early economic writing, Marx's 1844 *Paris Manuscripts*, and his 1858 *Grundrisse* revolutionized both the evaluation of Hegel and Marx, and the continuing publication of the volumes of the *MEGA* also transformed the study of Marx. For the most part, the documents revealed for the first time in the *MEGA* will also offer support for the logico-historical school of Hegelianized Marxism. The *MEGA*, for example, has published previously unknown workbooks and drafts which Marx used as preparatory material to the final version of the 1867 volume 1 of *Das Kapital*, and these drafts strongly support the idea that Marx borrowed many Hegelian methodological categories as explanatory devices in *Das Kapital*. In particular, Marx's 1861–1863 drafts of volume 1 obviously incorporate Hegelian methodological categories, or it is impossible to understand how Marx accounts for the functioning of capitalism without recourse to Hegel's *The Science of Logic*.⁽⁸¹⁾

In order to more thoroughly outline the central theoretical positions of methodological Hegelianized Marxism, I will discuss five sites within this interpretative approach. The sites that I choose to define by no means exhaust the theoretic positions or debates within methodological Hegelianized Marx-

ism, and my selection is intended to illuminate the differences between Hegelianized Marxism and the structural Marxism of Althusser and also to outline the major parameters of Schmidt's school of Hegelianized Marxism. To achieve these purposes, the five sites I will visit are: 1) Marx and *The Science of Logic*; 2) From Abstract to Concrete; 3) Marx's Method of Presentation; 4) Marx's Second Appropriation of Hegel; 5) Marx and the Philosophy of Science.

1. Marx and The Science of Logic

While Schmidt speaks of the "logico-historical,"(82) Zeleny speaks of the "structural-genetic,"(83) and although they employ different terminology, they refer to the same features of Marx's thought, and both Schmidt and Zeleny agree that Marx absorbed specific logical apparati from Hegel's *The Science of Logic* and that Marx's analysis of social formations employs these logical apparati.

The application of specific chapters of *The Science of Logic* to the investigation of social structures involves two forms of explanation, the diachronic and the synchronic. The diachronic refers to the linear or explanation based on the temporal or historicity, while the synchronic refers to the vertical, to the structural architecture of a social formation. Schmidt maintains that Marx was mostly interested in the synchronic, in social formations as complex systems.

Marx's philosophy of science existed as a tension between the cognitive and the historical. Marx hoped to achieve two goals, to explain the internal organization of social totalities and to show how these social totalities evolved over time, in linear succession. According to Schmidt, Marx prioritized the first goal, a structural analysis of social totalities. Schmidt argues that Marx's primary concern was cognitive, to understand the whole that provided immanence to the parts.

Like Schmidt, Zeleny also thought that Marx was primarily concerned with cognition as opposed to historicity, with the synchronic over the diachronic. Zeleny wrote: "We are not dealing here with a purely logical process, and at the same time . . . we might say . . . with only a pure historical process, but with the ideal expression of the historical process."(84) Marx was basically concerned with cognition, with arriving at a concept which captured the essence, the internal structure, of a social totality. In Marx, the concept meant an approximation of the deepest structure of a social totality.

From the perspective of logical Hegelianized Marxism, the view of history presented by the Second and Third Internationals was erroneous. Both of these Internationals based their interpretation of the movement of history in Marx on the chapter "On the Tendency of the Rate of Profit to Decline," in

the third volume of *Das Kapital*. Assuming that this chapter epitomized Marx's thinking on the future of capitalism, the Second and Third Internationals originated the "collapse theory" of Marxism, the prediction that the fall of capitalism was inevitable.

The school of logical Hegelianized Marxism decentered Second and Third International historical teleology. Zeleny substituted a gnoseological interpretation of Marxism, the belief that Marx's intent was to take "possession of reality, was the approximation of reality theoretically." (85) The highest purpose of Marxism was the "construction of an 'ideal expression' of the reality under investigation," (86) and this reality under investigation was always a social totality.

Grasping reality conceptually meant the relating of parts to the whole and then determining how these parts combined into a whole. On the conceptual level, Marx's ultimate goal was a theory of the totality, but he understood that in order to achieve this holism it was first necessary to deal with the parts individually, to show how the parts were mediated by the whole.

The use of specific chapters of *The Science of Logic* as cognitive tools for the comprehension of social totalities bequeathed two problems to Marx's philosophy of science: What was the relationship between diachronic and synchronic elements; Since Marx did incorporate specific apparati from *The Science of Logic*, why did he not fully explain his method? Why did not Marx openly acknowledge his indebtedness to Hegel and fully describe those parts of Hegel which he rejected and those parts of Hegel he accepted?

In an interesting article, "Warum hat Marx seine dialektische Methode versteckt?" Reichelt tries to decipher the reason why Marx failed to describe in full his own relation to Hegel. (87) Why he did not outline his own dialectical method of analysis?

Before getting to Reichelt's account, it should be pointed out that editorial pressures in part forced Marx to reduce the presence of Hegel in his *Das Kapital*. After the publication of the original 1867 German edition, Marx received criticism from his publisher that the book was too abstract. The publisher argued that political necessities demanded that *Das Kapital* reach the proletariat but that the 1867 edition failed to reach this audience because of its dense philosophical terminology. Bending to editorial pressure, the second edition in French, the third edition in German, and the Engels first English language edition of 1887 all witnessed a continuous reduction of the Hegelian presence. The steady diminution of Hegel in *Das Kapital*, sweeping Hegel under the rug, was in part the result of political exigencies. In addition, Marx also made an intellectual decision to reduce the appearance of Hegel in his own work, because there is a difference between the 1857–1858 *Grundrisse* and the 1858 *Urtext*, and the first German edition of *Das Kapital*. The year 1858

was a dividing line, and after 1858 Marx made a conscious choice to hide the Hegelian presence in his work.

Reichelt seeks to explain Marx's willingness to employ a "reduced dialectic" (88) and finds the reason in the difference between the "exoteric" and "esoteric" aspects of a philosophy, an issue Marx first discussed in his 1841 dissertation. (89) According to Hegel, every philosophy had an "exoteric" dimension: it was an expression of its time. The term "exoteric" referred to the historical environment of a philosophy, the intellectual climate in which it found itself and which it reflected. In addition, Hegel believed that every philosophy had an "esoteric" interior, or the individual philosopher's convictions. The opposition between the "exoteric" and the "esoteric" mirrors the contrast between the historical and the logical, between appearance and essence.

Reichelt maintains that in the period of 1858 Marx decided to escape from the Hegelian "exoteric," or he chose not to connect the logical aspects of his methodology to a philosophy of history. Marx selected a non-Hegelian option in choosing not to connect his logic to a teleological view of history which was consummated in the conquest of Freedom. Rather, Marx opted for a "reduced dialectic," the "esoteric," or the internal logic of his methodology. Marx decided for the priority of his categorical forms and abjured philosophico-historical speculations. Reichelt substantiates his claim of Marx's abandonment of the Hegelian "exoteric" by calling upon those sections of Marx's dissertation in which Marx rebuked the critics of Hegel because of their attacks regarding Hegel's "exoteric" faults (see chapter 3). These critics rejected Hegel on the supposition of his accommodation to the Prussian crown, and Marx in turn rebuked these critics on the basis that they overlooked the "esoteric" in Hegel and assessed Hegel totally on the historic "exoteric." Marx wished to preserve the essence, not the historiography, of any philosopher's thought, including his own. The decisions of 1858 to limit the dialectic was then continued in Marx's later various editions of *Das Kapital*, resulting in the presence of a contradiction in his method of presentation, a contradiction between the historical and the logical or appearance and essence. (90)

One of the fundamental principles of a materialist cooption of Hegel was the application of dialectical philosophy to explanation in the social sciences. Hegel's *The Science of Logic* became the methodological introduction to the study of socio-economic formations. Earlier sections of this chapter stated that the application of philosophy to Marxism was a distinguishing feature of Western Marxism, and we have seen that Lukacs endorsed a phenomenological approach, that Althusserian structuralism appropriated the methods of linguistic and anthropological structuralism, but the school of the materialist cooption of Hegel was the only one to incorporate *The Science of Logic* as its philosophical prolegomena.

2. From Abstract to Concrete

(At this point I will discuss Marx's "method of inquiry," and his "method of presentation." I do so because I am discussing Schmidt and his school, and these two concepts play an important role in the Marx interpretation of Schmidt and his disciples. However, this present discussion of the "method of inquiry," and the "method of presentation" is intimately connected to the section on Marx's method found on pages 223–26 of this book. I suggest to the reader that when they arrive at pages 223–26 they read these pages in conjunction with the following paragraphs, since the two sections form a unity.)

The fact that Marx was a materialist did not mean that he was an empiricist. The fact that Marx prioritized the concept did not mean that he also appropriated Hegelian Idealism. Marx borrowed Hegelian logical forms, and supplied them with a materialist content.

Marx never put forth a detailed exposition of his *forschungsweise*, or "method of inquiry." In this area as well Marx "hid" his analytic procedures. Nevertheless, it is possible to reconstruct his investigative protocols in general, and in particular to reassemble his "method of inquiry." This "method of inquiry" can be summarized as the movement from the abstract to the concrete.

The presupposition of the movement from abstract to concrete was the rejection of empiricism, and Marx's annulment of the British empiricist tradition was clearly expressed in his critique of the political economy of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Marx's definitive attack on Ricardian empiricism is situated in his *Theories of Surplus Value*. As a materialist, Marx recognized that sense perception was the first step in any knowledge, that an external object stood separate from the concept, and in this sense Marx rejected Hegelian Idealism, which thought of the object and concept as indistinguishable. But he also was aware that sense perception, a "thing," could not be comprehended in itself, and in this sense Marx was anti-empiricism. In order for a "thing" to have meaning it must be placed in a context, must be mediated by other "things," and although it was distinguishable from the concept, it only had meaning by being placed in a concept. The theories of value of Smith, Ricardo, and Thomas Robert Malthus were false because their "method of inquiry" was flawed, and was led astray by empiricism.(91)

Marx's "method of inquiry" avoided the pitfalls of empiricism, and was composed of five steps: 1) Empirical Data; 2) Abstraction; 3) Totality; 4) Organicism; 5) Concrete.

1) Empirical Data

All investigations must begin with the gathering of every facet of empirical evidence. On the level of the collection of data, Marx was an empiricist, and he was not Hegelian because he assumed that the formation of a concept

was a posteriori to the harvesting of factual data. The concept, meaning, was not a priori.

2) Abstraction

Based upon the factual data, the process of abstraction began. Abstraction meant the ascent to higher and higher levels of generalization. It meant that the investigator did not stop at the primary level of sense perception but constantly sought generalizations which progressively included increasing numbers of singular events.

The highest stage of generalization was the concept, and meaning only existed at the level of the concept. Meaning was equal to a concept, and when Marx made this assertion he jettisoned empiricism and entered the philosophical world of Hegel. Although Hegel and Marx arrived at the concept from different starting points, both were in agreement that only the concept supplied meaning to isolated sense-perceptions.

At the end of the ascent of abstracting there was the abstract, or the abstract was the essence of an object. The abstract was the idea of an object, the quality which distinguished this object from all others. The individualizing quality was the concept of the object.

It is at this level that materiality is subsumed under the concept. This is the stage at which the idea conquers the material.

3) Totality

The attainment of a concept allowed one to understand the totality of an object or to penetrate to the individualizing quality that gave it its definition. The climb from the level of data (1) to the level of totality (3) was the ascending movement to the abstract. The descent from the totality (3) to the concrete (5) was the sinking into the concrete. The totality was the culmination of the synthetic process of the concept, while the fall to the concrete was the culmination of the analytic process of the concept.

4) Organicism

Marx proposed that totalities operated on functional terms, which meant that the parts in a whole operated so as to preserve or benefit the whole. In Marx's brand of organicism the whole determined the roles individual parts performed, and this behavior was designed to allow the whole to survive and expand.

Organicist explanation was crucial to Marx's "method of inquiry," for it was the process which led to the concrete, or a function was the definition of a concrete.

5) Concrete

The movement from the abstract to the concrete ended with the particular. Marx's "method of inquiry" assumed that the concrete remained unfathomable unless the particular was placed in the context of the whole. Particularity in itself was incomprehensible, and this was the basis for the erroneous political economy of Smith, Ricardo, and Malthus.

To see a particularity in the context of a whole meant that the particularity only appeared in terms of its function. Knowledge of a particularity emerged only when the function of the concrete was identified.

3. Marx's Method of Presentation

The following analysis of Marx's "method of presentation" (*Darstellungsweise*) will be divided into the following six parts: 1) Essence; 2) Contradiction; 3) Categorical Development; 4) Self-Determination; 5) *Das Kapital*; 6) Marx's Theory of the Social Sciences.

The outcome of the analysis of these parts will be a formula for the writing of a dialectical presentation of the social sciences. This analysis will result in a protocol for dialectical description and explanation in the study of social formations.

1) Essence

Marx's "method of presentation" was the outcome of his "method of inquiry," and since his "method of inquiry" abstracted a socioeconomic totality, so his "method of presentation" began with that totality.

Marx's "method of inquiry" resulted in the determination of essence, and his "method of presentation" outlined a canon for a description of the behavior of this essence. The "method of inquiry" produced a concept and the "method of presentation" an explanation of how that concept functioned.

Essence is immanence, or the inherent tendency of a social totality. Essence was the synthesizing force that unified the whole and parts.

Das Kapital is the clearest diagram of Marx's "method of presentation," and it begins with an analysis of the commodity. But the essence of a commodity is labor, or the substance that generates the entire social universe is human labor power. "What exclusively determines the magnitude of the value of any article is therefore the amount of labor socially necessary, or the labor-time socially necessary for its production." (92) Essence, by producing value, produces the inherent tendency around which the various aspects of capitalism orbit.

When Marx introduces the commodity as the expression of essence, he introduces another category in his "method of presentation," for social need will require a commodity to split. Based on social requirements, a commodity can perform two contradictory roles, use-value and exchange-value. In capitalism a commodity becomes the ground of an antithesis: it can perform the function of a use-value, fulfill the utilitarian needs of a person or community; or it can perform the function of an exchange-value, or become the instrument of commerce. When the commodity rises to the level of the antithetical, Marx has entered another category, the category of contradiction.

2) Contradiction

Contradiction in Marx is synonymous with bipolarity. Objects, or economic forces, are dialectical, or possess qualities which annul each other.

The contradiction between use-value and exchange-value is carried over into the opposition between necessary labor and surplus labor. The essence of value is labor, but labor will split: part of labor becomes necessary labor and another part becomes surplus labor. Necessary labor is the required social labor time needed for the preservation of the worker and the manufacture of the commodity. The bipolarity of the commodity, the opposition of use and exchange value, is a direct outcome of necessary labor. Surplus labor is the value added to a commodity above the quantity of labor needed for the production of the commodity and the preservation of the worker. Surplus labor is a valorization, and it is the source of profit.

The continuity of contradiction in *Das Kapital* is manifested by the splitting of surplus value. Marx employs the concept of contradiction in his explanation of the genesis of profit.

The means of generating profit splits. Profits can be harvested by reducing the amount of labor time spent in necessary labor and thus expanding the time spent on surplus labor, and this can be done by extending the amount of total labor time; this is called absolute value. Conversely, profits can be harvested by the introduction of advanced technology so the total labor time remains the same; the necessary labor time is diminished because of the technological breakthroughs which increase the productivity of labor, and this is called relative surplus value. Capitalist greed, the infinite acquisition of profit, will cause the hunger for surplus value to split into procedures of absolute or relative surplus value.

The three illustrations I have used, the inherent opposition between use-value and exchange-value, between necessary labor and surplus labor, and between absolute surplus-value and relative surplus-value, demonstrate that the logical category of contradiction was central to Marx's "method of presentation." The development of *Das Kapital*, or capitalism as a totality, is dependent upon the notion of bipolarity. The inherent oppositions described in the above paragraphs are proofs of the inherent contradictions of capitalism and will ultimately lead to the consummate contradiction that a society whose basic motivating force is the acquisition of profit will fatefully produce out of itself its final negation in "the tendency of the rate of profit to fall." (93)

3) Categorical Development

Explanation in Marx meant describing how categories unfolded. Explanation resided in the conceptual and not in the empirical, or empirical events were merely the outcome of categorical development.

Categorical abstractions override empirical data. The “method of inquiry” supplied the investigator with categories, and the “method of presentation” required that the categories unfold in themselves and subsume the empirical into their own functioning.

Not only was every totality bipolar but it was also a constitution of categories. At this point in my discussion it is only necessary to deal with two, essence and contradiction, but every totality is constituted of a plurality of categories.(94)

4) Self-Determination

According to Marx, categorical development is inherent and immanent. This means that the evolution of the category is necessary; the movement of the category is determined by its essence; the unfolding of essence is the necessary.

Both categories and totalities are self-determining.

The self-development of both categories and totalities means that the empirical is determined by them. The empirical remains the empirical, but the function the empirical performs is completely determined by the category and the totality.

5) *Das Kapital*

Marx’s magnum opus is the realization of his “method of presentation”: *Das Kapital* exemplifies the “method of presentation” that Marx offered as the explanatory model for all the social sciences.

The “method of presentation” in *Das Kapital* should be understood as an ascending scale of categories that is driven forward by the force of contradiction. As we have seen, the first stage in the hierarchy of categories is the level of essence-contradiction, or the split in essence between use-value and exchange-value. This first stage is not final, but immediately self-develops to a higher stage of category-contradiction, and this ascending stage is opposition between necessary labor and surplus labor. This second stage is also immediately transcended and leads on to the third stage of category-contradiction between absolute surplus-value and relative surplus-value. It is not necessary to depict every stage of the evolution of category contradiction, but it is necessary to comprehend *Das Kapital* as a hierarchy of category-contradictions. This is Marx’s “method of presentation,” and he believed that it was the truest portrayal of how social formations worked.

Das Kapital should be read as a critique of *The Science of Logic*: it was an attempt to show how the categories of *The Science of Logic* could be appropriated into a theory of explanation in the social sciences.

6) Marx’s Theory of the Social Sciences

Marx’s “method of inquiry” and his “method of presentation” amounted to a revolution in the methodology of the social sciences. Marx was the first person to appropriate *The Science of Logic* as the theoretical basis of the social sciences.

Marx initiated the “materialist cooption” of Hegel, or Marx took many Hegelian logical forms and filled them with a materialist content. The Hegelian form of contradiction was appropriated around a materialist content as the reciprocal negation between necessary and surplus value.

This explanation of Marx’s method was not put forth as a philosophical verification of his work; it is set forth here to verify that Marx did make such an attempt.

Marx’s attempt was completely innovative, he was the first to fuse dialectical logic and social science methodology, and he inaugurated a new era in the philosophy of science.

However, a gap exists between Marx’s “method of inquiry”/ “method of presentation,” and his theory of history, because while his dialectical philosophy of the social sciences is synchronic, the passage of history is diachronic. Marx’s “method of inquiry”/“method of presentation” is exclusively concerned with the interior of a totality, its internal configurations, and he does not tell us what the relationship is between his dialectical theory of explanation in the social sciences and the chronological-historic flow of events.

On the diachronic/historical level, in his 1859 *Introduction To a Critique Of Political Economy* Marx proposes that history is driven forward by the clash between the means and mode of production. But he does not explain what the relationship is between the means and mode of production and the “method of inquiry/method of presentation.” In fact, there seems to be two proposals here: one concerns the clash between the means/mode of production, which is causally privileged in the diachronic/chronological flow of events, and as such is a theory of history; the second concerns the continuity between the “method of inquiry/method of presentation” which is devoted to the synchronic investigation of social totalities, and as such is a theory of explanation regarding holistic units.

4. Marx’s Second Appropriation of Hegel

In his *History and Structure*, Alfred Schmidt wrote the following comment:

On the contrary, in the later Marx, as is evident not least of all in the *Grundrisse* of 1857-58, we are dealing with a second appropriation of Hegel, especially the Hegel of *The Science of Logic*. This work is as important for Marx’s political economic analysis in the 1850s and 1860s as the category of labor taken from *The Phenomenology of Spirit* was for his “self-understanding” (*Selbstverstandigung*) in the 1840s.(95)

I single out this paragraph because I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Schmidt. In the 1971 publication of his *History and Structure* he was the

first to distinguish between two periods in Marx's reception of Hegel: the first era of the 1840s which was based on *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, and the second era of the post-1850s which was based on *The Science of Logic*. My own work accepts Schmidt's formulation.

In the first era Marx needed Hegel's *Phenomenology* because he was at the seminal stage of working through his theory of labor, of man as the source of predication. Lukacs, as Lenin before WWI, represented the Left-Wing opposition to Stalinism and assumed that the *Phenomenology* characterized the entire life span of Marx.

In the second era Marx turned to Hegel's *The Science of Logic* because he needed a theory of science from which he could write *Das Kapital*. *The Science of Logic* provided many of the methodological forms Marx needed to make his vision of capitalism explicable.

5. Marx and the Philosophy of Science

Marx created a new philosophy of the social sciences. As well as being a political revolutionary, Marx revolutionized the theory of explanation in the social sciences.

Marx's vision of economics could not be expressed by empirical protocols. His left-wing critique of Ricardo could not be sustained by empirical procedures, and so Marx turned in 1857-1858 to *The Science of Logic* for a methodology which would explicate his vision.

I will not at this point enumerate all the categories of Hegelian logic Marx incorporated as this will be done in last chapter of this book and other books in this series. At this point I have limited myself to comments on Marx's revolution in the theory of explanation, or in order to explain himself Marx had to create a dialectical language to accommodate a dialectical theory.

The new language of Marx divided itself into the "method of inquiry" and the "method of presentation." Taken together, the "method of inquiry" and the "method of presentation" offer a good introduction to his theoretical revolution.

JEAN HYPPOLITE AND HERBERT MARCUSE

Jean Hyppolite

The work of Jean Hyppolite is a perfect illustration of the kind of Hegelianized Marxism against which Althusser rebelled. A member of the re-Hegelianizing Marx school Hyppolite was a manifestation of the kind of phenomenological-existential Marxism that Althusser found abhorrent.

Hyppolite was part of the pre-WWII generation of young French intellectuals who were influenced by the Hegel revival of the 1930s, the same revival that impacted the thought of Lukacs. In addition to the Hegel revival of the 1930s, the phenomenological philosophy of Eduard Husserl was attracting attention in France, as was the existential philosophy of Heidegger, whose *Being and Time* appeared in 1927.

A legendary event in the modern history of French Hegelianism was the lectures given in the Sorbonne on Hegel by Kojève between the years 1933 and 1939.⁽⁹⁶⁾ These lectures gave a great impetus to the rise of French Hegelianism, and although Hyppolite did not attend, other future luminaries of French philosophy did, such as Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Emmanuel Levinas. Drawn totally from the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Kojève's lectures stressed the master-slave discourse in Hegel. Kojève approached Hegel from an anthropological perspective, identifying the absolute not with spirit but rather with the labor humankind.

Kojève's work is also interesting because it demonstrated a division within the scholarly interpretation of Hegel. Those who took their point of departure from *The Science of Logic* (1812), *The Encyclopedia*, and *The Philosophy of Right* privileged the late Hegel, and this later Hegel was seen as an apologist for the conservatism of the Prussian Restoration after the Napoleonic Wars. In the 1930s, the Prussian Restoration interpretation of Hegel was the standard in the French university.

Conversely, those who took their point of departure from the *Phenomenology of Spirit* or earlier works of Hegel which were just beginning to be published by Hoffmeister and Lasson in the 1920s, articulated a more anthropological Hegel, as did Hyppolite. The *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) and newly discovered works from the Jena period (1802–1806), most important being the *Jenaer Realphilosophie I* and *II*, belonged to the period of the early Hegel. In these works of the early period Hegel emerges as seeing subjective consciousness as the prius of history. Corresponding to this more activist view of consciousness, Hegel also appears in the *Jenaer Realphilosophie I* and *II* as interested in human social life, more focused on the potency of human labor and its creative potential. Hyppolite, like Kojève, belonged to those who prioritized the early Hegel writings. Hyppolite translated the *Phenomenology* into French in 1936, the first French edition of this work.

In addition, Hyppolite drew a distinction, as I have done in the early sections of this chapter, between the *Phenomenology* and *The Science of Logic*. He wrote: "The key difficulty of Hegelianism is the relation between the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic*, or, as we would say today, between anthropology and ontology."⁽⁹⁷⁾

If one takes the *Phenomenology* as the core text of Hegel, one comes away with an admiration for the predicative powers of human consciousness, while if one takes the *Logic* as encapsulating Hegel's thought, one comes away impressed with the ontological system of Hegel, the organic whole that idea imposes on reality.

The uniqueness of the re-Hegelianization of Marx carried out by Hyppolite is that he connected the early Hegel with the early Marx. Hyppolite stood at a unique juncture in modern Marxism, a point at which it was possible to juxtapose the *Phenomenology* against Marx's *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, in particular the essay "Critique of Hegel's General Philosophy as a Whole." By comparing these two works, Hyppolite was able to determine which Hegel lived on in Marx, and which Hegel was dead. In his own way Hyppolite retraced the steps of Lukacs in his *The Young Hegel*, except that whereas Lukacs wished to perpetuate the historical materialism of Marx, Hyppolite presented Marx in a phenomenological-existential wrapping.

Hyppolite was a generational figure in the history of modern Marxism. He was the beneficiary of the publication of Marx's 1844 *Paris Manuscripts*, which presented Marx for the first time in an anthropological light. The appearance of previously unpublished Marxist documents revealed formerly invisible aspects of Marx's thought. Hyppolite was also the beneficiary of the publication of previously unknown manuscripts of the early Hegel, which also brought to light dimensions of Hegel's thoughts that had been submerged. Hyppolite stood at a point in time, like Lukacs, when it was possible for the first time to juxtapose the previously unpublished works of both Marx and Hegel, and he did this from a phenomenological-existential bias. Texts can determine the course of intellectual history.

The roots of Hyppolite's re-Hegelianization of Marx lay in his book, *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, which he epitomized as "the itinerancy of the soul which rises to spirit through the intermediary of consciousness." (98) Hegel's *Phenomenology* is the odyssey of self-consciousness chartered through the objects produced by self-consciousness in its evolution to spirit.

This journey of self-consciousness presumes the historical nature of self-consciousness itself. In order for self-consciousness to evolve into Spirit it must be historical in nature, it must be capable of transforming itself. Spirit is the awareness that self-consciousness is self-determining. But in order for self-consciousness to become aware of its own self-determination it must produce objects, and after its production of objects it must reflect on them. Hegel refers to the production of objects as objectification, self-consciousness eternalizing itself. After an objectification is produced, self-consciousness re-

flects upon it and learns about its own powers. When self-consciousness reaches this degree of self-awareness, it is Spirit.

The self-education of Spirit is accomplished in the realm of culture. The self-observation of self-consciousness is conducted through the study of the objectifications of culture it produced. *The Phenomenology of Spirit* is the historiography of self-consciousness.

However, the process of objectification is also a process of alienation. When self-consciousness produces an object, that object is no longer a part of self-consciousness; it stands apart from self-consciousness. There is a momentary separation between the subject and the object, but this separation is instantaneously overcome when the subject in its next stage of evolution subsumes the object. Due to the constant cycle of externalization and sublation, an inescapable condition of self-consciousness is alienation. The historical phases of objectification mean that self-consciousness can never escape its own alienation.

The Phenomenology of Spirit contains a chapter called "The Unhappy Consciousness," and in this chapter Hegel comments on Greco-Roman Stoicism and Skepticism. According to Hegel, the philosophy of the ancient Stoics and Skeptics exaggerated the self-sufficiency of the individual, and this striving for self-completeness divided the individual from the group; a consequence of this separation was an "unhappy consciousness," a foreboding sense of isolation. Hyppolite considered "The Unhappy Consciousness" chapter the core of Hegel's masterpiece because it was a perfect description of the state of self-consciousness as it reflected on its own state of alienation from the cultural objects it produced.

Armed with this understanding of the *Phenomenology*, Hyppolite then compares this interpretation with Marx's writing, in particular the essay "A Critique of Hegel's General Philosophy as a Whole." Hyppolite's book *Studies On Hegel and Marx* is the site at which this comparison occurs.(99) In *Hegel and Marx* Hyppolite contributes to the re-Hegelianization of Marx, as the following quote clearly demonstrates:

Hegel's influence was considerable, and it is not possible to understand Marx's basic work, *Capital*, without a knowledge of the principle works which contributed to the formation and development of his thought, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, the *Logic*, and *The Philosophy of Right*. It is quite certain that Marx read these works closely and developed his thought from them, at times inspired by idealism and at others rejecting it. . . . Hegel's *Phenomenology* is no less basic to the foundations of Marx's great synthesis, *Capital*, than are the theoretical economists and Engels' empirical studies. Marx's thorough knowledge of the *Phenomenology* is evident from the illusions to a section of it on asceticism and the unhappy consciousness in his *German Ideology*.

Any reading of *Capital* is sufficient to convince one of the influence of Hegel's *Logic*. One realizes . . . as Lenin observed . . . that one must master the *Logic* to follow Marx's exposition and argument.(100)

Hyppolite not only underlined the continuity between Hegel and Marx, but he was aware that Marx transcended Hegel, and these were the themes of his *Hegel and Marx*. But Hyppolite was also aware that Hegel anticipated Marx.

Hegel's early writings from the Jena period, particularly *Das System Der Sittlichkeit* and the *Jenaer Realphilosophie* I and II were available to Hyppolite. In these notebooks from 1802–1806, Hegel, who had read Smith's *The Wealth Of Nations*, commented on the new political economy. Hegel commented on the liberal economic system, private property, the need of people to labor, and the division of labor. He was extremely critical of Adam Smith's new civilization, and saw the bourgeois worship of individuality and competition as destructive of the intersubjectivity of community. Hegel was a harsh critic of the contradictions of the bourgeois order, and Hyppolite argued that Hegel anticipated Marx; if it were not for the lack of the maturity of capitalist forces during Hegel's day "there is no question of Hegel being a Marxian."(101)

Marx's great achievement in the area of social theory was to consummate what Hegel had only hinted at, the application of Hegelianism to political economy. Marx took some of the central aspects of Hegelian thought and used them as critical weapons against the capitalist system. The uniqueness of the *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* arises because Marx measures English classical political economy from the criteria of German Idealism.

The Hegelian attacks on the bourgeois order did not limit itself to political economy, according to Hyppolite, but also extended to the question of the state. Hegel recognized the opposition between civil society and the state; civil society was the realm of the isolated individual while the state should be the domain of community, similar to the ancient Greek polis. The political problem for Hegel was how to sublimate the destructive individualism of capitalist civil society into a political community, or state. Even though Hegel defended the right of private property, he was convinced that only in the solidarity of a community could selfishness and confrontation be replaced by cooperation and mutuality. Given the historical moment in which Hegel lived, the French Revolution, the Battle of Jena, and the Holy Alliance, Hegel opted for a monarchical system.

Hegel's perception of the bipolarity between bourgeois civil society and an organic political order was, Hyppolite asserted, another anticipation of Marx.

The Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State, which Marx wrote in 1842, denounced Hegel's monarchism, and in this regard Marx and Hegel were divergent. But Marx and Hegel were congruent over the nature of bourgeois civil society (leaving aside the question of private property), as both saw it as Hobbesian warfare and both speculated on a way to overcome this disease of individualism. Marx and Hegel offered a similar diagnosis of the malignancy, but prescribed different remedies.(102)

In his approach to *Das Kapital*, Hyppolite was aware that both *The Science of Logic* and *The Phenomenology of Spirit* were present in the work of Marx, and both added different qualities to this book. *The Science of Logic* imparted a structuralist dimension to *Das Kapital*. *The Phenomenology of Spirit* on the other hand, which was the dominant influence in *Das Kapital*, transferred the notions of alienation and estrangement to the pages of Marx's magnum opus. Central to Hyppolite's approach to *Das Kapital* was not the validity of its economics or the validity of its analysis of social formations but its existential message. Just as the central motif of the *Phenomenology* was alienation, so the dominant chord in *Das Kapital* was the estrangement of man within the capitalist system.

Although Marx appropriated the concept of alienation from Hegel, they moved in different directions when speculating on the consequences of estrangement. They were in agreement on diagnostics but diverged over prognosis. Hegel thought of alienation as an inescapable fate of humankind. He had a tragic vision of human existence, and humankind was doomed to the "unhappy consciousness." Marx thought that alienation could be transcended, and he believed he found the instrument for that transcendence. In his *Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State*, Marx identified the proletariat as the agent of liberation. History for Marx was not tragedy but revolution.

Herbert Marcuse

The studies of Hyppolite of the Hegel-Marx relationship differs from that of Marcuse. Although both Hyppolite and Marcuse argue for the Hegelian presence in Marx, the Frenchman focuses on the problems of alienation and estrangement while the German analyzes the nature of critical theory in both Hegel and Marx. The Frenchman directs his attention to the *Phenomenology*, to Hegel's investigations into western culture, and concludes that Hegel had a tragic vision of human existence: that man was doomed to an "unhappy Consciousness," and that liberation from alienation was impossible. The German directs most of his attention (although he does include a chapter on the *Phenomenology*) to the economic, social and political writings of Hegel. Marcuse devotes himself to the dissection of *The Philosophy of Right* and to the

Jenaer Realphilosophie, particularly the 1802–1803 *Das System Der Sittlichkeit*, and the 1803–1804 *Philosophie Des Geistes*. According to Marcuse, although the subject of Hegel's system is the rational idea, this did not mean that Hegel sought to justify the monarchical state but rather that Hegel intended the rational idea to be a standard by which to criticize the existing. From this perspective, Marcuse emphasized the progressive and liberatory aspects of Hegel's thought. History was the narrative of freedom, and because of that, humankind was not doomed to the "unhappy Consciousness," but through its praxis became the subject of increasing emancipation.

Schmidt translated *Reason and Revolution*(103) from English into German, but his approach to Hegel was vastly different from that of Marcuse. Schmidt was mostly concerned with Marx's theory of knowledge, and toward this end explored how Marx incorporated Hegelian logical categories from the *Logic* into the explanatory methodology of *Das Kapital*. Marcuse was not primarily concerned with epistemology, but rather with the methodology of critique, how the idea acted as the standard by which reality could be measured, and also acted as a lever by which reality could be transformed.

Lukacs and Marcuse displayed many similarities in their approaches to the re-Hegelianization of Marx, but politics ultimately tore them asunder. Lukacs fled to the Soviet Union to escape the Hitlerian menace, while Marcuse came to the United States. Lukacs always looked upon himself as a communist partisan, while Marcuse was ever the intellectual defining his life as the application of German Idealism to capitalist society. While Lukacs was active in the Hungarian Revolution and the founding of the Third International, Marcuse was one of the principal architects of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research.

Marcuse knew of Lukacs's 1923 *History and Class Consciousness*, and the book is listed in the bibliography of the 1941 *Reason and Revolution*. Marcuse was in agreement with Lukacs's early attempt to reassociate Hegel and Marx.

Ironically, the Lukacs book which most closely corresponded to Marcuse's *Reason and Revolution* was *The Young Hegel*, but *The Young Hegel* had not been published when Marcuse published the American edition of *Reason and Revolution* in 1941. Lukacs completed *The Young Hegel* in 1938, but it was repressed by the Soviets, and it was only first published in Switzerland in 1948 and then finally in East Germany in 1954.

The Young Hegel and *Reason and Revolution* corresponded closely to each other because both books offer extended discussions of Hegel's *Jenaer Realphilosophie* I and II. Both Lukacs and Marcuse studied the socioeconomic thought of Hegel during the 1802–1803 period in Jena for two reasons: to show that Hegel and Marx shared the same insights and criticisms of the system of private property, which produced poverty and social inequality, and to show that Hegel was never a right-wing monarchist or imperialist but rather

a voice that contributed to political revolution. They both sought to rescue Hegel from Fascist or authoritarian interpretations.

Politics divided *The Young Hegel* from *Reason and Revolution* because Lukacs fashioned Hegel as a member of the German Humanist tradition that ultimately flowed into revolutionary Bolshevism. Lukacs followed Engels into claiming that the German Humanist tradition supplied the ideological foundations for the proletarian revolution, thereby making Hegel a contributory agent to the plebian revolution.

Even though Lukacs was not a Stalinist, he remained inside the Stalinist system and thereby lent his credibility to it. Even though Lukacs was an inhabitant of the Stalinist world, after the Soviet repression of the 1968 Czechoslovakian Revolution he identified the Politburo universe as "the debasement of Marxism." Marcuse remained a German émigré in the United States, and in 1958 published *Soviet Marxism* and denounced Soviet ideology as a positivist form of Marx. Later paragraphs will show that *Soviet Marxism* was a direct outgrowth of *Reason and Revolution*, so by the early 1940s, while Lukacs was fleeing Moscow to escape the German advance, Marcuse already recognized the discordance between Marxism and Soviet Communism.

Reason and Revolution was dedicated to Max Horkheimer and the Institute for Social Research, and that indicates the goal toward which Marcuse wanted to travel. Marcuse's intent was to portray Hegel as a precursor of twentieth-century critical theory. Marcuse justifies his claim that Hegel was one of the founders of critical theory by isolating the dialectical relation between idea and the object. For Hegel, the idea was the self-determination of the concept, it was the final phase in the evolution of self-consciousness.

Reason and Revolution was Marcuse's contribution to the development of critical theory. His form differed from that of Adorno and Jurgen Habermas, but it was predicated on the belief that the existent must be subjected to the scrutiny of the rational. Reason was not the existent; it stood apart from the existent and attacked the object with merciless revelations of its incompleteness.(104)

According to Marcuse, this enterprise was carried out above all in Hegel's *Jenaer Realphilosophie I and II* and in *The Philosophy of Right*. Marcuse presents a Hegel who was not a democrat, who recoiled from the horrors of Robespierre's Reign of Terror, but who was, nevertheless, a reformer.(105) Hegel believed that the object should conform to the idea and on this basis held to a progressive view of history. Continuing the spirit of the Enlightenment, Hegel believed history was a constant advance toward Freedom.(106)

Within the *Real Philosophie I and II* Marcuse focused upon *Der System Der Sittlichkeit* and *Die Philosophie Des Geists* and those portions of these texts which dealt with the socioeconomic foundations of society. Hegel was familiar with Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*, and with Stewart's *Principles of*

Political Economy. Civil society under the control of the bourgeoisie, according to Hegel, was turned into a contest of greed and luxury. Hegel acknowledged that the capitalist domination of civil society gave rise to inequality, class stratification, the unequal distribution of wealth, the expropriation of labor, and the increase in poverty. He also recognized that civil society under capitalism was totally absorbed in commerce, that exchange relationships defined the social intercourse between people, and that private interest and self-absorption took precedence over community and intersubjectivity.

Marx did not know of the *Jenaer Realphilosophie I* and *II*; they were part of the Hegelian archive which became available only in the twentieth century, and so it is impossible to compare Marx's interpretation of these texts against the assessments of other commentators. Nevertheless, not only does Marcuse re-Hegelianize Marx but he also almost turns Hegel into a Marxist. Marcuse's Hegel interprets bourgeois civil society in Marxist terms, seeing it as a struggle for profit, which leaves a large segment of society impoverished.

Hegel's *Der System Der Sittlichkeit* and *Die Philosophie Des Geist* (1802–1803) are examples of the application of German Idealism to the socio-political domain. Hegel was the first German philosopher to interpret economic life from the perspective of Idealist philosophy. Marcuse sees this as an opportunity to make reality conform to the idea. By exposing the master-slave relationship of bourgeois civil society, by using the idea of community as a critical tool to expose the alienation caused by bourgeois civil society, Hegel created the opportunity for reason, reinforced by praxis, to constitute a reality, which corresponded to the idea.

While Marx did not know of *Der System Der Sittlichkeit* or *Die Philosophie Des Geist* (1802–1803), he did know *The Philosophy of Right*, and in 1842 he wrote an extended commentary on this text called *A Critique Of Hegel's Philosophy of the State*. In his 1842 commentary, Marx is primarily concerned with Hegel's exposition of the state. Nevertheless, Marx leaves a striking vacancy in his commentary because he avoids any reference to those paragraphs in the texts in which Hegel deals with the issue of civil society. While Marx read *The Philosophy of Right* as a philosophy of the state, Hegel wrote this book as a discourse on the correlation between individual rights and community or the ethical foundations of society.

Marcuse, however, does comment extensively on those paragraphs in *The Philosophy of Right* which concern civil society. In *Reason and Revolution* he quotes the entirety of paragraphs 243 and 244 in which Hegel describes the pauperization of workers.(107) Marcuse focuses attention on Hegel's awareness of the impoverishment of workers, on the mechanical jobs they are forced to perform, which distorts them and turns them into a "class," and which transforms worthy individuals into a "mob."(108) While Marx's atten-

tion was directed to Hegel's defense of monarchy, Marcuse deployed a Hegel who proposed a historical materialist account of bourgeois civil society.

Regardless of the fact that Marx and Marcuse offered different readings of portions of Hegel's vast output, Marcuse felt that on the central points Marx continued the philosophical methods of Hegel. In the same way that Hegel used dialectical theory as a critique of capitalist civil society, so Marx applied philosophy to a critique of economics, and even to Hegel himself. Marx employed concepts which emerged from subjective consciousness to measure the real, the political-economic. Most of Marx's early works are written as critiques, in particular his "Critique of Hegel's General Philosophy as a Whole," and his writings on political economy were presented as critiques, especially his 1859 *Critique of Political Economy* and his 1867 *Das Kapital*. Marcuse presents Marx as a protagonist for critical theory.

When Hegel applied philosophy to the analysis of civil society and economics, he opened a new universe of investigation. Hegel was the point of origin of philosophical theories of social formations, and Marx was a practitioner of this method.(109) The employment of philosophy to understand society was intended not only as an analytical tool but as a device by which humankind could control its social environment. Hegel believed in the self-determination of man, and when Marx thought it within the grasp of humankind to create a society which corresponded to the true nature of people, he also demonstrated his adherence to the Hegelian concept of human self-determination.

Marx also continued the Hegelian strategy of using organic explanations. In the introduction to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, for example, Hegel states that he will study the forms of thought produced by consciousness over time. His analysis of "The Unhappy Consciousness" is a study of the form of thought that defined Stoicism.

His analysis of the Enlightenment scrutinizes the form of thought that characterized the European eighteenth century. Central to all of Hegel's works was the organicist method of explanation, a logic that explained by placing a particular event into an organic system. Marx, too, explained by totalities, and he also thought in organicist terms. Even though Marx perpetuated the Hegelian legacy in this area, it needs to be kept in mind that Marx and Hegel disagreed over the substance of an organic unit. For Hegel the totality was ontological, it was an expression of the idea, while for Marx the totality was composed of class structure. Regardless of these differing contents, both agreed on the priority of form, that totality was a form that gave meaning to particularity.(110)

According to Marcuse, Marx continued the Hegelian dialectic, but neither defined the dialectic in terms of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. This interpretation of the dialectic, initially articulated by Engels in *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, was classified by Marcuse as positivism.

The dialectic of Marx and Hegel was based on the relation of one object to another. Particular objects do not exist in isolation but are always mediated or seen in connection to other objects. The relation of object A to object B helps define object A and object B, and in this situation object A and object B negate each other. This does not mean that object A or B obliterates each other, but rather one helps determine the other. This Hegel and Marx form of the dialectic is based on mutual collisions, or the process of reciprocal cancellation. This dialectic is of a different order than the Engels's version of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. Engels turns the dialectic into a materialist metaphysics. It becomes a law of nature by which nature and history develop. The Hegel-Marx format does not describe the movement of nature and history; it is not a statement about the inherent in nature or history. Rather, the Marx-Hegel format seeks to tell us something about the structures of totalities. Engels is describing positivism, while Hegel and Marx are describing a logic of explanation, or it offers an account of why Being, or social reality, presents itself as it does.(111)

Marcuse's attack on positivist dialectics led him to attack Stalinist Russia. Positivist dialectic was essentially an evolutionary theory regarding the natural universe, and Stalinist ideologies used this positivist form to substantiate their claim about the evolution and ultimate world victory of communism. Positivist dialectics became historical necessity, or a theory to prove the inevitable triumph of Stalinist communism. In his book *Soviet Marxism* Marcuse ridiculed Stalinism as the violation and transmutation of Marxism. Positivist dialectic was the grave of Marxism.

Marx and Hegel both believed in progress but not in laws of nature that necessitated this progress. For Marx and Hegel, progress was achieved by conscious design, by conscious intent, not by materialist metaphysics. In their belief in progress through conscious choices, Marx and Hegel were children of the Enlightenment. Their shared faith in the idea of progress also united them, or they spoke with one voice about the capacity of humankind to consciously improve the human condition, and this message about the human constitution of the world was central to the entire western experience. To read Marx and Hegel was thus to open oneself to the message of progress through rationality.

JON ELSTER/JOHN ROEMER-GERALD COHEN/TONY SMITH

Elster/Roemer

In the post-1991 epoch of Marxist theory, three schools of interpretation dominate the debate over Marxist philosophy. These three schools are Analytic

Marxism, Functional Explanation, and New Hegelian Marxism. The days of Lukacs, Adorno, Althusser, Schmidt, Hyppolite, and Marcuse are past, and new approaches to Marxist thought come to the fore.

Analytic Marxism is based on the principles of methodological individualism, rational choice theory, and game theory. As represented in the work of Jon Elster, and John Roemer, Analytic Marxism rejects both Hegelian collectivism, and organicism.

Gerald A. Cohen and Philippe van Parijs give voice to the school of Functional Explanation. A functional explanation is a statement that an antecedent event can be taken as the cause of an effect if it is presumed that the effect had a nourishing impact on the system in which the antecedent event was embedded. The work of Cohen specifically seeks to maintain the Marxist thesis regarding the dependency of the superstructure upon the substructure. Cohen proposes that it is possible to validate Marx's theory of the means and mode of production by demonstrating that the means of production were primarily responsible for modeling the mode of production because of the advantageous influence the mode exerted on the means, how the mode assisted in sustaining the means.

The school of New Hegelian Marxism is represented in the work of Christopher Arthur and Tony Smith. New Hegelian Marxism holds that *Das Kapital* is the reflection of the *Science of Logic* in economics. Both Arthur and Smith explain the methodology of *Das Kapital* as a "systematic progression of categories." These two philosophers of science agree that Marx's explanations of how social systems work are based upon Hegel's theory of the immanent development of logical categories.

The re-Hegelianization of Marxism, which began in the context of this book in the work of Lukacs, acted as the background against which these post-1991 forms could emerge. The re-Hegelianization of Marxism reintroduced Hegel to the study of Marxism after the debacle of Engelsian *Diamat* and thus set a new starting point for the theorization of Marxism.

However, Analytical Marxism, Functional Explanation, and the New Hegelian Marxism all took different approaches to this twentieth-century re-Hegelianization of Marxism. Analytical Marxism completely rejected re-Hegelianized Marxism, and Functional Explanation rejected Hegelian organicism. But New Hegelian Marxism made up the right wing of contemporary Marxist speculation. This school argues that the systematic progression of logical categories offers the best instrument for understanding Marx's explanation of socioeconomic formations. The New Hegelian Marxism must be distinguished from the attempt in the early twentieth century, Lukacs, etc., to re-Hegelianize Marx. It is necessary to speak of two periods of Hegelianized Marxism: period one, the re-Hegelianization of Marxism; period two, New

Hegelianized Marxism. It is also necessary to address two periods in the de-Hegelianization of Marxism: period one, the Althusserian Structuralist School; and period two, the Cohen-van Parijs School of Functional Explanation—to which I belong.

The school of Analytic Marxism, of which the work of Jon Elster(112) and John Roemer(113) are exemplary, represents a radical departure from contemporary continental studies of Marx and the Marx-Hegel problematic. The school is an attempt to reconstruct Marxism on the basis of Anglo-American analytic philosophy and neo-classical economics. Not Cohen, Smith, Arthur, nor van Parijs are members of this Anglo-American school of Analytic Philosophy.

The work of Elster and Roemer seeks to preserve Marx devoid of Hegel. Specifically, they hope to maintain a theory of exploitation, a concept drawn from Marx, without any recourse to either the entire Marxist system or to Hegel. Both Elster and Roemer confirm the Hegelian influence on Marx, but additionally conclude that Hegel is the source of many of the errors in Marx's method.

The school of Analytic Marxism nourishes the larger movement of de-Hegelianizing Marx. Like Althusser, both Elster and Roemer seek to detach Marx from Hegel, but they disagree on the methodological foundations upon which this de-Hegelianized Marx will rest. Althusser thinks this new foundation will be structuralism, while Elster and Roemer think it should be Anglo-American analytic philosophy and neo-liberal economics.

Elster and Roemer are opposed to those who wish to re-Hegelianize Marx. They agree with Alfred Schmidt and his followers who have isolated the specific Hegelian logical categories appropriated by Marx, that *Das Kapital* bears the skeleton of *The Science of Logic*. But while agreeing with Schmidt's outline of the intellectual derivation of Marx's method, Elster and Roemer condemn it because the Hegelian origins only serve to pollute Marxism.

At this point a long quotation from Elster's *Making Sense of Marx* is in order because it will help anchor the following discussion.

Marx on numerous occasions invoked the "dialectical method" as a privileged approach to the analysis of social phenomena. Did Marx practice any such method? If so, was it a help or a hindrance to understanding? It is not easy to answer these questions. When Marx explicitly refers to dialectics, it is usually in such general, even vapid terms, that it is hard to see what implications they have for more specific analysis. Although he repeatedly intended to set out the rational core of the Hegelian dialectic he never got around to doing so. Any reconstruction of this method must, therefore, be very tentative. I shall discuss three strands of Hegelian reasoning in Marx, each of which has a claim to be called, if not the dialectical method, at least a dialectical method. The first is the quasi-deductive procedure used in central parts of the *Grundrisse*, and in the opening chapters of *Capital I*, inspired above all by Hegel's *Logic*.

The “self-determination of the concept” appears to be nothing more than a loose ex post pattern imposed by Hegel on various phenomena that he found important. At the time he was working on the *Grundrisse* Marx reread Hegel’s work, with a visible influence not only on that manuscript, but on parts of *Capital* as well. In particular, he believed it possible to deduce the economic categories from one another in a way reminiscent of what Hegel had done for ontology. Yet, unlike the Hegelian categories, the economic ones also succeed each other chronologically, in the order of their historical appearance. Hence Marx had to confront the question of how the logical sequence is related to the historical one, without being able, however, to provide a consistent answer.(114)

In order to understand the full dimensions of Elster’s attack on the Hegelian presence in Marx it is necessary to dissect his assault into four parts: 1) methodological collectivism, 2) dialectical deduction, 3) teleology, 4) functional explanation.

1) Methodological Collectivism.

Elster accused Marx of seeking to explain social events by means of methodological collectivism, and asserts that this fallacious manner of exposition derives from the Hegelian presence in Marx. By methodological collectivism Elster means the attempt to explain social events by means of objective collectivities, for example, the social category of class. When Marx seeks to explain the activity of the proletariat, he does so in terms of the collectivity, not in individual terms. It is not an individual worker who acts in Marx, but rather the holistic social unit, i.e., the proletariat.

Elster is correct in categorizing Marx as a methodological collectivist. Marx describes not only the behavior of the proletariat in collectivist terms but also the activities of the capitalist class. A reader of *Das Kapital* quickly discovers that the motivation of individual capitalists is never discussed but only the behavior of the collectivity of capitalists.

In his book *Making Sense of Marx* Elster criticizes Marx from the perspective of methodological individualism. In independent chapters he shows how Marx’s theories of value, ideology, class, modes of production, the revolutionary proletariat, and historical inevitability all proved to be invalid because they were based on the principles of methodological collectivism.

Elster, and the school of Analytical Marxism in general, proposed to substitute methodological individualism for methodological collectivism. Analytical Marxism employs rational choice models. The micro-foundation of Analytical Marxism is the intentional individual who is capable of making rational choices, and is striving to optimize his results.

Elster’s book *Sour Grapes* completely undermines methodological collectivism and Marx’s theory of class and of class motivation. Rather than

describe social motivation as arising from a collectivist base, Elster substitutes a methodological utilitarianism.(115)

Elster writes:

Social choice theory is a useful tool for stating the problem of how to arrive at socially optimal outcomes on the basis of given individual preferences. . . . The agents are supposed to be endowed with preferences that are also given, and assumed to be independent of the set of alternatives.(116)

Social choice theory assumes a rational individual who is free to select preferences which are beneficial to that person. The choice is made because it fulfills the needs of the subjective agent. Without debating the philosophical merits or demerits of social choice theory, it is evident that agency is placed in the individual. By placing the cause of action in subjectivity, Elster demolishes all theories of group action, or collective causality.

Elster is aware that his rational social choice theory is inspired by a utilitarian ethos, or neo-Liberalism. He writes:

My goal in this chapter will ultimately be to throw light on a problem arising in the foundations of utilitarian theory. It is this: why should individual want satisfaction be the criterion of justice, and social choice when individual wants themselves may be shaped by a process that preempts the choice?(117)

Elster's thesis is that a society is ultimately an aggregate of individuals selecting options which bring them satisfaction. Groups are nothing but the sum of individuals' choices that bring gratification to the agent of the choice. The result of Elster's social choice theory is to absolutize individual want satisfaction, its utilitarian bias, and in so doing demonstrate the invalidity of Marx's ideology of class solidarity, proletarian unity, or any social collectivist model.

Analytical Marxists discard almost all of the architecture of Marx's system with the exception of his ideas regarding exploitation and alienation because they feel that these two concepts are still applicable to capitalist society. Cleansing Marxism of the Hegelian presence, Analytical Marxists seek to revive the ideas of exploitation and alienation by placing them on a foundation of rational choice social theory; game theory comes to the rescue of radicalism.

2) Dialectical Deduction.

By the term dialectical deduction, Elster is referring to the Hegelian methodology in which an essence particularizes itself. In Hegel this process is self-contained, meaning that the movement from concept, i.e., universality to particularity, is a process determined solely by the inherent movement of the concept itself.

Elster argues that Marx's method of explaining social totalities uses dialectical deductions, that Marx appropriated this from Hegel, and that this Hegelian cancer is the primary reason for Marx's distorted picture of social evolution.

In *Das Kapital*, for example, the theory of contradictions is a perfect instance of dialectical contradiction. *Das Kapital* manifests three categories of contradiction: the dualities of use-exchange value, necessary-surplus labor, and absolute-relative surplus value. The logical unfolding of these categories, their dialectical deductions, is used by Marx to account for the entire productive process of *Das Kapital*. For example, the immanent categorical evolution of absolute surplus value leads to the struggle over the length of the working day. One way to increase surplus value, or profit, is to increase the surplus labor time performed by the workers, and this can be done by extending the working day. The conflict between the capitalist who seeks a longer working day as a means to increase surplus labor against a proletariat which desires a shorter working day to extend workers' lives is an example of class struggle. In Marx, the entire history of labor strikes and capitalist lock-outs can be accounted for in terms of the dialectical deductions of the categories of absolute-relative surplus value.

Another feature of dialectical deduction is constant development. Dialectical deduction is inherently self-evolutionary.

3) Teleology.

According to Elster's interpretation, Marx is wedded to a teleological view of history. On this score as well, Elster detects the influence of Hegel because Elster feels that Marx's conviction of the ultimate collapse of capitalism contains the same teleological bias as Hegel's philosophy of history. Just as Hegel assumed the necessity of the historical advance of Freedom, so Elster proposed that Marx believed in the necessity of capitalism to disintegrate and be replaced by communism.

A connection exists between dialectical deduction and historical teleology. Since it is necessary for an essence to develop in terms of its inherent telos, then this necessity requires the path of history to move in a specific, immanent direction.

4) Functional Explanation.

The debate over functional explanation is a crucial one for contemporary Marxism because it relates to the question of how institutions or any other objective collectivities are understood. Explanation in Analytical Marxism proceeds on the basis of micro-foundations; it is atomistic, it concentrates solely on the intentional acts of individuals; it is neo-liberal. A functional explanation of a social feature is one that explains the presence and persistence of the feature in terms of the beneficial consequences that feature has for the ongoing workings of the social system as a whole. An explanation can be judged

functional if it seeks to take an effect as proof of a cause on the basis that the effect tended to sustain a system. A beneficial consequence, a consequence that is supportive of a system, is taken as grounds that the consequence had a cause.

Marx's theory of the state is an example of functional explanation. The capitalist state remains in existence because it performs a vital function for the capitalist class: it ensures its political control. Marx's entire argument concerning the relationship between the substructure and the superstructure is based on a functional analysis: the superstructure sustains the power of the dominant economic class.(118)

Elster argues that functional explanations are logically unsound. The structure of a functional explanation assumes that because an outcome is a benefit to a prior condition, that prior condition must have determined the outcome. Functional explanations argue backwards in time and maintain that if an effect has taken place then that is proof that a prior cause required it to occur. Elster proposes that it is epistemologically unsound to argue that an effect can explain the cause, that a posterior event is grounds for establishing the determinations of an anterior event.

The attacks of Elster and Roemer are a vital dividing line between themselves and the camps of Cohen and Smith. Major differences separate Cohen and Smith and van Parijs and Arthur. While Cohen and van Parijs defend functional explanations, Smith and Arthur are apologists for a radical form of Hegelian organicism. Nevertheless, the attacks of Elster and Roemer will more sharply define the specificity of functional explanations and New Hegelian Marxism.

Another significant difference between the Roemer/Elster camp and the Cohen (leaving aside Tony Smith who argues from a different point of view) is the issue of historical materialism. In addition to resurrecting functionalism, Cohen also wishes to revitalize historical materialism. Roemer/Elster did not use the vocabulary of a clash between the means and mode of production, but rather their discourse concerns game theory.

Any attempt to ascribe a tendency, a force of determination, to a social objectivity requires functional explanation. The statement that an institution or any social organization is holistic or exerts determining force on its particular structures rests on the logic of functionalism. The argument raised by Roemer and Elster attacking functional theory reaches beyond Marxism, and is vital for all fields of the social sciences. It raises questions regarding the validity of explanation in terms of social collectivities. In relation to Marxism, however, Elster subverts the validity of Marx's method of explanation.

Elster refutes not only Marx's social objectivism but also the labor theory of value. Following neo-liberalism in this regard, Elster maintains that value

accrues from sources other than social labor. Elster's abandonment of the labor theory of value means, in addition, that he must also jettison the foundations of Marx's theory of exploitation. Marx maintained that exploitation arose due to the expropriation of social labor for the sole advantage of the capitalists. Does this mean, however, that Elster was required to renounce the theory of exploitation because he renounced the labor theory of value? The answer to this question is no, because Elster could preserve Marx's theory of exploitation if he could find alternate grounds from which exploitation and alienation derived. This is one of the primary tasks of Analytical Marxism, and in my discussion of Roemer I will describe how this was achieved on the foundations of game theory.

The invalidation of Marx's theory of value also entailed that Elster reject the entire structure of Marx's economics. In *Making Sense of Marx*, Elster did exactly that, and he discarded Marx's theory of profit, the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, as well as any suggestions of a collapse theory. *Making Sense of Marx* rejects the entire architecture of Marx's economics.

Elster's rebuttal of Marx was persuasive and decisive but not anti-Marxist. Using the tools of Analytical Marxism, Elster sought to rid Marxism of its theoretical encrustations, not in an effort to erase Marxism from twentieth century thought but to resurrect any of its still fertile intellectual imagination. In the nineteenth century, Benedetto Croce wrote a book entitled *What Is Living and What Is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel*, and Elster writes in this spirit. By stripping away what is "dead," Elster is seeking to unveil what is still "living" in Marx.

John Roemer's book *Analytical Marxism* is a collection of essays, and in two of these essays, "New Directions in the Marxian Theory of Exploitation" (119) and "'Rational Choice' Marxism: Some Issues of Method and Substance," (120) he describes the essential outlook of his brand of Marxism. *Analytical Marxism* is a significantly different book from *Making Sense of Marx*. Whereas Elster provides a critique of the total structure of Marx's thought from the perspective of "rational choice" Marxism, Roemer's two essays are designed to explain the relevance of "rational choice" theory to two central concerns of Marx, exploitation and alienation. Elster's view is global: he attacks the entirety of Marx; Roemer's view is targeted: he focuses on how game theory provides a new definition of the concepts of exploitation and alienation.

At this point a long quote from Roemer is in order because it is a program for "rational choice" Marxism. In this quote Roemer outlines the specific problematic toward which "rational choice" Marxism should be directed.

In seeking to provide micro-foundations for behavior which Marxists think are characteristics of capitalism, I think the tools par excellence are rational choice

models: general equilibrium theory, game theory, and the arsenal of modeling techniques developed by neo-classical economics. This method is a great contribution to the intellectual history of the last century. Against this position the accusation can be leveled that the tools were developed to apologize for the rising bourgeois order, to justify capitalism, and hence their use necessarily taints the results with a bourgeois pallor. This argument is a functionalist one of the type I criticized.

So I believe the program of applying neoclassical tools to studying what might be called Marxian questions has been productive. There does remain, of course, some key differences in the use of these models. I would single out, for example, taking agents' preferences as data. Neoclassical economics, being primarily concerned with positive description, usually (though not always) postulates individual preferences as given. I think this postulate is more than methodological: it is ideological and flows from the dictum "*Cogito ergo sum*." Marxism reverses the Cartesian epigram, and asserts that people's preferences are in large part the consequences of social conditioning. This is an important consideration, if one intends to use rational choice models for describing welfare, for making normative judgments about the consequences of rational activity. Rational choice models should be used to develop a theory of endogenous preference formation. A materialist psychology is necessary to derive preferences from endowments and history. This is an example of a specifically Marxian question, which will eventually be solved using standard tools.(121)

The target at which Roemer aims the tools of "rational choice" theory is the concept of exploitation. Accepting neo-Liberal economics, Roemer rejects both the labor theory of value and the labor theory of exploitation. It is not the expropriation of labor that engenders exploitation but rather the control of the means of production. Roemer shifts the genesis of exploitation from control over labor to control over productive property.(122)

In addition, Roemer also finds Marx's theory of value to be invalid, substituting instead a value concept based on price. For Marx, labor value existed prior to price, but for Roemer prices emerge prior to labor values. Roemer makes this shift because he feels it impossible to decide which production processes are profitable without first knowing the prices for these products. It is the expectation of profit that determines values rather than value theory being determined by the cost of labor.(123)

Roemer's demolition of Marx's labor theory of exploitation and of price still does not answer the question of how the person who is expropriated knows that he is exploited. How can he make a decision to leave the exploited situation? In answering this question Roemer resorts to game theory analysis.

Formerly, this amounts to specifying a game played by coalitions of agents in the economy. A coalition can either participate in or withdraw from the econ-

omy. To define the game, I specify what any particular coalition can achieve on its own if it withdraws from the economy. Given these specifications, if a coalition can do better for its members by "withdrawing," then it is exploited.(124)

Roemer hypothesizes that groups in a society maintain a withdrawal clause, or opt-out provision. If a group in a society exists in condition A, and if that group decides that condition B affords them improved circumstances of life, then they can opt out of condition A and enter into situation B. The opt-out provision allows them to identify exploitative conditions and find a situation in which their life's environment will be enhanced.

The withdrawal clause is not the only way that an exploited group, i.e., proletariat, can improve its standard of life. The shifting of the loci of exploitation from social labor, or the labor market, to the ownership of productive property plays a vital role in Roemer's theory of equality. Disproportional endowments, the domination of productive property endowments by a particular group, is the cause of inequality.

According to Roemer, the overcoming of inequality rests in establishing an order in which the exploited class receives its per capita share of the productive assets of a society.(125) Roemer does not employ classical Bolshevik ideology concerning the overthrow of capitalism or the nationalization of the means of production. Rather, he thinks in terms of a redistribution scheme: first, a determination of the per capita share of the productive assets of a society generated by the exploited class must be made; second, a redistribution of the profits of the productive assets must be put into place so that every member of the exploited class receives his or her per capita share. When Roemer located the site of exploitation in the unequal endowment of productive property, he established the criteria for his theory of redistributive justice. However, Roemer does not call for the overthrow of the private ownership of productive property but rather for the reallocation and reassignment of assets.

Roemer perpetuates the tradition of Anglo-American analytic philosophy, and therefore he finds the school of German Idealism arcane. He associates Hegel with teleological and functional thought and finds both these methods to be worthless. The extent to which Hegelian methodology was absorbed by Marx only impaired the Marxist method of analysis.

Gerald Cohen/Tony Smith

Gerald Cohen

This juxtaposition of the work of Cohen and Smith is not intended to suggest these men share congruent interpretations of Marx. Rather, its purpose is to

clearly summarize the incongruence between these major thinkers, the difference between functional explanation and the New Hegelian Marxism.

In 1978,(126) Cohen took Marx's *Introduction* to the 1859 *Critique Of Political Economy* as articulating the essence of Marx's theory of history. In that *Introduction* Marx stated that the development of history was driven onward by the clash of the means of production and the mode of production. By the means of production, Marx meant the material productive forces of a society, and by the mode of production he meant the socioeconomic structures that governed these productive forces. For Cohen this was the defining core of Marx's historical materialism, and historical materialism was a theory of how historical evolution took place.

In addition, Cohen subscribed to Marx's formula regarding the relationship between the substructure and the superstructure of a society. By substructure, Marx meant the means of production, and by superstructure, Marx understood the entire ideological apparatus of a society, i.e., religion, philosophy, law, and politics. The superstructure was a reflection of the substructure, or the ideological apparatus of a society was determined by the class that owned the means of production. This interpretation of Marx is referred to as inclusive historical materialism. It is inclusive because the substructure had causal priority in the determination of the superstructure.

In his 1978 book *Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defense*, Cohen also argued that the means of production (substructure) assumed causal priority over the mode of production (superstructure). Cohen maintained that productive forces (substructure) assumed causal primacy over the relations of production (superstructure), and this thesis was also a part of inclusive historical materialism. In chapter 6 of *Karl Marx's Theory of History*, "The Primacy of the Productive Forces," Cohen explained his thinking more completely.

In this chapter we show that Marx assigned explanatory primacy to the productive forces, and we provide some reasons for actually doing so.

The primacy thesis implies that changes in productive forces bring about changes in production relations. Yet some changes in productive forces are too limited in scope to have that effect. Nor it is possible to provide a general statement of how much productive power must increase for a consequent change in production relations to occur. Instead, we may formulate the dynamic aspect of the dependence of production relations on productive forces as follows: for any set of production relations, there is an extent of further development of the productive forces they embrace which suffices for a change in those relations, and . . . the further development tends to occur.(127)

In his defense of inclusive historical materialism, Cohen made use of functionalism. In order to defend the thesis of the derivation of the superstructure

from the substructure it was necessary to employ functional explanation; it was necessary to portray the superstructure as an effect and to reason retrogressively that because the superstructure was of assistance to the substructure, the substructure must be the cause of the superstructure.

In a 1988 article, "Restricted and Inclusive Historical Materialism," Cohen modified his position,(128) and he abandoned inclusive historical materialism and espoused restricted historical materialism. The decisive point in Cohen's self-modification was the position assigned to the superstructure. In inclusive historical materialism, the ideological apparatus derived from the substructure. It had no independence, and it was totally dependent upon the substructure. In re-examining his original position, Cohen found inclusive historical materialism an exaggeration, representing a failure to see that the ideological apparatus of a society did enjoy some independence and influence.

In an attempt to grant some freedom of self-development to the superstructure, Cohen offered a second interpretation of historical materialism, and he called this restrictive historical materialism. Cohen still thought in terms of substructure and superstructure, but he did not feel that the substructure was the sole causal determinant in the evolution of the spiritual realm. Restrictive historical materialism was not a reductive system; it did not reduce all spiritual phenomena to ideological instruments of the dominant class in the substructure. Restrictive historical materialism granted independence to the spiritual level as long as one did not argue that the spiritual controlled the material, because that would subtract from the priority of the material forces, which was the foundation of historical materialism.(129)

The major revision Cohen's 1988 essay made to his 1978 book was granting the spiritual level a certain degree of autonomy. He still thought in terms of two tiers, but the forces of determination flowed only in one direction; while it is true that the material influences the spiritual, it is false that the spiritual influences the material.(130)

Restrictive historical materialism, like the inclusive form, finds functional explanations indispensable. On this issue, Cohen made the following two comments:

1. I claim not that all historical materialist explanations are functional explanations, but that the non-economic phenomena which a theory must explain to count as a historical materialist theory are to be explained functionally. That conclusion is a deduction from a thesis about the minimal scope of historical materialist explanation to a thesis about its nature.(131)
2. Restrictive historical materialism arises naturally out of reflection on the question of which features of non-economic phenomena historical mate-

rialism is committed to explaining, and the appropriate way of explaining such features is only by recourse to functional explanation.(132)

Cohen draws a distinction between functionalism and functional explanations.(133) Functionalism, as a school of sociological explanation, grew out of the work of the anthropologists Bronislaw Malinowski and Alfred Radcliffe-Brown. As a school of sociology, functionalism makes the following assertions: all aspects of social life are interconnected, influence each other, and form a totality.

Cohen refutes the functional school, but he accepts particular functional explanations, or there are specific situations in which functional explanations provide an accurate account. He offers a definition of functional explanations drawn from the Marxist theory of ideology.

The Marxist "conspiracy theory" is wrong because it seeks to explain the behavior of the majority of capitalists as a class. However, Cohen proposes that functional explanations can be used in cases where a purpose is ascribed to an individual. Take the following example: A politician who is a recipient of large donations from oil companies campaigns against the bill to curtail private financing of political campaigns, and the activity of this politician can be assessed in terms of functional explanations. By acting to defeat campaign finance reform the politician proves that the effect, his purpose, is an outgrowth of the cause, his desire to maintain the old system of private financing of political parties. The ideological goal, the defeat of the reform of the financing of political parties, is merely an effect of the cause of maintaining an older system in which oil companies dominated.

Cohen is arguing for a restrictive functional explanation to match a restrictive historical materialism. He limits his functional explanations to the ideological realm, for the most part. Althusser is an example of inclusive functionalism, the belief that all aspects of socio-economic structures can be enlightened by functionalism. Althusser's brand of functionalism derives from anthropological antecedents, particularly the work of Levi-Strauss.

The dispute over functional explanation is a major dividing line between Cohen and the Roemer/Elster camp, and we have seen how the Roemer/Elster camp finds functionalism invalid in itself and a residue of Hegelianism which must be cast aside. In addition Roemer/Elster abandon the entire apparatus of Marx's theory of history and focus on the attempt to retrieve his theory of exploitation on the basis of analytical philosophy. Cohen, conversely, is seeking to salvage Marx's theory of history, sees historical materialism as the best explication of Marx's theory, and is eager to draw a parallel between Hegel's historiography and that of Marx. Cohen does not argue, as this book does, that Marx incorporated numerous Hegelian methodological categories into his own explanatory procedures, nor would he necessarily find

the ones Marx did take as epistemologically valid. But Cohen does argue that functional explanation, a central feature of Hegelian thought, is valid and that parallels exist between Hegel's and Marx's theories of history.

Functional explanation is not the only link that Cohen thinks binds Marx to Hegel, but also an approximation exists between the two on their understanding of history. Clearly, Marx does not comprehend history as the march of spirit to Freedom, but similarities existed on other matters.

In chapter 1, "Images of History in Hegel and Marx," of his *Karl Marx's Theory of History* (134), Cohen compared and contrasted the conception of history in Hegel and Marx. In Hegel, history was both developmental and progressive, and the force propelling this evolutionary movement upward was spirit. History was a precondition if spirit was to ascend to Freedom, because in order for idea to become Freedom, it must learn of its own potential, must observe its past creations so it could teach itself its own capacities and nature. Marx perpetuated the evolutionary vision of history, and both he and Hegel shared the Enlightenment sense of historical progressivity.

In terms of the contrasts between Marx and Hegel, Cohen points out that whereas Hegel saw spirit as the motivating force in history, Marx perceived socioeconomic structures as the historical propellant. For Marx it was social structures, economic morphologies, which were the causal basis of historical progressivism. Historical materialism continued the Hegelian belief in an evolutionary process but substituted socio-economic morphologies as the causal determinant.

In his *Karl Marx's Theory of History*, Cohen was mostly concerned with offering a defense of Marx's theory of history, but in his essay, "Restrictive and Inclusive Historical Materialism," Cohen showed that he recognized a split between Marx's theory of history and his sociology. Cohen thanked the American sociologist Erik Olin Wright for making him aware of this separation. (135)

The distinction between history and sociology which Cohen became aware of in 1988 was the same tension that Alfred Schmidt drew attention to by the phrase "logico-historical," that Jindrich Zeleny called the "structural genetic," and what I referred to as the clash between the diachronic and synchronic explanation. Cohen recognized that part of Marx, at least, was primarily concerned with the "method of presentation," with the holistic interpretation of a social totality, and that this preoccupation was divorced from a theory of temporal development. History played no role in the analysis of the synchronic, logical, structural nature of a totality, and the synchronic, logical structure of a totality told us little or nothing about its temporal development.

In the Post-Communist era, Cohen continues to make contributions to Marxist theory. However, his interests shifted, because he no longer debated the virtues of restrictive historical materialism but rather was drawn to the

ideas of exploitation and equality. After the burial of Stalinism in 1991, Cohen involved himself in the field of ethics, and never surrendering his Marxist faith sought to proscribe Marxist definitions of exploitation and equality.

In his 1995 book, *Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality*, Cohen acknowledged that the utopian expectation of a proletarian revolution abolishing private property was fatally punctured. He wrote:

For, however, one chooses to apply the much contested label “working class” there is now no group in advanced industrial society which unites the four characteristics of (1) being the producers on whom society depends, (2) being exploited, (3) being with their families, the majority of society, and (4) being in dire need. There certainly still exist key producers, exploited people, and needy people, but there are not now, as there were in the past, even roughly coincident designations, nor, still less, alternative designations of the great majority of the population. And as a result, there is no group with both (because of its exploitation, and neediness) a compelling interest in, and (because of its productiveness, and its numbers) a ready capacity to achieve a socialist transformation. In confidently expecting the proletariat to become such a group, classical Marxism failed to anticipate what we now know to be the natural course of capitalist social evolution.(136)

Along with the dream of the proletarian revolution and the initiation of a communist society, Cohen also abandoned the traditional Marxist idea regarding the end of exploitation and the institution of equality. Arising from Marx’s *Critique of The gotha Program*, traditional Marxism looked upon economic abundance as the source of both equality and the end of exploitation. According to traditional Marxism, the expansion of economic output due to technological efficiency would produce an abundance of the necessities of life, and this abundance would serve to eradicate social classes, and with the end of class expropriation so too exploitation would end and the realm of equality be born. The rationale for Marx’s egalitarianism has exploded.

Cohen’s speculations from the mid-1990s on were concentrated on reformulating the Marxist ideas of egalitarianism, exploitation, and equality. In this regard he was energized by the Robert Nozick book *Anarchy, State, Utopia*(137), and Nozick’s defense of libertarianism. Cohen endeavored to write a rejoinder to Nozick’s libertarianism, and this refutation of Nozick is encapsulated in these sentences:

But no Marxist would in fact tolerate a world in which differential talent allows self-owning individuals to be class-divided into buyers and sellers of labor-power, even when the position is reached from a starting point of initial equality of external resources. The standard Marxist critique of capitalist exploitation works only against capitalism with dirty histories. Because Marxists wish to re-

ject capitalism as such it is necessary for them to deny the principles of self-ownership.(138)

Cohen's 2000 book, *If You're A Egalitarian How Come You're So Rich?*(139) demonstrates how libertarianism leads to exploitation and inequality. Nozick's libertarian egalitarianism was a delusion, but Cohen still had to resolve the issue of capitalist exploitation and inequality.

Roemer was an influential stimulus in Cohen's evolution. An advocate of functional explanation, Cohen did not embrace Roemer's methodological individualism, or game theory. But Cohen was indebted to Roemer for the explanation of exploitation under contemporary capitalism and for a strategy to partially achieve equality.

Indebted to Roemer, Cohen jettisoned the principle that exploitation arose from the expropriation of labor. Rather than embracing a labor theory of exploitation, Cohen opted for an asset theory of exploitation. The origins of exploitation did not come from the expropriation of labor but rather from the control of productive assets, like great inherited wealth and industrial possessions. Exploitation arose because a certain class in society occupied privileged position, an advantageous starting point which allowed them to gain control over productive assets before others.

Cohen also followed Joseph Cairns(140) in espousing the redistribution of wealth through taxation. The dream of the proletarian demolition of the state had evaporated, and with it went the hope of a total egalitarian society deriving from abundance. At the end of the Cold War one victor stepped forth, and that was capitalism. Due to the triumph of capitalism, higher taxation of the affluent became the means by which the total social product could be more equitably transferred to the socially needy. Although not the total erasure of exploitation or inequality, this form of wealth transference was just and ethical and humane.

Tony Smith

Tony Smith stands to the far right within the school of re-Hegelianization. Lukacs focuses upon the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, and the concept of human predication in Marx; Alfred Schmidt speaks of a "materialist cooption" of Hegel, a cooption involving materialist content inside Hegelian forms; but Smith unstintingly claims that *The Science of Logic* provides the logical apparatus for *Das Kapital*. Smith says that the methodology employed by Marx in *Das Kapital* is merely a transference of the methodology utilized by Hegel in *The Science of Logic*.

In his book *Dialectical Social Theory and Its Critics*, Smith outlined his method in the following paragraph:

The intelligibility of the concrete and material can be grasped only through asserting the priority of the thought process over how the concrete and material is given in appearance. For the concrete and material has a depth level of essence underlying its surface level of appearance. The task of thought is first to pierce through the appearance to that depth level (the level of “value” as measured by labor-time rather than “price” where exploitation is discovered within the wage contract, where only labor counts as productive of value, and so on) and then to proceed to the mediations that connect the level of essence with that of appearance. To fulfill this task it is not sufficient for thought to assert its independence; it must assert its primacy over the real process and the appearance it generates. Here too there is no difference in principle between Marx and Hegel.(141)

Smith was primarily concerned with the logical, the synchronic, dimension of explanation in the social sciences. Thought took precedence over the material, and historical, and for Smith, explanation meant the demonstration of how a universal category penetrated into particularities, how the abstract became the concrete.

Texts play an enormous role in understanding the differences between Smith and Cohen. The *Introduction* to the 1859 *Critique of Political Economy* is taken by Cohen as capturing the vital center of Marx’s message, while Smith sees the 1857–1858 *Grundrisse* as fulfilling that role. A reading of the two texts immediately shows why Cohen and Smith recur to each. The 1859 *Introduction* proposes a theory of history, while the 1857–1858 *Grundrisse* is an early exposition of Marx’s methodology. While the 1859 *Introduction* demonstrates how the clash between the means and mode of production drives history forward, the 1857–1858 *Grundrisse* is Marx’s first detailed articulation of his method. The battle between Cohen and Smith is a struggle over which text is presumed to hold philosophical priority.

Assuming that Hegel and Marx exercised the same logical forms, Smith defined Marx’s dialectic of social explanation in the following manner:

A dialectical theory is a systematic progression of categories that moves in a step-by-step fashion to progressively more advanced determinations . . . each succeeding determination goes beyond the preceding one.(142)

This sentence is a perfect illustration of what Elster referred to as “dialectical deduction.” Smith affirms that social systems are composed of ideal categories and that these categories are self-unfolding, and as the categories advance they transcend the preceding one. In chapter 3 of this book I will describe the nature of a category. When Smith advances the idea of the self-unfolding of the category, he commits, according to Elster, the fallacy of the “self-determining concept.” Smith’s description of the evolution of the category is in perfect agreement with Hegel’s presentation of the concept, i.e., category, in *The Science of Logic*.

Another quote from Smith will document the exact parallel he sees between Marx and Hegel.

On the other hand, each later category also in some sense “sublates” those that have gone before.(143)

Smith’s use of the term “sublates” demonstrates how closely he stands to Hegel. In all of Hegel’s works, the term sublate refers to transcending and preservation. The idea of essence in *The Science of Logic* sublates the idea of “being” in that essence passes beyond being, but on the other hand preserves, not destroys, being. *The Science of Logic* portrays a constant series of sublations until the concept reaches the Absolute Idea. Smith maintains that the same course of sublation, the continuing higher levels of absorption and preservation, is the process Marx carries out in *Das Kapital*. Smith feels that *The Science of Logic* and *Das Kapital* display the same pattern of transcendence, and that Marx and Hegel exercised the identical methodologies.

In his book *The Logic of Marx’s Capital*, Smith describes what he means by a category:

The model at the beginning of *Capital* is instead a thought construct won by abstracting from generalized commodity production all but its simplest elements. Marx, proceeding systematically to progressively more concrete and complex elements, then reconstructed the inner logic of this mode of production. This systematic ordering follows its own immanent progression, from “value” through “money,” “production of capital,” and “circulation of capital,” to “distribution of capital,” to name the most important stages in the process from simple to abstract determinations to complex and concrete categories.(144)

A category, i.e., relative surplus value, is an abstraction, is a concept which is a generalization of a particular economic phenomenon. A category is a universal, is what subsumes every particular aspect of relative surplus value. They are immanent categories and as such possess a telos which is the energy of their self-determination. The immanent development of a category is a determining factor in the system of a totality.

Describing the existence and behavior of dialectical categories still leaves Smith with the burden of explaining how they came into being. Smith refers to the genesis of these categories as the “analytic-regressive method.”(145) The analytic-regressive stage corresponds exactly to what I described as the “method of inquiry.”

According to Smith, the analytic-regressive stage is a process of an ascending scale of abstractions. The researcher begins with a collection of empirical data and then through successive abstractions reaches the highest level

of generalization possible. The highest level of abstraction, the generalization that binds the empirical data within a given framework, is the concept. In my presentation of Marx's method of inquiry, I used the term concept, but Smith in his book uses the term category.

The attainment of the concept, or category, still leaves open the question of how the investigator moves from the abstract to the concrete, how the scientist moves from the abstraction of relative surplus value to analyzing the introduction of machinery into the factory. Smith introduces the second stage of dialectical analysis which he calls "the synthetic-progressive" stage,(146) and this term is an exact approximation of what I called "the method of presentation."

The synthetic-progressive method describes how abstractions devolve into concretes. It shows why an individual factory owner does introduce machinery into his factory and thereby reduce the amount of necessary social labor. The synthetic-progressive phase is that of dialectical deduction, because the particular is deduced from the abstraction.

The synthetic-progressive stage, or the "method of presentation," allows Smith to define a social totality as a system of dialectical deductions. For Smith, a social totality is a system of self-developing categories that are functionally interdependent. Particularities are deductions from the categories, and particularities are also expressions of the categories.

The similarity between Marx and Hegel also exists on the level of the synthetic-progressive, and the similarity here exists on the grounds that the synthetic-progressive is completely a product of thought. On the level of the analytic-regressive, or the method of inquiry, Marx is involved with the study of empirical data. On this level Marx and Hegel differ, because Marx starts his examination as an empiricist. On the second level, however, the synthetic-progressive, or the method of presentation, Marx's system of categories is conducted on the basis of pure thought. On this second level, Marx and Hegel are similar because they both proceed from the ground of pure rational reconstruction.

Smith is also aware of a break between history and the synthetic-progressive, because since the synthetic-progressive is a product of pure thought, it is detached from the real passing of events. A disjuncture exists between human history and Marx's rational reconstruction of categorical systems. In this regard, there is a divergence between Hegel and Marx because whereas Hegel connected history to the Absolute Idea, Marx saw a disjuncture between history and his rational constitution of categorical systems. Nevertheless, in the Marx of Smith there is no basis to make a forecast about the course of history, and this is one of the consequences of categorical systematic explanation.

From the previous discussion, it is now possible to pinpoint the differences among Smith, Cohen, and Roemer/Elster. Whereas the 1978 Cohen is seek-

ing to resuscitate a Marxist theory of history, Smith believes that Marx was more intent on constructing categorical deductions. In this regard Smith agrees with Eric Olin Wright's distinction between sociology and history, which was accepted in the 1988 restrictive historical materialism of Cohen.(147) Roemer/Elster seek micro-foundations from neo-liberal theory to rebuild a Marxist theory of exploitation, while Smith maintains that the best explanations derive from the macro-foundations of categorical deductions.

In addition, Smith disagreed with Schmidt's "logico-historical" and Zeleny's "structural-genetic" explanatory models. Schmidt's "logico" and Zeleny's "structural" were coincidental, because both terms referred to the synchronic, categorical aspects of explanation. The "historical" in Schmidt and the "genetic" in Zeleny were also congruent, and both of these terms referred to the developmental process of a social system. The Marx of Schmidt and Zeleny was a composite of the categorical-synchronic and the developmental-diachronic. Smith, on the other hand, severed this conjuncture, and for him the categorical-synchronic always assumed causal priority and antecedence.

PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS/ CHRISTOPHER ARTHUR

In this concluding section I combine my assessment of the work of van Parijs and Arthur. Like the previous sections on the work of Cohen/Smith, the writings of van Parijs and Arthur represent two different schools of contemporary Marxist interpretation. Van Parijs belongs to the camp of functional explanation and explores the theoretic fields planted by Cohen, while Arthur is a member of the New Hegelian Marxist school and shares an intellectual kinship to Smith. A scrutiny of the books of van Parijs and Arthur will not only reveal the philosophic fractures between various current Marxisms but also carry my discussion to the present moment.

The proper approach to the work of van Parijs is to take it as a logic of explanation. Van Parijs is not concerned with Marxism as a revolutionary strategy of the proletariat or Marxism as a predictive map of the evolution of capitalism but with the logic of explanation in Marxism. Are any statements within Marxist social science philosophically justifiable? The logic of explanation also predominates in the work of Roemer, Elster, Cohen, and Smith.

In the post-Communist world Marxism no longer has any attraction as a theory of revolution, as an economic theory of value, price, profit, as a prediction that capitalist society will splinter between a minority of capitalists and a vast majority of workers, and a prognosis that the rate of profit will fall. These attributes of nineteenth-century Marxism were all disproven by historical

events. The contemporary dialogue within Marxism has shifted from historical prediction, or retrodiction, from macroeconomics, and from Leninist-Maoist tactics to discussions about ethics, exploitation, and inequality, and the logic of social science explanation.

The work of Marxism in the contemporary period is a salvage operation, the attempt to retrieve from the distortions of the Soviet Union aspects of Marxism that are still viable, and this leads to the philosophy of explanation. It is in theory, as opposed to practice, that Marxism now resides. The attempts at retrieval are focused on historical materialism or the discovery of a logic rendering historical materialism philosophically valid.

This means that the Althusserian age is over. The great French structuralist attempted to salvage both historical and dialectical materialism, and by dialectical materialism Althusser meant the Engelsian-Stalinist debasement of Marxism. Althusser's efforts at rescuing dialectical materialism proved futile, and this metaphysics of nature today is totally discredited.

Van Parijs's labors are devoted to the reconstruction of historical materialism, and in this regard he is indebted to the prior work of Cohen. Indeed, his two books, *Evolutionary Explanation in the Social Science*(148) and *Marxism Recycled*(149) are both defenses and an amplification of Cohen's groundbreaking insights in *Karl Marx's Theory of History*.

In Cohen's work the essence of historical materialism is the relationship between the means of production and the mode of production. Van Parijs accepts Cohen's reconstruction of historical materialism, and van Parijs's books offer logical proofs that it is justified to speak of reciprocal relations between the substructure and the superstructure.

Van Parijs maintains that functional explanations are necessary in order to validate the means and mode of production interchange. The relationship between the substructure and the superstructure can be made logically sound only if functional explanations are used to describe this relationship.

A salient feature of historical materialism holds that means of production have priority in the evolution of socioeconomic structures. The productive forces hold primacy in determining all the other aspects of a socioeconomic structure or the relations of production: the superstructure is dependent on the substructure. Marx's theory of historical evolution is built on asserting the primacy of the means of production, and van Parijs argues that the primacy of the forces of production can be proven only through functional logic. Van Parijs believes that establishing the dependency of the mode of production on the means of production is "Marxism's central puzzle." (150)

The preservation of the primacy thesis is indispensable to any retention of historical materialism.

The work of Arthur stands in diametrical contrast to that of van Parijs. However, both men are illustrations that the debate over Marxism is at the moment a debate over the philosophy of the social sciences. Before Marxism can be granted any legitimacy as a social science, its method of explanation must be shown to be logically sound, or before Marxism can be granted any credibility as a form of social analysis, it must first be established that its logic of explanation is valid.

One of the fundamental distinctions between Arthur and van Parijs, and between Cohen and Smith, is that van Parijs attempts to authenticate functional explanation while Arthur seeks to substantiate that systematic dialectical categories undergird *Das Kapital*. While van Parijs seeks to verify that the relationship between means and mode of production, as sketched in Marx's 1859 *Outline of a Critique of Political Economy*, is the driving force behind the narrative of history, Arthur concentrates on documenting that an organic model is the prototype of *Das Kapital*. Like the central theme of my book, Arthur argues that Marx continued the Hegelian formula of explaining philosophical and social systems as organisms. The ruling metamodel for both men was biology.

Arthur describes Marx's method in almost the exact parameters that I used to present Marx's method in the section of this chapter dealing with Schmidt (see pages 37–41). I will quote two paragraphs from Arthur's book *The New Dialectic* in order to show the correspondence of my and Arthur's reading of the Hegelian influence on Marx.

If we read Hegel and Marx it is clear that analysis of wholes through systematic dialectical argument is important to their work . . . hence internal relations typify the whole. A thing is internally related to another if this other is a necessary condition of its nature. The relations themselves in turn are situated as moments of a totality, and reproduced through its effectivity.(151)

The reason a linear logic is inappropriate is that capitalism is constituted as a totality, which forms its elements in such a way that taken apart from it they are denatured. If value depends for its reality on the full development of capitalist production then the concepts of Marx's first chapter can only have an abstract character, and the argument as it advances develops the meanings of these concepts, through grounding them adequately in the comprehended whole. The exposition of the system, in starting with some simple yet determinate relations (such as the commodity form), is thereby forced to abstract it violently from the other relations that in reality penetrate it and help to constitute its affectivity. . . . Only at the end of the reconstruction of the totality is its truth unfolded: truth is system from an expositional point of view.(152)

The two philosophies of the social sciences, functional explanation and systematic dialectic, are equipped to do two different things. By targeting the

internal contradictions, or dependencies of the forces of production vs. the mode of production, functional explanations are more linear. The contradiction, or the dependency of the substructure and superstructure, must have a result, must solve the contradiction and move toward equilibrium, and this outcome is history, or the movement to a different plateau of development and contradiction.

Arthur's systematic dialectic is not concerned with history but with organicist totalities. It is synchronic and seeks to show how every particular in a system reflects the whole.

Systematic dialectic is not predictive but retrodictive. It is not concerned with progression but with regression, or the isolation of a concept which epitomizes the organicist whole. It is concerned with synchronic structures, which logical categories and how these categories stamp every singular form of an organicist totality.

Arthur draws a direct parallel between *The Science of Logic* and *Das Kapital*. He understands *Das Kapital* as the model of all explanation in the social sciences.

For Arthur, the dialectic of Hegel becomes the explanatory paradigm for all the social sciences.

EPILOGUE

The discussion so far has centered upon the logical similarities and dissimilarities which joined or separated Marx and Hegel, the methodological aspects of Hegel which Marx continued or discontinued. There is, however, another level to the Hegel/Marx problematic, the level of their historical placement, or the question of their relationship to the eighteenth century Enlightenment. This level concerns their position within the history of ideas in the West, and this issue demands some comment.

In a remarkable book written in 1939 while he was an émigré in Japan, *From Hegel To Nietzsche*, Karl Lowith argues that both Hegel and Marx, in their own styles, perpetuated the Enlightenment traditions of rationality, history, and progress.(153) While Hegel reformulated Christian eschatology, translating religious faith into philosophic self-determination, Marx, following Feuerbach, detached religion and philosophy and maintained that human reason alone was the propellant of history and capable of creating a utopian future.

Lowith used the "Absolute Knowledge" chapter of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* as emblematic of Hegel's secularization of Christian theodicy. In "Absolute Knowledge," Hegel outlines three stages in the ascent to complete knowledge, art, religion, and philosophy, and demonstrates how religion transcends art

and philosophy transcends religion. The fact that philosophy replaces religion as the highest form of knowledge is a reflection of the Enlightenment faith in reason. Lowith presents Hegel as an exemplar of philosophical theology, the substitution of reason for belief, the idea that after the Enlightenment philosophy could achieve the "Absolute Knowledge" previously reserved for faith.

Hegel transmitted the Enlightenment Project into succeeding centuries, according to Lowith. Fusing the Enlightenment principles of reason, history, and secular improvement, Hegel bequeathed to future Western intellectual history the expectations of human rationality and historical progress. The interpretations of Lowith were corroborated by the research of John Edward Toews and in his book *Hegelianism*. Toews understands Hegel as rebelling against the empiricist bifurcation of the rational subject and the objective world, and Hegel replaced this bifurcation with the reconciliation of reason and ontology.(154) The fact that ontology was itself logical, or self-determining, meant that human events were guided by rational design.

Although Marx divorced thought from ontology, he also regarded the human subject as rational, as capable of progressing to a future that corresponded to the nature of humanity, and this historical teleology aligned Marx with the Enlightenment-Hegelian Project.

In his book *The Philosophical Discourses of Modernity*(155) Jurgen Habermas looks upon Hegel as the inventor of modernity. Hegel presented the nineteenth century as a new age, a decisive break with both Greco-Roman and Christian predecessors.

This new age, modernity, was synonymous with the rule of reason in history, and both Hegel and Marx believed that thought would lead to the continual improvement of the human condition. In Hegel and Marx, Habermas proposed, the Enlightenment Project and modernity were coeval.

A tragic paradox existed in modernity, however. On the one hand, the rule of reason in Hegel and Marx promised a never-ending historical progressivism, but on the other hand the domination of reason also prepared the way for the birth of instrumental reason. Hegel and Marx were precursors of Adorno, or their faith in human rationality did not lead to the teleology of improvement but rather to the perfection of authoritarianism and Auschwitz. Instrumental reason was the bastard child of the Enlightenment Project, and unfortunately it was the offspring that gave birth to Hitlerism, Stalinism, the gas chambers, and the diatribes of *Negative Dialectics*. Post-modernity was a reaction against, the sign of failure, of the agenda of modernity.

In *The Philosophic Discourses Of Modernity*, Habermas raises one of the fundamental issues of the contemporary period when he asks whether the agenda of modernity is still relevant to the post-modernist world. Do Hegel and Marx still have something to say to the post-modernist age? This question

raises the problem of whether the ideas of rationality and historical improvement still have meaning at the present time.

This book will not attempt to answer the problem, but rather only seek to isolate the puzzle. The contemporary relevance of both Hegel and Marx on the more general level of the intellectual trajectory of the West rises or falls with the issues of human rationality and historical progressivism. If one rejects the concepts of reason and teleology, then Hegel and Marx are bereft of meaning, but if one retains a faith in thought and utopianism, Hegel and Marx remain vital sources of knowledge and inspiration.

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Chapter Two

Engels's First Appropriation of Hegel

The intent of this chapter is to explode the hyphenation Marx-Engels, and to argue that two different systems of thought emerged, one from each of these men, one called Marxism and the other labeled Engelsism. Marx and Engels were two distinct personalities, two separate mentalities, and they gave rise to two divergent theories of society. To maintain the hyphenation, to defend a single Marx-Engels social science, is only to distort the theories of each man and to confuse and retard investigation into the dual and conflicting systems of Marxism and Engelsism.

The fight to defend the singleness of Marx-Engels is an example of the Apostolic Succession of the Left. Ideological purity and unity is vital to any political movement, and the struggle to be the True Ideological Heir is a feature of all mass movements. Prior to the First World War, Karl Liebknecht, August Bebel, and Karl Kautsky struggled to make the German Social Democratic model predominate in Europe, and they hyphenated Marx-Engels because this fusion strengthened their claim to be the Apostolic Successors. After World War I a split developed between Western Socialism and Russian Leninism as both wings of the international socialist movement needed to establish their legitimacy by claiming the mantle of True Ideological Heir. Marx and Engels were victims of the schism between Western Socialism and Stalinist Bolshevism. Since the legitimacy of each of these branches of the world socialist movement required that it claim the title of True Ideological Heir, it was impossible for them to divide the legacy into a bifurcated Marx and Engels. The hyphenation of Marx-Engels was a requirement of their desire to be legitimized as the sole inheritor, or the need to be dominant in the global Left necessitated that they present Marx-Engels as a single message of which they were the single recipient.

The two-volume biography of Friedrich Engels written by Gustav Mayer⁽¹⁾ supplied support for the Western Social Democratic entitlement. Thoroughly researched, Mayer's biography remains a standard to this day, and Mayer's biography not only shows Western Social Democracy as the true executor of the will of Marx-Engels, but also establishes German Social Democracy as the purest beneficiary of the Marx-Engels estate. Mayer's work set the parameters of interpretation, and constructed the domination of the German Social Democratic School of Interpretation.

This majoritarian school is perpetuated in the work, of Eric Hobsbawm, Gareth Stedman Jones, and Hal Draper, among others. None of these men sees Marx and Engels as indistinguishable clones of each other, but they all adopt the thesis of basic uniformity, the Siamese twins argument. In an insightful article, "Marx, Engels and Pre-Marxian Socialism," Hobsbawm proposes that while Marx himself fused German philosophy and French revolutionary politics, Engels contributed the ingredients of English political economy and Chartist class struggle. Marx-Engels was an amalgam of German, French, and English traditions, and Engels's contribution to this "European triarchy" was his knowledge of Chartist class struggle theory gained when he was managing his father's business in Manchester.⁽²⁾ Jones correctly recognized that "popular conceptions of orthodox Marxism today still date back to Engels's work of systematization and popularization,"⁽³⁾ but then mistakenly asserts that "if the standpoint of Engels' critique was humanist, its method of critique remained Hegelian."⁽⁴⁾ Contrary to Jones, the central thesis of this chapter is that Engels never fully understood Hegel and therefore consistently misapplied the Hegelian dialectic. A scrupulous student of the texts of Marx and Engels, Draper agrees with Hobsbawm's interpretation that Engels heightened Marx's sense of political economy and the class struggle of the proletariat and also felt that Engels's *Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy* is "more important now for its effect on Marx."⁽⁵⁾ Opposing the Draper view, later books of this multi-volume study will show that Engels's *Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy* was not an example of Hegelian critique and had little influence on Marx's own critique of political economy.

Shortly after the Bolshevik Revolution, a dissenting school that challenged the theory of the Marx-Engels hyphenation arose. In place of the Siamese Twins Argument, the Dissenters substituted the Discontinuity School which asserted that significant differences separated Marxism and Engelsism. The original Dissenters were Georg Lukacs, Karl Korsch and Antonio Gramsci, and all three focused on the disparities distinguishing Marx's and Engels's interpretation of Hegel and how Marx never surrendered the Hegelian emphasis on subjective critique and political praxis, while Engels distorted the Hegelian dialectic into a metaphysical view of nature and a determinist view

of social evolution. The Discontinuity School was initially represented in Georg Lukacs's *The Young Hegel*,⁽⁶⁾ Karl Korsch's *Marxism and Philosophy*,⁽⁷⁾ and Antonio Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks*.⁽⁸⁾ The Discontinuity School emphasized the divergence between Marx and Engels but did not speak of two separate systems.

The Dissenting School revived in the 1960s, particularly with the wide dissemination and the English translation of Marx's *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. The Dissenting School itself divided into two camps, the Moderate Dissenters and the Radical Dissenters. I am a Radical Dissenter and argue the case that hyphenated Marx-Engels never existed, that in reality two distinct theories of society evolved, one called Marxism and one called Engelsism. I first presented this viewpoint in my book *The Tragic Deception: Marx Contra Engels*.⁽⁹⁾ In this book I isolate the origins of these two theories in the early works of Marx and Engels and demonstrate that the social philosophy of Marxism and the social philosophy of Engelsism can be evidenced as early as 1842.

After the publication of my *The Tragic Deception: Marx Contra Engels*, the Dissenting School was enlarged by the entrance of the works of Terrell Carver. A Moderate Dissenter, Carver rejected the idea of a single Marx-Engels, spoke of a "serious discrepancy between the two,"⁽¹⁰⁾ but stopped short of surgically separating Marx from Engels. Looking upon Engels's *Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy* as Marx's introduction to the study of English Classical Political Economy, Carver further maintains that "Marx's *Capital* was in effect a much elaborated specification of the contradictions discussed by Engels in his *Outlines*."⁽¹¹⁾ Carver's assessment is wrong, and a later volume will prove that Engels's *Outlines* was essentially derivative from the work of Moses Hess and Robert Owen, that the use of Hegel that Engels makes in his *Outlines* is merely linguistic and gratuitous, and that Marx started his study of political economy and the conditions of the working class in England prior to the publishing of Engels's *Outlines* in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*. Another example of the School of Moderate Dissenters is Stathis Kouvelakis's *Philosophy and Revolution*,⁽¹²⁾ and although Kouvelakis does not totally delink Marx and Engels, he succeeds in defining some of the causes of severance by tracing Engels to the Hess and Owen line of development, whereas Marx evolved out of the Heinrich Heine line and the radical wing of French Jacobinism.

A procedural note is in order at this point. My global interpretation is that two overall periods characterized both Marx's and Engels's perception of Hegel. I refer to the first large period as their First Appropriation of Hegel, and this spanned the years from 1837 to 1850; I refer to second large period as their Second Appropriation Of Hegel, and this bridged the years from 1857

to their respective deaths. My current enterprise concentrates on the young Marx's and young Engels's First Appropriation of Hegel.

However, the years 1837 to 1850 must themselves be divided into a first and a second segment. The first segment of the young Marx's and the young Engels's First Appropriation of Hegel covers the years 1837 to 1841 in the case of the young Marx and 1838 to 1842 in the case of the young Engels. The second segment encompasses the years 1841 for the young Marx, and 1842 for the young Engels, to 1850. This periodization is required because significant distinctions separate the segments.

This book concerns itself with the first segment of the young Marx's and young Engels's First Reception Of Hegel. The young Marx and the young Engels left a great deal of literary material to fathom, and the issues to be dealt with are complex, requiring in-depth analysis. It is necessary to move through their archive deliberately, painstakingly, with laser-sharp attention to detail. For these reasons it is obligatory to isolate the young Marx's and young Engels's First Appropriation of Hegel itself into two subdivisions.

This present chapter will be parceled into the following time periods: 1) 1837–Engels's aborted education; 2) 1838–1841, Engels in Bremen; 3) 1841–1842, Engels in Berlin.

The purpose of this chapter is to begin the process of disentangling Marxism and Engelsism, and it will employ Hegel as a criterion of detachment. How the young Marx and the young Engels perceived Hegel will be taken as a barometer of their divergent philosophic paths. Their contrary manner of absorbing Hegel at this early period of their careers acted as the seed for their future intellectual disharmony.

This investigation is primarily directed to the intellectual development of the young Engels, but since its purpose is to erase the hyphenation of Marx-Engels, each of the three time periods will allude to Marx. This is done as a means of demonstrating their divergent paths of intellectual development.

1837–ENGELS'S ABORTED EDUCATION

Born in 1820, the young Engels never graduated from his gymnasium because in 1837 his father removed him from school and put the seventeen-year-old to work in the family textile business.⁽¹³⁾ The young Engels never completed his gymnasium education, never went to the university, and this absence of advanced academic training maimed his intellectual endeavors throughout his entire life. The lack of academic skills, the lack of the requisite philosophic competence to accurately delineate theoretical systems, was a deficiency he never overcame.

Born in 1818, the young Marx first went to the University of Bonn and in 1836 transferred to the University of Berlin. During his course of studies he wrote a revealing letter to his father containing the following sentences:

While out of sorts, I got to know Hegel from beginning to end, and most of his disciples as well. Through several meetings with friends in Stralow I became a member of a Doctor's Club to which some of the instructors and my most intimate friend in Berlin, Dr. (Adolf) Rutenberg, belongs. In discussions many a conflicting opinion was voiced, and I was more and more chained to the current world philosophy from which I had thought to escape.(14)

The same letter also contains this paragraph, which gives us a view of the extent of Marx's intellectual curiosity and scope:

Meanwhile I had acquired the habit of making excerpts from all the books I was reading, from Lessing's *Laocoon*, Solger's *Erwin*, Winckelmann's *History Of Art*, Luden's *German History*. While doing this I scribbled down some reflections. At the same time I translated Tacitus's *Germania*, Ovid's *Tristim Libri*. With the aid of grammar books I began the private study of English and Italian, but as yet have not achieved anything. I read Klein's book on criminal law, and his *Annals*, and a lot of the most recent literature, though the latter only incidentally.(15)

In 1837 the young Marx and the young Engels moved in two entirely different directions. Under his father's promptings, the 17-year-old young Engels moved out into the world of business. He had little formal education and had no knowledge of Hegel, or of philosophy in general.

Pursuing a totally alternative path, the 19-year-old young Marx was already deeply engaged in the thought of Hegel and the Hegelian School. Even though his father wanted him to be a lawyer, the young Marx was already acquiring the habits of philosophic discipline. The young Marx's dedication to detail, his inclination to penetrate in depth, were already refined as testified to by these words to his father: "Meanwhile I had acquired the habit of making excerpts from all the books I was reading," and as evidenced by his collected *Exzerpte* notes in the *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe (MEGA)*.(16)

1838–1841: ENGELS IN BREMEN

This period in the life of the young Engels will itself be divided into the following subdivisions: the young Engels as an intellectual dilettante; the history of Germany; Ludwig Börne; the young German movement; the first segment of the young Engels's First Appropriation of Hegel.

The Young Engels as an Intellectual Dilettante

The young Engels's path to Hegel lay through the Young German literary movement. In 1838 the young Engels moved from Barmen to Bremen where he continued his business education at the export firm of Heinrich Leupold. During the day Engels immersed himself in the world of capitalism, and in the evening he began a career as a freelance journalist. Specializing in literature, he began by writing literary reviews, and his first articles appeared in 1839 in *Telegraph für Deutschland* of Karl Gutzkow, a member of the Young German movement. Hegelian philosophy influenced the Young German movement, particularly the theme that history was a progressive movement determined by the Idea of Freedom, and it was through his reading of the Young Germans that the young Engels became familiar with Hegel.

In his first published work, "Letters from Wuppertal," published in March 1839 in Gutzkow's *Telegraph für Deutschland*, Engels attacked the suffocating religious and political conservatism of the Wupper Valley in which the city of his birth, Barmen, was located. Referring to the Wupper Valley as the "Zion of obscurantism,"⁽¹⁷⁾ the young Engels, expressing the rationalism and social criticism of the Young Germans, satirized his hometown as reactionary in terms of culture, school system, and politics. In particular, the young Engels attacked Pastor F. W. Krummacher whom he identified as the champion of a dark, fundamentalist Calvinism. Krummacher was unswerving in his belief in the Calvinist doctrines of election, predestination, and biblical literalism.⁽¹⁸⁾ The young Engels perpetuated the Young German attack upon religion, and one of the major themes in the young Engels's life from 1839 to 1842 was the warfare between religion and rationalism.

From 1839 until Dec. 1842 the young Engels wrote his journalism under the pseudonym Friedrich Oswald. While in his journalism the young Engels posed as a social rebel, in his private life he could not break with his Pietist father, Friedrich Engels the Elder. It was not until Dec. 1842 that the young Engels, aged 22, attached his birth name to his writings and ended his underground existence and estrangement from his father and family.

The young Engels's divided self, Young German rebel at night and ambitious, rising business entrepreneur during the day, is clearly captured in his early correspondence with his sister Marie Engels and to his friends, the Pastors Friedrich and Wilhelm Graeber, which spanned the years 1838–1842. In essence, the young Engels engaged in two separate correspondences, one with his sister, in which he dealt with the details of his everyday life, in which he ridiculed the stuffiness of bourgeois existence, in which he displayed a touch of bohemianism, in which he never renounced being the scion of the Engels family textile business, and in which he never revealed his underground life; and a second line of communication opened to the Graeber

brothers. In this second line, like a confessional, Engels opened his true soul, clearly articulated his inner turmoil, resisted the Graeber entreaties to embrace Pietism, and left behind the most accurate description of his spiritual travails and decisions from 1838 to his last letter to Friedrich Graeber on Feb. 22, 1841. By 1840 the young Engels was an atheist.

The side of his divided self revealed in his correspondence with Marie Engels is that of a loving family member. The young Engels was one of eight siblings, and he was a faithful correspondent. It is clear from his letters to Marie that he also wrote to his parents and his other brothers and sisters, but only his letters to Marie survived in bulk. The young Engels was four years older than Marie, and his letters to his sister are characterized by the warmth and concern of an older, worldly brother supervising his sheltered sister's education and growth. The young Engels continually admonished Marie to write longer letters and more frequently. Paternal, the letters are also filled with love, and the poem the young Engels wrote about Marie when she graduated boarding school at age 18 was a beautiful incantation to female purity and innocence, but conversely, of a virgin first acknowledging the existence of male admirers.(19)

Regardless of the healthy familial compassion between brother and sister, the young Engels never communicated to Marie either his literary ambitions and successes or his spiritual turmoil. The young Engels was dishonest to his sister and family, and the reflection of the divided self he revealed to them was of an upper bourgeois paragon with slight bohemian tendencies, nothing unusual or worrisome in a young man between the ages of 18 and 22.

The young Engels's psychological need to hide the second reflection of his divided self, his appearance as a socio-political dissident, was testified to in his April 23–May 1, 1839, letter to Friedrich Graeber, in which he implores the pastor to keep his authorship of "Letters from Wuppertal" a secret:

Ha, ha, ha! Do you know who wrote the article in the Telegraph? The author is the writer of these lines, but I advise you not to say anything about it, I could get into a hell of a lot of trouble. . . . I put all five of you under obligation to your word of honor not to tell anyone that I am the author.(20)

The divided self of the young Engels consisted of two parts, the upper bourgeois paragon, and the socio-political dissident. To his family, to his associates at the firm of Heinrich Leupold in Bremen, the young Engels projected the image of the upper bourgeois paragon. The young Engels committed lies of omission, because this was the only way that the half of himself that was the socio-political dissident could remain invisible to his parents, siblings, and business community.

He arrived in Manchester in late 1842 to manage the firm of Ermen and Engels for his father. When Engels functioned during the day as a business

executive and community leader he projected the image of the upper bourgeois paragon, and when he pursued his writing as a Chartist, as a co-author with the young Marx of *The Holy Family*, *The German Ideology*, and the *Communist Manifesto*, he appeared in the guise of the socio-political dissident. His father died in 1860 and Engels maintained this divided self until 1870 when he sold his share in Ermen and Engels and moved to London to devote himself entirely to political agitation.

In his correspondence with Marie, the young Engels presented himself as the upper bourgeois paragon. Boasting to his sister, the young Engels proudly announced his love for horses and his riding lessons,(21) his fencing lessons,(22) his dancing lessons,(23) and his enjoyment of men's clubs,(24) and in his April 25–May 1, 1839 letter to Friedrich Graeber, he brings this missive to an early conclusion explaining that he must rush to attend a singing lesson.(25)

At times, however, the scion of a capitalist fortune exceeded the behavioral norms of the upper bourgeoisie and stepped over into the bohemian. He loved wine, cigars, and coffee, and frequently indulged all in these in excess. In his letter to Marie on July 7–9, 1840, the young Engels described a day at the office of Heinrich Leupold:

We now have a complete stock of beer in the office; under the table, behind the stove, behind the cupboard, everywhere are beer bottles, and when the Old Man (Heinrich Leupold) is thirsty he borrows one and has it filled up again for us later. That is now done quite openly, the glasses stand on the table all day and a bottle nearby. In the right-hand corner are the empty bottles, in the left the full ones, next to them my cigars. It is really true, Marie, the young people are getting worse and worse everyday, as Dr. Hantschke says, who would have thought 20 or 30 years ago of such terrible wickedness as drinking beer in the office?(26)

The young Engels liked to sketch, and his letters to both Marie and the Graeber brothers abound with his work. His August 20–25, 1840, letter to Marie contains a sketch of himself after one of these office drinking bouts: the young Engels reclines in a hammock, his left hand holds a cigar, and he appears to be readying himself for a nap.(27)

The bohemianism of the young Engels came with a cutting edge. A pampered member of the upper classes, he nevertheless ridiculed the stodginess of this kindred strata. As a bohemian renegade of the Barmen-Bremen capitalist class, the young Engels satirized the conformity and stuffiness of this group. He parodied the philistine, and this was his original target in "Letters from Wuppertal."

The sketches that he sent to Marie of people he regarded as philistines satirized their propriety, their lack of individuality, their obedience to class expectations. In a display of defiance the young Engels grew a moustache. The young

Engels considered this a major act of rebellion, and he proudly declared that it made him look Italian.(28) Before moving to Berlin, the young Engels looked upon his bohemianism as an anti-philistine instrument. His bohemianism became a statement of his individual freedom, and the moustache a weapon of protest against conformity; he advocated this strategy in a letter to Marie:

Last Sunday we had a moustache evening there. For I had sent out a circular to all moustache-capable young men that it was finally time to horrify all philistines, and that that could not be done better than by wearing moustaches. Everyone with the courage to defy philistinism, and wear a moustache should therefore sign.(29)

Clothing and personal grooming became instruments of rebellion to the bohemian young Engels, and this posture was exemplified in his attitude toward his military service. When reflecting on the possibility of military service in the fall of 1841, the young Engels assumed the dismissive, disdainful attitude of a member of the privileged classes. "However, I shall be leaving for Berlin in a week or a fortnight to do my duty as a citizen, i.e., to do what I can to evade conscription if possible, and then come back to Barmen. We shall have to wait and see how this turns out."(30) Even after being conscripted into the artillery to fulfill his military obligations, the young Engels persisted in his dismissiveness, looking upon the military itself as philistine. The young Engels sent Marie a sketch of himself dressed in a manner that violated the military code:

Here you see me in uniform with my great coat draped round my shoulder in a most romantic and picturesque fashion . . . but strictly against regulations. If I were to go out like this into the street, I should risk being arrested at any moment . . . which isn't very pleasant.(31)

In Berlin in 1842, as he engaged himself with the Young Hegelian movement for the first time, the upper bourgeois paragon continued his struggle against military philistinism by means of military bohemianism. "Romantic and picturesque fashion" was a sign of protest. The upper bourgeois paragon looked upon "fashion" as a political device. The young Engels had not grown beyond his rebellion against Barmen.

In the same letter in which the young Engels both invests and invents the meaning of "fashion," he does suggest to Marie that he has responsibilities in Berlin other than drinking wine and smoking cigars. For the first time in his correspondence with Marie he alludes to his involvement with the Young Hegelians, to his task to defend Hegel against the philosophical reaction sponsored by Frederick Wilhelm IV, King of Prussia. In his April 14–16,

1842, letter to Marie the young Engels acknowledges that he was attending the lectures of Schelling at the University of Berlin when he stated: "Splendid. The sun is beginning to shine well and truly which I find most delightful, and so I shall go for a walk after dinner, and since Schelling is not lecturing tonight, I shall have the whole to myself and be able to work seriously and without interruption." (32) The other side of the young Engels's divided self wanted to be recognized, wished to see the sunlight. The socio-political dissident could not be suppressed forever.

In his second line of communication, the link that connected him to Pastors Friedrich and Wilhelm Graeber, the young Engels displayed himself as a socio-political dissident. The obverse side of his divided self was allowed to appear in the letters he wrote to his male friends.

The nexus of the intellectual turmoil of the socio-political dissident during the years 1838–1842 was the conflict between reason and religion. The Young Germans were advocates of the superiority of reason, and the socio-political dissident gravitated toward their position. Giving voice to his dual existence, the socio-political dissident described this central dilemma of his Bremen and Berlin years in the April 23–May 1, 1839, letter to Friedrich Graeber:

But nobody tells you this in dear old Barmen, there one is taught according to quite different principles. And on what does the old orthodoxy base itself? On nothing but . . . the old routine. Where does the Bible demand literal belief in its teachings, in its accounts? Where does a single apostle declare that everything he says is directly inspired? This is not surrendering reason in obedience to Christ, as the orthodox people affirm; no, it is a killing of the divine in man to replace it with the dead letters. I am therefore just as good a super-naturalist as I was before, but I have cast off orthodoxy. Thus I cannot even believe that a rationalist who seeks with all his heart to do as much good as possible, should be eternally damned. That is at odds with the Bible itself, for it is written that no one is damned on account of original sin, but only because of his own sins. But if a person resists original sin with all his might, and does what he can, then his actual sins are only a necessary consequence of original sin, and therefore they cannot condemn him. (33)

The socio-political dissident acknowledges his indebtedness to the Young German movement, and on April 8–9, 1839, he wrote to Friedrich Graeber:

Indeed I must become a Young German, or more exactly I am already one in body and soul. I cannot sleep at nighttime because the ideas of the century march through my head; if I stand at the post office and look at the Prussian coat of arms I overflow with the spirit of freedom; every time I read a journal I try to uncover the progress of freedom.

No, I have never been a Pietist, for a time I was a mystic, but that was a passing illusion; now I am, as opposed to other positions, a honorable liberal Supernaturalist, but perhaps I will sooner or later gravitate to rationalism.(34)

The young Engels confirmed his conversion to Young Germany in his June 15, 1839, letter to Friedrich Graeber, which he signed, "Friedrich Engels, Young German." (35) The first reference the young Engels made about David Friedrich Strauss was in his March, 1839, letter contained in his "Letters from Wuppertal," (36) but his June 15, 1839, letter contained his first specific allusion to Strauss's "The Life of Jesus." (37) The Young German Engels was still caught in the bipolar split between religion and reason, but his trajectory toward rationalism was persistent, and he wrote: "I hope to experience a radical transformation of the world's religious consciousness; . . . but I need to clarify that in myself first. I will be able to accomplish that for myself if I have the time to develop these ideas quietly and undisturbed." (38)

The mutability of the young Engels's intellectual beliefs became evident a month later. In a letter written to Friedrich Graeber between July 12 and 27, 1839, he commented on the influence of Friedrich Schleiermacher on his own thought:

I have enormous respect for Schleiermacher. If you are consistent then you must condemn him, because he did not preach Christianity in your sense, but in the sense of Young Germany, such as Theodor Mundt, and Karl Gutzkow. But he was a great man and among contemporaries I only know one man who possesses the same spirit, the same force, and the same courage, and that man was David Friedrich Strauss. . . . That is Schleiermacher's doctrine and I am one with it.(39)

The letter of July 12–27, 1839, is interesting because the young Engels made no attempt to distinguish between Strauss and Schleiermacher; he drew no distinction between the subjectivity of Schleiermacher's religious system and the rationalism of Strauss. Despite his momentary relapse into religious intuitionism, the intellectual trajectory of the young Engels during the critical year of 1839–1840 was toward rationalism.

In October the young Engels wrote to Wilhelm Graeber that he was now an "impassioned Straussian" (40) and threw out the following challenge: If Wilhelm Graeber proved Strauss wrong then Engels would become a Pietist.

One month later, Engels declared himself a convert to Hegelianism, punctuating the transience of his intellectual positions. In his Nov. 13–20, 1839, letter to Wilhelm Graeber, the young Engels wrote:

I am at the point of becoming an Hegelian. I cannot be certain now whether I will make the change, but Strauss provided me with insights into Hegel that made his system very plausible. His (Hegel's) history of philosophy strikes me as beyond doubt as written from his soul.(41)

Between Dec. 9, 1839, and Feb. 5, 1840, the young Engels completed his journey to Hegelianism. On Jan. 21, 1840, he sent these lines to Friedrich Graeber:

I traveled the difficult road to Hegel with the help of Strauss. I will not be an exact copy of Hegel, like Hinrichs, but I will take significant ideas from this colossal system. I have taken as mine Hegel's idea of God, and with that I entered into the ranks of 'modern Pantheists,' as Leo and Hengstenberg say, knowing well that the word pantheism stirs a vast horror in these unthought. . . . The modern pantheism, i.e. Hegel.(42)

The young Engels's embrace of Hegelianism brought his inner turmoil with religion to a close. The resolution of his religious conflicts began when the young Engels became a Hegelian, and the young Engels said as much when he wrote to Friedrich Graeber on Jan. 20, 1840, that he had "no great desire to continue these theological disputes."(43)

The period April 1839 to Jan. 1840 was a critical one for the young Engels because he left theology and entered the realm of philosophy. In these nine months the impressionable young Engels experienced at least three philosophical transformations: he moved via Strauss over Schleiermacher to Hegel. In terms of religion, one additional transformation awaited the young Engels: he must transfer from pantheism to atheism, and this transition he undertook in 1840.

The History of Germany

During his Bremen years the young Engels adopted a Northern German Liberal interpretation of German history. At this period of his life the son of Bar-men was primarily concerned with German history since the Napoleonic Conquest, and in this regard he held an ambivalent assessment of the French Emperor. Napoleon I was a contradiction of liberator and imperialist.

The victor of Jena was a liberator because of the internal reforms he brought to France. The young Engels admired Napoleon I as a liberal reformer, because the progressive policies that Napoleon instituted in France were programs that the young Engels advocated for Prussia. Napoleon's secularization of the state, his destruction of feudal decentralization, his emancipation of the Jews, trial by jury, his codification of the laws, his welcoming of the middle classes into the highest echelons of state government, and his predisposition to Enlightenment were all reforms that the young Engels hoped to see initiated in Prussia.(44)

Conversely, the young Engels was an opponent of Napoleon as subjugator. He was a champion of the 1813 Wars of Liberation that emancipated Germany

from French domination. Born in 1820, after the Battle of Waterloo and the defeat of the French Emperor, the young Engels had no personal memories of the French colonization of Germany, but his opposition to any foreign hegemony over Germany was the root of his ardent nationalism. Even though the son of Barmen opposed Napoleon as conqueror, he admired Napoleon as Enlightenment Reformer, as the embodiment of the world spirit, and wrote two poetic encomiums to the vanquished Emperor. One poem was entitled, "St. Helena" and compared the Emperor to a Greek god, and it contained these lines: "That here on self-made history came to brood, And in Promethean agony died alone." (45) The second poem was written when Napoleon's body was returned to France, and it carried this stanza:

Collapsed his house, tumbled the royal crown,
Gone is the world empire that he dreamed might be.
Like Alexander, without heirs he sleeps
The eternal sleep beneath the laurel tree. (46)

One of the great achievements of this "Alexander" was the Battle of Jena in 1806, and the son of Barmen looked upon this Prussian defeat as the second rebirth of Germany. Prussia and Germany had a pre-1806 and a post-1806 existence. Its pre-1806 existence witnessed a decline into absolutism and a culture of socio-political obedience. The first rebirth of Prussia was the reign of Frederick the Great, whom the young Engels conceived as a significant internal reformer. In this regard, the young Engels was in agreement with Friedrich K  ppen's *Friedrich Der Grosse Und Seine Widersacher* (see chapter 3 of this book). (47) Unfortunately, the Prussian reform movement of Frederick the Great died in the aristocratic stagnation of the subsequent Prussian monarchies. The first rebirth of Prussia was extinguished by the first Prussian reaction.

However, this "Alexander" in 1806 gave rise to the rebirth of Prussian internal reform, the Era of Stein and Hardenberg. The post-1806 Prussia was a "Prussia entirely reborn, a new order of things." (48) Many residues of medievalism were uprooted.

The dreams of German unification unleashed by the Wars of Liberation did not survive the 1815 Congress of Vienna. The results of 1815 again left Germany fragmented between two great monarchies, the Prussian and the Austrian, as well as smaller subordinate kingdoms. In his essay, "Ernst Moritz Arndt," the young Engels lamented the failure of German unification with these words:

Then came the Congresses giving the Germans time to sleep off their intoxication with freedom and wake up to find themselves back in the old relationship of Your Most Gracious Majesty, and Your Most Humble Servant. (49)

The defeat of the nationalist aspirations in Germany signaled that internal reform was also vanquished. The era of Stein and Hardenberg was over, and the domestic politics of Germany in general suffered from a conservative reaction. That was supported by Lutheran and Calvinist orthodoxy. German territorial unification did not take place, but the unity of altar and throne was victorious. This amounted to the second death of German liberalism.

Nevertheless, whatever sparks from the volcano of 1830 still burned in German liberalism burned in Prussia and in the German South. In an essay, "North and South German Liberalism," the young Engels outlined his preference for North German Liberalism.⁽⁵⁰⁾ Prussia took the lead in the 1813 Wars of Liberation and claimed the flag of German leadership. Germanization was the most important need in Germany, and the young Engels looked upon Prussia as the most likely incubator of Germanization.

Germanization meant a national consciousness. Germanization meant the overcoming of German particularism and the recognition that a single national spirit superseded the decentralized monarchical kingdoms. It meant the creation of a single German national identity, and because Prussia assumed the leadership of the German nationalist movement in 1813, the young Engels looked upon the Hohenzollern monarchy as the potential generator of this monolithic national identity.

North German Liberalism, as represented by Prussia, enjoyed the additional advantage of its philosophic heritage. The rich philosophic traditions of Prussia situated this kingdom as the vanguard of Germanization. When talking about philosophy as a source of Germanization, the young Engels thought of Hegelianism. The young Engels wrote that "the newer German philosophy" was "the heart of Germany."⁽⁵¹⁾

One negative aspect of Germanization was the attempt to exclude French cultural influence from Germany. France was the home of the Enlightenment, of materialism, of rationalism, of revolution, and of revolutionary political ideas, and Germanization was taken by some as the building of a national barrier blocking any penetration of French culture. One dangerous aspect of Germanization was the cultural isolation from greater European developments.⁽⁵²⁾

South German Liberalism, although rich in ideas, lacked a territorial core. It lacked a state center that could Germanize Germany or a philosophic tradition that could define a nation. South German cosmopolitanism was not the smithy out of which a single nation could be forged.

In this situation in which the movement toward German unification had stalled, where the impetus toward internal reform had died, the French Revolution of 1830 exploded. For the young Engels, 1830 was the beginning of contemporary history in Germany, because it reignited the call for domestic reform. The young Engels was a product of the generation of 1830. What the

Congress of Vienna buried, the overthrow of the Bourbon Charles X resurrected.

The young Engels presented a cyclic view of late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century German history. The fundamental pattern was a triplicity of eras of liberal reform: the first period was the era of Frederick the Great, the second period was the era of the Wars of Liberation, and the third era was baptized by the French Revolution of 1830. The first two cycles of reform ended with a restoration of monarchical absolutism, and the young Engels hoped this would not prove true of the post-1830 rebirth. Sadly, the third rebirth was also dashed by a conservative reaction.

The intellectual development of the young Engels must be seen as an outgrowth of the revolutionary fervor and success of 1830 in France. His biography is emblematic of the power that events in France exerted on Germany. The intellectual currents passing through these two countries were interconnected. On politico-cultural matters the young Engels did not follow the dictates of Germanization but rather followed the paths of Heinrich Heine and Ludwig Börne and embraced French political Liberalism. Political reform in Germany could not succeed without the infusion of French thought or French political models.

Ludwig Börne

Ludwig Börne was the prophet of the third rebirth of Prussian Liberalism. He was the tribune that awakened Prussia to the liberal demands of the July Revolution in Paris.

The young Engels unsparingly lavished praise on Börne. He seconded Karl Gutzkow's description of Börne as the "modern Moses,"(53) and in his essay "Alexander Jung, 'Lectures on Modern German Literature,'" portrayed Börne in the following sentences:

He [Jung] does not know that as a personality Börne is unique in German history; he does not know that Börne was the standard-bearer of German freedom, the only real man in the Germany of his day; he cannot imagine what it means to rise up against forty million Germans and proclaim the realm of the idea; he cannot understand that Börne is the John the Baptist of the new period, who preaches repentance to the self-satisfied Germans and tells them one mightier will come, who will baptize with fire and mercilessly sweep away the chaff from the threshing-floor.(54)

Börne was both a role model for the young Engels and a Socratic gadfly in the German conscience calling upon them to liberalize their country.

The fact that Börne acted as a role model for the young Engels is amply attested to by the poem that he wrote in July 1840 in honor of Börne. The poem

is called. "An Evening," and contains these lines that express the young Engels's desire to emulate Börne:

I, too, am one of Freedom's minstrels
 'Twas to the boughs of Börne's great oak tree
 I soared, when in the vales of the despots hand
 Tightened the strangling chains round German.
 Yes, I am of those plucky birds that make
 Their course through Freedom's bright aethereal sea.(55)

The correspondence between the young Engels and Wilhelm Graeber is the site for Börne's initial appearance in the thought of the son of Barmen. The earliest reference to the works of Börne is located in a letter to Wilhelm Graeber dated from Bremen between May 24–June 15th, 1839. In this letter, the young Engels indicates that he read the collected works of Börne, volume 1 and volume 2 and describes Börne as "the great fighter for freedom and justice." (56) In another letter to Wilhelm Graeber dated Nov. 13–20, 1839, the young Engels characterized himself as a "large-scale importer of banned books into Prussia." (57)

Among the books, the young Engels illegally funneled into Prussia was Börne's *Franzosenfresser* in four copies, and *Briefe aus Paris*, by the same, six volumes. (58) Wilhelm Graeber was apparently unimpressed with the works of Börne he read, and in the Nov. 13–20, 1839, letter the young Engels describes Börne's *Franzosenfresser* as "unsurpassable," and promises that he will convert Wilhelm Graeber into a Börne enthusiast the next time the two friends meet. (59)

Heine, who exiled himself in France, sought the unity of German philosophy and French radical politics, and the young Engels referred to him as "the new Tannhauser of Heine," (60) but maintained that this "new Tannhauser" was currently in a state of "enervated prostration." (61) Börne, who also went into exile in Paris, had passed beyond Heine and was now the "John the Baptist" of the amalgamation between German philosophy and French revolutionary practice as unleashed by the Revolution of 1830.

Nevertheless, it was Heine's book *Religion and Philosophy in Germany* that first presaged the uniqueness of the coming German political revolution. Published in 1832, *Religion and Philosophy in Germany* argued that German philosophy would eventuate into a political upheaval. Since Luther, Heine maintained, Germany was the epicenter of philosophic speculation, but he believed that a tradition born in the sixteenth century would evolve in the nineteenth century into a revolutionary upheaval. The uniqueness of Germany was that revolutionary practice would emerge from rationalist theory. (62)

Börne was the embodiment of North German Liberalism. He broke the hold that theory exerted in German life and placed the emphasis on practice.

The young Engels's personification of Börne as the living flame of North German Liberalism was captured in these words:

In him practice wrested itself free from theory, and revealed itself as the latter's most beautiful flower. Hence he adopted the standpoint of North German Liberalism firmly, becoming its precursor and prophet.(63)

Börne was synonymous with political praxis and stood in close affinity to Arnold Ruge. Börne was not blind to the need of theory, of philosophy, as a guiding light but placed the emphasis on accomplished reform, and this was his greatest gift to the entire political reform movement in Germany. The young Engels memorialized Börne:

The man of political practice is Börne, and his place in history is that he fulfilled this calling perfectly. He tore the ostentatious finery off the Germanization trend and also exposed the scheme of cosmopolitanism, which merely had impotent, more pious wishes . . . no one described the glory of the deed like Börne. With him all is life, all is vigor. . . . Yet Börne was the first to show the relationship of Germany and France in its reality and thereby did a greater service to the idea than the Hegelians.(64)

The future of German Liberalism lay in the blending of Hegel and Börne, of theory and practice. The young Engels wrote that the "task of our age is to complete the fusion of Hegel and Börne." (65) The two men actually complemented each other, for whereas the thought of Hegel in itself frequently became silted and obscure with theory, Börne's call for action was a healthy, and redemptive way of breaking through this barrier into the light of deeds. Börne was the actualization of Hegelian philosophy.

Heine's formula of the unity of German philosophy and French political practice was alive in the young Engels. The presentation of Heine's formula by the young Engels was German philosophy represented by Hegel and French republicanism as embodied by Börne. As formulated by the young Engels, the synthesis of Hegel and Börne was the propellant of the post-1830 German reform movement.

Indeed, the young Engels saw the synthesis of Hegel and Börne as the seed of the Young Hegelian movement: "There is already a good deal of Börne in Young Hegelianism, and Börne would have little hesitation in signing many articles in the 'Hallische Jahrbucher.'" (66)

Börne was the spiritual ancestor of the Young Hegelians. Börne was the prototype for Ruge.

Börne was also one of the intellectual signposts guiding the young Engels to Hegel. The study of Börne acted as an introduction as well as inducement for him to research Hegel in depth.

The Young German Movement

The young Engels's correspondence with Friedrich and Wilhelm Graeber charts the mutability of his intellectual commitments and his first reception of Hegel, but his writings on the Young German movement provides deeper insight into his understanding of Hegel during the years 1839–1841. In the following paragraphs I will briefly describe the young Engels's assessment of the Young German movement with the focus on how the Young German movement molded the young Engels's initial reception of Hegel. I will write of the position of Hegel in the Young German movement in order to ascertain the position of Hegel in the young Engels.

The Young German movement is mentioned in the young Engels's first published work, "Letters from Wuppertal," and in the letter of April, 1839, he contrasts Calvinist fundamentalism with the progressivism of Heinrich Heine, Karl Gutzkow, and Theodor Mundt.⁽⁶⁷⁾ The young Engels approached the Young Germans as a literary critic and publicist, not as a philosopher. Furthermore, he was a self-taught literary critic, and he wrote newspaper articles in which he evaluated the poetry, drama, and novels of the Young German artists.

The young Engels's relationship to the Young German movement fell into four periods: 1) the young Engels as publicist for Young Germany; 2) the break with Young Germany; 3) from Young Germany to Young Hegelian; 4) the seminal role of Arnold Ruge; 5) the young Engels's First Appropriation of Hegel.

The Young Engels as Publicist for Young Germany

The adherence of the young Engels to the Young German movement dates from his arrival in Bremen in 1838 until late 1840. The document which most fully captures his commitment to the Young German movement is his March–May 1840 essay "Modern Literary Life"⁽⁶⁸⁾ in which the young Engels extolled Gutzkow's literary talents. It must be recalled that in his June 15, 1839, letter to Friedrich Graeber the young Engels already declared himself a "Young German."

Gutzkow exerted a formative influence on the son of Barmen. As the editor of the newspaper *Telegraph für Deutschland* Gutzkow published twenty articles by the young Engels between March 1839 and April 1841 ⁽⁶⁹⁾ and acted as the catalyst to the literary career of the young Engels. The editor of the *Telegraph für Deutschland* supplied the initial encouragement and acceptance of the journalistic output of the son of Barmen and thus launched his literary career. The positive assessment of Gutzkow's work by the young Engels was in part a statement of his gratitude to the editor of *Telegraph für Deutschland*. In addition, it was Gutzkow who introduced the young Engels

to Börne, it was Gutzkow who referred to Börne as the "Modern Moses,"(70) and it was Gutzkow who wrote a biography of Börne.(71)

In another series of articles written for *Telegraph für Deutschland*, the young Engels also documented how Gutzkow was one of those who drew his attention to Hegel. In these articles, the young Engels quotes from Gutzkow's book *Zur Philosophie Der Geschichte* in which Gutzkow comments on Hegel's own philosophy of history.(72) Manifesting the degree to which Young Germany drew the young Engels's attention to Hegel, he made the following observations:

In that case, of course, the point of view would be different, and we could hope for that co-operation between science, and life, between philosophy and the modern trends, between Hegel and Börne, which a section of so-called Young Germany aimed earlier at promoting. Apart from these two conclusions, there remains only one way out, one which, to be sure, looks somewhat strange compared with either of them: namely, to assume that Hegel's influence will be of no importance for belle-lettres. I think, however, that there are few who will be able to make up their minds to adopt this course.(73)

Nevertheless, the help that Gutzkow extended to the young Engels did not preclude their relationship also being marred by disputes. In his book *Marx, Engels and the Poets* Peter Demetz comes close to accusing the young Engels of plagiarism. Demetz points out how the young Engels's early literary evaluations were essentially restatements of previous opinions of Gutzkow.(74) After they parted ways, Gutzkow once referred in a derogatory fashion to the young Engels as "Young German shopkeepers clerk"(75) and in a Dec. 6, 1842, letter regretted that the "sad honor of having introduced E [sic] Oswald to literature unfortunately belongs to me."(76) Other comments by Gutzkow also disparaged the contributions of the young Engels.

Another member of the Young German movement who helped draw the young Engels's attention to Hegel was Karl Mundt. The series of essays, "Retrograde Signs of the Times," called attention to the religious and politically reactionary policies of Friedrich Wilhelm I and identified the Young German movement as a party of opposition against this obscurantism. The young Engels placed Hegel and Mundt in this army of opposition and praised Mundt as "one of the first . . . to speak in his own idiom . . . to introduce Hegelian categories into literature." Mundt was expanding the Hegelian influence beyond philosophy to literature.(77)

In May 1840 the young Engels wrote another series of literary reviews called "Modern Polemics" in which he described the internecine struggles of the Young German movement. This piece of journalism which outlines the animosities between Gutzkow and Mundt foreshadowed the dissolution

of Young Germany. Nevertheless, Mundt is portrayed as a Hegelian advocate, and to the young Engels "Mundt sat in the comfortable shades thrown by the huge branches of the Hegelian system." (78) Mundt was also a reliable guide to the "educational introduction to Hegel and Berlin social life." (79) The change that the young Engels underwent in Dec. 1839–Jan. 1840, the dates of his embrace of Hegel, was underwritten and advanced by the example of Mundt.

It needs to be noted here that by the summer of 1842, in his article "Alexander Jung, 'Lectures on Modern German Literature,'" the young Engels reversed his positive attitude toward Mundt and criticized him as a hindrance to sound philosophical thought.

An additional member of the Young German movement who awakened the young Engels to the thought of Hegel was Friedrich Kühne. The attitude of the young Engels to Kühne underwent some modifications. On Feb. 27, 1840, the young Engels pointed out that Kühne sought to relate Hegel to modern literature and in this regard imitated Mundt. In the series "Retrograde Signs of the Times," the young Engels commented that Kühne's "first volume contains enough passages in which he tries to translate Hegel into the modern idiom." (80) Four months later, on May 26, 1840, in part of the series "Modern Literary Life" the young Engels altered his opinion of Kühne and saw him looking "for a way out of the labyrinth of the Hegelian system." (81)

However, during the years from 1839 until late 1840 the young Engels was a student of literature and was mostly concerned with Hegel's relevance to the arts. The young Engels attempted to ascertain Hegel's importance in the domain of aesthetics. As I will show in succeeding paragraphs how this 1839–1840 approach to Hegel changed.

In addition to sensitizing the young Engels to the importance of Hegel, the Young German movement also presented the son of Barmen with examples of social protest. Using literature as their trumpet, Gutzkow, Mundt, and Kühne were models of resistance against the stultifying Calvinism and Pietism of Germany post-1830. They were nonconformists, and all were influenced by the message of sexual liberation proclaimed by the St. Simonian creed of Pere Enfantin, (82) a message that received resonance in young Engels's bohemianism. Political and social nonconformists, the Young German movement encouraged the young Engels to adopt the role of rebel.

In his defense of Young Germany the young Engels again exhibited himself as a publicist. During the time from 1839 until late 1840 the young Engels acted as an apologist for Young Germany. He was the movement's protagonist and filled newspapers with explanations of and encomiums for their literary productions.

The Break with Young Germany

As I previously stated, by Jan. 1840, the young Engels declared himself a Hegelian. A month later, on Feb. 8, 1840, he wrote the following sentences to Friedrich Graeber:

In addition I am studying Hegel's *Geschichtsphilosophie*, an enormous work; I read out of it dutifully every evening, the tremendous thoughts grip me terribly . . . adhere to Hegel's principle that humanity and divinity are in essence identical.(83)

The rapid movement of the young Engels into the Hegelian camp provided the impetus for his break with Young Germany. The death knell of the young Engels's attachment with Young Germany was stated in his July 1842 essay, "Alexander Jung, 'Lectures on Modern German Literature,'" in which he confirmed that "Young Germany has passed away." (84)

The rupture with Young Germany was brought about by the young Engels movement from literature to socio-political criticism. Recognizing that art could not change the world, the young Engels evolved out of aesthetics to politics and history. The criticism of art was supplanted by the criticism of society.

From Young Germany to Young Hegelian

The Young Hegelians, Ruge, Feuerbach, and Bauer, were living examples that Hegelian philosophy, when joined with political activism, wielded a greater power of reform than literature.

The transition to Young Hegelian was already manifested in the young Engels's Jan. 1841 essay, "Ernst Moritz Arndt." In this series of reviews he interpreted Hegel not as the defender of the Prussian autocracy but as a tribune for politico-social reform. This interpretation of Hegel, which he absorbed from the young Hegelians, supplied the rationale for the young Engels to ally himself with the Young Hegelian movement. In the "Ernst Moritz Arndt" essay, the son of Barmen wrote:

By the side of Börne and opposed to him, Hegel, the man of thought, presented his already completed system to the nation. Authority did not take the trouble to work its way through the abstruse forms of Hegel's system and his brazen style; but then, how could it have known that this philosophy would venture from the quiet heaven of theory onto the stormy seas of actuality, that it was already brandishing its sword in order to strike directly against existing practice.(85)

The young Engels became a young Hegelian when he subscribed to the Young Hegelian interpretation of Hegel as a unity of theory and practice, the marriage of Hegel and Börne. This new conviction, this re-reading of Hegel,

was again expressed in his July 8, 1842, essay, "Alexander Jung, 'Lectures on Modern German Literature'":

The Young Hegelian school has emerged, Strauss, Feuerbach, Bauer, and the "Jahrbucher" now command universal attention . . . the political movement embraced everything. (86)

Leaving aside the essay on "Alexander Jung," the young Engels's conversion to Young Hegelianism transpired before he left for Berlin in late 1841.

The movement of the young Engels into Young Hegelianism is another expression of his intellectual inconsistency. When the young Engels arrived in Bremen in 1838 he became a Young German, but by 1841 he was a Young Hegelian. The span of the young Engels's commitment to Young Germany lasted about one year, and his intellectual dilettantism manifested itself when after roughly twelve months he embraced Young Hegelianism.

The Seminal Role of Arnold Ruge

In the transition which the young Engels made to the young Hegelian movement the personage of Ruge was indispensable. Alongside Börne, Ruge exercised the most influence on the intellectual development of the young Engels.

Ruge first edited the journal *Hallische Jahrbücher*, and when this magazine was repressed by the Hohenzollern Crown, Ruge was not dissuaded from continuing his editorship but began another journal called *Deutsche Jahrbücher*. In both the *Hallische Jahrbücher*, and the *Deutsche Jahrbücher* Ruge presented a Hegelianism which criticized literature and in addition, Prussian politics. The *Hallische Jahrbücher*, and the *Deutsche Jahrbücher* were the voices of Prussian dissent, and Ruge enlisted Hegel as a partisan of this dissenting movement.

The first reference to Ruge's *Hallische Jahrbücher* occurs in the young Engels's "Modern Polemics" review of May, 1840. (87) Thereafter, both the *Hallische Jahrbücher* and the *Deutsche Jahrbücher*, as well as Ruge himself, are frequently mentioned in the letters and essays of the young Engels. Both these journals and Ruge were taken as proof that the spirit of dissent was alive in Germany and that the intellectual father of this rebelliousness was Hegel.

In a May 1840 piece, the young Engels called for an end to the bickering amid the Young Germans writing: "They (Gutzkow and Mundt) should learn from the *Hallische Jahrbücher* that polemics should only be directed against the children of the past, against the shades of death." (88) In the same Dec. 9, 1839–Feb. 5, 1840, letter in which the young Engels declared himself to be in the ranks of the "modern pantheists," he also wrote that only "Gans, Rosenkranz, Ruge were worldly enough" to be the true students of Hegel. (89)

Four months later in an article that appeared in the *Morgenblatt für gebildete Leser* the young Engels again quotes from the *Hallische Jahrbücher* showing that he was a frequent reader of Ruge's journal.(90)

In January 1841, the young Engels wrote another series of reviews for the *Telegraph für Deutschland* with the title "Ernst Moritz Arndt." Ruge's thesis that praxis must be the ultimate result of theory influenced the young Engels because he wrote that the *Hallische Jahrbücher* "associates itself with the program of political praxis." (91) The young Engels realized that just as Strauss had used reason to critique theology, so Eduard Gans and Ruge advocated the use of political praxis to critique the reactionary conditions of the times. The young Engels was aware that Ruge showed that Hegelian philosophy must be used as a instrument of critique against contemporary politics and wrote that it remains Ruge's "service to represent the political side of the Hegelian system in its agreement with the spirit of the times," (92) and that Ruge "openly expressed the free thinking of Hegelianism." (93)

The young Engels began to detach himself from Young Germany because this movement remained too literary; it was immersed in the subjective. Young Germany remained encased in the aesthetic, in the self, and never fully succeeded in seeking to emancipate the objective, the socio-political. By 1841, the young Engels abandoned the priority of the aesthetic, the primacy of the bohemian, and recognized that the essential task of philosophy was to modify the socio-political environment.

The young Engels passed from Young Germany to Young Hegelianism over the bridge of Börne and Ruge. The line of evolution moved from Börne to Ruge to the Young Hegelians, and the young Engels made that pilgrimage.

In his call for the unity of theory and praxis in the style of Ruge, the young Engels clearly prioritized the practical side, but this did not mean that he was blind to the need for theory as a guideline for action, and it was this theoretical requirement which aligned the young Engels to Hegel.

The Young Engels's First Appropriation of Hegel

The young Engels's movement into the ranks of the Young Hegelians was facilitated by his relocation to Berlin in Sept. 1841. His need to fulfill his one-year military service worked to his advantage, because the branch of army service he entered, the artillery, required that he be stationed in Berlin. The Young Hegelian movement was centered in Berlin, and the young Engels gained enormously because in the evenings, after he met his military obligations in the afternoon, he became personally acquainted with the protagonists of the Young Hegelian phalanx. His divided self continued.

At this point in my discussion of the philosophical growth of the young Engels I will explain his approach to Hegel only up until his arrival in Berlin

in Sept. 1841. The most significant writings by the young Engels on Hegel occur in 1842–1843 in his three pamphlets on Friedrich Schelling; however, in order to achieve a complete picture of his understanding of Hegel, to chart the evolution of his comprehension of Hegel between 1841 and his Schelling essays, it is important to fathom what conceptions of Hegel the young Engels carried with him to Berlin and his attendance at Schelling's lectures at the University of Berlin.

His first allusion to a work by Hegel appears in his Nov. 13–20, 1839, letter to Wilhelm Graeber in which he comments on *The Philosophy of History*.⁽⁹⁴⁾ Approximately three months later, in another letter to Friedrich Graeber he again alludes to *The Philosophy of History*.⁽⁹⁵⁾ The young Engels read *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* by Jan. 1841 because he calls attention to it in his essay "Ernst Moritz Arndt."⁽⁹⁶⁾ I also maintain that the young Engels read Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*. At the end of his life the personal library of the then senior Engels contained a copy of *The Philosophy of Right*, and this is documented in the *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe*, part four, vol. 32.⁽⁹⁷⁾ The notation in the *MEGA* affirms that the young Engels had this book in his possession by 1841, and therefore I assume that he read this text by that date.

Both the young Engels, and the young Marx were beneficiaries of the work of Eduard Gans, a friend and colleague of Hegel. After the death of Hegel, Gans organized a group of Hegelian devotees, which carried the name the Friends of the Eternal, and this group, between the years 1831 and 1835, published the collected works of their teacher as they existed at that time. The young Engels knew of the Gans edition of the *Collected Works* because he referred to it in his 1842 brochure *Schelling and Revelation*.⁽⁹⁸⁾ I take it that the young Engels had access to the majority of the Hegelian archive available by 1842.

The presentation of Hegel found in the writings of the young Engels to Sept. 1841 consisted of two dimensions, the political and the philosophical. From the political side, the young Engels was aware that Hegel-himself was not a Young Hegelian. While the Young Hegelians were political reformers, Hegel-himself was a conservative. From the point of view of political allegiance, a great chasm divided Hegel-himself from the Young Hegelians. The Young Hegelians radicalized Hegel-himself, or they interpreted Hegel's idea of rational self-consciousness as an instrument of political critique. From the political perspective, the young Engels was an adherent of Young Hegelian politics and a foe of Hegel-himself politics.

The adherence to Young Hegelian politics did not mean the rejection of Hegel-himself philosophy. The young Engels was an amalgam of Young Hegelian politics and right-wing Hegelian philosophy.

On the philosophical side, the young Engels adopted a right-wing view of Hegel-himself thought. The young Engels was a composite of Young Hegelian politics, and Old Hegelian philosophy.

In committing himself to Old Hegelian philosophy the young Engels also advocated the objective, abstract side of Hegel-himself. The young Engels negated the significance of subjective consciousness.

Embracing the belief that Hegel-himself was an expression of rational pantheism, the young Engels emphasized the role of objective, abstract forces. He argued the case that the objective, the real, was rational, or that reality was a predicate of reason. In his Dec. 9–Feb. 5, 1840, letter to Friedrich Graeber he concurred with the principle of Hegel-himself that divinity and humanity were the same.(99) The rational was the divine, and the divine realized itself in the human world. Therefore, objectivity, reason, took precedence over the individual.

When the young Engels wrote of history as a canvas upon which the Idea printed itself, he puts forth the concept of historical necessity. Rational pantheism committed him to the belief that the unfolding of the Idea was the controlling motif in history. The other side of this assertion is the conviction that it is necessary for history to develop in accordance with the Idea, or necessity was a principle of historical development.

In the same letter to Friedrich Graeber, the young Engels defends the Hegel-himself position that the whole takes precedence over the individual. In making this claim, the son of Barmen alludes to the individual as a partiality. The individual is not complete in itself, and the abstract takes precedence over the subjective. The young Engels diminishes the role of the subjective and subordinates it to the general and abstract.(100)

The driving force of the history of the world was Idea. In his Dec. 9, 1839–Feb. 5, 1840, letter to Friedrich Graeber, the young Engels wrote: "The history of the world is the development of the Idea of Freedom."(101) In the same letter, the young Engels draws a connection between the Hegelian Idea and God, and he wrote that "he accepted the Hegelian idea of God." Engels found in Hegelian rationalism the unifying ground for both reason and religion. Reason took over the same function as religion: it provided a universal synopsis of historical existence. On October 29, 1839, the young Engels wrote to Friedrich Graeber that the Hegelian doctrine was predicated on the existence of a "world soul," and that he agreed with this Hegelian presupposition.(102)

The role of subjective consciousness was not thoroughly grasped by the young Engels. When the young Engels embraced the pantheistic view of Hegel, the belief that the universal Idea was the determinate propellant in history he completely overlooked the importance Hegel assigned to subjective consciousness, particularly in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Subjective consciousness was the primary force of negation, the galvanizing power of historical consciousness.

Empowering the individual, Bruno Bauer maintained that subjective consciousness was the negative force that changed social conditions. The young Engels failed to appreciate the hydraulic power of subjective consciousness because he continued to believe in the speculative concept of “world soul,” or “the development of the Idea.”

Additionally, the young Engels did not fathom the instrumentality of critique. He admired Ruge, who did apply critique to the Prussian state, but Engels did not grasp the protocols for the application of critique.

In Hegel, critique emerged out of the contradiction between essence and appearance, or critique was the divergence between essence and appearance. The in-itself of an object was essence, or the necessary development of a thing was essence. Appearance was a thing’s external manifestation, how a thing showed itself in reality. The protocol of critique in Hegel followed these steps: 1) the essence of an object must first be ascertained, the *telos*; 2) the appearance of an object must be compared to the essence. Critique was the calculation of the disparity between the essence and appearance. The protocol assumed that appearance should correspond as closely as possible to the essence.

The young Engels did not exercise critique because he did not comprehend the Hegelian concepts of essence and appearance. The writings of the young Engels from 1839 until 1841 make no mention of these logical categories. Enriched by a better grasp of Hegel, Bauer, and Ruge, the young Marx also employed the categories of essence and appearance, and so all were equipped to practice critique in the Hegelian sense.

The young Engels also lacked any perception of Hegelian methodology. For him Hegelian methodology reduced itself to the belief that history portrayed the necessary progression of the Idea of Freedom. This was both a simplistic and a distorting view. To select just three categories, the Hegelian methodology was a scheme of explanation that utilized the categories of whole and parts, form and content, and organic development. For Hegel, history was the succession of organic entities, or cultures. These organic entities possessed a whole, a defining core, and the parts of this organic entity reflected the whole. Every historic organism possessed a content, an essence, and the form, or structure, of the social organism was imprinted by the essence. History, for Hegel, was the unfolding of these organic entities, an analysis of the interrelation of whole and parts, a investigation of the interpenetration of the form and content. When the young Engels defined history as the progress of the Idea of Freedom, he interpreted Hegel speculatively and precluded himself from understanding and applying Hegelian methodology.

In his 1838–1841 writings, the young Engels did use the Hegelian term “negation,” proving that he was familiar with this Hegelian category. But when he employed the idea of “negation,” he did so in a non-Hegelian fashion, or

a fashion that violated the core of Hegelian meaning. In his series of reviews of Jan. 1841 entitled "Ernst Moritz Arndt," the young Engels wrote:

Germanness was negation, an abstraction in the Hegelian sense. It formed abstract Germans by shedding every quality that was not of pure German lineage, or did not spring from volkish roots. The positives of German nationalism were negative, for the reminding of Germany of its ideals could only happen through the negation of its contemporary status and development, and the nationalists wanted to push the people back to the German Middle Ages, or even to the purity of the Urgerman from the Teutoberger Forest.(103)

In the above paragraph the young Engels used the term "negation" to mean difference, or the contrast between one state and another. "Negation" meant one thing distinguishing itself from another.

This was not the Hegelian meaning of negation, because his definition of the term comprised three parts, cancellation, retention, subsumption. In the realm of ideas, the act of negation occurs when one concept canceled another, showed that it was no longer relevant, but retained a part of the idea that had been canceled. Negation did not mean extinction, but something of the thing that was negated survived and was absorbed in the new synthesis. Hegel's idea of negation also contained a progressive dimension, the assumption that the new object subsumed the negated thing, that the new object superceded the negated thing.

Another serious flaw in the young Engels's conceptualization of Hegel was his inability to draw distinctions between various philosophers or legal scholars: the young Engels did not group intellectuals in terms of their true definitions or philosophic characteristics. For example, when he described the new life injected into Hegelianism, he wrote this sentence: "Strauss in theology, Gans and Ruge in the political field were all epoch making." (104) The young Engels was incapable of making delineations among these three men. Strauss did not belong to the Young Hegelian school, and his book *The Life of Jesus*, did not breathe new life into Hegelianism but rather caused the disruption of the Old Hegelians. Strauss used reason to criticize the New Testament, but this did not make him a Hegelian. Major differences separated Gans and Ruge.

Eduard Gans was a vital figure in the transition from Hegel to the Young Hegelians. A Jew, Gans was initially denied an appointment to the faculty of law at the University of Berlin by Friedrich Karl von Savigny on anti-Semitic grounds. After a long struggle, Gans triumphed over the opposition of Savigny, and began teaching law at the University of Berlin after his conversion to Christianity.

He became a personal friend of Hegel, and when Hegel died in 1831, Gans organized the "Society of Friends of the Eternal," a group of colleagues who

sought to perpetuate the works of Hegel, and under the direction of Gans issued in 1835 the first collected edition of all of Hegel's works that were available at that time. Gans himself died in 1839.

Advocate of the French Revolution of 1830, Gans was a powerful force in the creation of a Liberal Hegelianism. He was a German Liberal and opposed the conservative politics and legal theory of Savigny, a leading member of the German Historical School of Law, and a defender of Prussian autocracy. Hegel and Gans both refuted the legal positivism of the Historical School of Law. Gans not only inspired Liberal Hegelianism, but helped pass this tradition on to the young Marx. During the young Marx's studies in law at the University of Berlin, he took two courses from Gans and was influenced by Gans's theory of law and property.

Although Gans was greatly influenced by the 1830 French Revolution, he was not a Young Hegelian in the style of Ruge. Gans died in 1839, a year before the Young Hegelian movement found its inception. Gans was a Liberal, Ruge was a Republican. While he did employ the Hegelian method of critique, Gans did not believe in the absolute independence of subjective consciousness.

An opponent of the legal positivism that Savigny espoused, Gans wedded Hegel's theory of historicity to legal systems. Rejecting the idea that law accurately reflected the existent conditions of a society, the copy-theory of law, Gans proposed instead that legal systems changed as social systems changed. In his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, Hegel argued that philosophic systems were expressions of the ideas of the time, and Gans expanded that vision to the theory that legal systems also mirrored the ideas of their time.

True to Hegel, Gans looked upon social systems as organic units in which the parts imaged the whole. Gans maintained an anatomical perception of social systems; societies were holistic entities, and one of the mechanisms they employed to maintain themselves was to ensure that the parts functioned toward the end of sustaining the whole.

Gans wrote several studies on the history of property. He advanced the notion that property relations were historical. For the most part, he studied property relations in Europe and specialized in the decline of Roman theories of property and the origins and development of Germanic ideas on property. He attacked Savigny's legal positivism by showing that the laws governing property relations were not eternal but rather subject to the evolutionary processes of history.

The influence of Gans on the young Marx was substantial. Through his teacher, the young Marx learned that private property was not a fixed order of the universe but conversely that property relations were evolutionary, they were parts of the anatomy of a society they helped configure and sustain.

The new theory of property that emerged in Berlin in the first three decades of the nineteenth century followed the line of progression from Hegel to Gans to the young Marx.

These flaws in the young Engels's comprehension of Hegel do not completely encapsulate his *First Appropriation of Hegel* until 1841. On the positive side, the young Engels understood the theory-praxis program of the Young Hegelians. Following Ruge, the young Engels fathomed that reason must expose the defaults of reality and praxis was political action to bring reality into closer coincidence with reason. On the other hand, the young Engels did not grasp that the theory-praxis activity took place in subjective consciousness. It was the procedure of Ruge, Bauer, and the young Marx that the agency which exposed the fault line between reality and idea was self-consciousness. The young Engels followed a different path, holding instead that the universal Idea in its march to Freedom would disclose the disjuncture between the rational and the existing.

His final embrace of Hegelianism also brought his struggle between religion and rationalism to a close. By embracing Hegel, the young Engels also became a rationalist, only in his case it was a metaphysical rationalism.

The path of development of the young Marx between the years 1839 and 1841 completely diverged from that of the young Engels. While the young Engels devoted these two years to being a publicist for the Young German movement, the young Marx made a professional examination of not only the philosophy of Hegel but of Epicurus and Democritus as well.(105) While the young Engels wrote book reviews for foreign newspapers, while he read exhaustively in contemporary German literature, the young Marx spent 1839–1841 excavating philosophical literature, and his bibliography to his dissertation demonstrated a deep probe into the classics of western philosophy.(106)

The young Marx's doctoral dissertation, *The Differences Between Democritus' and Epicurius' Philosophy of Nature*, stamps the first period of his First Appropriation of Hegel. Heavily influenced by the work of Bruno Bauer, *The Differences* represented a break from the Old Hegelians and was a manifesto for the Young Hegelians.

The young Marx incorporated Bauer's ideas regarding subjective consciousness and critique. Bauer broke with Old Hegelianism, with Hegelian pantheism, and instead of judging history as the march of the Idea rather saw progress as evolving from the employment of critique by the subjective consciousness. Bauer followed Hegel in defining critique as a comparison of reality against the criteria of essence, or the what is against the should. But Bauer revised Hegel over the notion of subjective consciousness. Whereas Hegel was suspicious of subjective consciousness, seeing it as a factor that brought about the decline of Athens and Socrates and a factor that encouraged the Reign of

Terror and Robespierre, Bauer maintained that the use of the weapon of critique by subjective consciousness was the key to historical progress.

In the first period of the young Marx's First Appropriation of Hegel Marx's Hegel was Bauer's Hegel, or the young Marx comprehended the core message of Hegel to be critique carried out by subjective consciousness.

The young Marx applied this conviction to his comparison of Democritus and Epicurus. Democritus belonged to the tradition of Greek empiricism and believed that all knowledge derived from sense perception. Epicurus, whom the young Marx thought more significant than Democritus, utilized subjective consciousness. Epicurus did not apply critique but did propose that individual consciousness allowed concepts to interpret the operations of nature. Epicurus did not believe that sense perception explained the functions of nature but believed that concepts were necessary to organize these experiences and that subjectivity was the ground of these concepts.

To the young Marx of 1839–1841, Hegel was the unity of subjectivity and critique, or Hegel was Bauer's vision of him. The young Marx not only embraced a Bauerian Hegel, but used this Bauerian Hegel to criticize Hegel's *History of Philosophy*. The young Marx did not accept Hegel's vision of the history of philosophy as the evolution of Freedom, nor did he accept Hegel's view that Epicurus, a member of ancient Stoicism, was indicative of the decline of Greek and Roman thought. In his *History of Philosophy* Hegel stated that Epicurus, the Stoics, and the Skeptics, brought the great age of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle to an end.⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ Contrary to Hegel, Marx believed that Epicurus rejuvenated classical philosophy. Epicurus was not an instance of decline but rather a voice for the rejuvenation of philosophy, the redefinition of philosophy as subjectivity, and consequently the rebirth of philosophy as a force of progress.

The young Marx fought against the use of abstract concepts as constitutive powers in history. The Marx of 1839–1841 already rebuffed any suggestion that supersubjective forces predicated the direction of human events. The young Marx stood against the abstract and in its place substituted subjective critique. The young Marx continued his struggle against Old Hegelianism abstraction in his 1843 *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of State*.

By 1841 major schisms separated the approaches of the young Marx and the young Engels to Hegel; one of these dissimilarities related to the question of history and the second to the exercise of critique. In the area of history, the young Engels read Hegel as a pantheist, as a philosopher of the abstract Idea: the abstract as causality. In his dissertation, the young Marx did not expound a theory of abstract historical causality but rather saw causality as emerging out of the subjective. For the young Marx it was not Idea that was telos but rather subjective consciousness asserting itself in different historical periods. The young Engels committed the same error of which Marx accused Hegel in

his *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of State*, of perpetuating, i.e., allowing an Idealist substance to replace human social activity.(108) In 1841 the young Engels was guilty of the Hegelian Fallacy according to Marx, the displacement of causality from the subjective to the transcendental.

In the area of critique, while the young Engels understood the theory-praxis category, he was uninformed about the essence-appearance category. In the 1838–1841 period, the young Engels never exercised a full deployment of critique in the young Hegelian fashion. Rational pantheism superseded subjective consciousness.

1841–1842: ENGELS IN BERLIN

When the young Engels arrived in Berlin in Sept. 1841, he assumed a role he was psychologically inclined to play. Just as he acted as a protagonist for the Young German Movement, now he was to play the role of advocate for the Young Hegelians.

In his capacity as a publicist for the Young Hegelians, the young Engels found it necessary to defend the Young Hegelian movement against a broad front of detractors which included Schelling, Heinrich Leo, and Ernst Wilhelm Hengstenberg, and his nemesis from the Wuppertal days, F. W. Krummacker. The young Engels took up arms against the entire scope of the Prussian reaction brought about by Friedrich Wilhelm IV, the attempt to reimpose Lutheran religious orthodoxy, monarchical authority, and cultural-philosophical conformity on the politics of absolute kingship. Polarization characterized Berlin for the young Engels, a confrontation between the forces of the religio-political Right, and the forces of reform as represented by the Young Hegelians.(109)

In March 1842, the young Engels published a brochure called *The Triumph of Faith*,(110) a long poem, four cantos, which offers a portrayal of the Young Hegelians and the extreme Right Wing of Prussia. Primarily, the poem is of interest because it offers membership lists of the two antithetical camps.

The camp of religious orthodoxy–political authoritarianism–philosophical conservatism was peopled by Leo-Hengstenberg-Krummacker-Schelling. They were advocates of the Prussian monarchy.

The camp of reform is filled by the Young Hegelians, and the young Engels included in this camp: Bruno Bauer, Edgar Bauer, Arnold Ruge, Karl Friedrich Köppen, Max Stirner, Eduard Meyen, Ludwig Buhl, Otto Wigand. Fond of drawing, the young Engels sketched a meeting, which included all of the above, of those he listed as the Young Hegelians.(111)

Although not included in the above-mentioned sketch but referred to in the poem as Young Hegelians were Ludwig Feuerbach, Adolf Rutenberg, Karl

Marx, and Friedrich Engels. It is worthwhile quoting the poetic description of the young Marx he had not yet met. The young Engels first met Marx in Cologne in late November 1842. Regardless of this factual discrepancy, the young Engels said this of the young Marx:

A swarthy chap of Trier, a marked monstrosity,
He neither hops nor skips, but moves in leaps and bounds,
Raving aloud. As if to seize and then pull down
To Earth the spacious tent of heaven up on high,
He opens wide his arms and reaches for the sky.
He shakes his wicked fist, and raves with a frantic voice
As if ten thousand devils had him by the hairs.(112)

The young Engels's imaginary construction of the young Marx pictured him in a Feuerbachian mode, as reducing the divine to the earthly, as substituting the anthropological for the religious.

The young Engels described himself in the following manner:

Right on the very left, that tall and long-legged stepper
Is Oswald, coat of grey and trousers shade of pepper.
Pepper inside as well, Oswald the Montagnard;
A radical is he, dyed in the wool, and hard,
Day in, day out, he plays upon the guillotine a
Single-solitary tune and that's a cavatina,
The same old devil-song; he bellows the refrain:
Form your battalions. To arms, citizens.(113)

In this self-portrayal the young Engels referred to himself as a "Montagnard," a follower of Robespierre, and by making this association with the Jacobins wing of the French Revolution, he established that by March 1842 he became a revolutionary democrat. It is only when the young Engels became a Young Hegelian that he became a revolutionary.

The young Engels continued to hide his identity behind the pseudonym "Oswald." Even as late as March 1842, the young Engels persisted in his intellectual bipolarity; he needed to hide his true self behind a verbal subterfuge.

In the poem *The Triumph of Faith*, the young Engels enclosed the Young Hegelian movement inside the Berlin Free. The fact that the young Engels synthesized the Young Hegelians with The Free is shown in the text of *The Triumph of Faith*.

In one passage in which all the Young Hegelians show themselves as devoid of courage, the Devil, whose legions they are, admonishes them:

The Devil walks straight in. "You wretched
trash, for shame."
He castigates the Free ones with a tongue
of flames
You think you're heroes, while your
courage quite deserts you
As soon as you get banned, or when the
censor cuts you.(114)

In another passage, the poem depicts Arnold Ruge assembling his colleagues in the Young Hegelian movement:

Then Arnold summons all those of the Free persuasion
To meet at Borkenheim in Hellish congregation.
Arise, you Free ones all. How can you sit so tight
When the Romantics plunge the whole world into night?(115)

The young Engels included the young Marx in the Young Hegelian movement, and therefore when the young Engels subsumed Young Hegelianism into The Free, he necessarily also absorbed the young Marx into The Free. As editor of the Cologne *Rheinische Zeitung*, Marx had difficulties with the Berlin Free. Clearly, the question of The Free was one reason why the young Engels's meeting with the young Marx in late November 1842 went badly. While the young Engels considered himself a member of The Free, the young Marx had serious reservations regarding members of The Free, for example, Max Stirner and Eduard Meyen. The fact that the young Engels identified the young Marx as an associate of The Free in his poem *The Triumph of Faith* was also a serious point of contention between the two, if one assumes that the young Marx knew of this poem.

The young Engels grouped these twelve individuals under the category of The Free and thereby displayed his inability to distinguish between separate schools of thought. He forged an arbitrary collectivity of persons, and this decision documented the insufficiency of his analytic abilities.

According to the young Engels's systematization, Bauer and Feuerbach were representatives of The Free, but the young Engels made no attempt to delineate between these two philosophers. Bauer was the apostle of critical self-consciousness while Feuerbach was the missionary of anthropological humanism. Great differences separated Bauer's commitment to self-consciousness from Feuerbach's dedication to social being. Bauer belonged to the critical rationalist tradition, was an outgrowth of Kant-Fichte-Hegel tradition, while Feuerbach was an advocate of naturalism, a descendent of Pierre Gassendi and the revival of antique materialism, and the John the Baptist of sexual liberation.

The young Engels failed to discuss any of these distinctions or qualifications, and in so doing left an erroneous impression of intellectual unity between not only Bauer and Feuerbach, but also with all the men the young Engels referred to as The Free.

Great differences also distinguished Arnold Ruge and Max Stirner. Ruge was primarily a political activist, while Stirner was one of the founders of nineteenth century anarchism. Ruge wished to change political circumstances, while Stirner was apolitical, concentrating on the absolute intellectual freedom of the individual. Ruge was concerned with the organization of massive groups, parties, as the instrument of political reform, while Stirner regarded any group as an infringement on subjective freedom and allegiance to any community as an abridgement of the independence of the individual. The young Engels did not draw attention to any of these discontinuities between Ruge and Stirner, and such an oversight suggests that the young Engels was unaware of them.

The young Engels presented The Free as a bloc, and the common element that bound the members together was their opposition to the status quo; the Young Hegelian movement was a camp of resistance. A journalist, the young Engels advertised them as a progressive force, the vanguard of change. Nevertheless, a vacancy existed in the young Engels's presentation: he provided the argument of a bloc interpretation but was incapable of analyzing the specific characteristics of the thought of the members of the bloc that individuated them.

The Triumph of Faith was a poetic rendition of the resistance movement to the autocracy of Friedrich Wilhelm IV. *The Triumph of Faith* portrays Bruno Bauer as the leader of the legions of the Devil. Hegel was the teacher of Bauer, and The Free were led by Bauer; The Free were the army of rationalism, and in the poem they were also the minions of the Evil One. The army of Bauer clashes with the battalions of Friedrich Wilhelm IV, commanded by Leo and Hengstenberg and Krummacker, or the troops of the Hohenzollern-Protestant synthesis. The fusion of Lutheranism and Monarchy, the marriage of Church and State, is lyricized in *The Triumph of Faith* as the foundation of the conservative order. In this battle between the religious-political amalgamation and rationalism the victory goes to Faith; the banners of Leo, Hengstenberg, and Krummacker dominate the battlefield. This poem is a warning: it is a signal that the triumph of the religious and political orthodoxy is sorrowfully an introduction to an age of obscurantism.

The Triumph of Faith was not the only document produced by the young Engels in his capacity as a protagonist for The Free. His role as protector of the Young Hegelian Movement led him to write additional screeds against the *Evangelische Kirchen-Zeitung*.

This newspaper and the people associated with it, Leo and Hengstenberg, led the battle against Hegel from the orthodox religious position. The *Evangelische*

Kirchen-Zeitung understood the contemporary intellectual battle in Prussia as a mortal conflict between two schools of thought, religious fundamentalism and philosophic rationalism. As a strategy in its defense of religious fundamentalism, Leo, as the major spokesperson for the *Evangelische Kirchen-Zeitung* tried to discredit Hegel, who Leo viewed as the major exponent of philosophic rationalism. Leo published a book, *Die Hegelingen*, in which he tried to discredit not only Hegel but the entire Young Hegelian Movement that perpetuated the rationalism of their mentor.

In the warfare between religion and reason, the young Engels assumed the position of publicist for both Hegel and the Young Hegelian Movement. An early April 23–May 1, 1839, letter to Friedrich Graeber, at the exact time that the young Engels in Bremen was involved in his own personal struggle between faith and idea, contains a poem entitled “Horned Siegfried.” (116) Leo’s book, *Die Hegelingen*, sought to blemish the work of Karl Michelet, a Liberal Hegelian, and in this poem the young Engels portrays Leo as a obscurantist and Hegel and Michelet as the philosophic liberators of German thought.

The young Engels persisted in his role as protagonist of the Young Hegelian Movement against Leo in an 1842 essay he wrote for the young Marx’s *Rheinische Zeitung*. (117) In this essay, “Polemic Against Leo,” the young Engels again defamed the intelligence of Leo as a means of defending the entire Hegelian Movement, and by so doing, led the publicist counterattack against Leo’s *Die Hegelingen* and the *Evangelische Kirchen-Zeitung*.

At this developmental stage of the first period of the young Engels’s First Appropriation of Hegel he was fortunate to find himself in Berlin. The monarch, Friedrich Wilhelm IV, brought Friedrich Schelling to the University of Berlin. A youthful friend of Hegel at the Tübingen Seminary, a professional advocate who helped bring Hegel to the University of Jena, Schelling later broke with his youthful companion and became a forceful philosophical opponent of Hegel, one who denounced the negativity of Hegelian philosophy. The battle between religion and philosophy passed beyond Leo and into the lecture halls of the University of Berlin, and since the young Engels was in the capital, it was possible for him to attend the lectures of Schelling.

Just as the young Engels played the role of Hegelian publicist against Leo, he again played the role of Hegelian publicist against Schelling. During the years 1841–1842, the young Engels assumed the role of Hegelian protagonist against the anti-Hegelianism of Schelling.

Five works on Hegel and Schelling poured from the young Engels’s pen during the 1841–1842 period. These works were *Schelling on Hegel*, *Schelling and Revelation*, *Schelling, the Philosopher in Christ*, “Diary of a Guest Student,” “Alexander Jung: ‘Lectures on Modern German Literature,’” which contains valuable insights into how the young Engels read Hegel.

The five essays are vital to any attempt to reconstruct the young Engels's reading of Hegel during the first period of his First Appropriation of Hegel. They offer the best insights into his comprehension of Hegel from 1841 until 1842, and also show a continuity of his thinking from the 1838–1841 years. Previous paragraphs in this chapter outlined the young Engels's approach to Hegel during the 1838–1841 years, and this present discussion of these five essays, from the 1841–1842 years, will expose the continuity of his Hegelian assessment.

The longer productions of the young Engels on the Hegel-Schelling controversy were both published as independent brochures. The work *Schelling and Revelation* was published as an anonymous brochure in Leipzig in 1842, and the work *Schelling, The Philosopher in Christ*, was published as an anonymous brochure in Berlin in 1842. His essay "Schelling and Hegel" appeared in Gutzkow's *Telegraph für Deutschland* and was signed "Friedrich Oswald." His essay "Diary of a Guest Student" appeared in the young Marx's *Rheinische Zeitung* in May 1842 and was also signed "Friedrich Oswald." The review on "Alexander Jung" was published in Ruge's *Deutsche Jahrbücher* in July 1842 and was signed "Friedrich Oswald."

The young Engels continued his divided self during his entire residence in Berlin. In the afternoon he was Friedrich Engels the artillery officer, while in the evening he was Friedrich Oswald the radical. The young Engels persisted in his divided self until he left the continent for England in late Nov. 1842, and he used his own name for the first time when he wrote the article "The Attitude of the English on Their Internal Crisis" for the young Marx's *Rheinische Zeitung* on Dec. 8, 1842.(118) Until that time the young Engels never gave public acknowledgment of his own political conscience.

In order to properly assess the young Engels's comprehension of the thought of Hegel, I will divide my analysis into the following categories: I) Schelling; II) The Accommodationist; III) Philosophic Principles; IIIA) The History of Hegelianism; IIIB) Reason and Necessity; IIIC) Idea and Reality; IIID) Subjectivity and Objectivity; IIIE) *The Phenomenology of Spirit*; IIIF) The Dialectic; IIIG) *Schelling, The Philosopher in Christ*; IIIH): The Absence of Hegel.

Schelling

Schelling and Hegel first met at the Tübingen Seminary in 1790, and the two young men shared a room there during their student years. The two were joined by the future poet Friedrich Hölderlin, and the three friends shared an admiration for the French Revolution. Schelling went so far as to translate the "Marseillaise" into German.(119) Hegel left the Tübingen Seminary in 1793, and the two men did not meet again until 1801 when Hegel joined the faculty at the University of Jena.

Schelling was the first of the two to arrive at Jena and actually assisted Hegel in getting a position there. While they were colleagues at Jena, Schelling and Hegel co-edited a journal, *The Critical Journal of Philosophy*. Due to a personal scandal, Schelling was forced to leave Jena in 1803, and the two friends thereafter went separate ways.

During his formative years, Hegel was influenced by Schelling's romantic philosophy of nature. Gradually, however, as Hegel matured he disassociated himself from Schelling, and Hegel's *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) represented his break with Schelling. Hegel sent a copy of the *Phenomenology* to Schelling, but recognizing the rupture, Schelling never responded directly to the book.

The rupture between Schelling and Hegel widened, and sometime between 1833 and 1837, when Schelling was teaching at the University of Munich, he delivered a series of lectures denouncing the Hegelian system. Hegel had died in 1831, so shortly after Hegel's death, Schelling, whose reputation and respect in philosophic circles had plummeted, launched his assault on the Hegelian system. In addition, by the 1830s Schelling's former republican sympathies were transformed, and he became a defender of the monarchical order. As a reward for his anti-Hegelianism, for his interest in religion, for his political conservatism, Schelling was brought to the University of Berlin to lead the war against the Hegelian tradition. Once friends, now philosophical opponents, Schelling gave his first anti-Hegelian screeds on Nov. 15, 1841.

These 1841 lectures were the ones the young Engels attended. He was not the only significant literary figure to attend as the audience also included Søren Kierkegaard and Mikhael Bakunin.

The central dividing point between Schelling and Hegel concerned the role of reason. Schelling accused Hegel of espousing a negative philosophy, a philosophy in which mind, or subjectivity, negated objectivity. The dialectic of consciousness in Hegel appeared to be a formula by which mind constantly negated the objective, and the dialectical made the unity of subject and object an impossibility.

Schelling also charged that mind could never certify being. Negative philosophy, which claimed the exclusivity of reason, must always be contained within reason. The dialectic, purely a procedure of consciousness, must remain within consciousness, could never pass beyond it, and thus could offer no proof of being. Negative philosophy was incapable of grappling with the ultimate questions of existence. Hegelianism could never become a philosophy of pure identity.

Schelling subscribed to a positive philosophy, a system of thought calculated to construct the abstract unity of subject-object. Whereas Hegel was imprisoned inside negativity, in which reason functioned by negating, Schelling

espoused a positive philosophy in which reason was the outgrowth of nature and therefore one with nature.

Schelling posited the existence of three universal potencies, mind, nature, or consciousness, or the unity of the first two. The first potency was mind, the second was nature, and these two forces were joined at the “point of indifference.”(120)

This “point of indifference” was the simultaneous manifestation of mind and nature, it was the moment of coexistence between mind and nature. There was no opposition, no contradiction, but complementarity. Emerging out of this complementarity was consciousness, and consciousness became the product of the unity of the subject and object, or the identity of spirit, and objectivity.

Schelling gave rise to a romantic nature philosophy. While Hegel eventually adopted a philosophy of nature, Schelling was committed to nature philosophy. A philosophy of nature concerned the forms imposed upon the physical world by mind, an interpretation of how nature functioned. A nature philosophy studied the forces released by nature in mind or the forms and powers embedded in mind by nature. In the philosophy of nature it was reason that determined the rationality of nature, while in nature philosophy, reason itself was an outgrowth of natural potencies, or the evolutionary spirals of mind were empowered by nature.

In addition, since Schelling argued that reason could not prove being, then being existed outside of reason and was only open to the powers of intuition. The fact that being was immune to reason, deterred reason, meant that being was only accessible to religious intuitions. Toward the end of his life, Schelling was led to extensive religious speculations as he saw this intuitionism as the only avenue to being.

When the young Engels attended these Nov. 1841 lectures of Schelling he experienced them as another act in the struggle between religion and rationalism. Given the intellectual position of Schelling in 1841, his recourse to the supernatural, the young Engels understood these lectures as another phase in the warfare between faith and reason, the same battles that were outlined in his correspondence to the Graeber brothers. The defense of Hegel put forth by the young Engels was a defense of the superiority of reason over faith. Hegel was correct, and Schelling was wrong, because Hegel was the spokesperson of the Idea, while Schelling was the apologist of supernatural forces.

The young Engels put Schelling in the same camp as Leo. They were both pawns in the hands of the Prussian reaction to disprove Hegel. The role of the young Engels against the Leo-Schelling coalition was to act as a publicist for Hegel. As one of the “Hegelian gang,” condemned by Leo, the young Engels defined his role as Hegelian advocate to reveal the Leo-Schelling alliance as

a simple mouthpiece of Prussian Lutheran orthodoxy. This task called upon the young Engels to uphold Hegel as the champion of human rationality.

The Accommodationist

The young Engels drew a distinction between Hegel-himself and the Young Hegelians, or The Free. Politically and philosophically, Hegel-himself was conservative, while it was The Free who took certain categories of Hegel's philosophy and radicalized them.

The accommodationist tendencies in Hegel-himself derived from his definition of philosophy, "that every philosophy was only an expression of the ideas of its time." (121) Just as Hegel-himself believed that philosophy was a manifestation of its cultural environment, so Hegel-himself believed that his theory of the state should reflect the attitudes of the Prussian monarchy during the Restoration period.

The young Engels maintained that Hegel-himself viewed the state as a projection of the world of spirit. In his 1842 essay "Alexander Jung: 'Lectures on Modern German Literature,'" the young Engels wrote in a clear reference to the *Philosophy of Right*: "Did not Hegel do the same? For him, was not the state a transition to world history, and in the relationship between internal and external politics was it not the concrete reality of absolute Spirit?" (122) The young Engels also argued that Hegel's political theory was also "elevated to a Prussian philosophy of state." (123)

The political accommodationism of Hegel-himself was aggravated by the opaqueness of his literary style. It was extremely difficult to understand the "abstruse form of the system and Hegel's dense manner of writing." (124) The impenetrable nature of both language and system was one reason why Hegel-himself during his lifetime exerted little influence beyond the lecture hall. (125)

The young Engels presented a Right Wing view of Hegel-himself. In the young Engels, Hegel-himself emerged as an apologist for the Prussian crown. In the brochure *Schelling and Revelation* the young Engels described Hegel-himself in the following terms: "His political views, his interpretation of the English theory of the state, was undeniably stamped by the era of the Restoration, and he never grasped the world historical significance of the July Revolution." (126)

In addition, Hegel's political conservatism was also a consequence of the more positive aspects of his philosophy. Hegel's idea that the real was rational meant that he had philosophical justification to assume that the Prussian monarchy was rational in its time, necessary, and something one needed to accommodate. (127)

Philosophic Principles

On the philosophic level, however, Hegel's system contained theoretic categories which could become foundations for a progressive philosophy. Hegel himself did not see the radical potential of his own philosophy, and while he originated these categories, he never applied them to criticize existent political conditions and advance the cause of reform. This is the task the Young Hegelians embarked upon.

Concepts like negation, contradiction, self-consciousness, dialectic, the Idea, Freedom all found their points of origination in Hegelian thought. In Hegel-himself all these concepts buttressed his Right-Wing tendencies, and it was only The Free, a new generation, who used them as the structure of a revolutionary philosophy.

But The Free had to wait for the publication of the collected works, a mission performed by Eduard Gans. "The publication of his collected works, especially the lectures, had an immeasurable effect." (128) The development of the Idea of Freedom, the progressive improvement in the history of humanity, concepts which formed the telos of *The History of Philosophy*, *The Philosophy of History*, and *The Philosophy of Religion*, served as an inspiration, a point of ignition for The Free movement. Ruge, who formed one wing of The Free, fused the Hegelian notion of Freedom with the belief in political praxis, or the doctrine that the most effective way to encourage Freedom was through progressive change in the political constitution; this was the camp to The Free to which the young Engels belonged.

The History of Hegelianism

In his brochure *Schelling and Revelation*, the young Engels wrote that Hegel completed the foundations of his world outlook by 1810 and that his systematic presentation of this global vision was in place by 1820. (129)

The dates of the publication of the major works of Hegel are: *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, 1807; the complete *Science of Logic*, 1816; *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, 1817; *The Philosophy of Right*, 1820. These were the works which the young Engels considered as composing the core of the Hegelian system. The Gans edition of the collected works of Hegel appeared between 1831 and 1835, and it included the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, the *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, and the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*. The young Engels knew of these works, as I indicated in preceding paragraphs; he recognized that the lectures played an important role in the Young Hegelian Movement, but he himself did not consider them definitive to the Hegelian system. The Gans edition does contain some early essays by Hegel, essays that predate the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit*, but the young Engels did

not allude to them. He took the *Phenomenology* as the opening statement of the system and the *Philosophy of Right* as the concluding statement.

The Philosophy of Right exercised an enormous impact on the young Engels, specifically the Hegelian sentence that what was real was rational and what was rational was real. In the essay *Schelling and Revelation*, the young Engels paraphrased this Hegelian sentence when he wrote "Hegel maintains that anything which is reasonable is also real" (130) and with this statement epitomized his entire reading of Hegel: Reason was the supreme deity of the cosmos, and the real was a reflection of Reason. *The Philosophy of Right* was a seminal text in the young Engels's comprehension of Hegel, because the young Engels interpreted it as asserting the immanence of Reason; this belief formed the unchanging core of the young Engels's understanding of Hegel.

Another text that helped shape his appreciation of Hegel was the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. In his articles "Schelling on Hegel," the young Engels wrote of the "trinity of idea, nature and mind which emerges from Hegel's *Encyclopedia*." (131) In depicting the movement of Hegelian thought as starting with the Idea and eventuating into mind, the young Engels again associated Hegelianism with the divinity of the Idea. The *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* was composed of three books, *The Logic* (1812), *The Philosophy of Nature* (1813), and the *Philosophy of Mind* (1816), and the young Engels read these three books as the history of the Idea. He took *The Science of Logic* as validating his views because the final chapter of this work ended with the Absolute Idea. For the young Engels, existence was merely the trajectory of idea as it unfolded in nature and ultimately in individual consciousness.

In summarizing Hegelian philosophy, the young Engels offered a Right-Wing exposition of Hegel. The Absolute Idea ruled in Hegel's work, not individual self-consciousness. The Young Hegelians and the young Marx prioritized the role of subjectivity, but the young Engels emulated the Old Hegelians and centered the Universal Idea. Like the Old Hegelians, the young Engels espoused reason as a substitute for religion.

Reason and Necessity

The young Engels interpreted Hegel as a logical pantheist, that Hegel believed that reason was the telos of the universe.

In the later pages of *Schelling and Revelation*, the young Engels again reaffirmed the necessitarian theme. "Freedom is only true if it contains necessity in itself, for the true is only the reasonableness of necessity." (132) The young Engels remained bound to a logical pantheism, the claim that reason was the substance of the universe, and that reason functioned according to necessitarian laws.

The young Engels defined reason as unfolding in terms of necessitarian laws. If necessity was the substance of reason, and since reason ruled the world, then it was necessary for reason to become reality.

Idea and Reality

Familiar with the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, particularly *The Philosophy of Nature*, the young Engels agreed that Idea preceded reality.

The need to present a rejoinder to Schelling's thought helped shape the young Engels's approach to the philosophy of nature. Among other concepts, Schelling set forth two philosophic principles, that Being was independent of thought and that thought itself was an expression of nature. Schelling's positive philosophy was based on the idea that mind itself was an outgrowth of nature, and that nature preceded mind.

The young Engels refuted both these ideas of Schelling, asserting instead that thought itself was self-sufficient, and therefore nature was a reflection of mind. If thought itself was self-determining, then nature could be shaped only by thought, and the movement from mind to nature was necessary.(133)

I already indicated that the young Engels was greatly influenced by Hegel's *The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. In that three-volume work, Hegel began with *The Logic*, and the second volume was *The Philosophy of Nature*. The young Engels followed the same sequence and made mind antecedent to, although not the creator of, nature.(134)

In 1842, the young Engels was not a materialist; he did not believe that sense perception was the point of origin of ideas. Reason was not an outgrowth of material externality. An Old Hegelian, the young Engels argued that since thought preceded nature, then reality was scripted by the Idea.

By contrast, by 1841 the young Marx had already freed himself from a rational ontology. In his dissertation, the young Marx was already a materialist, and his praise of Epicurus was due to the Greek atomist's espousal of empiricism. Contrary to Democritus, Epicurus did not think ideas were a direct reflection of sense perception, but rather Epicurus realized that a concept was the indispensable organizing framework for physical sensations. Nevertheless, Epicurus believed in the primacy of the material world; in his 1841 dissertation, the young Marx upheld a materialist position, and by 1841 the young Marx and the young Engels stood at opposite poles of the philosophic spectrum. (On the young Marx's dissertation please refer to chapter 3 of this book, "Marx's First Appropriation of Hegel.")

A specter of *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* was already embedded in the young Engels's 1842 rational ontology. The seeds of dialectic materialism were already implicit in his rational metaphysics. In the place of the Idea the later Engels only needed to substitute the

three dialectical laws: the transformation of quantity into quality, the interpenetration of opposites, and the negation of the negation. The ontology of 1842 would serve as the foundation into which the later Engels fitted the three dialectical laws that governed nature.

Subjectivity and Objectivity

In his commitment to logical pantheism, the young Engels fell victim to the fallacy of objectivism. He empowered an abstract entity, a force which originated outside of the human being, with ontological causality.

This logical pantheism devolved into self-consciousness. It would be a distortion of the 1842 young Engels to claim that he totally negated the energies of subjective self-consciousness.

The following two quotes, although hyperbolic, document that young Engels was aware of the power of subjectivity:

And this crown, this bride, this divinity, is the self-consciousness of humanity, the new grail around whose throne the nations triumphantly gather, and all who wish to recognize and honor this kingship must accept that all the nobility and power, all the richness and potency, all the beauty and fertility, of all this world, comes from this lord.(135)

The Idea, the self-consciousness of humanity, is similar to this wondrous Phoenix, and the most precious gift the Phoenix gives to the world is to rise again from the funeral pyre, which it built, out of the flames which destroyed a former time, ready to renew the quest once again.(136)

Even though the young Engels recognized the importance of self-consciousness, he did not understand it as a totally subjective capacity. Self-consciousness did not ultimately derive from the subject. The origin of self-consciousness lies in logical pantheism.

In his 1842 essay "Alexander Jung: 'Lectures on Modern German Literature,'" the young Engels wrote the following two sentences:

Self-consciousness, which is the foundation of humanity, is simultaneously world consciousness, and it is only a moment of this world consciousness.(137)

It is not necessary to be a Hegel expert to know that he advocated the most elevated theory of the reconciliation of subjectivity with objective forces, that he possessed a huge respect for objectivity and reality. He considered the existing to be far higher than the subjective reason of the individual, and because of this demanded that objective reality be recognized as reasonable. Hegel is not the prophet of subjective autonomy, as Herr Jung suggests, and Young Germany

also promulgated this viewpoint. However, Hegel's principle is heterodoxy, the subordination of the subject under universal reason.(138)

He read Hegel's statement that the "real is rational, and the rational is real" in a Right-Wing manner. The young Engels took this phrase to mean that reality reflected rational ontology.

The theory of self-consciousness espoused by the young Engels contradicted Bauer's formulation. For Bauer, subjective self-consciousness was autonomous. It was not derivative but individuated.

In addition, the theory of self-consciousness advanced by the young Engels was also contrary to the young Marx's version. In 1841 the young Marx followed Bauer, and defended self-consciousness as an individuated capacity. In his dissertation on Epicurus, the young Marx applauded this Greek philosopher for his advocacy of an autonomous self-consciousness.

Contrary to the young Engels, the young Marx never claimed that the existing was a reflection of the Absolute Idea. Following Bauer, the young Marx proposed that existence was a projection of individual self-consciousness.

In summary, the young Engels put forth an essentially Right-Wing view of Hegel. However, the young Engels differed from the Hegelian Right in two major respects, his atheism and his dedication to political praxis. It is true that the young Engels replaced orthodox Calvinism with logical pantheism, but he did deny the existence of a personal God. In 1842 he was not a formal theist. The young Engels was not a defender of the Prussian crown, the Prussian status quo, but influenced by Ruge advocated political reform of a significant degree.

Nevertheless, the young Engels was a proponent of logical pantheism, and denied the autonomy of subjective self-consciousness. On these two crucial points, the young Engels was at odds with The Free and aligned himself with the Hegelian Right. His connecting link with The Free was his political reformism. Similarly, what divorced him from the camp of the Hegelian Right was his political reformism.

The Phenomenology of Spirit

The young Engels read *The Phenomenology of Spirit* as a Right-Wing Hegelian text.

The *Phenomenology* was, however, and this is the exact contradiction of Schelling's assertion . . . not a mature science of reason, but precisely the first step toward it, the surpassing of empiricism, the overcoming of sense perception from the standpoint of a completed science of reason. It was not the logical, but the phenomenological consciousness which found these three (Art, Religion, Philosophy) as the last "possibilities to ensure the existence of absolute transcendence." The logical, free consciousness observes other things, but we need

not concern ourselves with this at the moment because free consciousness already has the absolute in itself.(139)

Hegel, whose profound and unperturbed dialectic first begins to unfold . . . presents in 1806 in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* a farewell to the natural philosophical point of view, and declares himself liberated from it.(140)

In these quotes the young Engels presented a Hegel who freed himself from "natural philosophy," who overcame "empiricism" and "sense perception." *The Phenomenology of Spirit* is presented as Hegel's supercession of materialism, as Hegel's rejection of the seventeenth and eighteenth century scientific revolution: Hume, Locke, Helvetius, and Holbach.

The *Phenomenology* is read as a reemphasis of Hegel's logical ontology. The logical is the absolute: *The Phenomenology* as an early version of *The Science of Logic*.

The young Engels did correctly assess the *Phenomenology* as instancing Hegel's break with the natural philosophy of Schelling. Accurately reading the *Phenomenology*, the young Engels recognized that in it Hegel was moving away from Schelling; Hegel was proclaiming the ascendancy of thought over nature.

On the other hand, the young Engels's reading of the *Phenomenology* also proves that his reading of Hegel was mostly distorted. In commenting on the *Phenomenology*, the young Engels does not mention the ideas of alienation or estrangement. He also does not comment on the negative force of self-consciousness, or how self-consciousness is a consequence of the master-slave relationship. The young Engels was totally blind to the theme of labor, the productive power of self-consciousness in the generation of the socio-intellectual world. He was detached from the Hegelian theme of how the labor of self-consciousness ultimately results in the alienation of mankind from the products of his own labor.

For the young Engels, the Idea ruled existence and all of nature. Logic formed the substance of the universe. All the young Engels needed to do was to propose that this universal logic functioned in accordance with dialectical principles. When the young Engels asserted that this universal logic operated in terms of thesis, antithesis, synthesis, it necessarily followed that these were the natural laws that nature followed. In 1842 the young Engels already formulated a series of philosophical beliefs that were the foundations for dialectical materialism. The seeds of *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* were already planted.

With the exception of his doctoral dissertation, Marx's writing on Hegel begins in 1843 with his *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of State*, which he wrote while staying with his in-laws in Kreuznach. This present chapter stops

at the end of November 1842, so it does not accord with the structure of this chapter to compare the 1842 young Engels with the 1843-1844 young Marx. That is the subject of a following book. Nevertheless, the young Marx's *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of State, On the Jewish Question, The Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction*, and the *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* are widely known, and it is clear that the young Marx's view of Hegel differs completely from the young Engels's logical pantheism. While the young Engels was mired in objectivism and the abstract, the young Marx embraced the labor of social man as the generative force of the universe. The hydraulics of the universe for the young Engels was logic, while the hydraulics of social creativity for the young Marx was subjectivity in social communities.

Marxism and Engelsism made their appearance in embryo by the end of 1842. Two different systems of thought were germinating, and their contradictory interpretations of Hegel was one of the reasons these young men were launched on divergent paths.

The Dialectic

In his writing during this developmental stage of the first period on the young Engels's First Appropriation of Hegel, the philosophically unskilled publicist made use of Hegelian categories, and negation was one of these. The young Engels's use of specific Hegelian thought determinations provides insight into his grasp of Hegel.

However, only thought alone in its development is in truth the eternal and positive because the empirical, the external of events, falls victim to the negative, the dismembering, the critical.(141)

Even though the young Engels made use of Hegelian vocabulary, he was incapable of applying Hegelian formulas. He used words but not complete procedures.

The dialectic in Hegel proceeded in essentially three stages: a subjective consciousness negated an object, the negation did not obliterate the object, and a portion of the negated object was subsumed into a higher stage of consciousness. The dialectic in Hegel arose out of the activity of subjective consciousness and was based on the principle of retention. In the new synthesis that emerged after the negation, not obliteration but a portion of the cancelled object was retained.

Nowhere in the young Engels's writing from 1838-1842 did he use these dialectical protocols. It was impossible for him to use these dialectical formulae because he lacked the idea of the importance of subjective conscious-

ness. By denying the centrality of subjective consciousness, the young Engels blocked himself from correctly understanding the role of cancellation, retention, and subsumption. He could not see the world as constructed by the dialectic of individual consciousness.

Negation, for the young Engels, was a function of the abstract. People did not negate, the Idea did. Since the Idea was the primary propellant in history, negation was a property of the Idea.

Schelling, the Philosopher in Christ

This was the last brochure the young Engels wrote on Schelling, and it is a description of Schelling's movement more deeply into religion. This pamphlet is an attack on the religious presuppositions of Schelling's thought, and by exposing this religious bias, the young Engels hoped to erase any philosophical merit of these Berlin lectures.

The Absence of Hegel

The fact that the young Engels knew Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* makes it difficult to explain why he did not incorporate this work into his critique of Schelling. The *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* was published in 1833 as part of Gans's project of printing the *Collected Works* of Hegel, which the young Engels mentioned in his *Schelling and Revelation* as a vital contribution to the study of the master. Volume III of *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* contains a section in which Hegel offers a summary of the philosophy of Schelling.⁽¹⁴²⁾ Even though this work was available to the young Engels, he failed to use Hegel's critique of Schelling in his own critique of Schelling contained in his own publications. The failure of the young Engels to include the person, Hegel, whom he was defending, in his own assault on Hegel's opponent proves that the young Engels was more of a polemicist than a scholar. In addition, Hegel's essay *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy* was published in 1801 and appeared in the second volume of Hegel's *Collected Works* issued by Gans, but the young Engels totally overlooked this work.

Hegel's own summary of the work of Schelling, even though written before Schelling came to Berlin to refute him, was more object, more analytical than the young Engels himself. Hegel applauded Schelling for understanding that the task of modern philosophy was to unify Spinoza and Fichte. The mission of modern thought was the unification of the objective and the subjective. Spinoza concentrated upon the objective as substance, and Fichte introduced the idea that individual self-consciousness was the sole causal agency. Even though Hegel thought that Schelling failed in his mission, he

nevertheless found value in the efforts of his soon-to-be enemy for his insight and his vision.(143)

Schelling's effort to unify the objective and subjective grew out of his theory that thought itself was an expression of nature. Schelling postulated the existence of three potencies, nature, mind, thought, and mind was a potency of nature, existed in nature as a capacity. Mind and nature were joined at the "quantitative indifference of subjective and objective,"(144) or there was no "difference" between nature and mind. The manifestation of this "indifference" was thought, and since "difference" did not exist, the unity of the objective and the subjective was beyond doubt.

The philosophic effort of Schelling was a failure, according to Hegel, because it ended in natural philosophy. Rather than unifying the objective and subjective, Schelling concluded by absorbing the subjective into nature.(145)

Schelling's defeat derived from his absorbing of the Idea into nature. From the point of view of Hegel, the idea must be totally independent, it must be self-existent. The Hegelian Project was taking the Spinozist concept of substance and making substance into thought. Schelling moved in exactly the opposite direction, for he made thought into a manifestation of a natural potency. Rather than proclaiming the independence of consciousness, Schelling reduced reason to a faculty of a natural potency. Subjectivity was not liberated in Schelling but rather imprisoned as an epiphenomenon of nature.(146)

Hegel's evaluation of Schelling was an expression of the Hegelian system. It was an application of Hegelian principles to an alternative system of philosophy. It was also absent any personal animosity.

Unfortunately, the young Engels refused to utilize any of these Hegelian arguments. Hegel's writings on Schelling are never mentioned by the young Engels. For the most part, the young Engels's critique of Schelling rested on the charge that the enemy of Hegel attempted to reinstall religion back into philosophy, or a Scholastic renaissance.

The young Engels was more interested in polemics than philosophy. Confirming his basic patterns of behavior as they exhibited themselves between 1838 and 1842, the young Engels was an editorialist, as opposed to a philosophically schooled, adept, and well-informed analyst.

His writings during the 1838-1842 years were partisan editorial pieces.

In this chapter I drew attention to the young Engels's imprecise grasp of Hegelian thought. His defective understanding of Hegel not only produced serious distortions of Hegel's thought but also made it impossible for him to correctly differentiate between those students and followers who sought to continue the tradition of their teacher.

In May 1842 the young Engels wrote two articles for the young Marx's *Rheinische Zeitung*, one called "Marheineke" and the other named "Henning," which were joined under the heading of "Diary of a Guest Student." (147) When the young Engels was in Berlin involving himself in the controversy over Hegel, he attended not only the Schelling lectures but those of Marheineke and Henning, both of whom also entered the controversy over Hegel and litigated on behalf of their former colleague.

The young Engels applauded the lectures of Marheineke and Henning and saw their actions as those of publicists. Marheineke and Henning were presented as belonging to the Pro-Hegelian bloc, the camp that fought off the assaults of the Prussian monarchy and tried to salvage the Hegelian patrimony.

Demonstrating a lack of analytical ability, the young Engels did not note that both Marheineke and Henning were Old Hegelians. By May 1842 the young Engels classified himself as one of The Free, but failed to note that major differences separated The Free from the work of both Marheineke and Henning.

In his exhaustive and penetrating study of the Hegelian tradition, John Toews wrote this about these two men:

A conservative accommodationist interpretation of the relationship between Hegelian philosophy, and the existing religious, and political order, best exemplified in the view points of Marheineke, Henning. (148)

The young Engels was unaware of or did not draw attention to the fact that his encomiums for Marheineke and Henning were placed upon two "conservative accommodationist" Old Hegelians. Even though during the controversy over Hegel the young Engels belonged to the same bloc as Marheineke and Henning, young Engels did not inform his readership about the great schisms that separated his own Hegelianism, political reform, from these two orthodox right-wing representatives who defended the Prussian monarchy.

The young Engels did not even point to the differences between Marheineke and Henning. Although both of these men were champions of Hegel, they carried out their defense from two distinct intellectual positions. Marheineke saw Hegel as an instance for the reconciliation between religion and reason. On this point Toews writes:

In his theological lectures and writings, Marheineke continued to maintain that the whole system of religious "representations" revealed in the Bible and codified in the doctrinal teaching of the Evangelical Church could be appropriated in the form of philosophical truth without compromising the legitimate demands of human freedom, or sacrificing any part of the content of religious faith. (149)

Conversely, the reconciliation sought after by Henning was between reason and reality. While Marheineke pursued the harmonization of reason and religion, Henning sought the blending of reason and politics.

For both Henning and Forster the focal points of the Hegelian reconciliation of reason and reality was politics. Man could grasp the absolute because the absolute had revealed itself in the world in the rational freedom of constitutional monarchy.(150)

The needs of the publicist, the need to present a united bloc against the Prussian reaction, was one reason that the young Engels did not fully define the positions of Marheineke and Henning. Regardless of these claims of unity, the young Engels left major vacancies regarding the Old Hegelianism of Marheineke and Henning as well as of the two different approaches of these men to the idea of reason in Hegel.

The member of the Old Hegelians that the young Engels respected the most was Eduard Gans, who died in 1839. In his May 24–June 15, 1839, letter to Wilhelm Graeber, the young Engels admonished him to visit the grave of Gans.(151) About two months later, on July 30, 1839, Engels again urged Graeber not to forget to pay his respects at the grave of Gans.(152) About one year later, in a Dec. 9, 1839–Feb. 5, 1840, correspondence with Friedrich Graeber, the young Engels wrote that only Gans, Rosenkranz, and Ruge were worthy to be considered students of Hegel.(153)

The high regard in which the young Engels held Gans probably came from two sources: the young Engels himself was an exponent of Jewish emancipation and admired Gans's final success in winning a faculty position at the University of Berlin; the young Engels regarded Gans as an ally in the struggle against the Historical School of Law and its position as an ideological apologist for Prussian autocracy.

The need of the young Engels to be an advocate acted as the basis of his initial attraction to Marx. Just as the young Engels was a champion of the Hegelian bloc in the controversy over Hegel, so he was also a champion of Karl Marx as a force in the early history of communism. I already made note of the fact that the young Engels praised the brilliance of the young Marx in his poem *The Triumph of Faith*, which the young Engels wrote in June/July 1842, approximately four months before he actually made the acquaintance of Marx in Nov. 1842.

The role the young Engels wished to fill was chief publicist for a radical political movement, and this desire sometimes led him to distort some facts. In order to prove this point, it is necessary for me to again abridge the 1842 boundary I set for myself and to bring under scrutiny some writing of the young Engels from England in Nov. 1843 and Jan. 1844.

A full appreciation of the quotes I will evidence is dependent on recalling that the young Engels first met the young Marx in Cologne at the offices of the *Rheinische Zeitung*, and that the young Marx was suspicious of the young Engels's connection with the Berlin Free. The young Marx refused to publish articles from The Free, and the young Marx ended his meeting with the young Engels coldly. No additional meeting between the young Marx and the young Engels occurred until August 1844.

Regardless of this lack of contact between himself and the young Marx from December 1842 until August, 1844, the young Engels wrote the following paragraph in a November 18, 1843, article, "The Progress of Socialism on the Continent," which was published in Robert Owen's *New Moral World*.

By the Fall of 1842 a small group in the party already believed that political reform was insufficient, and declared that according to their opinion a social revolution on the basis of the common ownership of property was necessary, a position in accordance with their theoretical principles. Nevertheless, even the leaders of the party, for example, Bruno Bauer, Dr. Feuerbach, and Dr. Ruge, at this time were not prepared to make this decisive step. The political organ of the party, the "Rheinische Zeitung," published an essay that embraced communism, but the essay failed to persuade any of the readership. But communism was a necessary consequence of Young Hegelian philosophy so the opposition could not repress it, and in the following year the founders of the communist movement had the satisfaction of seeing one republican after another join their party. In addition, Dr. Hess, an editor of the suppressed "Rheinische Zeitung," who in fact was the first communist in the party, there are now many others, such as Dr. Ruge, the publisher of the "Deutsche Jahrbucher," the scientific journal of the Young Hegelians, which is now also banned by an act of the German Parliament, and Dr. Marx, likewise an editor of the "Rheinische Zeitung," George Herwegh, the poet whose letter to the king of Prussia this past winter was translated in most English newspapers, and others, and we hope that the remainder of the republican party will gradually come over to us.(154)

In this paragraph, the young Engels is posturing as the herald of the nascent German communist movement. He was writing for the adherents of Owen and also the Chartists and trying to persuade them that a communist movement was growing on the continent. The young Engels wished to appear the prophet of a communist revolution.

The young Engels himself became a communist only in Nov. 1842 when he met Hess in Cologne at the *Rheinische Zeitung*. Hess was already a communist and converted the young Engels to communism after cursory meetings, so when the young Engels crossed the channel at the end of Nov. 1842 on his way to his family's business in Manchester, he arrived there as the apologist for and the promoter of German communism.

The eagerness of the young Engels to be a clarion for German communism, to bring about the union of English and continental radicalism, drove him to make not only distorted statements but misstatements of fact. The young Engels presented a misshapen image of the Young Hegelian movement as well as false assertions regarding the politics of the young Marx.

In the paragraph quoted above, the young Engels referred to the Young Hegelians as a “party,” and this is a distortion of reality. The young Engels made this assertion in Nov. 1843, but by 1844 the Young Hegelian movement dissolved.⁽¹⁵⁵⁾ The “party” that the young Engels referred to proved, at the least, ephemeral. More importantly, the use of the word “party” to characterize the Young Hegelians was an exaggeration. The differences among Bauer, Feuerbach, and Ruge were too great to be classified as a “party,” the reason the movement fragmented a year later.

It was also grossly misleading to suggest that the “party” of Young Hegelians was sympathetic to communism. Hess became a communist, but neither Bauer nor Ruge ever became a communist. But this dissension within the “party” of Young Hegelians was recognized by the young Engels when he wrote that “even the leaders of the party, for example, Bruno Bauer, Dr. Feuerbach, and Dr. Ruge, at this time were not prepared to make this decisive step.” They never made the decisive step.

The statement that “communism was the necessary consequence of Young Hegelian philosophy” was absurd. Bauer, nor Feuerbach, nor Ruge, ever took “this decisive step,” so Young Hegelianism did not necessarily lead to communism. The young Marx became a communist only when he freed himself from the Young Hegelians. The young Engels took a slightly different course, because he followed Hess in 1843 and took the “decisive step.” But in 1844 and in 1845, the young Marx and the young Engels, now collaborators, wrote *The Holy Family* and *The German Ideology* and disassociated themselves from Young Hegelianism, from Bauer, Feuerbach, Ruge, and Hess. The young Engels proved that the Young Hegelians did not “necessarily lead to communism” because he severed his ties with the Young Hegelians in order to become a materialist, the foundation of Marxist communism.

Finally, the above quoted paragraph from the young Engels contains a falsehood. “In addition, Dr. Hess, an editor of the now suppressed ‘*Rheinische Zeitung*,’ who in fact was the first communist in the party, there are now many others, such as Dr. Ruge, the publisher of the ‘*Deutsche Jahrbücher*’ the scientific journal of the Young Hegelians, which is now also banned by an act of the German Parliament, and Dr. Marx, likewise an editor of the ‘*Rheinische Zeitung*.’”

Only one part of this sentence is true: Moses Hess was an early convert to communism and was the person, as I indicated earlier, who baptized the young Engels into communism.

In order to display the falsity of other statements in this sentence it is necessary to be reminded of the following chronology: the young Engels wrote these words in Nov. 1843: the young Marx's own conversion to communism is announced in his essay "Toward a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction," which was written at the end of 1843 and first published in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*. It also must be borne in mind that the young Marx was not a communist when the young Engels first met him in Nov. 1842. In fact, the young Marx published an article in the *Rheinische Zeitung*, "Communism and the Augsburg 'Times,'" in which he stated that he was not a communist.¹⁵⁶ Thus one month prior to his Nov. 1842 meeting with the young Engels, the young Marx publicly affirmed that he was not a communist. Furthermore, the young Marx and the young Engels did not correspond between Nov. 1842 and Jan. 1844, the date of the publication of the young Marx's essay "Toward a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of State: Introduction."

Consequently, the young Engels's statement of Nov. 1843 is contrary to fact. The young Marx never wrote to the young Engels of his conversion to communism, and the article in which the young Marx made known his embrace of communism was published after the young Engels made his assertion in Nov. 1843. The young Engels did not see the young Marx's "Toward a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of State: Introduction" until it appeared in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, thus the claim of the young Engels in Nov. 1843 that the young Marx belonged to the communist movement was not based on any factual evidence. It was the exaggeration of an overeager publicist.

Similarly, the claim that Ruge's editorship of the *Deutsche Jahrbücher* proved that Ruge was a communist was also contrary to fact. Ruge was never a communist, and after he and the young Marx collaborated on one issue of the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, he and Marx split apart, and while the young Marx pursued his communist convictions, Ruge remained a republican. The young Engels's statements to an English audience in the Owenite *New Moral World* about Ruge was another instance of the hyperbole of the aspiring publicist.

The center of gravity of this chapter turns on the differing Hegel interpretations of the young Marx and the young Engels. It is premised on the belief that the contrasting manner in which they received Hegel acted as a barometer of the differences between the two men themselves or their conflicting view of Hegel derived from a deeper polarity which divided Marxism and Engelsism. This chapter is not directly concerned with their inherent intelligence or their formal education but rather with how their opposing vision of the world was the background from which they offered antithetic visions of Hegel. Within this context it is, nevertheless, instructive to see how a third party, Hess, grasped their personalities and talents. The comments of a third party, while not conclusive, could add another dimension

to this argument, it provides an independent assessment of the two opposites.

Hess wrote of the young Engels: "Engels was a revolutionary to the core before we met but when he left me he was a passionate communist." (157)

Even this single sentence gives a picture of an impetuous, impressionistic young man. After his brief meeting with Hess, the young Engels left a "passionate communist." The young Engels was not meticulous, not painstaking, but an enthusiast looking for a cause.

You will be glad to make the acquaintance of a man, who belongs to our friends, though he lives in Bonn, where he is about to start teaching.

He is a phenomenon who made on me a most deep impression. Be prepared to meet the greatest, perhaps the only real philosopher living now. When he will appear in public (both in his writings as well as at the university) he will draw the eyes of all Germany upon him. . . . He goes far beyond Strauss and even Feuerbach. . . . Could I be in Bonn, where he teaches Logic, I would willingly become his avid listener. Such a man I always wanted to have as my teacher in philosophy. Only now do I feel what an idiot in philosophy I have been. But patience. I will still learn something.

"Dr Marx . . . this is the name of my idol . . . is still a young man, hardly 24 years old; but he will give the final blow to all medieval religion and politics; he combines deepest philosophical seriousness with cutting wit. Can you imagine Rousseau, Voltaire, Holbach, Lessing, Heine and Hegel combined . . . or thrown together . . . in one person? If you can, you have Dr. Marx. (158)

Hess's praise of the young Marx is effusive, but what comes clear is that Marx was both a professor and a scholar. The young Marx had all the attributes of a scholar, penetrating, thorough, focusing on details, analytical, and cautious. This was a different mentality than the passionate, mercurial young Engels.

Both the young Marx and the young Engels commented on Leo, the German Historical School of Law, and the Prussian Censorship Law of 1841. The personal mentalities which molded their contrasting visions of Hegel were again replicated in these writings. A pattern of perception manifested itself, individual forms of consciousness, for the principles which underlie their disagreements over Hegel were the same principles which supported their contrary views of these personalities, schools of thought, and laws.

The young Marx and the young Engels ridiculed the Prussian Censorship Law of 1841. The attack of the young Marx, "Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction," was written in 1842 but published a year later in Ruge's *Anekdoten*. (159)

"Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction" is an early exercise by the young Marx in the application of the categories of Hegelian cri-

tique. In this essay, the young Marx employed the Hegelian modalities of substance and essence to demonstrate the authoritarian nature of the Prussian Censorship Instruction. The young Marx utilized the concepts of substance and essence in the defense of a free press.

"Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction" defines the essence of a free press as free mind, or the essence of reason as freedom. The young Marx argues that it was impossible for reason to act in accordance with its essence unless it was totally free, because without absolute freedom, reason cannot follow its own insights to their logical conclusion. Consequently, when the Prussian Censorship Instruction limits the freedom of reason, when it sets boundaries beyond which reason cannot go, the Prussian Government annihilates the essence of reason.(160)

The strategy of the young Marx in his essay is to adopt Hegelian logic in the cause of liberalism. He wished to show how Hegelian categories could be adjusted, could be transformed into weapons in the cause of political reform.

In this 1842 essay, the young Marx proved two things, that he interpreted Hegel as a Critical Hegelian and that he himself continued this Critical Hegelian tradition. In 1842, the young Marx explored, experimented with the use of Hegelian categories, essence, and appearance as devices by which to advance the cause of political progressivism, and this was the meaning of Critical Hegelianism in the generation of Gans.

The response of the young Engels to the 1841 edict was contained in his essay "Toward a Criticism of the Prussian Press Law," which appeared in the *Rheinische Zeitung* on July, 14, 1842.(161) Even though the young Engels employed the word "criticism" in the title, the remainder of the essay is devoid of Hegelian categories. The young Engels did not incorporate Hegelian logical modalities as critical tools, and therefore he was not coincidental with the Critical Hegelian school of Gans.

The assault of the young Engels on the 1841 Edict was evaluative, or the young Engels rebuked it on moral grounds. He referred to the law as "insolent," as "disrespectful," and as "derisive."(162) The law was an insult to the standards of a free press or a free mind.

The diatribe of the young Engels was powerful, but it was journalistic. The essay contained no evidence that the young Engels wished to, or was able to, absorb and exercise Hegelian concepts as tools of critique.

Similar patterns evidence themselves in the two men in their appraisal of the Historical School of Law. The reaction of the young Marx is contained in his essay "The Philosophical Manifesto of the Historical School of Law" which appeared in the *Rheinische Zeitung* on August 9, 1842.(163)

Essentially, the young Marx's attack against the Historical School of Law recapitulated the struggle of Gans against Savigny. By perpetuating the tradition

of Gans, the young Marx showed his adherence to the Critical Hegelian school of thought, to the attempt to exploit Hegelian methodology as an instrument of political progressivism.

The young Marx refuted the positivity of the Historical School of Law. He rejected the empirical as the basis of legality; what existed was not necessarily a right or the jurisprudence of Leo. The Historical School of Law was an expression of the natural law tradition of Hugo Grotius; it also derived from Enlightenment empiricism. The young Marx rejected all forms of positivity, from legal positivism to the sense perception of John Locke and David Hume.(164)

Defending Critical Hegelianism, the young Marx argued that human reason shaped reality. On this score, Marx replicated the thought of Gans that the evolution of law was historical, that the variety of legal systems did not reflect the positive but the effects of history. Different legal systems were forms that the evolution of history brought into existence. Historicity was the nature of law.

Although the young Engels did not directly confront the Historical School of Law in itself, he did confront one of the leading members of this theory, Leo. The young Engels's engagement with Leo is outlined in his essay "Friedrich Wilhelm IV, King of Prussia," written in Oct. 1842 but published in 1843 in Georg Herwegh's *Einundzwanzig Bogen aus der Schweiz*.(165)

This essay is written from the perspective of a political journalist. It laments the attempt to legitimate the crown of Friedrich Wilhelm IV by religious mandate. The young Engels judged this religious sanctification of absolute monarchy as a return to medieval principles.

Leo is mentioned in this essay, but the Historical School of Law is not. By implication, the young Engels was also implying that a theory of jurisprudence could also become a justificatory tool for Monarchy: "Friedrich Wilhelm IV, King of Prussia," demonstrates how ideological apparati, religion, law, could be usurped by the Crown as arguments to rationalize its autocracy.(166)

Contrary to the young Marx, the young Engels made no attempt to utilize Hegelian methodology to denounce the Prussian autocrat and the Historical School of Law, or Leo. Rather, he wrote a direct political screed, a journalistic exposé.

The young Engels displayed total ignorance of the theoretical strata of Gans's attack on legal positivism. Contrary to the young Marx, the young Engels was devoid of any knowledge regarding the theoretical principles for Gans's refutation of the Historical School of Law, Savigny, and Leo. He showed himself unfamiliar with Gans's notion of legal historicity, the ideas that societies were anatomical units which evolved over time, and with Gans's recognition that property itself had a history. The young Engels did not call up any of the philosophic methodology of Gans or Hegel in his own assault on Leo. All of the emancipatory methodology of Gans totally evaded the young Engels, a display of his philosophic immaturity.

Finally, confirmation regarding the deficiencies of the young Engels in the field of philosophy, the major thesis of this chapter, comes from the young Engels himself. The self-evaluation of the young Engels is also a truthful self-condemnation. On July, 26, 1842, he wrote an honest and self-revealing letter to Ruge in which he admitted his inadequacies as a student of philosophy:

I have decided to abandon all literary work for a while in order to devote more time to studying. The reasons for this are fairly plain. I am young and self-taught in philosophy. I have learnt enough to form my own viewpoint and, when necessary, to defend it, but not enough to be able to work for it with success and in the proper way. All the greater demands will be made on me because I am a "journeyman" in philosophy, and have not earned the right to philosophize by getting a doctor's degree. I hope to be able to satisfy these demands once I started writing again . . . and under my own name. In addition, I must not try to do too many things now, as I shall soon be again more fully occupied with business matters. Regarded subjectively, my literary activities have so far been mere experiments from the outcome of which I was able to learn whether my natural capacities were such as to enable me to work fruitfully and effectively for progress and to participate actively in the movement of the century. I can be satisfied with the results and now regard it as my duty, which I now continue with redoubled zest, also more and more of that which one is not born with.(167)

In this paragraph the young Engels draws attention to the double life he led. He recognizes that when he starts writing again he must do so "under my own name," and predicts that "I shall soon be again more fully occupied in business matters." The young Engels's involvement in German progressive politics in 1842 was done in secret, hidden from his father. In July 1842, he continued to use a pseudonym, never publicly asserting his own beliefs, and he hinted that he would soon be going to Manchester, England, to manage the family partnership of Ermen and Engels. In late 1842, the young Engels did go to Manchester where he supervised the partnership until 1870, or until he was fifty years old. From age seventeen until a grown man of fifty, Engels spent most of his days in the world of capitalist business, while his evenings were devoted to a part-time career in journalism and study. Until the age of fifty, Engels was a closet revolutionary. He was unable to ask his family to accept him for what he was, to establish his own identity, and therefore was compelled to bury his true self in midnight darkness.

The young Engels never took his own advice. The opening sentence of the paragraph states: "I have decided to abandon all literary work for awhile in order to devote more time to studying," and the young Engels made this decision because he recognized his superficial knowledge of philosophy. But the young Engels did not "abandon all literary work for awhile," because he was writing again by October 1842 when he published his article

“Friedrich Wilhelm IV, King of Prussia,” in *Einundzwanzig Bogen Aus Dem Schweiz*. In November 1842 the young Engels was in Cologne for his first meeting with the young Marx, which went poorly, and his first meeting with Hess, which went well; after these contacts at the *Rheinische Zeitung*, the young Engels left for Manchester. He never took the necessary time to devote himself to the intense study of philosophy, never gained mastery of the subject, and remained essentially untutored in philosophy throughout his life.

This paragraph is a private acknowledgment by the young Engels of his lack of competence in the area of philosophy or in intellectual matters generally. He never graduated from the gymnasium, never went to the university, did not acquire a doctorate, and the young Engels confessed that these gaps left him with only a superficial grasp of philosophy or cultural studies in general. His penetration of Hegel was amateurish, and his ineptness in this area caused him to make egregious misstatements regarding Hegel’s philosophy and other areas in which he attempted to apply Hegel’s thought.

This chapter was dedicated to a deep probe into the first period of the young Marx’s and young Engels’s First Appropriation of Hegel, the years 1839 to 1842. It uncovered the origins of two different systems of thought, one Marxism and the other Engelsism. The contrasting ways in which these two antipodal mentalities incorporated Hegel was the source out of which the later Marxism and Engelsism developed. Their aporetic reading of Hegel was the ground out of which their bifurcation emerged.

The genesis of Marxism began with Marx’s conversion to Hegelian subjectivity, as opposed to Hegelian speculative philosophy. Hegelian subjectivity was the point of departure between Hegel and the speculative philosophy of Leibnitz and Spinoza, or seventeenth-century metaphysics. When the young Marx adopted the subjective approach to philosophy, he automatically broke with the tradition of speculative thought.

The years 1839–1842 also show the young Marx experimenting with Hegelian methodology, or fusing Hegelian methodology with subjectivity. The young Marx’s formula for critique amalgamated the following elements: a) the application of Hegelian categories, such as essence and appearance; b) the agency that applied these categories, subjective consciousness; c) subjective consciousness applied Hegelian concepts as tools for investigating society. A critique which employed these three elements underwrote political progressivism. The young Marx took Hegelian methodology and turned it into a device for criticizing the contemporary world.

The genesis of Engelsism lay in the young Engels’s failure to embrace Hegelian subjectivity. Engels remained a captive of the Hegelian Right, and he never exited from this tradition of seventeenth century metaphysics. The

later Engels's formulation of the dialectics of nature is a direct consequence of his inability to exit the school of Leibnitz and Spinoza.

The young Engels did not experiment with Hegelian methodology, or his failure to philosophize in terms of subjective consciousness prevented him from experimenting with Hegelian methodology. The young Engels could not marry subjective consciousness to Hegelian logical forms such as essence and appearance, and when he failed to do this he could never create a subjective social critique.

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Chapter Three

Marx's First Appropriation of Hegel

The earliest indications of young Marx's familiarity with Hegel stem from the year 1837. In the spring of that year young Marx sent a book of verses to his father, and one of these poems was entitled, "Epigram on Hegel."⁽¹⁾ This poem contained the following two stanzas:

Kant and Fichte soar to heavens blue
Seeking for some distant land,
I but seek to grasp profound and true
That which . . . in the street I find.

Forgive us epigrammatists
For singing songs with nasty twists,
In Hegel we're all so completely submerged,
But with his AESTHETICS we're yet to be purged.⁽²⁾

In this epigram, which young Marx wrote at the University of Berlin when he was nineteen, he appears impatient with German Idealist philosophy. He pokes fun at Kant, and Fichte for soaring to the "heavens," while he can only focus on the reality of the "street." Hegel is also presented as an Idealist, as a person entangled in the labyrinth of words, and even though Marx is aware of Hegel's fame, Marx is critical of Hegel asserting that his *Aesthetics* must be "purged." Marx did not unquestionably embrace Hegel, but his approach was cautious, abounding with hesitations.

The same book of verses contains reference to a drama Marx wrote called "Scorpion and Felix."⁽³⁾ In his Nov. 10, 1837, letter to his father, Marx stated that he wrote a twenty-four-page dialogue entitled "Cleanthes, or the Starting Point and Necessary Continuation of Philosophy."⁽⁴⁾ These two works are lost, and so it is impossible to know whether they contained any references to Hegel.

The Nov. 10, 1837, letter is Marx's first detailed statement of his study of and attitude toward Hegelian thought, in which he wrote that he "got to know Hegel from beginning to end, together with most of his disciples."⁽⁵⁾ However, his in-depth analysis of Hegel dates from his doctoral dissertation, *The Differences Between Democritus' And Epicurus' Philosophy of Nature (DDEPN)*, which he completed in March 1841 and for which he received his diploma from the University of Jena on April 15, 1841.⁽⁶⁾ When Marx wrote his dissertation he was already a Left-Wing Hegelian, and his work was not only a critique of Hegel's evaluation of Epicurus in particular but more importantly an attack on Hegel's *The Lectures on the History of Philosophy (LHP)*. In order to properly appreciate Marx's attitude to the Hegelian system in 1841, it is necessary to summarize *LHP* and to comment in some detail on Hegel's assessment of Epicurus, the Stoics, and Skeptics, or post-Aristotelian philosophy.

At the outset of my commentary on the *LHP*, it is necessary to separate those areas of Hegel's thought that are germane to the issues raised in *The Hegelian Foundations of Marx's Method* from those areas that are not.

NON-GERMANE AREAS

I do not seek to offer an analysis of the entirety of Hegel's thought. *The Hegelian Foundations of Marx's Method* is not a study of Hegel in himself but rather of those parts of Hegel's system which Marx appropriated, or annulled.

In my investigation of Hegel I will not reference any of the *Zusatz* contained in his *Philosophy of Right (PR)*, or his *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (EPS)*. My point of demarcation is 1841, the year in which Marx completed his dissertation. Only those books of Hegel that Marx read by 1841 will be included as source material, and since the *Zusatz* were added to Hegel's works after 1841, they are excluded from consideration in this chapter.

Marx's acquaintance with the complete works of Hegel is a complex question, and his reading of Hegel was shaped by the texts available to him. Marx did not know many Hegelian manuscripts; crucial ones did not become available until the twentieth century, and these absences produced serious flaws in Marx's knowledge of Hegel and influenced the views he took of the venerated sage of Berlin.

GERMANE AREAS

Hegel will be presented in this book only in his relation to Marx or those aspects of Hegel that Marx either appropriated or annulled.

The first complete edition, or works, of Hegel that was known at that time was published between 1833 and 1836 by Eduard Gans. It is reasonable to assume that Marx was familiar with all the texts contained in the 1833–1836 compendiums, because in his 1837 letter to his father he claimed that he read everything Hegel wrote. I already pointed out that in his “Epigram on Hegel” Marx demonstrated that he read Hegel’s *Philosophy of Aesthetics* (PA). Nevertheless, because I want to illuminate Marx’s grasp of Hegel as it existed in 1841, I will, for the most part, limit Hegelian books referred to in this chapter to the Hegel bibliography Marx specifically incorporated in 1841.

With one exception, I limit my references to Hegel to those books Marx noted in the bibliography to his dissertation. The bibliography to the *DDEPN* lists the following Hegelian works:

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- *Philosophy of Right*, Berlin, 1833. In Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Bd. 8.
- *The Phenomenology Of Spirit*. In Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Bd. 2, 2. Aufl., Berlin, 1841. (PHS)
- *The Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. In George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Bd. 14, Berlin 1833 (LHP)(7)

I will also include reference to Hegel’s *The Science of Logic* (SL). Even though the SL, or Larger Logic, was not footnoted in the *DDEPN*, it was part of Marx’s library. Volume 32 of division IV of the *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe* (MEGA) is a catalogue of all the books found in the libraries of Marx and Engels, and an 1841 second edition of the SL was a part of Marx’s library.(8) I make this one exception, because the SL contains chapters which are vital elucidations of Hegel’s concepts of negativity, subjectivity, method, and development, and without a precise definition of how Hegel used these terms, is impossible to fully grasp the relationship between Marx and Hegel.

This chapter will delineate two attitudes which Marx assumed toward the inventor of modern dialectics, anti-Hegelian and pro-Hegelian. When Marx took an anti-Hegelian posture, he invalidated certain aspects of the thought of Hegel, and when Marx took a pro-Hegelian posture, he incorporated aspects of Hegelian thought with which he agreed. From the pro-Hegelian point of view, two avenues of thought of the venerated sage of Berlin impacted with enormous force on the young Marx, Hegel’s thoughts on the process of production, and on method.

In the passages which immediately follow, I organize my discussion into (a) the process of production and (b) method.

THE PROCESS OF PRODUCTION

The proceeding discussion of Hegel's understanding of the production process will show that he conceived of the labor of creation as solely an activity of thought. It is important to stress, however, that Hegel never doubted that thought itself began its journey from sense data or that sense perception was the initial content of consciousness. The *PHS* devotes its first two chapters to "sense-certainty," and "perception."⁽⁹⁾ In addition, both the Larger Logic, *SL*, and the Smaller Logic, contained in *EPS*, begin their discourse on logic with "Being," or the perceptible,⁽¹⁰⁾ while in the third book of the *EPS*, *The Philosophy of Spirit*, Hegel demonstrates how spirit self-actualizes itself out of anthropology and psychology.⁽¹¹⁾ Thought and the external were simultaneous, and in the ensuing struggle between mind and content, the content was immediately absorbed by mind so that it immediately lost its determinate character and became inseparable from thought. This is what Hegel meant by the unity of thought and Being.

Presupposing the external content, the process of production in Hegel passed through five stages: 1) consumption, 2) objectification, 3) alienation, 4) reappropriation, 5) reproduction.

In the first stage of the labor process thought consumed sense-certainty. The individuality, the particularity of the external content, was obliterated, and the perceptible is absorbed into consciousness.

Consciousness is not satisfied with the mere consumption of the content, because consciousness is inherently active. Objectification is the process by which consciousness externalizes its own form of the perceptible.

The new objectification is immediately alienated from consciousness. The generation of a new object means that this object is distinct from consciousness, and this distinction is alienation.

As the active force, consciousness seeks to overcome this alienation, and so it again consumes this new objectification. Reappropriation refers to the action of consciousness as it negates alienation by ingesting its previous externalization back into itself.

In the final stage of the production process of consciousness it reproduces another objectification. The step of reappropriation presents consciousness with a new content, and because consciousness has an immanent drive toward self-manifestation, it will take hold of this new content and generate another object.

The labor process of thought is continuous. The stages outlined above are but one cycle within a non-ending spiral of generation. It is the nature of consciousness to be a force of predication.

The labor process witnessed the subsumption of content into concept. The act of subsumption does not mean that a content is annihilated but rather retained in a modified form.

The labor process of thought outlined above takes place within the individual, the self. This cascade of thought forms is described by Hegel as the self-actualization, or self-origination, of the subject. The development of thought, its long march to absolute knowledge, finds its point of commencement within subjectivity.

Subjectivity is negativity. According to Hegel, the subjective will always contradict a given object. Not only does subjectivity self-externalize, but it is also an energy of perpetual opposition. The productive process is also a site at which the dialectic ignites, for the dialectic starts when subjectivity negates an existing object and thus supercedes it. Charles Taylor, in his book on Hegel classifies this theory of production as "expressivist." By this term, Taylor proposed that Hegel looked upon the world of objects as expressions, as embodiments of consciousness.(12)

Hegel calls this level of the development of thought subjective mind. The evolution of thought eventually advanced to a higher level referred to as objective mind, which concerns itself with externalizations such as social ethics, laws, political rights, aesthetics, religion, and philosophy. Objective mind is the grade in which group mind—collective mind—exhibits itself.

The picture of the productive process sketched by Hegel presents thought as a power of self-manifestation. Thought is naturally dynamic and prius. It exhibits "urge," "drive," and "appetite."

In other sections of his work,(13) Hegel alludes to thought as the realization of the concept, or *Begriff*. Some translators of Hegel employ the word "notion" as the English equivalent of *Begriff*, but I prefer the term "concept."

The concept is the universal. In explaining the meaning of the concept Hegel frequently resorts to organic terms, such as seed, germ, or genus. The concept is the genus, or universal, which concretizes itself in a species, or particularity. The movement is from the universal, the abstract, to the particular, the concrete.

The movement, however, is inherent, a process which is the in-itself of the concept. The employment of organic analogies is crucial to the understanding of the concept. Hegel wanted to portray the concept as an inherent tendency, as an organism which unfolded according to its inner nature and was thus active.

Thought was teleological, and when Hegel utilizes the expression "telos" he again reverts to an organic image. Teleological processes manifest purpose. Just as it is the purpose of life to produce children, so it is the purpose of concept to issue forth with determinate objects.

Teleological processes manifest also exhibit end. The expression "end" carries particular significance for Hegel, and he often alludes to the fact that the end was in the beginning. A student of Aristotle, Hegel believed that a dynamic

object, such as the concept, developed over time in accordance with its original design, or its original design contained its end. Hegel used the term *it-itself* to convey the fact that the end lay at the start, or what a living thing was in embryo would be its final outcome.

The Hegelian lexicon also contained two other usages which were synonymous with the *in-itself*, and they were immanence and essence. The outcome of an end was immanent in its beginning, and the essence of the end was its necessary development to its outcome.

The importance that Hegel assigned to teleological explanation is convincingly demonstrated in his *SL*. The second volume of the *SL* is devoted to a discussion of Subjective Logic, or to the theory of the concept, or to the forms which individual thought imposes on the external. Section two of the Subjective Logic dissects the forms in which the concept perceives the external: mechanism, chemism, and teleology. Mechanism is a form which is appropriate when explaining external objects which are separate from each other, while chemism is a form which correlates with explaining the laws inside the external objects themselves.

Teleology, however, is a form which corresponds to explaining objects once they are posited in thought. Because thought itself is teleological, that is, because thought inherently moves to an end, then any object which is ingested by thought must be seen as moving toward the end of the Idea.(14)

A critical part of Hegel's inquiry into teleology occurs in the chapter entitled "Teleology," which is chapter 3 of section two of volume 2 *SL*. In this chapter Hegel argues that teleological movement conforms to the pattern of the syllogism, or it functions in terms of the universal, the particular, and the individual. The syllogism will be considered in greater detail in later portions of this chapter, and at this point it is only required to note that Hegel divides the teleological process into three moments: subjective end, the universal; the means, the particular; and the realization of the end, the individual, or the unity of the universal and the particular. Here it is required to focus on the second moment of the syllogism of teleology, the means, or particular. Hegel is drawing attention to the act of subsumption, the act by which a part is incorporated into a whole.(15)

The chapter that immediately follows the one on "Teleology" is called "Life," and it is the first chapter in section three, "The Idea," in volume 2.(16) Hegel totally revolutionized the traditional Western definition of logic and did not perceive it as a set of rules of thought, as epistemology. Rather, Hegel re-defined logic as the self-manifestation of the concept, as forms assumed by the concept as it subsumed particularities. From this point of view, seeing thought not as passive recipient of sense data but as an active generator of patterns, as method, the chapter on "Life" is appropriate in a book on logic.

The "Life" chapter is central to a proper understanding of Hegel's *SL*. Life not only has a concept, but since it has concept, this concept is manifested in the activity of life. Hegel defines the concept of life and the impact that life has on the labor process of thought in these words:

Concept is immanent in it, the purposiveness of the living being is to be grasped as inner; the Notion is in it as determinate Notion distinct from its externality, and in its distinguishing, pervading the externality and remaining identical with itself. This objectivity of the living being is the organism; it is the means and instruments of the end, perfect in its purposiveness since the concept constitutes its substance; but for that very reason this means and instrument is itself the realized end, in which the subjective end is thus immediately brought into unity with itself . . . it is the urge of each single, specific moment to produce itself, and equally to raise its particularity to universality, sublate the other moments external to it and produce itself at their expense, but no less to sublate itself and make itself a means for others.(17)

The labor process of organic life recapitulates the labor process of the concept. Just as the concept subsumes the objects around it, organic life reaffirms and enhances this productive process by assisting in the subsumption of the objective. Life, then, is a vital part of Hegel's definition of logic, and the living organism is a means toward the attainment of the idea.

My discussion of the productive and reproductive processes in Hegel emphasized the role of the concept. Not only is the concept the inner being of an object, such as life, but it is also a method of cognition. To know an object is to know its concept, and therefore the act of cognition is predicated upon knowledge of the concept of the object.

But the productive process does not stop there, because it then spills over into the reproductive process. Subjectivity must negate the new object, now a new content, and it does this by subsuming the new object-content. The new externality is subsumed by the concept, and the concept reproduces another object. Hegel describes a creative process built around the ideas of consumption, retention, production, alienation, reappropriation, and reproduction.

My presentation of Hegel highlights the subjective aspects of production, and in this regard I adopt the phenomenological interpretation of Edmund Husserl, Alexandre Kojève, and Jean Hyppolite. But Marx lived before the phenomenological school rose to fame, and his approach to Hegel was split. On the one hand, he perpetuated the Hegelian theory of production as outlined here, but on the other hand he generally interpreted Hegelian philosophy as an expression of panlogicism. In the chapters dealing with the labor process in *The Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx continued the Hegelian theory of production, but in his *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy*

of Right, and “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy in General,” the last chapter of the *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, he presents Hegel as a panlogistic. When young Marx believed that the Idea was the subject of the Hegelian system, he stressed the panlogical aspects of the venerated sage of Berlin. The decisive factor for Marx was the placement of subjectivity, either in the person or as a member of society, or in the Abstract Idea.

The temporal dimension is indispensable to Hegel’s theory of production. In order for the object to become content, development must take place. Becoming is a central idea in the totality of Hegel’s philosophy, because the self-actualization of the concept can only occur in time. The processes of consumption and objectification, and then the subsumption of a new externality, is one that advances in stages and is consequently temporal.

The idea of historicity lay at the core of Hegel’s theory of production. If the process of subsumption and resubsumption is to take place, change over time must be presumed. Hegel’s entire philosophy charts the spiral from sense-perception to absolute knowledge, and historicity is the precondition for this evolutionary ascent.(18) The change from the implicit to the explicit is not instantaneous but must be sequential.

Hegel used the analogy of a bacchanalia when describing the activity of thought. This allusion to a Greek festival honoring the god Dionysus suggested the unbridled propensity of thought to create.

Knowledge

Hegel’s theory of knowledge is the reverse side of his theory of production. The manner in which thought objectifies itself provides the framework in which knowledge can take place. Knowledge is a reflection of the labor process of thought. Knowledge is the self-observation of consciousness.

Knowing was an exercise of self-recognition, or subjective thought recognized itself in its objectifications. Hegel defined knowledge as the “I” knowing the “I,” or subjective thought could only know an object because thought was already present in the object.

Hegel was the father of modern hermeneutics, a belief that knowledge can only come into being through self-recognition. When objectification, whose form is thought, reflects itself back into subjective thought, when the same substance exists in two objects, then knowledge becomes. All knowledge is self-knowledge. Since knowledge is the result of subjective thought recognizing itself in its objectification, then knowledge is the outcome of self-knowledge. When the “I”= “I,” then knowledge is the self-recognition of its own activity.(19)

This is the point at which historicity enters the Hegelian equation. The labor process of thought takes place over time. Taking the *LHP*, which will be dis-

cussed in subsequent portions of this chapter, as an example, Hegel seeks to discover the essence of the Greek concept of philosophy. His endeavor is hermeneutical in that contemporary thought seeks itself in ancient thought. Since knowledge is self-knowledge, Hegel can only know Greek thought as an act of recollection, he must recollect the thoughts which sculptured Greek speculation. Knowledge of any historical process was always an act of recalling.

In his preface to the *PR*, the father of modern hermeneutics made this comment: "The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk." (20) He meant that the owl can only see after the day is past, or that knowledge only arises in thought when observation of a past creation, now in the darkness, presents itself.

Learning was the self-education of mankind. By gaining knowledge of the object it manufactured thought gained knowledge of what it was in itself. By observing its own products, thought and the self became cognizant of their own capacities.

The final chapter of the *PHS* is called "Absolute Knowledge," and it describes how freedom is synonymous with the self-education of mankind. (21) In this chapter, however, Hegel does not relate to the history of philosophy as engendering absolute knowledge, but to the relation between consciousness and self-consciousness. Even though Hegel shifted the terms of reference, his subject was no longer thought but self-consciousness; the same methodology that governed the development of thought also regulated the evolution of self-consciousness.

Consciousness is the level of sense-perception. However, consciousness has the ability to inspect itself, and this power of self-examination is self-consciousness. Consciousness can divide itself: one part receives sense-data and engages in the struggle for recognition with the consciousness of other subjects, whereas self-consciousness refers to the ability of consciousness to scrutinize its own functioning.

The examination of consciousness by self-consciousness turns consciousness into an object of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness does not produce consciousness, but it gains a knowledge of it, learns that consciousness is a reflection of self-consciousness. A subject-relationship is brought about in which consciousness is the object, and self-consciousness is the subject.

Just as there is unity between thought and Being, so there is unity between subject and object. The unity of self-consciousness and consciousness is the ground of "absolute knowledge." Subjectivity can control the object, indeed it gives it a form, but the energy of self-consciousness is the ground of self-determination. Absolute knowledge means that self-consciousness, the ultimate unity of subject and object, is aware of its own unhindered potency for self-determination, and this is Freedom, or Freedom is equivalent to absolute knowledge.

METHOD

Hegel revolutionized the classical idea of logic, and rather than understand logic as epistemology, he redefined it as those forms produced during the evolution of the concept to the Absolute Idea. Hegel introduced the idea of historicity into the definition of logic, and rather than describe logic as a static, mechanical program to comprehend an object, he presented logic as developmental, as a sequence of forms produced by the concept in its struggle for complete unity with the object, the Absolute Idea.

In the logic of the *EPS*, Hegel discards four methods of cognizing the objective world, and these methods were the metaphysical, the empirical, the critical (meaning the philosophies of Kant, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Fichte), and the intuitive (meaning the immediate knowledge of God). In order to arrive at his own definition of logic, Hegel needed to overthrow the entire tradition of western logic from Aristotle to Kant and Fichte.

For example, in volume 1 the Small Logic of the *EPS*, Hegel discusses different approaches to the apprehension of objectivity. The “First Attitude of Thought to Objectivity” is metaphysics, and in paragraph #27 Hegel writes: “This method of thought has never become aware of the antithesis of subjective and objective.”(22) Hegel rejected the logic of metaphysics because it subsumed subjectivity into universality, or subjective concept was totally absorbed into the categories of “matter, force, those of one, many, generality, and infinity.”(23)

Empiricism constituted the “Second Attitude of Thought to Objectivity,” and Hegel criticized the empirical approach because it remained limited to isolated sense perceptions. Empiricism confined itself to the narrowness of the Understanding in which experience was the sole determinant.(24)

Critical philosophy was represented by the epistemology of Kant, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Fichte. All these thinkers failed to recognize that on the primordial level, subject and object stood opposed to each other, but that through the labor of thought, a concept was achieved which fused the subject and the object into a unity. Critical philosophy was borne above all in the work of Kant and Fichte. Kant, in his attempt to critique the empiricism of Hume, was unable to bridge the gap between subject and object, ultimately conceding that the “thing-in-itself” always remained outside and incomprehensible to reason. Fichte’s response to the empiricism of Hume was to postulate the existence of a supreme “I,” a self-consciousness out of which the “thing-in-itself” emerged. Fichte’s response to the subject-object bifurcation was to absorb the objectivity into self-consciousness, to deny the subject-object dichotomy by denying the independence of the object. Intuitionism, for Hegel, merely amounted to a cancellation of the powers of reason: intuitionism abolished thought in favor of the fiction of immediate apprehension.

Hegel considered himself a speculative philosopher and judged speculative philosophy as superior to the four above-mentioned outdated schools of philosophy. Speculative thought distinguished itself by its ability to create a conjunction between subject and object. Speculative thought was predicated on the oneness of subject and object and on the belief that the process which brings about this correspondence is developmental in nature, that it is historical.

Like all of Hegel's monographs, the *SL* is defined by a single, pervading concept. The central theme of the *SL* is the evolution of the Absolute Idea, or the perfect unity of subject and object. It is consistent with Hegel's overall design of the *SL* that his most complete discussion of method occurs in the final chapter of the *SL*, the "Absolute Idea."

The *SL* is a description of the odyssey of the Absolute Idea. It is the developmental history of the Absolute Idea. But the genealogy of the Absolute Idea passes through many forms, or the Absolute Idea must pass through many stages before it reaches its completion as Absolute Idea.

Method is coequal with logic. Method is the forms the concept produces in order to realize itself as Absolute Idea.

The actualization of concept in the Absolute Idea traverses many forms, or the Absolute Idea leaves a curriculum vitae. Method is the archeology of thought and is the search for the earlier shapes of thought as it ascends to the fulfilled Idea.

Method is the self-knowledge of the concept.(25) It is the concept's self-recognition of its own function.

In its march toward self-actualization, the Absolute Idea predicates many determinations. Being, Essence, Content-Form are examples of such predications. The Absolute Idea precipitates through its diremptions into determinate constructs, and methodology is a cognition of the functioning of the Idea.

Prior to the chapter on "Absolute Idea" Hegel placed a chapter entitled "Life." The insertion of such chapters is representative of Hegel's definition of logic.

Hegel characterized "life" as "urge."(26) He purposely selected the term urge because he wanted to emphasize the developmental character of logic, or logic could not be separated from life, and therefore it necessarily must be continuous in nature.

The "Life" chapter is divided into three sections: 1) "The Living Individual"; 2) "The Life Process"; 3) "Genus." Hegel applied an organic image in describing the ascent of the Idea. The organic image was meant to highlight the theme of continuous growth, of perpetual process in the history of the logic or in the history of thought generally.(27)

The "Life" chapter, the use of the term urge, was intended to demonstrate that logic was possessed by immanence, that Idea was directed by purposefulness.

Since historicity was the presupposition of existence, then methodology must also reflect perpetual change. Methodology was the portrait, a mapping of the immanent development of concept to Idea.

Method was a theory regarding how reality should be apprehended. Within Hegelian dialectical thought, method was equal to a philosophy of science. Hegel rejected the metaphysical method, or science, because it gave no allowance to subjectivity, and he negated the empirical method, or science, because it did not evolve to the level of the concept. Method was a science because it was a particular strategy by which thought imposed a design on reality. Later pages will evidence Marx's dependency on Hegelian method, but Marx did not propose a method to fathom the natural sciences but method as a logic of explanation in the social sciences.

Hegelian methodology possessed a series of unique features, and these were: 1) the organic; 2) totalities; 3) whole and parts; 4) subsumption; 5) theory of development; 6) functional explanation.

1). The Organic

The model Hegel employed to picture the essence of the dialectical method was an organism. The inherent quality of an organism was life, and this meant that the organic method was characterized by activity, appetite, and drive. Organisms developed over time and consumed the world around them. They were absorbent and appropriative in that they sublated and negated the external around them.

Organisms were imbued with an in-itself, an essence, and a purpose. They manifested an inner voltage and telos which propelled them toward an end that lay in its germ.

The organic method was the presupposition of the entire Hegelian system, or organic explanation lay at the basis of all the books Hegel authored. The movement is always from the empirical to the Absolute Idea. Since the Absolute Idea is understood as the unity of subject and object, then the movement of all of his scientific studies ascends from sense perception to self-determination. The end of organic evolution is always Freedom, or self-determination.

2). Totalities

Organic methodology actualized itself as a totality. Hegel utilized systematic explanation. He did not explain phenomena as isolated or as particularized but always saw them as part of a unified process. An object of knowledge becomes a system, for example, the history of philosophy in which each part or articulation of that history is integrated with a corporate entity.

The program of systemization lay at the core of Hegel's definition of science. Just as he revolutionized the meaning of logic, so he also revolutionized the meaning of science. In Hegelian thought, science did not refer to the correspondence theory of truth, science did not mean building verisimilitude be-

tween an external object and the mental representation of that object, or discovering laws of nature. Rather, the dialectical theory of science assumed that every area of research within a specific domain of knowledge could be unified within a totalizing system.

The *SL* is a good example because it is a systematic presentation of the rules of thought. It begins with Being, or existence surrounded by the perceptible, and ends with the Absolute Idea. Every step of the logic contributes to the evolutionary ascent as both an appearance of or a facilitator of the advance of logic to the Absolute Idea. The advance is a unitary process in which the totality molds the parts, and the parts sustain the totality.

3). Whole and Parts

All of Hegel's explanations are holistic, and they derive from the modality of whole and parts. Just as separate organs in the human body were subordinated to and contributed to the purpose of the body, so the particularities of a totality were absorbed into the end of the whole. Reciprocal influences characterized the relationship between whole and parts, for parts were coordinated into the whole, and the whole was a summation of the parts.

Holistic methodology assumes collectivities. Holistic entities are taken as individualities in themselves; they are judged as collectivities with unique behavioral patterns. The collectivities become objective forces or grow necessary modes of operation. One law of objective totalities was the necessity for self-preservation and self-reproduction. Explanation of the behavior of objective totalities was based on functional reasoning, or the parts of the totality always acted to preserve or advance the system.

4). Subsumption

The idea of subsumption is indispensable to holistic methodology. The words subsumption and sublation are synonymous, and both relate to the tendency of an organism to incorporate and assimilate material that initially is outside the organism. Subsumption equals ingestion, the consuming of an object not initially part of the organism, but once ingested, it immediately becomes a member of the whole body. The object ingested by the whole is not obliterated by the whole, and even though its function in the totality may be altered, it is still retained.

5). Theory of Development

In *SL*, volume 2, the chapters on The Notion and The Syllogism contain Hegel's clearest exposition of his theory of development.

The primary developmental force was the dialectic, and I will select those features of the dialectic which were unique propellants of progressive evolution.

Subjectivity provided personality, or a self. Although Marx interpreted Hegel as a panlogician, in Hegel's works thought required a self in order to be activated. Personality was the mode in which the dialectic expressed itself.

Since subjectivity always stood opposed to a historical totality, since it was the “I” as distinct from the “Other,” subjectivity was generally a critical agent, a force causing change in the Other.

Negation was also a unique dynamic of development, because negativity annulled an existing historical object, thereby engendering change. Negation was a means of establishing a determinate, because through the process of negation, of establishing a border between two objects, or a subject and object, negativity produces a determinate, a delimited individuality.

Negation was an instrument of exclusion and otherness. Through the creation of its individuality, negativity excludes the other, or the exclusion of the Other becomes the ground for an object’s own distinctiveness, or appearance. Otherness is the presupposition of determination.

For the reasons outlined above, negation was the origin of opposition, or opposition was necessary for determination. Opposition was a contradictory energy, and because opposition always sought to overthrow an opposing object it was the engine of modification, and development.

The determinate was always the outcome of negation, but the determinate was temporary. The dynamic of the dialectic of contradiction ensured that a determinate would be sublated by an Other, or negation was the source of the historical.(28)

The dynamic of development was additionally fueled by the contradiction between the universal and particular which was reconciled in the individual. The opposition between the universal and particular was a feature of thought, was the breeding ground of the judgment, and judgment was a faculty of the syllogism.(29)

The concept, for Hegel, was the universal, but the concept was incapable of subsuming all of reality. A particular, an object in-itself, always stood outside the universal, and the opposition between universal and particular was an inexpugnable condition of thought. The faculty of judgment endeavored a reconciliation between universal and particular, and the result of this effort of mediation was the individual. The individual was the synthesis of the universal and particular.

In order for the Absolute Idea to emerge, thought must pass through the stage of the syllogism. In order for the unity of subject and object to be realized it was necessary for the emergent Idea to overcome the contradiction between the universal and particular. The opposition, the antipode, of universal and particular was another octane in driving development forward.

The polarity of universal and particular was employed by Hegel to analyze the functioning of totalities. Since the antithesis of universal and particular was a feature of logic, it was impossible to cognize a social totality without conceiving of it as a composite of the dialectic of universal and particular.

Hegel's theory of functionalism was constructed on both the presupposition of organic immanence and telos, as well as on the theory of negativity in all the forms outlined above.

6). Functional Explanation

Functional explanations account for the preservation and maintenance of totalities. For example, the function of the struggle for survival between two subjects is to lay the basis of the state. If the mortal combat for recognition is to be pacified, an ethical order must be established, and the state is a major expression of such an ethical order. The war for recognition performs a functional operation because it was a medium for the development of the state, or the emergence of objective mind, a step toward philosophy.

A statement of Hegel's functionalism is found in the "Introduction" to the *EPS* in which Hegel wrote:

Each of the parts of philosophy is a philosophical whole, a circle rounded and complete in itself. In each of these parts, however, the philosophical Idea is found in a particular specificity, or medium. The single circle, because it is a real totality, bursts through the limits imposed by its special; medium, and gives rise to a wider circle. The whole of philosophy in this way resembles a circle of circles. The idea appears in each single circle, but, at the same time, the whole idea is constituted by the system of these peculiar phases, and each is a necessary member of this organization.

How much of the particular parts is requisite to constitute a particular branch of knowledge is so far indeterminate, that the part, if it is to be something true, must not be an isolated member merely, but itself an organic whole. The entire field of philosophy therefore really forms a single science; but it may also be viewed as a total, composed of several particular sciences.(30)

This summary of Hegel's method is vital to an appreciation of his definition of the science of the system of philosophy. In this "Introduction," Hegel begins his study of the science of the system of philosophy by defining the science of the system of philosophy. He seeks to answer the question What is the object of study of the system of philosophy?

The primary attribute of a science is to have an end, an Idea, and the Idea of the system of philosophy is absolute knowledge. Every science, the *PR*, and the *LHP*, possess an Idea. The science of the system of philosophy is to portray how thought ascends to absolute knowledge, and how each of the parts of the system of philosophy lends itself to the realization of this purpose. In order for there to be a science, a systematic approach must be adopted.

After defining the science of the system of philosophy, Hegel enumerates the syllogistic division of his study. The *EPS* is divided into three volumes, *The Logic (L)*, *The Philosophy Of Nature (PN)*, *The Philosophy of Spirit (PS)*,

and each volume represents a single stage of the syllogism. In the *L*, or Smaller Logic, Hegel demonstrates that thought is antecedent. Although thought and sense certainty are simultaneous occurrences, it is thought which acts as the energy for the ascent to Idea, and so concept is the universal. The *PN* represents the syllogism as particularity, as a contradiction of the universality of the concept. In the *PN* Hegel shows that nature has an independent existence separate from thought. The independence of nature from thought provides thought with an "Otherness," and it is this Otherness which thought must subsume in mind's climb to the Absolute Idea. Sense perception possesses its own being, but it is instantaneously absorbed into thought, becomes indistinguishable from thought, as thought begins its development to Idea. The *PS* is the triad of the syllogism in its moment of reconciliation: the *PS* is the moment of fusion between the universal and the particular which results in spirit or the evolution of thought to absolute knowledge. The *PS* demonstrates that the science of the system of philosophy has achieved its end, for the "Introduction" specified that the end of science was the Absolute Idea, and the syllogism of the system of philosophy illuminated the stages leading to the achievement of this end.

The general syllogism of the *EPS*, *Logic*, *Nature*, *Spirit*, was replicated by specific syllogisms in each of the volumes. The specific syllogism of the *Logic* was Being, Essence, and Concept, and the specific syllogism of the *PN* was Mechanism, Chemism, and the Organic, while the specific syllogism of the *PS* was Mind Subjective, Mind Objective, and Absolute Mind. Furthermore, each of these specific syllogisms was itself subdivided into micro-syllogisms. For example, the specific syllogism of Mind Subjective in the *PS* was itself split into the micro-syllogism of Anthropology, the Phenomenology of Mind, and Psychology. The syllogism was the evolutionary prius of Hegel's methodology, and the syllogism recapitulated itself from its general form into its micro-forms.

The attempt will now be made to show how this methodology was duplicated in *LHP*. The *EPS* was the template of the Hegelian method, and the *LHP* was merely a copy of this methodology. However, before going on to outline this replication, it is first necessary to define what Hegel discerned by both philosophy and the history of philosophy.

Philosophy was the remembrance of thought, the recollection of the systems generated by thought in its journey through time. Using time as its canvas, thought is engaged in progressive manifestations, and the apprehension of these sequential externalizations of thought is philosophy.(31)

The presence of progressive manifestations means that philosophy must be historical, and to think philosophically means to think historically.(32) Since thought emits an unending sequence of formulations, which is history, unless one thinks historically it is impossible to penetrate to the essence of thought.

Hegel set himself the task of fathoming all previous thought architectures, and he could only do this by writing history.

From this point of view, the nature of philosophy is not the search for eternal truth. Philosophy does not pretend to capture the unchanging meaning of the universe. In the "Introduction" to volume 1 of the *LHP* Hegel elucidates his topic with these words:

But men do not at certain epochs, merely philosophize in general, for there is a definite philosophy which arises among a people, and the definite character of the standpoint of thought is the same character which permeates all the other historical sides of the spirit of the people, which is most intimately related to them, and which constitutes their foundation.

This is the position of philosophy amongst its varying forms, from which it follows that it is entirely identical with its time. But philosophy does not stand above its time in content, it does so in form, because, as the thought and knowledge of that which is the substantial spirit of its time, it makes that spirit its object.(33)

Philosophy captures the thought forms which reflects a particular historical period. These thought forms are expressions of a historical era, they reflect the political, scientific, religious, artistic conditions of a given moment in time. However, each conditioned totality has a purpose because it is subsumed by the next holistic shape. Each organic whole is sublated into a higher architecture, and each totality thus contributes to the evolutionary spiral of mind, or spirit.

Historical description has two aspects, the exoteric and the esoteric, or the outer and the inner. Exoteric historical explanation, the outer, accounts for thought totalities in their chronological environment. The exoteric approach to the history of philosophy accounts for organic shapes in terms of their temporal circumstances, in terms of their relation to the political, or intellectual environment.

Esoteric explanation, the inner, explains philosophic organisms in terms of their inherent growth. The analysis of the inner qualities of a philosophic totality entails a discussion of its internal consistency, the internal network of a thought system with its various parts, such as the sciences, or religion, or the question of internal coherence.

With these terminologies in place, it is now possible to outline the overall design of Hegel's *LHP*. At this point, this chapter is basically concerned with Hegel's views of Democritus, Epicurus, and the Skeptics, because later paragraphs of this chapter will discuss young Marx's own analysis of these philosophers and schools, and thereby compare Hegel and young Marx on these topics. As I proceed in sketching Hegel's overall reconstruction, which

unfolds in terms of the syllogism, I will pause to indicate to which arms of the triplicity of the syllogism Democritus, Epicurus, the Stoics and Skeptics are relevant, or the place of these individualities and schools in the progressive manifestations of thought, the march of spirit.

The history of philosophy begins in Greece, because freedom was a prerequisite for the birth of philosophy. The Oriental world did not know philosophy because it did not know free subjectivity. Given to despotism, in the Oriental world only the monarch was free, while all his subjects were subservient. In the Oriental world the individual submerged his identity to the authoritarianism of an emperor, the subjective was extinguished, and so free thought, philosophy, could not develop.(34)

According to the Hegelian system, the general syllogism which encompassed the entire history of philosophy posited the following triplicity: Greece, the Medieval period, and the Moderns.(35) The Greeks discovered the meaning of the idea, the Scholastics focused on the divine world, and modern philosophy was preoccupied with the concept.

Each part of this general syllogism was itself divided into a specific syllogism, or a smaller circle within the global circle. The Greek world took on this triadic design: 1) the period from Thales to Aristotle; 2) Greek philosophy in the Roman World; 3) Neo-Platonism. Hegel characterized each of these circles in the following manner: 1) the period from Thales to Aristotle was distinguished by the conquest of the concrete idea; 2) the period of Greek philosophy in the Roman World was stamped by science and dogmatism, and dogmatism was a method in which a single principle dominated the entire system of a thought form; 3) Neo-Platonism was the withdrawal of thought into absolute universality.(36)

But even these specific syllogisms were separated into micro-syllogisms. The specific syllogism of Greek philosophy in the Roman World miniaturized itself into a micro-syllogism, and the triadic division of this micro-syllogism was: 1) Stoicism; 2) Epicureanism; 3) Skepticism. This wing of the triplicity was the target of young Marx's attack on Hegel in *DDEPN*, or these three schools of thought, in particular Epicureanism, acted as the content of young Marx's dissertation. Since I want to complete my overview of Hegel's syllogistic methodology, in particular his understanding of modern thought, because his views on the Enlightenment and German Critical philosophy shed important light on his own thought and that of Marx, I will momentarily bypass the triplicity of Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Skepticism (SES). I will first discuss Hegel's comprehension of modern thought and then return to analyze how Hegel conceived of the micro-syllogism of SES. I will not discuss the Medieval organism of thought, because it has no bearing on the subject under consideration.

Modern philosophy was also composed of specific syllogisms. The first triad was: "Modern Philosophy in its First Statement," which was a study of

the empiricism of Francis Bacon and Jakob Boehme; the second triad was that of the "Thinking Understanding," but this triad was itself constituted by a micro-syllogism: 1) The first micro-syllogism was Rene Descartes and Baruch Spinoza; the second triad was John Locke and Thomas Hobbes; the third triad was Gottfried Leibnitz. After his analysis of "Thinking Understanding," Hegel inserted a section called "Transition Period," basically a summary of eighteenth century French materialism. He then concluded with the third triad of the specific syllogism of Modern Philosophy, which he called "Recent German Philosophy," and this was an interpretation of the thought of Friedrich Jacobi, Immanuel Kant, Johann Fichte, and Friedrich Schelling, or generally of Critical theory. For the purpose of this chapter, the syllogism on Modern philosophy is important because in it Hegel presents his ideas regarding materialism, empiricism, and the Enlightenment in general.

The Enlightenment, essentially beginning in the seventeenth century, was the dominant influence in the shaping of modern thought. The best approach to Hegel's assessment of the Enlightenment is to divide it into two parts, the aspects Hegel considered positive and those he judged as negative.

On the positive side, Hegel looked upon Descartes as the father of modern philosophy, for when Descartes wrote "I think, therefore I am," he inserted the idea of subjectivity into modern western thought. The yardstick of methodological doubt supplied Descartes with an instrument to establish subjectivity as the unchallenged presupposition of existence.

Another positive feature of the Enlightenment was the rediscovery of empiricism by Bacon, Locke, and David Hume. Hegel knew that the revival of empiricism after Medieval Scholastic thought dated from the sixteenth century. From the sixteenth century work of Pierre Gassendi, who gave rebirth to the atomism of Epicurus, but Locke and Hume were the fundamental craftsmen of modern empiricism. Hegel evinced great respect for Locke and Hume because they continued the subjectivity of Descartes. In addition, Hegel found them significant thinkers, because they advanced the concept of sense perception. Hegel argued that speculation about discovering the "thing-in-itself" was a fruitless enterprise, although an external object was a requirement for the activity of self-consciousness, because the inseparability of the external object and thought was instituted at the moment self-consciousness made contact with the "thing-in-itself." Nevertheless, Locke's and Hume's examination of sense perception and the empirical opened up new horizons for modern thought, indispensable tools for the exploration of the physical universe. The growth of the natural sciences during the Enlightenment was a direct consequence of the advances of Locke and Hume.

On the negative side, Hegel felt that Descartes, Locke nor Hume joined subjectivity and thought. Although in different ways, Descartes, Locke, and

Hume all made concept dependent on the external world. Descartes looked upon mathematics as a perfect science, while Locke and Hume never freed themselves from the grip of sense perception. All three believed in the priority of subjectivity, but some of them wedded subjectivity to concept.

The Enlightenment was a pan-European phenomenon, but Hegel recognized three national minds as major contributors to this continental cultural movement: the English, the French, and the German. While the English and French were the originators of Enlightenment empiricism and natural science, the Germans remained the source of spiritual fulfillment. The Enlightenment was a composite of Anglo-French empiricism and natural science alongside German Protestantism, or spirituality.

Fichte and Kant embodied the essence of the German Enlightenment. Heirs of Martin Luther, although in differing degrees, both situated the origin of ideas in thought instead of in sense perception. Both changed the point of the inception of the idea, for they moved it from a result of perception to a self-generated outpouring of mind.

Both Fichte and Kant inaugurated Critical philosophy, for they were both critical of the empiricism of Locke and Hume, and they also initiated a critical examination of the categories of thought. Kant offered the most precise exploration into the categories of thought but continued the distinction between the idea and the “thing-in-itself.” Accepting that the “thing-in-itself” could never be known, he never speculated on the unity of subject and object but always accepted their dualism.

Critical philosophy in the hands of Fichte suffered from a different default. For Fichte, the ego alone was the pneumatic force, or he negated the external object. Fichte eliminated the power of contradiction, how consciousness overcame contradiction by ingesting the “thing-in-itself.” Critical philosophy, as practiced by Fichte, asserted the potency of subjectivity, but in so doing minimized the dialectical force of opposition.

Hegel’s version of critical philosophy differed from that of both Kant and Fichte. Hegel criticized Kant and Fichte and was not interested in providing verification for Newtonian science but rather in establishing the self-determination of thought. Although in different modes, Kant and Fichte maintained the divorce of subject and object, and their critical approach to thought was predicated on this distinction. On the other hand, Hegel assumed the union of subject and object. Hegel’s version of Critical theory was unKantian and unFichtean because Hegel criticized any attempt to separate thought and Being, or to deny a philosophy of identity.

With this abbreviated summary into Hegel’s method, and with this cursory view of his appreciation of sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth century materialism and empiricism, it is now necessary to return to his as-

assessment of Greek philosophy, particularly the forms assumed by the SES. A long quote from the *LHP* is of benefit here because it summarizes Hegel's grasp of the specific syllogism of the Greco-Roman World and its three moments, Thales to Aristotle, Greek philosophy in the Roman World, and Neo-Platonism.

We begin with thought, as it is in a quite abstract, natural, or sensuous form, and we proceed from this to the Idea as determined. The first period shows the beginning of philosophic thought, and goes on to its development, and perfection as a totality of knowledge in itself; this takes place in Aristotle as representing the unity of what has come before. In Plato there is just such a union of what came earlier, but it is not worked out, for he only represents the idea generally. The Neo-Platonists have been called eclectics, but they had a conscious insight into the necessity for uniting these philosophies.

After the idea was reached, it came forth as if in opposition, perfecting and developing itself. The second period is that in which science breaks itself up into different systems. A one-sided principle is carried through the whole conception of the world; each side is in itself formed into a totality, and stands in the relation of one extreme to another. The philosophical systems of Stoicism, and Epicureanism are such; Skepticism forms the negative of this dogmatism, while the other philosophies disappear.

The third period is the affirmation, the withdrawal of the opposition into an ideal world, or a world of thought, a divine world. This is the idea developed into a totality, which yet lacks subjectivity as the infinite being-in-itself.(37)

In these passages Hegel outlined the development of Greek and Roman philosophy in the form of a syllogism. Period One covers the evolution of Greek philosophy from the Ionic School to Aristotle, which encompasses Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, the Sophists, Socrates, Plato, and culminates in Aristotle. In this period the universality of the Idea was discovered but without the individuality of subjectivity. The discovery of the universality of the Idea can be compared to the first stage of the syllogism, the stage of generality. In *LHP* Hegel tries to show how the advancement of Greek and Roman thought proceeds dialectically.

Since Greek thought from Thales to Aristotle discovered the universality of thought, it was necessary for the universality to be repudiated by the principle of subjectivity, and the repudiation was carried through by the Stoicism and Epicureanism of the Roman World. The strength of Stoicism and Epicureanism was their discovery of subjectivity, but their weakness was their commitment to empiricism.

Neo-Platonism constituted the third stage in the cycle of the dialectic. This third stage was a moment of harmony in which the universal and particular were joined into a new synthesis. This synthesis was not final, because it too

would break apart and begin another cycle. The best way to conceive of the dialectic in Hegel is to imagine it as a spiral of self-expanding circles. The weakness of Neo-Platonism was its lack of the principle of subjectivity, and this set the stage for the advancement of philosophy in the modern era, especially the seventeenth century.

Within the dialectical movement of Greek philosophy, Hegel viewed the SES schools as instances of decline. Although they were expressions of Roman civilization, these schools represented the decay of ancient philosophy after the peaks attained by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. These schools did not announce a new emancipation, a new definition of freedom, but rather contributed to the breakdown of the classical world.

Hegel's judgment of the SES reveals how he approached the issue of subjectivity. For him, subjectivity could either be positive or negative.

Subjectivity in itself was a necessary part of the dialectic. Individuality was an engine of negation, and such contradiction occasioned the advance of the dialectic. In this sense, the subjective elements of SES all affirmed the principle of subjectivity, and in this sense these schools were positive.

However, SES thought affirmed an abstract subjectivity, which was a regressive step. Abstract subjectivity saw the individual as an atomic "I," as an "I" completely detached from the state, politics, and ethical community.

Hegel's rejection of abstract subjectivity was one reason he never developed a critical philosophy in the style of Bauer and Marx. In order for a Bauer-Marx form of critical theory to emerge, it was necessary for a subject to stand separate from the world and to judge it.

The Bauer-Marx version of critical theory was based on the disconnection of thought and Being. The Hegelian formulation of critical philosophy assumed the oneness of thought and Being, and Hegel's critique was directed at those like Kant and Fichte, and presumably Bauer and Marx as well, who assumed the divergence between subject and object, who denied the philosophy of identity.

Positive subjectivity, for Hegel, was an individual intellect which had a symbiotic relationship with state, politics, and ethical community. This interconnectedness was one of the foundations of the oneness of thought and Being, subject and object. If philosophy was intertwined with the world there was no distinction between the Idea and reality, and thus Idea could not judge reality because reality was itself Idea. Consequently, although Hegel found the SES defense of subjectivity a significant step, an advance in Greek-Roman thought after Aristotle, he also attacked those schools for serious distortions of the idea of subjectivity.

In addition to his rejection of abstract subjectivity, Hegel also found the SES idea of happiness to be seriously flawed. Although their definitions of

happiness differed, all these schools shared the belief that happiness was a state of personal well-being. The Stoics argued that life should be lived in accordance with nature, because following nature's regime would eliminate distress and trauma. Epicurus designated happiness as tranquility, because the total absence of anxiety permitted a person to live without any malaise. The SES prescription of happiness also served to weaken any bonding between a person and society. Since the thrust of the ethical teaching of these schools was avoidance of any harmonization between the individual and the polis, this ethical canon led to reclusive withdrawal.

These types of classical eudemonism were distasteful to Hegel. They were additional consequences of abstract subjectivity, for they did not encourage the individual's engagement in the socio-ethical world but rather supported his retreat from communal involvement. In terms of practical activity, Hegel substituted an ethic of duty in place of an ethic of happiness.

Indebted to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, Hegel believed that man was most fulfilled when he was a part of an ethical community. Adhering to Aristotle, Hegel defined man as a *zoon politikon*, for he realized that a subject could achieve universality only when that subject acted in conjunction with other men. Politics was ethical in nature.

Just as Hegel's approach to the SES revealed his attitudes toward subjectivity, so his evaluation of these schools reflected the positions he took toward materialism. *LHP* joined Stoics and Epicureans under the rubric of dogmatism, while the Skeptics were considered a distinct discipline, but with much in common with the Sophists.

Hegel defined dogmatism in the following manner:

There is opposed to thought, in the second place, the determinate as such, the principle of individuality, feeling generally, sensuous perception and observation. These two form the principles of the Stoic and Epicurean philosophies. Both principles are one-sided, and, as positive, become sciences of the understanding, just because this thought is not in itself concrete, but abstract, the determination falls outside of thought, and must be made a principle for itself; for it has an absolute right as against abstract thought.(38)

Stoics and Epicureans were dogmatists because they fixated on one aspect of reality, materialism, and turned this into a universal principle. They believed that thought was a reflection of sense perception, and this violated the dialectical principle of the self-determination of thought. Dependency on observation reduced mind to the level of understanding, and Stoicism never advanced to the higher grades of the dialectic. As I pointed out earlier, the *LHP* narrates the ascent of thought to the self-determination of the Idea, and from the point of view of this immanent process, Stoicism was a deterrent to this historical evolution.

Stoics believed in physics, or laws of nature that were applicable to the world's entire population, and the theory of natural rights was one outgrowth of this belief. Hegel opposed the Stoics on natural rights theory. First, natural rights theory placed the issue of political rights in the sphere of nature, whereas Hegel felt that political rights belonged to the domain of ethics. This was another instance of the Stoic enslavement to physics. Second, the doctrine of nature rights led in the eighteenth century to the false speculations of J. J. Rousseau. Natural rights theory provided the justification for the concepts of equality and democracy. Not only did Hegel oppose Rousseau but all egalitarian and democratic ideologies.

The second dogmatist, Epicurus, was a devotee of the earlier Greek atomists, Leucippus, and Democritus. The Epicureans' brand of atomism had some distinct features, and Hegel described this uniqueness in the following way:

Besides their different figures, atoms have also, as the fundamental mode in which they are effected, a difference of movement, caused by their weight, but this movement to some extent deviates from the straight line in this direction. This is to say, Epicurus ascribes to atoms a curvilinear movement; in order that they may impinge on one another and so on. In this way there arise particular accumulations and configurations, and these are things.(39)

Hegel's comment is a passing one. He does not compare the "curvilinear movement" of the atoms of Epicurus with the perfectly linear fall of the atoms of Democritus. Marx compares Epicurus and Democritus, but Hegel does not. Hegel does not question whether the atoms of Epicurus have a being outside of thought or whether they are determinations of the thought, but Marx does. In other words, the "curvilinear movement" of Epicurus's atoms becomes the decisive point on which Marx exits Hegel's history of philosophy, or it is the substance out of which Marx's critical theory will emerge. I briefly make note here of the difference between Marx and Hegel, but I offer a more extended analysis in my discussion of Marx's dissertation.

Epicurus's atomism was the ground upon which his materialism and empiricism were built. Materialism deals with the problem of the composition of the external world, and it asserts that the external world is ultimately reducible to matter. Empiricism is more epistemological; it asks questions regarding the origin of ideas. Empiricism is one method of investigating the external world, the procedures to be adopted by an investigator if he is to acquire adequate results from his experiments.

On the epistemological level, Hegel refers to Epicurus as espousing a "natural philosophy,"(40) and this means a philosophy which derives from sense perception, or no philosophy at all. "Natural philosophy" is a phrase which Hegel uses to invalidate the claim that it is philosophy in any sense. To be phi-

losophy, ideas must be diremptions from thought, or ideas must be produced by self-consciousness. For only in this way is self-consciousness autonomous. While Hegel claims that philosophy in his definition is dialectical, he judges the ideas of Epicurus to be of the poorest level, that of understanding. In addition, "natural philosophy" was not the same as the philosophy of nature. In the philosophy of nature, mind also provided the method by which nature could be comprehended. "Natural philosophy" was an epistemological protocol, it sought to explain how ideas arose, but a philosophy of nature was a mode of apprehending how nature functioned, or a philosophy of nature was a theory regarding the cognition of nature.

Hegel's low estimation of Epicurus was summed up in the paragraph taken from the *LHP*:

The above mentioned interruption of the streaming together of internal things with our organs, as the ground of error, is now explained by the theory that the soul consists of peculiar atoms, and the atoms are separated from one another by vacuum. With such empty words and meaningless conceptions we shall no longer detain ourselves, we can have no respect for the philosophic thoughts of Epicurus, or rather he has no thoughts to respect.(41)

In spite of these attacks on Epicurus, Hegel recognized that he had a lasting influence on western thought. Materialism and empiricism became permanent features of the western tradition. Although they were ignored throughout the Middle Ages, they resurfaced as shaping influences in the eighteenth century Anglo-French Enlightenment.

Locke and Hume were descendants of Epicurean materialism and empiricism, and the weaknesses of Epicurean thought were also found in the Anglo-French Enlightenment. This branch of the Enlightenment never advanced beyond the level of the understanding.

Epicurus's search for tranquility, as well as his materialism and empiricism, led him to reject all appearances of superstition and any aspect of religion which disturbed human quietude. The desire to preserve human tranquility led him to deny any religious belief which threatened to destroy human happiness. From the basis of eudemonism, an anti-religious prejudice infused Epicurean philosophy.(42) Unlike Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, Epicurus denied the existence of the divinities.

Whereas Hegel focused upon the weakness of dogmatism, especially the Epicurean version, he stressed the positives of Skepticism. The biggest difference between Skepticism and dogmatism derived from the fact that whereas dogmatism drew its authority from sense perception, Skepticism found its authority in thought. Dogmatism remained immersed in the physical universe, physics, while Skepticism proclaimed the rule of self-consciousness.(43)

Skepticism discovered that every determination was exposed to a contradiction, and so was one of the origins of a theory of negation. Skepticism introduced the idea of opposition into philosophy and performed the historic role of giving rise to one aspect of this dialectic.(44)

Skepticism brought the idea of negation into philosophy but not the idea of synthesis. In order for the dialectic to exist, a negation must annul an object, but after this contradiction occurs, a synthesis must arise, or the cancelled object must be subsumed into a higher determination. The Skeptics proposed contradiction, one pole of the dialectic, but never advanced to the synthesis, the second pole of the dialectic.(45)

Skepticism was unified with subjectivity but not dogmatism. Whereas the Stoics, Epicureans, according to Hegel, were dogmatists in relation to physics, Skepticism opposed any final and absolute determination.

Hegel wrote favorably about Skepticism because it influenced his thinking, or Hegel completed the Skeptics' enterprise. Where Skepticism postulated the existence of negativity, Hegel completed the dialectic by adding the existence of synthesis. Skeptics initiated the U-P formula, and Hegel completed the equation by adding the I.

Neither Skeptics nor Stoics discovered the dialectic. They had only unearthed the power of the antipodal, the Skeptics in the realm of thought and the Stoics in the relation between man and society. Both ended their endeavors by allowing contradiction to be the final stage, and the opposition between subject and object remained. They did not attain a philosophy of identity.

The Sophists also exemplified the negative aspects of the self. On this point, the Sophists were precursors of the SES, for all made the "I" into an ultimate principle. The negative aspect of the self displayed itself in the withdrawal of the "I" from the ethical community. Hegel accused the Sophists of contributing to the decay of Athens. Hegel presented this analysis of how the Sophists led to the corruption of the Greek World:

We have, then, now to investigate the corruption of the Greek World in its profounder import, and may denote the principle of that corruption as subjectivity obtaining emancipation for itself. We see Subjectivity obtruding itself in various ways. Thought . . . the subjective universal . . . menaces the beautiful religion of Greece, while the passion of individuals, and their caprice menace the political constitution. In short, Subjectivity, comprehending and manifesting itself, threatens the existing state of things in every department . . . characterized as that state of things is by Immediacy (a primitive, unreflecting simplicity). Thought, therefore, appears here as the principle of decay . . . decay, viz. of Substantial (prescriptive) morality, for it introduces an antithesis, and asserts, essentially rational principles.(46)

Hegel articulated a similar theme in the "Freedom and Self-Consciousness" chapter of the 1807 *PHS*. The subtitle of this chapter is "Stoicism, Skepticism and the Unhappy Consciousness." (47)

Epicurus is not included in this chapter, although in these pages, Hegel proposes that abstract individuality is the breeding ground of the "Unhappy Consciousness." The autonomous "I" leads to personal isolation, to the separation of the individual from the community, and this reclusiveness is the cause of the "Unhappy Consciousness," or the subject as divorced from the polis.

Just as Hegel accentuated the destructive tendencies of Sophist abstract subjectivity, so he also emphasized the deficiency of the societal role model of the "sophos," or "wise man." The behavioral paradigm of the "wise man" was defective, because the Sophists looked upon the private person who had achieved self-satisfaction in himself as a paragon of virtue. Hegel recognized that the Sophists had made vital contributions to Athenian culture, particularly in the domain of education, but Hegel dismissed the depiction of the "sophos" as hero. The singular individual who isolated himself from the tides of history was not heroic. Alexander the Great, Caesar, Marcus Aurelius were the great men of history because they were the tools of the "cunning of reason," and not naysayers to the world of spirit.

Hegel's evaluation of the "sophos" influenced his assessment of Socrates. The genius of the gadfly of Athens was not an issue, and Hegel set forth an extended discussion of the trial of Socrates, the clash between the ethical substance of the Athenian polis and the individuality of Socrates.

In *LHP* Hegel summarized the conflict between the teacher of Plato and the state in the passage quoted below:

According to Athenian laws, i.e. according to the spirit of the absolute state, both these things done by Socrates were destructive of this spirit, while in our constitution the universal state is a stronger universal which undoubtedly permits the individuals having freer play, since they cannot be so dangerous to the universal. Hence it would undoubtedly in the first place mean the subversion of the Athenian State, if this public religion on which everything was built and without which the State could not subsist, went to pieces; with us the State may be called an absolute and independent power. The daemon is now, in fact, a deity differing from the known, and because it stood in contradiction to the public religion, it had to it a subjective arbitrariness. But since established religion was identified with public life so closely that it constituted a part of public law, the introduction of a new god who formed self-consciousness into a principle and occasioned disobedience was necessarily a crime. We may dispute with the Athenians about this, but we must allow that they are consistent. In the second place, the moral connection between parents and children is stronger and much more the moral foundation of life with the Athenians than with us, where subjective freedom reigns.; for family

piety is the substantial key-note of the Athenian state. Socrates thus attacked and destroyed Athenian life in two fundamental points; the Athenians felt and became conscious of it. It is then to be wondered at that Socrates was found guilty.(48)

The clash between Athens and Socrates was a battle between two opposing forces, the ethical substance of the polis and the self-centeredness of subjectivity. Hegel judged Socrates from the point of view of the Athenian community: Socrates had subverted the state religion and interfered with the family bond between children and parents. But since Socrates himself was the essence of the self-sufficiency of subjectivity, he could not accept the principle of a community which was at variance with his own self-definition, and this was the ground of this irreconcilable conflict.

Antigone was Hegel's favorite tragedy because it depicted the insurmountable clash between two moral principles, the law of the state, as embodied in Creon, and the law of the family, as personified by Antigone. The conflict between Athens and Socrates was such a tragedy, although the oppositions were composed of two different contents. Tragedy was a part of culture, for the history of the world was a filled with instances in which two unyielding moral principles collided, and the Athens-Socrates confrontation was one such incidence.

Hegel affirmed Socrates's genius but not his moral claim against the Athenian state, not his status as a "sophos." Hegel narrates the tragedy from the perspective of the Athenian court. The state had no choice but to bring Socrates to trial because the teacher of Plato had in fact challenged the religious and familial foundations of Athenian society. When Hegel subscribed to the charges of the Athenian court, he revealed two fundamental principles of his own theory of the state. Opposing all forms of abstract individualism, Hegel thought of the state as a community, but at this point it is only necessary to emphasize his commitment to a social collectivity. Just as he denounced the claims of abstract subjectivity, so he refuted the principles of natural law theory.

The force that bound individuals together into a community was a moral substance. Hegel defined substance as an outer, an objective quality. The objective quality which unified men into a community was ethical values. A substance was a social glue, and for the Greeks this social adhesive was religion and family.

By selecting for discussion these specific topics from the *LHP*, a background was established by which to better understand Marx's doctoral dissertation. Only by comprehending the framework against which Marx wrote his doctorate, Hegel's presentation of the SES, and Hegel's view of the world development of philosophy, is it possible to isolate exactly where Marx deviated from Hegel and the reasons for these deviations. The most fundamental break between Marx and Hegel in 1841 concerned Hegel's theory of identity.

For Hegel, reason and reality were one. When Marx concluded his dissertation, he ruptured the unity of reason and reality and recognized the disjuncture between thought and existence. It was out of this fissure between thought and existence that Marx's critical philosophy emerged.

In his Nov. 10, 1837, letter to his father, written after Marx transferred from the University of Bonn to the University of Berlin, in which Marx described his shift of interest from law to philosophy, he wrote that he "hit upon seeking the Idea in the real itself." (49) This phrase suggests that in late 1837 Marx was attracted to Hegel's thesis of the unity of reason and reality because he went on to state that if "formerly the gods dwelt above the world, they are had now become its center." (50) Nevertheless, his first encounter with Hegel left him unsatisfied. "I had read fragments of Hegel's philosophy and found its grotesque craggy melody displeasing." (51)

But shortly thereafter, Marx exposed himself to Hegelian philosophy once again, and this time the results were different. "While out of sorts, I had got to know Hegel from beginning to end, and most of his disciples as well. Through several meetings with friends at Stralow I became a member of a Doctors Club to which some instructors, and my most intimate friend in Berlin, Dr. (Adolf) Rutenberg belong. In discussions many conflicting opinions were voiced, and I was more and more chained to the current world philosophy from which I had thought to escape. But all tones were muted, and a fit of irony possessed me as was natural after so many negations." (52)

In 1837, Marx became a member of the Berlin Doctors Club, which was the center of the Young Hegelian movement, but Marx's entrance into the Left Hegelian movement still leaves open the question of why he chose to write a dissertation on SES philosophy as well as disproving Hegel's interpretation of the history of philosophy. The answers to these questions are to be found in Marx's relationship to Karl Friedrich Köppen and Bauer.

In 1840, Köppen published a book, *Friedrich der Grosse und Seine Widersacher* (FGC), which he dedicated to "My Friend Karl Heinrich Marx from Trier." (53) Marx returned the compliment in his dissertation when he wrote: "These systems (Stoic, Epicurean, Skeptic) are the key to the true history of Greek philosophy. A more profound indication of their connection with Greek life can be found in the essay of my friend Köppen, 'Friedrich der Grosse und seine Widersache.'" (54) Although Bauer opened the doorway through which Marx passed to critical philosophy, it was Köppen who drew Marx's attention to SES, to post-Aristotelian philosophy, and to the role of philosophy in the post-Hegelian era. After stating his indebtedness to Köppen, Marx punctuated his obligation to his friend by adding a quotation, and this is taken from page 39 of Köppen's monograph. (55) The quotation is a single sentence, but I will copy liberally from this same paragraph in order

to give a more accurate sense of Köppen's approach to these three ancient philosophical systems.

In their own way, both the Enlightenment and the Reformation studied the Classics. Because he was an embodiment of both the Reformation and the Enlightenment Friedrich was also a student of ancient philosophy. [The next sentence is the one quoted by Marx.] Epicureanism, Stoicism, Skepticism are the nerve muscles and intestinal systems of the antique organism whose immediate natural unity conditioned the beauty and morality of antiquity, and which designated with the decay of the later. With marvelous virtuosity, Friedrich absorbed and cultivated all three traditions in himself. They became fundamental structures of his world view, his character and his life, which fused with the Christian education of the eighteenth century, so that it is untrue and comic to refer to Friedrich as a heathen.(56)

Köppen offered an assessment of the SES, which contradicted Hegel's interpretation. While Hegel looked upon these schools of classical philosophy as signs of the decay of the Greco-Roman world, Köppen judged them as the "nerve muscles and intestinal system of the antique organism." He did not see these systems as examples of decline, but rather these Greco-Roman schools of thought pointed to a new beginning in the history of philosophy.

Köppen also indirectly contradicted Hegel's notion of subjectivity. Earlier sections of this chapter discussed Hegel's approach to subjectivity, showed that he opposed the SES's high estimation of autonomous subjectivity as an invitation to the "unhappy consciousness." On the other hand, Köppen indicated that SES subjectivity was a source of personal strength to Friedrich. Köppen portrayed Friedrich as a hero, as a "philosopher king" of the eighteenth century world, and courageous subjectivity was required of a person who wished to bring political and intellectual reforms to Prussia.

As a young man, Friedrich read widely in ancient literature. One feature of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment was a deepened interest in the history and culture of the ancient world. Friedrich familiarized himself with Epicurus, and in a letter to a friend described Epicurus "as the philosopher of humanity, Zeno is one of the gods and I am only a man."(57)

Both the moral and epistemological thinking of the SES strengthened Friedrich's subjectivity. On the moral side, Friedrich learned from the Stoics the importance of friendship but also the need for self-sufficiency. Political power alienated a king from social collegiality, but the Stoic prescription for inner harmony was a needed moral message for Friedrich. "Most importantly, he valued the morality of the Stoics, their heroes were his ideal," particularly Marcus Aurelius.(58)

On the epistemological level, Epicurus instructed Friedrich in the superiority of sense perception. In Greco-Roman civilization "Epicurean sensual-

ism led directly to Skepticism and Friedrich followed a similar path.”(59) However, to Friedrich, Skepticism was not destructive, but a productive tool. Friedrich looked upon Epicurus as espousing a form of Skepticism that demanded empirical proof before accepting something as true.(60) Friedrich’s commitment to empiricism, his transcendence of medieval superstition, found its origins in his study of the SES.

Through the figure of Köppen put forth an interpretation of SES as the moral and empirical ancestors of the Enlightenment. Submerged during the Middle Ages, these three schools facilitated the overthrow of Catholic Thomism and led to the birth of a new historical age. As a Lutheran, Köppen was an enemy of Catholic dogmatism, papism, and cultism. He drew a line of continuity between Luther and the Enlightenment, and to a certain degree associated eighteenth-century modernism with anti-Catholicism. Köppen acknowledged that Gassendi in the sixteenth century ignited a rebirth of atomism as well as a renewed interest in the writings of Epicurus.

The materialism of the Enlightenment assumed moderate and radical wings. Köppen argued that Baron d’Holbach and Claude Helvetius represented a radical materialism, or the Enlightenment left-wing. But Köppen himself and his hero Friedrich did not adhere to the radical Enlightenment. The materialism to which Köppen subscribed was moderate eighteenth-century German Liberalism leading to the acceptance of an enlightened monarch. Nevertheless, the book *FGC* clearly identified materialism as the central theme of the new historical era about to be born.

Friedrich was a perfect synthesis of Ancient materialism, Protestant and Enlightenment thought. Köppen set forth an idealized portrait of Friedrich and presented him as an example of Plato’s “philosopher King.”(61) Friedrich was glorified, painted as the embodiment of reason on the Throne, the herald of a new world. Köppen wrote: “There are times and conditions in which one man is the beacon of what is right, and the rest of the world is wrong. This is true of Socrates, Christ, and Joseph.”(62)

Friedrich applied the rule of reason to politics. In an unHegelian fashion, Friedrich recognized that reason and reality were discordant. Voiding the Hegelian philosophy of identity, the Prussian king understood that the idea and existence were disparate. The duty of the monarch, however, was to try to overcome this duality, to bring as much coherence between reason and reality as possible. Friedrich’s reign was characterized by both intellectual and political reforms.

The intellectual reforms of the Prussian king were for the most part directed at removing the obscurantism of the Middle Ages, and Friedrich pursued the tradition of Luther against Catholicism. Friedrich wished to bring about a synthesis of reason and religion. From this perspective the Prussian king was opposed

to superstition and religious dogmatism. A defender of subjective rationality, Friedrich looked upon any attempt to violate free conscience and impose orthodoxy, papism, as a form of intellectual authoritarianism. In addition, the victor of the Seven Years War was opposed to religious intolerance, which was simply the denial of free, rational subjectivity to other religious denominations. Under Friedrich, Prussia practiced religious toleration.

The impetus to reform, which arose from the awareness of the disjuncture between essence and appearance, reveals how theory and practice were balanced in Friedrich's mind. For him, theory was synonymous with reason. Based on the separation of essence and appearance, theory offered an insight into the cause of this discontinuity. Theory provided rational explanation for the existence of this disjuncture and offered solutions, not to unify essence and appearance but to bring them toward greater proximity.

When Köppen writes of theory and practice he does not define practice as a theoretical practice or the critique of appearance by the application of the standards of essence. Practice, for Köppen, was not an act of rational disassembling but rather of a political deed.

On the political level Friedrich reformed the idea of absolute monarchy. The book he wrote as a young man, *Anti-Machiavel*, put forth a redefinition of the idea of sovereignty.⁽⁶³⁾ His idea of sovereignty attempted to fuse a legitimization of monarchy with the liberal idea of popular consent.

The parliamentary system of England was not attractive to the Prussian king. During his reign, Friedrich made no attempt to bring a constitution to Prussia, and Köppen did not criticize the German "philosopher King" for this omission but actually excused his idol on the grounds that conditions in Prussia were not ready for such a reform. In a more positive vein, Friedrich argued that monarchy was a more efficient government than liberal constitutionalism. If one man stood forth as the executive, then the decision-making process was more likely to correspond to the interests of the state, because the decision-making center was less encumbered with particular interests. In addition, Friedrich maintained that the centralization of power facilitated the recruitment of talent to government, because monarchy eliminated the need to cater to the selfish interests of socioeconomic voting blocs.

On the other hand, Friedrich did not believe in the divine right of kingship. Sovereignty did not flow from God but from civil society. The authority of the state flowed from the "social contract."⁽⁶⁴⁾ Authority was "delegated"⁽⁶⁵⁾ to the state by civil society.

The syntax of the phrase "social contract" did not mean that Friedrich belonged to the radical Enlightenment, to Rousseauist democracy. Friedrich was a figure of the moderate Enlightenment, of the liberal Enlightenment, and believed in a delegation of power, or that the authority of the state derived from

the people. The people did not retain sovereign power but rather was the origin of this power, but then they transferred it to the state which then became sovereign.

Friedrich drew a distinction between king and state. He thereby reformed both the meaning of monarchy and the state. Louis XIV of France proclaimed the synthesis between monarchy and state through his pronouncement that "I am the State." The Prussian king destroyed this divine right theory of monarchy, this usurpation of the state by the dynasty and the law of inheritance, because he drew a line between state and monarchy.

In the "social contract" as understood by Friedrich, the people transferred their sovereignty to the state, and the state was an autonomous institution separate from the crown. The king was the "first servant" of the state.⁽⁶⁶⁾ Monarchy was like a stewardship, for the King must serve the state. Friedrich thought of himself as the caretaker of Prussia.

The separation of the state from monarchy, of the nation from nobility, presented Friedrich with an opportunity to outline the purpose of the state. The end of political power was the "public welfare."⁽⁶⁷⁾ Specific areas which fell under the umbrella of "public welfare" were the problems of poverty, the codification of law, and religious tolerance. Friedrich made reforms in all these areas. He was aware that since sovereignty derived from the people, they were justified in expecting that the laws would protect their legitimate concerns. The political modifications of Friedrich turned Prussia into a Enlightened Despotism. The application of reason to politics, of rationality to governance, was the heritage of the Enlightenment that Friedrich bequeathed to Prussia.

FGC was both an analysis of the Prussian king and a political statement. Köppen glorified the former Prussian monarch, and at the end of the book referred to Friedrich as "our Moses."⁽⁶⁸⁾

By means of the idealization of the inhabitant of Sans Souci, Köppen was protesting the reactionary government of Friedrich William III. Köppen divided the regressive tendencies of Friedrich William III into religious and political categories, and Köppen protested both the religious orthodoxy and political repression of the Hohenzollern monarchy. Superstition and Protestant tyranny were destroying Enlightenment rationality in Prussia, and political repression was decimating free dissent and free conscience.

Köppen offered an alternative to the government of Friedrich William III, and the book was a reminder that Prussia had experienced progressive government in the past and that reforms were still necessary for Prussia. Köppen's book was a plea for the regeneration of Prussia in the spirit of the Prussian "Moses."

It is now necessary to answer the question of how *FGC* influenced Marx's dissertation. What impact did Köppen exert on Marx's development?

On the philosophical level, Köppen brought Marx's attention to the importance of SES thought to the Enlightenment as well as the rise of materialism in Europe after Gassendi. Köppen's work pointed out to Marx how the moral philosophy of these three Greco-Roman schools proved to be an impetus to the birth of eighteenth-century individualism as symbolized in the person of Friedrich of Prussia.

But outside of these historical references to specific schools in the evolution of western thought, Köppen's major concern was not philosophy. His book does not mention Hegel, nor does it involve itself in any contemporary philosophical disputes.

On the political level, however, Köppen's book was one of the influences that convinced Marx of the need for political renovation in Prussia. Köppen's book was a trumpet blast against the repressive reign of Friedrich William III and IV. His monograph gave voice to the Liberal tendencies of the Young Hegelians. He presented an alternative to the Left-Wing Hegelians drawn from Prussian history itself, to the reactionary government of these two post-Friedrichian monarchs.

But political revitalization could be realized only when theory and practice were unified. Friedrich the Great stood as an example of how reality could be modified. Reality could be altered when one acknowledged the separation of the Idea and reality, when one had a strategy of how this separation could be reduced, not overcome, and when one acted on the basis of this tactic. Köppen provided Marx with a formula for realizing political rectification whose motivated force evolved out of the disjuncture between the ideal and the actual, between theory and practice.

However, in order to write his dissertation, Marx needed more. He needed a specialist in the philosophy of Hegel. Convinced that the Old Hegelians had made the Hegelian tradition into a legitimating force for the Prussian reaction, Marx required instruction in how Hegelianism could be detached from conservatism, how Hegelianism could be turned into an instrument of political rejuvenation. These were the tasks performed by Bauer.

Bauer was one of the major influences on Marx's early development, but at this stage I am only interested in their exchange of ideas through 1841. Marx's dissertation is the centerpiece of this chapter, and so I am only concerned with the impact Bauer exercised on Marx in relation to the dissertation, either through his correspondence by or any books Bauer published.

The first statement of Marx's acquaintance with Bauer is made in Marx's 1837 letter to his father in which Marx recounts that Bauer encouraged him to publish an essay in which Bauer is identified as a member of the Doctors Club.⁽⁶⁹⁾ The friendship continued to expand, Marx as a frequent guest at the Bauer home, and in the summer semester of 1839, Marx took Bauer's course

on Isaiah at the University of Berlin. A correspondence developed between the two friends, but none of Marx's letters to Bauer have survived, while thirteen letters of Bauer to Marx are extant, and of these three date from the pre-1841 period.(70)

The fraternity between Marx and Bauer is demonstrated by Bauer's plans to publish a critical journal of religion and theology and Bauer's hope that both Marx and Feuerbach would act as contributors. Bauer's project never materialized. Additionally, Bauer asked Marx to write a review of Hegel's *Philosophy of Religion*, which Bauer edited, but this hope never came to fruition. Nevertheless, both situations are instances of the faith and respect Bauer held for Marx.(71)

The philosophic affinity between Marx and Bauer is further verified by the fact that many believed in 1841 that Marx was co-author of the book *Die Posaune Des Jungsten Gerichts Über Hegel Den Atheisten Und Antichristen*. (TLJ) This was not true, and modern scholarship has proven Bauer as the sole author.(72) However, Marx and Bauer did agree that Marx should include an independent essay called "A Treatise on Christian Art."(73) The common publication would be composed of two works, Bauer's TLJ and Marx's essay, but this intent was not realized. Bauer's TLJ was published with Bauer as the sole author.

Marx did complete his essay, "A Treatise on Christian Art," but it is lost. In his March 5, 1842, letter to Arnold Ruge, Marx alludes to this essay, states that it "should have appeared as the second part of the *Posaune*," and then asks if Ruge would publish the essay in Ruge's journal the *Anekdoten*.(74) Two weeks later, in a March 20, 1842, letter to Ruge, Marx informs him that his article must be "entirely redone" and renamed it "On Religion and Art, with Special Reference to Christian Art." Marx wrote that this revision was unavoidable "because the tone of the *Posaune*, which I consciously followed . . . this tone of the *Posaune* and the irksome constraint of the Hegelian exposition should now be replaced by a freer, and therefore more thorough exposition."(75) About a month later, in an April 25, 1842, letter to Ruge, Marx writes that he will send four articles to Ruge, including one entitled "On Religious Art," presumably the transformed version of the original "A Treatise on Christian Art," but this is the last reference to the essay, and it hereafter disappears from history.

Bauer's pre-1841 letters to Marx are of particular interest, because they reveal the personal relations between the two men. Nine years older than Marx, Bauer assumed the role of the intellectual mentor; he was a spiritual guide.

In a letter dated December 11, 1839, Bauer sympathizes with Marx's "logical lucubrations,"(76) particularly over the question of "contradiction." Bauer seeks to help Marx by pointing out that the meaning of contradiction

in Hegel can be understood only by placing it in the context of the clash between essence and appearance.

For the most part, the three letters deal with Bauer's attack on the reactionary Prussian crown and the Prussian university. The antidote to the Prussian reaction is critique, or the Christian Prussian state must be exposed as corrupt. In his April 5, 1840, letter Bauer spoke of a crisis in Prussian governance, of an irreconcilable conflict between the "state and science." (77) On March 28, 1841, Bauer wrote to Marx that "the terrorism of true theory must make the field pure." (78) Three days later he penned these words to Marx: "Theory is now the most effective practice and we cannot yet predict in what a great manner it can become practical." (79)

For Bauer, philosophy in Prussia had become a means of monarchical repression. Critique would not only dissolve the alliance among philosophy, Hegel, and the state, but also between religion and philosophy. In addition, critique involved the use of theory and practice. Due to the influence of both Köppen and Bauer, the dissertation that Marx wrote would take the form of a critique, of exposing the difference between theory and reality. To what target was Marx going to apply his critique?

Bauer's book, *TLJ, The Trumpet of the Last Judgment of Hegel, the Atheists and Anti-Christians*, published in 1841, played an important role in supplying Marx with a target against which to aim his critique. (80) The three main targets of Bauer's monograph were: 1) to negate the idea that Hegelian philosophy was simply a restatement in a different form of Christian belief; 2) to invalidate the claim that Hegelian philosophy provided an ideological legitimization of the Prussian reaction; 3) to claim the Hegelian heritage for Left-Wing Hegelianism.

TLJ is a diatribe in a scholastic dispute. As the chief spokesman of the Young Hegelian movement, Bauer outlined the basic parameters of Left-Wing Hegelianism and also claimed that the Young Hegelians were the rightful heirs of the Hegelian heritage.

In the *TLJ*, Bauer, in order to substantiate his interpretation of Hegel, points to several Hegelian works, such as *PR*, *PH*, and the *LHP*. From the point of view of my own thesis, Bauer's use of *LHP* is most important, because this work was the background of Marx's dissertation. Bauer helped draw Marx's attention to the significance of these three volumes for Hegel's general philosophy, and Marx then wrote the dissertation to prove that Hegel's interpretation of the SES was wrong, or how a Left-Wing Hegelian perspective revealed the importance of these three systems.

In part 2 of *TLJ* which is entitled "The Ghost of the World Spirit," Bauer utilizes several long quotes from the *LHP* and then concludes his arguments with the following sentence: "Self-consciousness is the sole power of the world and of history, and history has no other meaning than as the becoming and the development of self-consciousness." (81)

Bauer's most lethal attack on the Old Hegelians was that they misread Hegel as a philosopher of substance. The Old Hegelian school was predicated on the belief that either God or the world spirit acted in history. They transplanted the concept of subjectivity and made an abstraction, God or the Logos, into the subjective impetus of historical evolution.

The idea of misplaced subjectivity was central to Bauer's definition of Left-Wing Hegelianism. For Bauer, subjectivity belonged to the "I," and instead of being substance, subjectivity was connected to individual self-consciousness.

Bauer transformed subjective self-consciousness into the sole power of the world and history. "The end of the development is not substance, but self-consciousness, which posits itself as infinite, and which consumes the universality of substance, but self-consciousness, which posits itself as infinite, and which consumes the universality of substance is its own essence." (82)

Bauer appropriated the exoteric aspects of Hegel's *LHP*. Just as Hegel in these three volumes described the successive replacements and supercessions of philosophic forms, so Bauer interpreted the dialectic as successive subsumption. (83)

Part 4 of *TLJ* epitomized Bauer's attack on the Old Hegelians. Called "Hatred Against the Existing," Bauer presents a Hegel who was at war against reality. Rather than an Old Hegelian view of philosophy as an expression of religion, Bauer presented a Hegel who was an atheist. Rather than an Old Hegelian perspective of Hegel as a person who reconciled philosophy with the Prussian crown, Bauer offered a Hegel who was a disciple of the French Revolution. Rather than an Old Hegelian approach to Hegel as a thinker who affirmed the unity of thought and Being, Bauer portrayed a Hegel who perceived the gap between reason and existence, who saw the disjuncture between Being and thought. Bauer was committed to the idea of a divided world, of a world split between thought and existence. The world was always binary.

The Hegel of Bauer was committed to the principle of theory and practice. "His [Hegel's] theory was the same in itself, and because of this the most dangerous, extensive and destructive practice." (84) The Old Hegelianism was Hegel in a contemplative posture, as a quietist, as someone who was a spectator to the activity of the world spirit. The Hegelian Left presented an entirely different Hegel, as a philosopher who believed that ideas must become the basis of action or that the purpose of thought was the springboard for practice.

The principle of theory and practice related to the method by which thought was brought into contact with reality, but the principle of critique concerned the disparity between the Idea and the real. Bauer put forth a Hegel who also practiced critique. He wrote:

Knowledge, however, is free, frees the spirit, and its determinations transforms the earlier shapes in a new form, and thereby becomes a new shape itself,

namely according to the laws of freedom and self-consciousness. Philosophy is accordingly the critique of the existing . . . consequently, what is there and what should be a different. The should be is, however . . . solely the truth . . . it must overcome these contrasts.(85)

Critique is the process which reveals the difference between thought and Being. The Idea becomes the criteria of reality, and reality is found deficient. "It must also evolve into an action, into a practical opposition, and not only an afterthought or a diversion, but as a theoretical principle must directly become a principle of praxis."(86) Left-Wing Hegelianism inspired Hegel as a source of "practical opposition," or subjective self-consciousness became a site of "practical opposition," or subjective self-consciousness became a site of "opposition."

Bauer ascribed to a progressive view of human development. Through the negation of an otiose historical configuration, a new and more advanced shape came into being. Although absolute freedom would never be realized, the course of human history spiraled to higher levels of self-determination. Left-Wing Hegelianism perpetuated the Hegelian motif of historical progress and presented humanity as evolving to more elevated grades for freedom.

The surge forward was made possible by the ability of self-consciousness to objectify itself. Influenced by Fichte, Bauer saw self-consciousness as the demiurge of the world. Self-consciousness produced ideas, then ideas expanded into theories, and theories criticized the existing.(87)

Bauer's theory of historical development was dialectical. But it was a dialectic that was restricted to self-consciousness. An existing historical configuration was dominant at a given moment in time and at a passing level of self-consciousness. But critique repudiated this practical form. By negating this historical mode, critique brought forth the conditions which permitted a new transitory shape to dominate the new moment in time.

Left-Wing Hegelianism borrowed the theory of development as outlined in Hegel's *LHP*. Although Hegel did not see critique as the dynamic of historical evolution, he nevertheless saw development as indispensable to the understanding of history and defined development as the transcendence of one configuration by another. As we have seen, Hegel saw spirit as the pneumatic force of development and not individual self-consciousness, but he understood the stages of the progression of self-consciousness as forms, shapes, totalities, or organic systems. Although Hegel and the Left-Wing Hegelians have a different location for subjectivity, they both understood the objectification of the subjective in the same manner: subjectivity objectified itself in terms of forms, shapes, and totalities of self-consciousness.(88)

In part 4 of *TLJ*, "The Destruction of Religion," Bauer affirms that Hegel believed that "religion was basically a result of the human spirit, a product of

the limited genius, of the liberating genius.”(89) In order to document his claim, Bauer quoted from Hegel’s third volume of *LHP*: “Art demonstrates that the divine is brought forth out of man himself.”(90)

In part 2 of *TLJ*, “Religion as a Product of Self-Consciousness,” Bauer again returns to the theme that religion is only the projection of self-consciousness. “Self-consciousness is the essence of the entire natural and spiritual universe, and it is that act and only in the act of thinking self-consciousness that the universal arises out of this essence.”(91)

The critique of religion was the starting point for all Left Hegelian reproaches. The critique of religion was the practice that liberated philosophy, that made philosophy free. It was the starting point for subjective self-consciousness.

The critique of religion revealed the problem of alienation. The divine was merely the stolen powers of humanity. The critique of religion redeployed the powers of humanity back to mankind, and for Bauer this meant that philosophy could now see that human subjective self-consciousness was the pneumatic power of creation.

Bauer also applied the notion of alienation to the political realm. When he did this, he showed that Hegelianism was not, as the Old Hegelians believed, a legitimating ideology for the Prussian reaction. Bauer claimed Hegel for the cadres of Prussian political reorganization, made Hegel into a prosecutor of the Prussian monarchy. In *TLJ*, Hegel is made to appear as a pro-French political reformer. In advocating political reform for Prussia, Bauer joined hands with Köppen’s *FGC*,(92) although Köppen embraced a moderate Prussian Liberal remodeling.

In the presentation of Bauer, Hegel is portrayed as a defender of the French Revolution of 1789.(93) Rather than an apologist for monarchism, Hegel emerges in *TLJ* as a political revolutionary. In part 5 of *TLJ*, “Admiration of the French and Hatred Against the German,” Bauer asserts that Hegel achieved his purpose and turned all his students into devotees of the French Revolution that overthrew Louis XVI.(94) He wondered whether these students wanted to imitate the heroes of the French insurrection, and he wrote: “Who knows whether another Danton, Robespierre, Marat is already among these students?”(95)

By making Hegel into an advocate of the French Revolution of 1789, into a prophet of the destruction of the Prussian state, Bauer turned the Hegelian Left toward political radicalism. At this point it is to be recalled that Marx began his penetrating study of the French Revolution in 1843, just three years after the publication of Bauer’s *TLJ*. Marx’s own political radicalization started from a Bauerian foundation.

Following on Heinrich Heine’s book *Religion and Philosophy in Germany*, Bauer saw that German reflection was mired in abstract speculation, while eighteenth-century French thought had cleansed the existing of religion and

superstition. French thought was also critical of the state and appeared in both a reformist and a radical mode.

Again using Hegel's own words from the *LHP*, Bauer painted Hegel as accepting materialism and naturalism. Bauer associated Hegel with the empiricism and materialism of the French Enlightenment. The French were the best defense against the marriage in Prussia of throne and altar, against the revival of medievalism.

The influence that Bauer exerted on Marx was seminal. Among the other topics I touched upon, he turned Marx's attention to the primacy of self-consciousness and the division between essence and appearance. Bauer dismantled the philosophy of identity, the axiom of the unity of reality and thought. But the most significant insight that Bauer passed on to Marx was the renovation of the idea of critique. In order to capture the uniqueness of the Bauer-Marx conception, it is necessary to show how their formulation differed from Kant and Hegel.

After Hume's attack on the possibilities of knowledge concerning the external world, Kant's critique was aimed at salvaging the prospects of a comprehension of the natural world. By means of a critical examination of the categories of reason, Kant intended to show that the science of Isaac Newton correctly mirrored the physical universe.

In order to fulfill his purpose, Kant's critique was an examination of epistemology. He set forth a priori components of thought, or synthetic transcendent categories of thought, which were the organizational frameworks of sense perception. Kant believed that he saved the "thing-in-itself," that a priori categories of reason provided an image of the "thing-in-itself" which corresponded to the actual external object. He did not believe that the "image" constituted in the human mind was a perfect copy of the external object, that a separation existed between mental image and the external actual, but he did believe that what arose in the mind was a reliable approximation of the perceptible.

Kant accepted a bipolar world, a gulf between a constituted mental image and the "thing-in-itself." Although approximations of the "thing-in-itself" were achievable, this similarity did not overcome the distinction between reason and the empirical. Hegel surrendered the "thing-in-itself." He did not believe in the gulf between idea and the perceptible. Rather, as soon as thought appropriated the perceptible, the two were indistinguishable.

While Kant was concerned with the constitution of ideas, Hegel concentrated on the objectification of the concept, and this led Hegel to a study of the phenomenology of thought. Knowledge of mind was not acquired through the study of how ideas were assembled through the categories of reason but rather through the observation of the products manufactured by thought. For Hegel, cognition grew out of the study of the crystallizations of thought, for true knowledge was the apperception of mind, and the apprehension of mind

was best achieved by the examination of the products emanating from mind. Knowledge, for Hegel, was historical, or it was only possible to gain knowledge through the scrutiny of the phenomena brought forth by mind.

The form of critique practiced by Bauer was neither Kantian nor Hegelian. Bauer rejected the epistemological stances of Kant, and he also opted out of Hegel's philosophy of identity. Whereas Hegel maintained the unity of Idea and reality, of essence and appearance, Bauer proposed the disjuncture between essence and appearance.

Bauer's redefinition of critique regarded subjective self-consciousness as the agent of essence. Using its own powers of discernment, autonomous self-consciousness distilled an essence from external occurrences and then compared them the existing individuality against this essential standard. Critique was an examination that exposed the chasm between the existing and essence, but by exposing the gulf it also opened the possibility of surmounting it.

For Bauer, the possibility of supersession only existed in self-consciousness. Only a change of mental attitude could bring about societal change, or consciousness took priority over the social environment. Modifications in the socioeconomic were not necessarily change-inducing because self-consciousness could remain the same, and so Bauer focused primarily on remaking self-consciousness as a motor of historical progress.

Marx borrowed the Bauerian formula of critique, and this remained part of Marx's methodology throughout his life. *Das Kapital*, Marx's magnum opus, was subtitled *A Critique of Political Economy*. Critique was the primary analytical category of Marx's dissertation.

Marx began the research for his dissertation, *DDEPN*, in the summer of 1839. In addition to the dissertation itself (see below), seven notebooks, or excerpts, which Marx copied from books, mostly by ancient authors, have survived from the 1839 period. These notebooks are called "Preparatory Materials for the History of Epicurus, Stoic and Skeptic Philosophy."⁽⁹⁶⁾

In addition, the 1839 materials also consist of brief notes that Marx entitled "The Plan of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature." These notes were made by Marx in 1839 at the beginning of his research on the dissertation on five pages of the sixth notebook of the excerpts materials. "The Plan of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature" is an extremely brief summary of Hegel's *PN*, which is the second volume of the *EPS*. In other words, Marx read Hegel's *PN* at the same time he commenced his research into Epicurus, Stoicism, and Skepticism.

Marx hoped to publish the dissertation as a book, but these plans never materialized.⁽⁹⁷⁾ Although the original copies of the excerpts survived, the doctoral thesis did not. Marx's original manuscript is lost, and what came down to the present is an incomplete version written by an unknown person, which is interspersed with corrections and additions in Marx's own handwriting. Al-

though the table of contents indicates that part 1 had fourth and fifth chapters, these chapters are not extant. The table of contents also indicates the existence of an appendix, but this is also missing, except for one fragment.

Although the doctoral dissertation is incomplete, and written in the hand of an unknown person, it still offers indispensable insights into the relationship between Hegel and Marx. The seven preparatory notebooks are for the most part excerpts, or quotes, which Marx copied by hand from the books he read; these are occasionally interspersed with Marx's own comments and speculations. In my analysis of the doctoral dissertation, I will join the thesis and the notebooks, that is, I will treat them as one text, but I will indicate if the material I use comes from the thesis itself or from the preparatory materials.

I will also allude to the outline entitled *The Plan of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature (PHPN)*.

In order to make my interpretation of *DDEPN* as clear as possible I will divide the proceeding discussion into the following subdivisions: 1) Marx's General Design; 2) Marx's Relation to Hegel; 3) Marx and Religion; 4) Marx and Materialism; 5) Marx and the State; 6) From Speculative Philosophy to Critique; 7) Marx's Philosophy of Science; 8) The Theory of Development; 9) Marx's Method.

MARX'S GENERAL DESIGN

The work of George E. McCarthy is a prerequisite to clarifying the impact that ancient philosophy exerted on young Marx. In three books, *Marx and Aristotle*, which is an anthology,(98) *Marx's Critique of Science and Positivism*,(99) and *Marx and the Ancients*(100), which are monographs, McCarthy established himself as the leading commentator on the influence which Greco-Roman thought exercised on the young Marx's own thought. Although I reached my conclusions independently of McCarthy, I must acknowledge the intellectual confirmation I received when I read the entirety of his contributions. In particular, I draw the reader's attention to the essay "Marx and Epicurus," which appeared in the anthology *Marx and the Ancients*.(101) The arguments I present in the next nine subdivisions are in substantial accord with the thesis presented by McCarthy, except for one major discord:

McCarthy believes that Marx's philosophy of nature was indebted to Schelling, while I cannot detect any Schelling input into Marx at all.

When Marx completed his dissertation in 1841, he was a young man of twenty-three. *DDEPN* was his first scholarly endeavor, and like most works of a young academician, although the Prussian government never granted Marx a university appointment, this early work was filled with enthusiasm

but lacked focus and definition. Many themes and ideas crisscross through the work, and in my analysis I attempt to impose some order on this uncontrolled material.

In the "Forward" to the thesis, Marx does make his central intent clear: "This treatise is to be regarded only as the preliminary to a larger work in which I shall present in detail the cycle of Stoic, Epicurean, and Skeptic philosophy in their relation to the whole of Greek speculation. The shortcomings of this treatise, in form and the like, will be eliminated in that later work." (102)

In the same "Forward," as I pointed out earlier, Marx acknowledged his indebtedness to his friend Köppen, (103) and learned that these three ancient schools of thought had a profound impact on the Enlightenment. Marx wrote: "Is not their essence so full of character, so intense, and eternal that the modern world itself has to admit them to full spiritual citizenship." (104)

Later on, Marx explained that he would not follow the course of the SES thought into the Roman Empire, but would trace the origins of these schools in earlier Greek philosophy. (105) In particular, he would compare the atomism and the philosophy of science of Epicurus to his precursor, Democritus. On one level Marx's gaze went backward, a comparison of the atomism of Epicurus to the antecedent atomism of Democritus. On a more profound level, however, Marx was actually involved in the study of the history of materialism. He himself pointed out that Gassendi in the seventeenth century sparked the rebirth of Epicurean atomism. (106) Within this broader picture Marx was outlining a survey of European materialism. He was providing the Hegelian Left with an alternative to Hegel's *LHP* and *PN*. While baptizing Hegel as the father of the history of philosophy, Marx posited that Hegel's interpretation of the history of philosophy was not false but incomplete and that he was bringing to the Hegelian Left the tradition that Hegel omitted, the tradition of materialism. Marx negated Hegel's *PN*, provided a new philosophy of science from a materialist perspective, and outlined a new historiography of western thought.

Although most of *DDEPN* compares the atomism of Democritus and Epicurus, Marx recognized that Epicurus was writing the philosophy of nature, "the philosophy of nature in regards to physics." (107) In another place, Marx wrote: "As such an example I select the relationship between the Epicurean and the Democritean philosophy of nature . . . despite the interdependence of Democritean and Epicurean physics, an essential difference extending to the smallest details can be demonstrated." (108) In other words, Marx's outer investigations would concern Epicurean and Democritean atomism, but his inner scrutiny concerned the Epicurean and Democritean philosophy of nature as well as the philosophy of science. *DDEPN* combined an investigation of physics, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of nature.

Democritus proposed that only atoms and a void existed. The atoms, which fell in a straight line, nevertheless collided and joined, and material objects were concoctions of these adhesions. Obviously, Democritus could not see these atoms, so they were figments of his mental conjectures. A crucial aspect of Democritean physics was his belief in necessity. According to Democritus, the collision and adhesion of the atoms was absolutely necessary, and I shall return to the importance of the concept of necessity to Democritus because it was a decisive demarcation line between him and the physics of Epicurus.

Democritus believed in “sensuous appearance, but appearance did not belong to the atoms themselves.” According to Marx, Democritus believed in “subjective semblance,”(109) that the semblance of the atom was imprinted in the subjective mind. In other words, Democritus “turns the sensuous world into subjective semblance,”(110) and he believed that the “world of sensation [is] the real world.”(111)

Epistemologically, Democritus was the prototype of the empiricist. He was the investigator who remained at the level of sense perception, the level that Hegel denigrated as the “Understanding” while recognizing that the impressions only posited semblances of the sensuous world. The philosophy of science that Democritus represented was flawed because he failed to apply the organizing universality of concept to sense experience.

Marx referred to Democritus as a “skeptic and empiricist.”(112) Democritus is a skeptic because he realized that sensuous reality can never be known; since he did not apply a form, or concept, to sensuous reality, he could never know it with certainty. Marx called Epicurus a “philosopher” because he did apply a form, or a concept, to the sensuous world.(113) Marx privileged the Epicurean approach to the philosophy of science. For Marx as well as for Epicurus, sense perception could only be made comprehensible through the imposition of form, or concept.

These differences between Democritus and Epicurus over the issue of sense perception were magnified in their dispute over necessity. Whereas Democritus held to a doctrine of necessity, Epicurus believed in chance. However, the manner in which Marx framed this dispute between chance and necessity lay in Hegel. In analyzing the differences between chance and necessity, Marx turned to Hegel’s *Larger and Smaller Logic*. Later sections of this chapter will discuss in greater detail the influence that Hegel’s *Larger and Smaller Logic* exercised in Marx’s philosophy of science.

The broader design of Marx’s dissertation was to present a revision of Hegel’s *LHP*. In part 1, “The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature in General,” Marx provided a brief outline of Hegel’s volume 1 and volume 2 of the *LHP*, or Hegel’s interpretation of the

course of ancient philosophy in general.(114) The Hegelian interpretation saw Aristotle as the epitome of Greek thought. The SES was proposed as a period of decline in ancient philosophy. The Alexandrian philosophy, although a composite of conflicting trends, was seen as a revival of Platonic speculation. At the least the Alexandrians again appreciated the self-determination of thought, although for them, thought completely withdrew into the divine.

Marx devoted his dissertation to presenting a different interpretation of the course of ancient philosophy in general and of SES in particular. He wrote: "Should not this relationship urge us at least to an inquiry, to see Greek philosophy ending up with two different groups of eclectic systems, one of them the cycle of Epicurus, Stoic and Skeptic philosophy, the other being classified under the collective name of Alexandrian speculation?"(115) Hegel pictured the SES as signs of the decay of post-Aristotelian thought, but Marx saw them as explorers of the complete powers of subjective self-consciousness in the post-Aristotelian era.

Marx made the study of the philosophy of nature, although he himself did not write in this field, one of the central themes of western thought. For Hegel, the history of philosophy was the development of spirit, or the awareness of the self-determination of thought. Hegel's view was part of Old Hegelianism. For Marx, the philosophy of nature was one of the pivotal lines of development of western thought. In addition, narrating the history of the philosophy of nature was simultaneously an instance of the power of self-consciousness. Bauer did not follow Marx on this score, and this was a major reason for the later break between the two former friends, as first expressed in *The Holy Family*. Feuerbach did appreciate the importance of naturalism in western thought, and this was a major cause for Marx's replacement of the Bauerian with the Feuerbachian one as evinced in *The Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*.

The overall strategy of Marx's dissertation was to provide Left-Wing Hegelianism with a left wing interpretation of the history of philosophy. Marx offered the movement a counter-Hegelian view of the history of philosophy, an antithesis to the Hegelian thesis. Marx disproved the assertion that philosophy reached its culmination in Hegel, but rather offered the Left-Wing Hegelians a program for the future, and materialism was central to this agenda.

Bauer was the herald of the new epoch which was characterized by critique. Marx broke with Hegel's philosophy of identity, and the new epoch was to be dominated by theory and practice, or a new age of philosophy in which critique became practical, that is, where theory eventuated into the practice of reconstituting the existing.

Not only did the dissertation announce Marx's own philosophical program but also Marx's approach to the natural sciences. Marx was anti-positivist, and he was anti-Kantian. He disavowed the "copy theory" of truth, denied

that the “thing-in-itself” could be known. Marx emerged from the study of Epicurus with an Epicurean interpretation of the natural sciences. Perception was always conditioned by concepts, social conditions, or ethics.

Furthermore, Marx proposed that materialism was the core of critical thought. Continuing the work of Köppen, Marx recognized the importance of materialism to Enlightenment thought, the importance of ancient physics to the eighteenth century. Marx associated materialism with political progressivism.

Marx’s concern with the philosophy of science, not the philosophy of nature, is emphasized by the fact that in 1839 he made excerpts from Hegel’s *PN*.(116) In addition, the bibliography to Marx’s dissertation indicates that he also read Feuerbach’s *The History of Modern Philosophy from Bacon of Verulam until Benedict Spinoza*, which was published in 1833.(117) The reading of Hegel’s *PN*, of Feuerbach’s *History of Modern Philosophy*, and the study of ancient Greco-Roman physics emphasize the seriousness of Marx’s interest in the philosophy of nature as early as 1839.

This chapter cannot discuss Marx’s study of the philosophy of nature, of his relationship to both Hegel and Feuerbach on this score. It is a complex issue and requires a separate treatment. I can only call attention to Marx’s involvement with the questions of materialism and the philosophy of science in the 1839–1841 period.

After completing his dissertation, Marx’s interests turned to politics. Since he could not find a university teaching position, Marx abandoned the realm of pure philosophy and turned instead to political journalism as the editor of *Die Rheinische Zeitung*. From 1841 until 1844, Marx was silent on the issue of materialism, but he resumes his interest again in the *Paris Manuscripts of 1844*, in which the Feuerbachian influence once more reasserts itself. But the 1845 *The Holy Family* offers the best documentation of Marx’s thinking on materialism. In the chapter called “Criticism’s Battle Against Materialism,” Marx outlined a history of modern materialism, a history patterned on Feuerbach’s *The History of Modern Philosophy*. It is my thesis that the ideas of materialism born in Marx’s mind during the 1839–1841 period were given their fullest expression in *The Holy Family*.(118)

MARX’S RELATION TO HEGEL

Marx’s revision of Hegel’s design of the course of western philosophy was not a total rejection of the inventor of modern dialectics. At the same time that Marx voided Hegel’s design of SES as well as proposing an alternative Left-Wing view of the development of western thought, Marx also defended Hegel and perpetuated his methodology.

Marx was a composite of both anti-Hegelian and pro-Hegelian attitudes. The student of Marx's thought must identify those aspects of Hegelian philosophy from which Marx exited, and those aspects of "The Master's" thought he retained. The problem is one of laser intellectual surgery: it is necessary to cut into the labyrinth of Hegelian speculation and to disassemble those strands of Hegel which Marx abandoned from those strands Marx embraced.

In the "Forward" to his doctoral thesis, Marx wrote in praise of Hegel:

To be sure, Hegel on the whole correctly defined the general aspects of the above mentioned systems. But while the admirably great and bold plan of his history of philosophy can in general be dated, it was impossible, on the one hand, to go into detail, and on the other hand, the great thinker was hindered by his view of what he called speculative thought par excellence from recognizing in these systems their great importance for the history of Greek philosophy and for the Greek mind in general. These systems are the key to the true history of Greek philosophy.(119)

Marx praised Hegel as the inventor of "the history of philosophy," as a "great thinker," and for being "our master." (120) Hegel's failure to give SES their proper importance for Greek philosophy arose from his dedication to "speculative thought par excellence." "Speculative thought" meant Hegel's proclivity to absorb the particular into the general, to focus on the totality and the systematic, and this prevented Hegel from weighing the importance of subjectivity in the Greek mind or to philosophy in general.

Furthermore, Marx defended Hegel against the attacks of some of Hegel's "pupils." (121) These ignorant "pupils" attacked "The Master" (122) because of his supposed "accommodation," (123) which meant that the old Hegel became suppliant to the Prussian crown. In short, these "pupils" charged that the old Hegel was guilty of moral weakness, because he sold out to the monarchists.

Marx attacked these "pupils" by claiming that Hegel's philosophy remained significant even if "The Master" was guilty of acquiescence to authority. The primary task of the student of philosophy was to penetrate to the "inner essential consciousness" of a "giant thinker" (124) and not be led astray by an extraneous issue such as accommodation. The student of philosophy must isolate the inner, esoteric thought of a "giant thinker."

In addition to rebutting these ignorant "pupils," Marx took up arms against "some of the Hegelians who understood our master wrongly." (125) As I showed in earlier portions of this chapter, Hegel believed that the condemnation of Socrates by the polis was necessary, and so "the Hegelians who understood our master wrongly" argued that "the philosopher Hegel, for example, has pronounced sentence upon itself." (126) In other words, "the Hegelians who understood our master wrongly" paralleled the death of Socrates to

Hegel's philosophy, meaning that Hegel's philosophy must also be condemned because it became an accomplice to Prussian autocracy.

Marx emerged as pro-Hegelian in his denunciation of the anti-Hegelians, although his defense of Hegel did not mean that Marx was blind to the weaknesses of Hegel. In this pro-Hegelian mode, Marx called attention to the esoteric aspects of Hegelian philosophy and inferred that the inner essence contained great richness. No contradiction existed in both retaining the esoteric aspects of Hegel's thought, and denying some of the exoteric, the historically conditioned, dimensions of his thought. Marx was pro-Hegelian because he saw specific features of Hegelian thought as opening new horizons for philosophy. Hegel was not a final statement but a new beginning.

Marx argued that a total system transformed itself into subjectivity. One of the laws of philosophic development called for the transposition of the objective system into individual subjectivity. This process of transition from the speculative into subjectivity was occurring among the Left-Wing Hegelians, and they were introducing a new era of philosophic advancement.(127) Marx wrote: "But as Prometheus, having stolen fire from the heavens, begins to build houses and to settle upon the earth, so philosophy, expanded to be the whole world, turns against the world of appearance. The same now with the philosophy of Hegel."(128)

Marx's anti-Hegelianism focused upon Hegel's speculative treatment of philosophy, his failure to prioritize subjective philosophy. When Hegel failed to privilege subjective thought, he was led to overlook the importance of SES. The task Marx maps out for himself was the retention of Hegel's methodology but at the same time reformulating aspects of "The Master's" ideas.

MARX AND RELIGION

The Third Notebook contains many excerpts from Plutarch's assessment of Epicurus. It carried the title "Plutarch,1, That Epicurus Actually makes a Pleasant life Impossible."(129) In the brief comments Marx made in this Third Notebook, he ridicules Plutarch. Marx defends the atheism of Epicurus and explains that Epicurus denied the existence of the gods because a belief in deities destroys ataraxy, or tranquility. The highest good for Epicurus was a life without malaise, and Epicurus felt that belief in the gods made one vulnerable to anxiety and distress. The gods enslaved humanity to supernatural divinities, thereby robbing humanity of its self-sufficiency. Epicurean morality, that happiness was the end of life, was the basis for his atheism.

Plutarch criticized Epicurus for this argument, but Marx defended Epicurus vis-à-vis Plutarch. Marx wrote: "Plutarch does not understand the fear of

God at all in the sense that Epicurus does; he does not grasp how philosophical consciousness wishes to free itself from it. The ordinary man is not aware of this. Plutarch therefore quotes trivial empirical examples showing how little terror this belief has for people at large.”(130)

In this Third Notebook, Marx again showed his affinity with Bauer. *TLJ* was an attack on religion, a portrayal of religion as the cause of human alienation as well as a plea for the separation of philosophy and religion. The Third Notebook was written in 1839, and it proves that by this time, Marx was committed to divorcing religion and philosophy. Four years later, in 1843, Marx wrote his “Toward the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law: Introduction,” and this essay contained the following frequently quoted sentence: “For Germany the criticism of religion has been completed and criticism of religion is the premise of all criticism.”(131) But Marx’s separation of philosophy from religion predates the writing of “Toward the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law: Introduction,” by four years.

For Epicurus, religion, or knowledge in general, was determined by conceptual, or ethical presuppositions. The needs of self-consciousness the desire to enjoy emotional harmony, the criteria of knowledge for Epicurus. Concept was prior to knowledge, or the concept of happiness determined what was necessary to know.

MARX AND MATERIALISM

In order to fully comprehend Marx’s approach to nature, it is best to distinguish between naturalism and materialism, although the two are not inherently contradictory. The term materialism refers to the constitution of nature. Materialism asserts that matter is the basic element of nature and is both an epistemological and an analytical tool. Naturalism is not analytic but practical; it is a statement about how people should lead their lives in order to be happy. Naturalism is a moral precept that says life should be led in accordance with the laws of nature.

The a priori of Epicurus’s theory of knowledge was that mankind’s theory of the universe was ultimately determined by conceptual and ethical boundaries, but within these preconditions, Marx presented an Epicurus who was a materialist and a believer in sense perception. Epicurus was an atomist, holding that atoms made up the basic building blocks of nature, and so he was a materialist in terms of a philosophy of nature. Epicurus held that concepts, even moral prescriptions, were the organizing frameworks of sense data. In addition, Epicurus was a naturalist, for he maintained that the end of life was happiness and that the most efficient way to achieve this end was to live in accordance with nature.

In this regard Marx placed Epicurus in the tradition of the Cyrenaics. In the First Notebook, which carried the title “Excerpts from Book Ten of Diogenes Laertius Contained in P. Gessendi: Notes on Book Ten of Diogenes Laertius,” Marx copied out this quote from Diogenes Laertius: “He [Epicurus] differs from the Cyrenaics in his teaching on pleasure. They do not recognize pleasure in the state of rest, but only in pleasure in motion. But Epicurus admits both the pleasure of the mind as well as in motion. But Epicurus says the following: ‘Ataraxy and freedom from pain are sensations of pleasure in a state of rest, while joy, and delight are seen to be effective only in motion. . . .’”(132)

Both Epicurus and the Cyrenaics worked with the pleasure-pain equation. The Cyrenaics, however, were concerned with the acquisition of pleasure. For them, happiness was the accumulation of as much pleasurable sensation as possible. On the other hand, Epicurus focused upon the avoidance and elimination of distress. Happiness, for Epicurus, lay in the absence of pain, or the avoidance of any sensation or situation or emotional entanglement which brought pain.

Naturalism served as the basis of Epicurus’s rejection of the existence of meteors. Since the ideas concerning meteors were capable of causing fear and anxiety in humankind, Epicurus denied the existence of meteors because they interfered with psychological peacefulness.(133) Self-consciousness was the controlling force in the interpretation of the external world, either in the shape of meteors or of a divinity.

The discussion that Marx carried on with ancient naturalism during the years 1839–1841 set the stage for his reception of Feuerbach in the *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. I already stated that Marx lists Feuerbach’s *The History of Modern Philosophy* in the bibliography of his 1841 dissertation. In addition, Marx alludes to Feuerbach’s book in the Second Notebook and penned this reference: “Compare: Feuerbach, geschichte der neuer Philosophie, ‘Pierre Gassendi’ pp. 127–150, does not understand Epicurus at all and still less teach us anything about him.”(134) The interest in naturalism dates from Marx’s 1839–1841 period, and his work on his doctoral thesis prepared him for his later reception of Feuerbach. In other words, Feuerbach did not introduce Marx to the study of either naturalism or materialism, but rather Marx’s study of naturalism and materialism in 1839–1841 laid the foundation for his reception of Feuerbach.

In terms of a philosophy of practice, the years 1839–1841 already show Marx breaking from the ethics of Kant, universal laws and Hegel, duty. Marx was already an atheist, and as I showed, the ethics of the Judeo-Christian religions had no meaning for him. Rather, he turned to the ethics of the radical French Enlightenment and ancient Epicureanism.

Marx wrote an appendix to his dissertation called “Critique of Plutarch’s Polemic Against the Theology of Epicurus,” and in this appendix Marx jotted down the following excerpts from Paul Holbach’s *The System of Nature*:

The idea of such powerful agencies has always been associated with that of terror, their names always reminded man of his own calamities or those of his father's; we tremble today because our ancestor's have trembled for thousands of years. The idea of divinity always awakens in us distressing ideas . . . our present fears and lugubrious thoughts . . . rise every time before our mind when we hear his name.(135)

Holbach merely restated the earlier conclusions of Epicurus, and gave Marx additional justification for deciding that Epicurus was correct to reject the gods on the ethical grounds they compromised human equanimity.

The embrace of the ethics of the radical Enlightenment is further instantiated in the section of *The Holy Family* entitled, "The Critique of Materialism" in which Marx comments again on Holbach,(136) and Holbach was a representative of the Left Wing of the French Enlightenment. In addition, in *The Holy Family*, Marx again makes a plea for ancient eudemonism in his famous commentary on Charles Fourier that "Fourier's assertion that the right to fish, to hunt, etc. are innate rights of man is one of genius."(137) The early Marx, 1839–1841, was inspired by the materialism and naturalism of the Left Wing of the French Enlightenment, and early French socialism. Marx's use of the French to criticize the German was an intellectual device he already employed in 1839–1841.

Lastly, the Second Notebook shows that Marx turned to the ancient philosophy of nature as a means to escape German idealism. In the Second Notebook Marx wrote:

Antiquity was rooted in nature, in materiality. Its degradation and profanation means in the main the defeat of materiality, of solid life; the modern world is rooted in the spirit and it can be free, can release the other, nature, out of itself. But equally, by contrast, what with the ancients was profanation of nature is with the modern salvation from the shackles of servile faith, and the modern rational outlook on nature must first raise itself to the point from which the ancient Ionian philosophy, in principle at least, begins . . . the point of seeing the divine, the idea, embodied in nature.(138)

This paragraph contains three vital insights. First, it is a rejection of Hegel's *PN*, which is the second book of *EPS*, and which maintained that nature was the opposition of the Idea. For Hegel, nature was the "Otherness" of the Idea, or it was the objectivity that Idea negated, and comprehension of the physico-organic universe proceeded from the Idea.(139) When Marx, as a materialist, wrote that "the modern world is rooted in the spirit and it can be free, can release the other, nature, out of itself," he was referring to Hegel and declaring the vacuity of Hegelian thought on this issue.

Second, this paragraph demonstrates how far Marx traveled since his 1837 "Letter to His Father." In that letter, as mentioned in earlier sections of this

chapter, Marx wrote that he “hit upon seeking the ideal in the real itself.” This was a Hegelian statement, because it indicated that the ideal was the ground of the external world. In the 1839 Notebook, Marx moved to “seeing the divine, the idea, embodied in nature,” or nature was the real content. From the 1837 position of maintaining that the Idea was the ground of the real, Marx moved to an 1839 position of asserting the priority of matter. The 1839 stance was anti-Hegelian.

Lastly, the paragraph contains Marx’s own curriculum vitae. His purpose was to revive antique materialism. His job was to escape the world, primarily German, which was flooded with spirituality, and to lead the revival of ancient materialism, as first enunciated by Köppen.

MARX AND THE STATE

DDEPN is devoted almost entirely to Epicurus’s philosophy of nature and philosophy of science. The dissertation, however, contains several allusions to a theory of the state, and they demand commentary because of their relation to the later development of Marx’s theory of politics. Marx’s First Notebook does contain several passages which he copied from Gassendi’s “Notes on Book Ten of Diogenes Laertius” in which Laertius summarized some ideas of Epicurus. For example, Marx copied the next two quotes which are from Laertius and deal with the Epicurean theory of the state.

Natural right is a mutual agreement, contracted for the purpose of utility, not to harm, or allow to be harmed.(140)

Justice is not something existing in itself, it exists in mutual relations, wherever and whenever an agreement is concluded not to harm each other or allow each other to be harmed.(141)

According to Diogenes Laertius, Epicurus felt that the state was founded on “mutual relations which are satisfactory to each of the contracting parties.” Based on these few summaries from the pen of Diogenes Laertius, Epicurus does not consent to the Stoic idea of a universal natural law or universal natural rights. Rather, Epicurus embraces a contractual view of the state, holding that “mutual relations is the basis of the state.” The legitimation of the state comes from the fact that the same benefits are awarded to as many contractors of the state as possible.

Epicurus also appears to believe in a “contract” that brings the state into existence. Another quote that Marx copied out by hand from Diogenes Laertius read: “For all living beings which could not enter into mutual contracts

not to harm each other or allow each other to be harmed, there is neither justice nor injustice. It is the same, too, with peoples who have been either unable or unwilling to enter into contracts not to harm each other or allow each other to be harmed.”(142)

According to Epicurus, as excerpted by Marx, the purpose of the state was mutual assistance, or most people in a society should benefit from symmetrical advantages. A contract was a means by which mutual values were distributed.

Indeed, Marx took Epicurus to uphold a social contract theory of the state. Marx made this comment of his own: “The following passages represent Epicurus’ views on the spiritual nature of the state. The contract he considers to be the basis, had accordingly, only utility as the end.”(143)

Additional verification that Marx interpreted Epicurus as subscribing to a contract theory of the state is found in the 1845 *The German Ideology*. In the section “The Leipzig Council,” in which Marx attacks Max Stirner’s view of the Stoics and Epicureans, Marx wrote the following sentence:

To give our saint some indication of the real base on which the philosophy of Epicurus rests, it is sufficient to mention that the idea that the State rests on the mutual agreement of people, on a contract social is found for the first time in Epicurus.(144)

Nevertheless, Marx quickly dismissed the Epicurean theory of the state, because the theory was grounded in reciprocal advantage and was not adequate for him. Marx demanded a more “spiritual nature” to the state.

In his anti-Hegelian mode, Marx dissented from both the “natural law” theory of the state and Hegel’s proposition that the origin of the state derived from the human will, or objective spirit. On March 5, 1842, Marx wrote to Ruge: “Another article which I also intended for the *Deutsche Jahrbücher* is a criticism of Hegelian natural law, insofar as it concerns the internal political system.”(145)

Hegel’s political philosophy is expressed most completely in the *PR*, and in its pages he rebukes natural rights doctrine. In particular, Hegel attacks the ideas of Rousseau, of a primitive human equality, and Hegel himself was strongly anti-democratic.

Rather than locate the origin of the state in natural rights, Hegel places the seeds of the state in the individual will. Every person seeks to realize his own private ambitions, and the will is an instrument for the actualization of individual ends. This means that the social life of man in primitive societies was Hobbesian, a clash of all against all. The chapter on the “master-slave” relationship in the *PHS* encapsulates the combat of primitive social life. Hegel refers to this early period of social existence as a “struggle for recognition,” and it is a condition without ethics in which the superiority of force, “the master,” rules.(146)

The dialectical process, however, did not allow mankind to remain at the “master-slave” level. Inevitably, the dialectic ascends to the level of objective mind, and at this grade the state as such makes its appearance in history.

At the stage of objective mind the state was an ethical community. The progress of thought attained the plane of the ethical, or the awareness of mutual interdependence, and this consciousness witnessed the appearance of the state, or the state was an expression of moral interdependence.

The anti-Hegelian Marx abrogated both the natural law theory of the state, which Hegel also rejected, and Hegel’s assertion that the origin of the state lay in the will. The doctrine of natural rights, for Marx, was merely a disguise for unlimited private acquisition, or unbridled capitalism. It provided a justification for economic greed. The idea also that the state found its ultimate origin in the individual will was anathema to Marx because he took such a claim as an apology for the right of unlimited self-aggrandizement. In other anti-Hegelian postures, by the time Marx wrote his *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of the Right* in 1842, he was already a democrat as well as a Rousseauist. Marx rejected Rousseau’s theory of natural rights but embraced his theory of democracy and the social contract. In fact, in his *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of the Right*, Marx called upon Rousseau as the antidote to Hegel.

The pro-Hegelian Marx was deeply influenced by Hegel’s principle that the state was ultimately founded on social ethics. In “The Master’s” *PR* individualism operated in the domain of civil society, of subjective mind, but in the last analysis, individual voluntarism must be superseded by the universality of the state, and this movement from particularity to universality could take place only through the instrumentality of the ethical, or of objective mind. Earlier sections of this chapter also reviewed Hegel’s attitudes toward the Greek polis. The Greek city-state ultimately derived from the universality of Athenian customs and morality.

McCarthy’s book *Marx and the Ancients* contains two chapters, “Epistemology, Politics, and Social Justice in the Greek Polis; Marx and Aristotle” and “The Ancients, Democracy, and Marx’s Critique of Classical Liberalism,” which are penetrating probes into Marx’s theory of the state.(147) McCarthy convincingly demonstrates the Aristotelian nature of both Hegel’s and Marx’s political theory. It is clear that Hegel wanted to maintain the state, while Marx wanted to abolish it. For Hegel, statelessness was similar to anarchy, the “master-slave” condition, or the state was civil order. For Marx, statelessness meant the end of class repressiveness, of class domination. Regardless of these differences, both Marx and Hegel, although by means of different institutions, desired a political order founded on the polis sense of community. Aristotle did not separate political life from moral-

ity, and Marx's and Hegel's political thought, although in different ways, perpetuated the Aristotelian tradition of assembling a congruence between the ethical and the political.

In the Second Notebook to his dissertation Marx wrote extensive passages on the philosophic development of ancient Athens. He took particular notice of the emergence of subjectivity in Greece as embodied in the person of the "wise man," or "sophos." In these speculations on Athenian intellectual life, Marx wrote this paragraph:

Since the soul of Greek life, and the Greek mind is substance, which first appears in them in free substance, the knowledge of this substance occurs in independent beings, individuals, who, being notable, on the one hand, each has his being in external contrast to others, and whose knowledge, on the other hand, is the inward life of substance and thus something internal to the conditions of the reality surrounding them.(148)

Further on in the Second Notebook, Marx added this paragraph:

If the first Greek wise men are the real spirit, the embodied knowledge of substance, if their utterances preserve just as much genuine intensity as substance itself, if, as substance is necessarily idealized, the bearers of its progress assert an ideal life in their particular reality in opposition to the reality manifested substance of the real life of the people, then the ideality itself is only in the form of substance. There is no undermining of the living powers, the most ideal men of the period, the Pythagoreans and the Eleatics, extol state life as real reason.(149)

The Pro-Hegelian Marx accepted Hegel's view of the state as expressed in the *LHP*.

In the *DDEPN*, Marx is in search of a definition of the state. It indicated that he dissented from both the utilitarian and natural rights theory of the state. It is also clear that Marx found Hegel's monarchism unacceptable.

Marx's search for a definition of the state showed how much he was influenced by the Greeks. In a subsequent book, I will trace in detail the influence that Greek political thought, particularly Aristotle's *Politics*, exerted on his own political speculations. At this point it is only necessary to observe that Athens was one of the formative influences on Marx's political theory.

Like Hegel, Marx abandoned social contract and natural rights theory. Like Hegel and the Greeks, Marx sought a political theory which supported collectivity and community. Hegel found this underpinning in ethics and substance, whereas Marx found it in economics. Marx made the mutual interdependence of economic life into substance. Marx's political theory was the union of ethics and economics.

FROM SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY TO CRITIQUE

One area in which Marx's anti-Hegelian rupture was most clearly instanced was the issue of subjectivity, or the agency which propelled the dynamic of development. As a speculative thinker, Hegel looked upon spirit as subjectivity. Agency, or causality, for Marx, was located in the individual, or in human activity organized as a group. Marx completely relocated the site of subjectivity. For Hegel, the ultimate subject was spirit, or the dialectical unfolding of the panlogical.

During the years 1839–1841, while he was under the influence of Bauer, Marx transferred subjectivity to the individual. In 1846, in *The German Ideology*, after his break with Bauer, Marx situated the center of subjectivity in the social forces of production. In other words, human actions as embodied in the social forces of production became the agency of social change.

In addition, Bauer throughout his life remained wedded to the primacy of self-consciousness. Bauer joined individuality to self-consciousness and looked upon subjective self-consciousness as the primary impetus of development. Marx again imitated Bauer in his own Promethean image of self-consciousness. In the "Forward" to *DDEPN*, the doctoral candidate wrote: "Philosophy makes no secret of it. The confession of Prometheus. . . . In simple words I hate the pack of gods . . . is its own confession, its own aphorism against all heavenly and earthly gods who do not acknowledge human self-consciousness as the highest deity. It will have done other besides." (150)

The anti-Hegelianism of Marx extended itself to Hegel's view of self-consciousness. In the "Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and Philosophy in General," which is the last section of *The Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx disassociated himself from Hegel's idea of subjectivity on the basis that the moving force in history was spirit and not human labor. (151) Thereafter, Marx never surrendered the idea that human action, either in terms of human labor power or mental inventiveness, was the sole agency of historical progress.

However, in order to arrive at critique, it was necessary to incorporate two Hegelian modalities. Critique, as practiced by Bauer and Marx, became an amalgam of the ideas of self-consciousness and the modality of essence and appearance, and by engaging in this synthesis, both Marx and Bauer showed their pro-Hegelian affinities.

The forms of essence and appearance were fully explored in Hegel's *SL*, published in 1812, five years after the *PHS*. By essence, Hegel meant the in-itself of an object. According to Hegel, every object possessed a telos, an end toward which its inner being drove it, and this purpose was its essence. The historical movement of essence required that it actualize itself, or present itself in palpable form to an observer. Essence and appearance were the

inner and outer of an object, the inner tendency and its realization in a perceptible form.(152)

The clearest definition of Marx's concept of critique is found in *DDEPN*. In order to provide the fullest view of Marx's thinking on this subject, I quote this text at length:

It is a psychological law that the theoretical mind, once liberated in itself, turns into practical energy, and, leaving the shadowy empire of Amantes as will, turns itself against the reality of the world existing in it. (From a philosophical point of view, however, it is important to specify these aspects better, since from the specific manner of this turn we can reason back towards the immanent determination on the universal historic character of a philosophy. We see here, as it were, its curriculum vitae narrowed down to its subjective point.) But the practice of philosophy is itself theoretical. It is the critique that measures the individual existence by the essence, the particular reality by the idea. But this immediate realization of philosophy is in its deepest sense afflicted with contradictions, and this its essence takes form in the appearance and imprints its seal on it.(153)

In Bauer and Marx, critique meant the measurement of reality against its essence. Taking an illustration from the sphere of politics, they considered it desirable to submit monarchy to a critique. The first step is to arrive at a theory of the essence of government, or a generalization must be made after a thorough empirical investigation of the essence of government. After such a definition was arrived at, after the in-itself of government was attained, this essence was compared to the existing Prussian monarchy. A comparison was drawn between the essence of government and the reality of the Prussian Crown, and this comparison would illustrate the deficiency of the Prussian Crown vis-à-vis the essence.

The Bauerian definition of critique, which Marx incorporated in *DDEPN*, was a combination of Bauer's idea of Promethean self-consciousness and the Hegelian modality of essence and appearance. Marx's relation to Bauer also had pro- and anti- dimensions. Marx and Bauer eventually went their separate ways, but Bauer's prescription for critique remained a continuous presence in Marx's philosophical armory, from 1839 until his death in 1883.

It is impossible to understand Marx without recognizing that Marx retained certain features of Hegelian thought. Specifically, Marx employed the Hegelian formula of essence and appearance throughout his life, and, in fact, this apparatus was one of the central interpretive tools of *Das Kapital*. The pro-Hegelian Marx is most visible in Marx's borrowing of Hegelian forms. Marx's anti-Hegelianism related to the Hegelian system, to its panlogicism, but Marx's pro-Hegelianism was connected to a methodology appropriate for explanation in the social sciences.

It is important to distinguish between the concepts of essence and substance in the thought of both Hegel and Marx. In Hegel, essence referred to the inner, to the necessary. On the other hand, substance shines forth in its accidents, can become an objective attribute. In the *PS*, the Third Volume of the *EPS*, Hegel identifies subjective logic with the anthropological and psychological levels of humankind. Objective mind related to those areas of human existence in which civil society produces an external environment. Substance was constructed by collective social actions. For example, the substance of the state was ethics, or ethics was a social constitution, which then served as the framework of political life.

Marx's use of the terms essence and substance were exactly congruent with the Hegelian employment. Essence, for Marx, was also the inner, the necessary. Capitalism had an essence; it developed in accordance with an immanent formula. In addition, government had an essence, or an inner quality which determined its being. Marx also duplicated Hegel's concept of substance, for Marx also used the term to identify the objective. Marx referred to labor as substance; it had an attribute in that it created value. For Marx, the essence of man, his in-itself, was to be active, and the result of this necessity was substance, an object, or an economic value.

MARX'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

This part of the chapter is mainly aimed at Marx's philosophy of science as it existed in the period 1839–1841, but in order to clearly delineate this part of his thought, it is first necessary to distinguish the philosophy of science from the philosophy of nature as well as Marx's method.

In the present discussion, the philosophy of science means a theory regarding the procedures to gain knowledge of the external world. Marx's method, to be defined later, is synonymous with Marx's philosophy of science. However, Marx did not apply this method to the study of the natural sciences but rather to socioeconomic formations.

In this area as well, Marx was pro-Hegelian, for he focused on the phenomenological forms produced by labor. Hegel applied the phenomenological method to the historical productions of thought and was preoccupied with how consciousness manufactured art, religion, philosophy, the state, or substance. Marx and Hegel disagreed over the placement of subjectivity, for whereas Hegel took spirit as the subject, Marx took social labor as the subject. Therefore, Marx was absorbed in studying the productive process of social labor and in devising a method to comprehend this form of socioeconomic propagation.

The phrase “philosophy of nature” concerns speculations about the physics, or laws of nature. The physics of nature was not spaces of concern for Marx. However, Marx was a materialist, and so he believed that matter was the primal substance of nature, but he did not go further to speculate about the laws of nature.

In his book *Marx's Critique of Science and Positivism*, George E. McCarthy argues that Schelling was an important source for the origins of Marx's materialism.(154) McCarthy proposes that Schelling freed nature from the prison of the Hegelian theory of identity. Hegelian thought rested on the assumption that concept and the external were indistinguishable, but Schelling split the empirical and the conceptual and in so doing provided nature with an independence outside of thought. McCarthy maintains that Schelling's escape from the philosophy of identity, his liberation of the empirical from the conceptual, offered Marx an opening to materialism. Marx knew the works of Schelling, and McCarthy is persuaded that Schelling's writings on the philosophy of nature, his emancipation of the empirical, invited Marx to the study of materialist thought.

The fact that Marx knew Schelling's work is documented by the *DDEPN*. In his appendix to the dissertation entitled “Critique of Plutarch's Polemic Against the Theology of Epicurus,” Marx refers to Schelling's “Philosophic Writings.”(155) However, Marx's evaluations of Schelling are not positive; he does not ascribe any value to Schelling's thought. Marx never states that he was indebted to Schelling in any area of philosophy. On the contrary, Marx's brief statements on the one-time colleague of Hegel are critical, calling attention to the literary abstruseness of Schelling's writing and the politically conservative nature of his lectures at the University of Berlin.

In the appendix Marx copied the following sentence from a work by Schelling: “The time has come to proclaim to the better part of humanity the freedom of minds, and not to tolerate any longer that they deplore the loss of their fetters.” Immediately following this quote, Marx wrote this sentence: “When the time already had come in 1795, how about the year 1841.”(156)

The allusion to 1795 was a reference to the instillation of the Directory at this point of the French Revolution of 1789. The Directory represented a right-wing movement in the French Revolution, and it extinguished Jacobinism. Marx was identifying Schelling with the conservative reaction of the Directory. Marx was inferring that Schelling's call to the University of Berlin in 1841 was tantamount to the establishment of the Directory. As I pointed out in chapter 2, Schelling was called to the University of Berlin by the Prussian crown to eradicate any vestige of Liberal Hegelianism, as an assault against Left-Wing Hegelianism, and as a reimposition of monarchism and Lutheran orthodoxy. As a Left-Wing Hegelian, such apologetics were

anathema to Marx, and he looked upon Schelling as the philosophical personification of Thermidor.

Marx's negative attitude toward Schelling in 1841 continued into the 1845 *The Holy Family*, (157) and the 1845–1846 *The German Ideology*. (158) Brief comments on Schelling in both of these works repeat Marx's pejorative assessment of Schelling. Schelling was not even mentioned in the brief history of materialism Marx sketched in the chapter "Critical Battle Against French Materialism" in *The Holy Family*, (159) and it is unlikely that Marx, having discarded Hegel's panlogicism, would embrace Schelling's pantheism. In *The Holy Family*, Marx associated Schelling with Bauer's rejection of materialism. McCarthy is wrong in his assessment of the Schelling-Marx relationship, because it was not Schelling who revealed the importance of materialism to Marx, but in 1841 the mentor was Feuerbach.

Marx's philosophy of science is made clear in his attitude toward Epicurus's philosophy of science. In his evaluation of Epicurus, Marx also revealed his own principles. Marx's doctoral dissertation was divided into two parts. The first part was entitled "Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature in General," and the second part was entitled "Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature in Detail." Chapter 2 of the second part was called "The Qualities of the Atoms," and in this, Marx wrote this paragraph:

Through the qualities the atoms acquires an existence which contradicts its concept; it is assumed as an externalized being as different from its essence. It is this contradiction which mainly interests Epicurus. Hence, as soon as he posits a property and thus draws the consequences of the material nature of the atom, he counterposits at the same time determinations which again destroy this property in its own sphere and validates instead the concept of the atom. He therefore determines all properties in such a way that they contradict themselves. Democritus, on the other hand, nowhere considers the properties in relation to the atom itself, nor does he objectify the contradictions between the concept and existence, which is inherent in them. To him they are merely hypothesis to explain the plurality which makes its appearance. It follows that the concept of the atom has nothing to do with them. (160)

Sense perception never supplied Epicurus with a reflection of the atom. The atom, therefore, was only a concept in the mind of Epicurus. For example, the concept of tranquility, the moral desirability of eudemonism, was sufficient reason to deny the existence of the gods. The concept was the definitive factor in Epicurus and also in Marx's philosophy of science.

Epicurus also maintained that human freedom was incompatible with scientific determinism. Individual autonomy was antithetic to positivism. In or-

der to affirm human freedom, Epicurus denied both positivism and natural determinism. On these issues, as well, Marx remained an Epicurean throughout his entire life.

The principle of the priority of the concept served as the ground of two sets of contradictions: the contradiction between the concept and existence, and the contradiction between concept and essence. These contradictions meant that the philosophy of science was a dialectical process.

The concept was never correspondent with existence. For both Epicurus and Marx, a contradiction always existed between the concept and reality, and thus the relation between the concept and the real was always dialectical. Form was always negated by content, and negation was an ever-present factor in the construction of knowledge. Similarly, there was always a contradiction between the concept and essence. While existence referred to the real, essence pointed to the inner of an object. Just as it was impossible for the concept to capture existence, so it was also impossible for it to capture essence. Therefore, the relation between concept and essence was dialectical, or essence always negated the concept.

According to Marx's interpretation, Epicurus held to a dialectical philosophy of science. It was based on the antipodal relationship between concept and essence, concept and existence, and the advance of knowledge was driven forward by the force of negation.

The manner in which Marx interpreted Epicurus was exactly the protocols by which he was later to interpret the development of societies. The philosophy of science as espoused by Marx in 1839–1841 was the same apparatus, employed the same categories, that he later used in historical materialism.

Marx's disparagement of Democritus is made clear in the materials I quoted. Although the title of the dissertation is, *The Difference Between Democritus' and Epicurus' Philosophy of Nature*, Marx devoted the majority of the dissertation to the work of Epicurus. The Democritean philosophy of science assumed that ideas were semblances of sense perception. Unlike Epicurus, Democritus did not grasp the priority of the concept but took it for granted that ideas were semblances of the external. Democritus was an ancient precursor of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century epiricism, and Marx abandoned the Democritean tradition.

In chapter 3 of part 2, "Indivisible Principles and Indivisible Elements," Marx also described the Epicurean philosophy of science in these words:

The contradiction between existence and essence, between matter and form, which is inherent in the concept of the atom, emerges in the individual atom itself once it is endowed with qualities. Through the quality the atom is alienated

from its concept, but at the same time is perfected in its construction. It is from repulsion and the ensuing conglomerations of the qualified atoms that the world of appearance now emerges.

In this transition from the world of essence to the world of appearance, the contradictions in the concept of the atom clearly gather its highest realization. For the atom is conceptually the absolute, essential form of nature. This absolute form has now been degraded to absolute matter, to the formless substrate of the world of appearance.

The atoms are, it is true, the substance of nature, out of which everything emerges, into which everything dissolves, but the continuous annihilation of the world of appearance comes to no result. New appearances are formed; but the atom itself always remains at the bottom as the foundation.(161)

In these three paragraphs, Marx again returns to the theme of contradiction. The concept of the atom is always a contradiction, the clash of existence and essence. But Marx goes further and introduces the dialectical relationship between essence and appearance. The dialectical relationship between essence and appearance was pivotal to the manner by which analyzed societies after he discovered labor as the DNA of social existence, and *Das Kapital* is incomprehensible without applying essence and appearance as interpretive syntax.

Marx incorporated the protocols of essence and appearance from *The Smaller Logic* of the *EPS*.(162) In this book Hegel devoted the second subdivision to the Doctrine of Essence. The in-itself graduated to appearance, or the inherent tendency realized itself in appearance. Hegel defined appearance as the “forth-shining.”(163) Appearance was the “phenomenal,”(164) or it was the essence becoming apparent to human sense perception.

Marx again returned to the Hegelian theme of a divided world. Essence was pure, but appearance was corrupted. Even though appearance was a shining forth of essence, once essence was touched by materiality it was tainted. This process of impurity was the ground for the dialectical nature of the social universe. The world of reality was always a Fall from Grace.

In his writings on Epicurus Marx also returned to the Hegelian idea of alienation. When Marx wrote that “through the quality the atom is alienated from its concept,” he was again pointing to the contradiction between concept and existence. When the atom was given qualities, when it was assigned size, weight, exteriority, it immediately was alienated from its concept. The joining of the idea of alienation to the formula of essence and appearance supplied the methodology by which Marx criticized capitalism. If essence was labor, and if appearance was capitalism, then labor was alienated from capitalism’s appearance. The apparatus of alienation made it possible to measure how essence and appearance, labor and capitalism, created an inverted world.

Marx's absorption of Hegelian forms is starkly highlighted in his discussion of chance and necessity. In the work of Epicurus and Democritus, this analysis takes place within the dissertation itself, and because this is a crucial issue, I shall quote at length. It should be recalled that for Epicurus, chance ruled nature, while for Democritus necessity was the governing force of nature.

Once again Epicurus stands directly opposed to Democritus. Chance, for him, is a reality which has only the value of possibility. Abstract possibility, however, is the direct antipode of real possibility. The later is restricted within sharp boundaries, as is the intellect; the former is unbounded, is the imagination. Real possibility seeks to explain the necessity and reality of the object which is explained, but in the subject which does the explaining. The object need only be possible, conceivable. That which is abstractly possible, which can be conceived, constitutes no obstacle to the thinking subject, no limit, no stumbling block. Whether this possibility is also real is irrelevant, since here the interest does not extend to the object as object.

Since everything possible is admitted as possible, which corresponds to the character of abstract possibility, the chance of being is clearly transferred only into the chance of thought. The only rule which Epicurus which prescribes, namely, that "the explanation should not contradict sensation" is self evident; for, to be abstractly possible consists precisely in being free from contradiction, which therefore must be avoided. And Epicurus confesses finally that his method of explaining aims only at the ataraxy of self-consciousness, not at knowledge of nature in and for itself.(165)

In these paragraphs Marx once more affirmed the autonomy of subjective self-consciousness and the concept. Underlining the superiority of Epicurus's "method of explaining," Marx located that preeminence in that Epicurus "aims only at the ataraxy of self-consciousness." The determining factors in Epicurus's approach to the philosophy of science were the needs of self-consciousness and not a "knowledge of nature in and for itself." Epicurus was not primarily interested in a correspondence theory of truth, the verisimilitude between reality and the idea but rather in the freedom of self-consciousness and how this freedom determined the knowledge of nature without contradicting "sensation."

Of equal interest to Marx's discussion of the self-determination of self-consciousness is his use of the categories of real and abstract possibility. Marx appropriated these categories from Hegel's *Smaller* and *Greater Logic*, although they appear in different modalities in each of these works. The degree to which Marx ingested the apparatus of Hegel will be clarified as we discover the exact text from which Marx incorporated these categories.

In the *Smaller Logic*, Hegel's doctrine of essence is subdivided into three parts, essence, appearance, and actuality, and the logic of possibility is briefly

discussed in the subdivision of actuality. Basically, the description occurs in paragraph 143.(166) In the *Smaller Logic*, Hegel defines possibility as the non-contradiction of the actual. The actual must develop, and possibility means that the development of the actual proceeds in terms of what is consistent with the actual. The discussion in the *Smaller Logic* does not include any reference to abstract or real possibility.

Hegel's discussion of the categories of abstract and real possibility appears in *The Greater Logic* in which Hegel also ruminated about these shapes in the context of his analysis of actuality, which is the immediate, the manifestation of existence in externality.(167) Actuality must develop, and in the course of its historicity, it is shaped by real possibility and abstract possibility. Real possibility means that the options opening before actuality are limited. Therefore, real possibility is equal to relative necessity. What is limited is the necessary.(168)

Abstract possibility means that the alternatives open to an actuality are infinite. This form of possibility has infinite options, and it is, therefore, equal to contingency, or to chance.(169)

In his analysis of the theory of chance in Epicurus, Marx applied the Hegelian logical categories of abstract and real possibility. Hegel was an active presence in Marx's scrutiny of ancient philosophy. Hegel presented a method by which Marx could grasp the difference between Epicurus and Democritus.

Marx classified Democritus as an "empiricist," and a "dogmatist."(170) This was a form of derogation. Conversely, he praised Epicurus as a "skeptical" and a "Philosopher."(171)

The dual nature of Marx's approach to Hegel became starkly visible in their differing interpretations of Epicurus. Marx employed the Hegelian categories of abstract and real possibility to comprehend Epicurus's doctrine of chance. When Marx utilized these Hegelian modes of perception, he appeared in a pro-Hegelian moment.

Conversely, Marx applied both an esoteric and an exoteric critique of Hegel's view of Epicurus, and when he did this, he appeared in an anti-Hegelian moment.

On the esoteric level, Marx rejected the Hegelian view that Epicurus was a "dogmatist" and a positivist. For Marx, Epicurus advocated the freedom of self-consciousness, the freedom of thought from sense-perception. Interestingly, Hegel, who extolled the autonomy of thought, completely overlooked the fact that Epicurus was also a proponent of the freedom of the concept. Marx supplied a critique of "The Master's" reading of Epicurus, and in this regard proposed an esoteric critique of Hegel.

Both Marx and Hegel were aware that Democritus thought that atoms fell in a straight line, while Epicurus maintained that atoms descended in a curvilinear fashion. Hegel failed to explore the meaning of this difference, for he

simply took account of this divergence and never sought to investigate the significance of this divergence between the two Greek atomists. Marx did analyze the contrast between straight, and curvilinear falls, and from this scrutiny, Marx proposed that Democritus was indeed a “dogmatist,” but that Epicurus upheld the principle of free consciousness. When Hegel failed to examine the polarity between straight, and curvilinear descent, he missed an opportunity to perceive the importance of concept in Epicurus. Marx seized this occasion and out of his study put forth his theory of Epicurus and the self-determination of the idea.

Marx also refuted the “historiography of philosophy” as contained in the *LHP*, and in so doing Marx applied an exoteric critique of Hegel. In the *LHP*, Hegel presented Epicurus as an embodiment of the decadence of Greek thought, for it had descended into “dogmatism” and rigidity. In Marx’s rewriting of the *LHP*, he centered on an Epicurus who revitalized philosophy after the Great Triumvirate. The exoteric critique of Hegel’s *LHP* set forth a new historiography of philosophy, a historiography that embraced Epicurus as the ancient father of critique and therefore the initiator of new possibilities for philosophy.

Marx’s dissertation amounted to a Bauerian critique of the Hegelian system. Marx sought to show the disparity between the essence of the system and its appearance in Old Hegelianism. The essence of the system was the self-determination of thought, but not only had Hegel violated this principle in his evaluation of Epicurus, but the Old Hegelians were involved in the same deficiency after “our master’s” death. The appearance Hegelianism, its inability to embrace the freedom of concept in Epicurus, to place the decadence of the Prussian crown under the sword of critique, was contradicted by the essence of the system.

Those who combined the logical categories of Bauer, self-consciousness and critique, with Hegel’s methodology, while at the same time jettisoning Hegel’s panlogicism, were the “liberal” Left-Hegelian explorers of the new age of philosophy. This was Marx’s position in 1841.

THE THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT

The anti-Hegelianism of Marx was made most apparent in their conflicting ideas regarding historical development. “The Master” accounted for historical development in terms of the panlogical.

As I mentioned above, Marx relocated the fuel of causality to the subjective, and in so doing reconstructed the Hegelian concept of development. The anti-Hegelian Marx defined the progress of philosophy as the movement from the abstract to the subjective, from the universal to the particular, from the spirituo-logical to the material.

However, in his refutation of the Hegelian scheme of evolution, Marx had recourse to specific Hegelian formulas.⁽¹⁷²⁾ Marx's anti-Hegelianism concentrated upon the speculative, panlogical Hegel, while his pro-Hegelianism was evidenced in his use of Hegelian methodological formulas.

The move that Marx made out of Hegel's panlogicism toward a declaration of the causal priority of subjectivity forced him to explore two other related problems: first, the theory-practice equation and critique; second, the relationship between a subjectivity and an entire philosophical system.

One of the major propellants of development in Marx's methodology was the dialectical instruments of negativity and contradiction, and these two dialectical tools on the subjective level took two forms: theory-practice and conceptual critique.

The theory-practice modality was operative in the world of appearance. The theory-practice modality occasions development, because a practical action modified the contemporary appearance. This dialectical instrument focuses upon an action taken by a subject which negates a contemporary reality. The negation of practice, informed by theory, causes an alteration of circumstances.

The theory-practice instrument must be distinguished from Marx's concept of praxis. While theory-practice relates to a political act, praxis refers generally to human labor. Regardless of the fact that theory-practice points to the civic political domain, while praxis points to the economic-productive domain, praxis is also an engine of development. The processes of labor and social productivity negate the immediate economic conditions, and by remodeling the material environment, praxis ignites the motors of development.

Critique operates in a different dimension than theory-practice. Whereas theory-practice concerns the contradiction between the existent and action, critique concerns the contradiction between essence and appearance. Critique functions in the domain of thought and is primarily concerned with theoretically exposing the fallacy of the existing. The force of negativity in the modality of critique is not practice but the theoretical exposure of the distortion of the existent.⁽¹⁷³⁾

However, the critique supplies the theory to the theory-practice modality. By explicating the disparity between essence and appearance, critique supplies theory with a target, it supplies theory with a goal, and practice is aimed at that goal. The goal was to contradict the contradiction between essence and appearance and to establish a new coherence between the two.

The dialectic of negativity in both these modalities are energies of development.

In terms of the second problem regarding the relation of self-consciousness to an entire philosophic organism, Marx referred to individual as the "imme-

diating energy of development,”(174) which is caught in a contradiction. At the stage of the expansion of a philosophy, individual self-consciousness has not as yet “theoretically emerged from the system,”(175) and it is not yet aware that when it finally does step out of the system, it only realized a particular moment of the totality. In his description of the relationship between individual self-consciousness and a philosophic totality, Marx was in a pro-Hegelian posture, because he was operating with the form of universal-particular; to what degree the part manifests the whole.

The dilemma of the particular self-consciousness toward a universal philosophic order was graphically captured by Marx in the preceding paragraph. I will again quote this passage at length, because of its importance to the thrust of the present analysis.

This duality of philosophical self-consciousness appears finally as a double trend, each side is utterly opposed to the other. One side, the liberal party, as we may call it in general, maintains as its main determination the concept and the principle of philosophy; the other side, its non-concept, the moment of reality. The second side is positive philosophy. The act of the first side is critique, hence precisely that turning-towards-the-outside of philosophy; the act of the second is the attempt to philosophize, hence the turning-in-towards-itself of philosophy. This second side knows that the inadequacy of the world which has to be made philosophical . . . as to content: only the liberal party achieves real progress, because it is the party of the concept, while positive philosophy is only able to produce demands and tendencies whose form contradicts its meaning.(176)

Marx clearly aligns himself with the “liberal” camp. In determining the relationship between individual self-consciousness and a total philosophical order, Marx was a “liberal” because he embraced the ideas of: a) critique, that philosophy must be practice, that is, must philosophize the world; b) the superiority of the concept. For Marx, the proper outcome of the evolution of philosophy was a subjective critique, or Bauer.

Marx rejected the second determination of individual self-consciousness to a total philosophical totality, or the “positive” approach. The inadequacy of the positive approach arose because it did not accept the priority of critique; rather it was enslaved to the positivity of a philosophical system. Also, the strategy of the positive approach did not turn outward, it was not practical, but rather turned inward, turned back toward thought itself.

In terms of the direction of development, Marx also was persuaded by the “liberal” camp, because “only the liberal party achieves real progress, because it is the party of the concept.” On the other hand, positive philosophy can only bring forth ineffective demands, because they are directed inward, to a philosophic order, and not toward reality.

The paragraph I just analyzed is a summary of the central thrust of the doctoral dissertation. In the framework of a theory of development, Marx held that philosophy must move from abstract totality to individual subjectivity. In the framework of the relationship between individual subjectivity and an organic philosophic whole, Marx opted for the practical dimension, the exercise of critique.

As previous sections of this chapter indicated, the *DDEPN* painted Epicurus as a “liberal,” as an exponent of the power of concept. Epicurus was the Bauer of ancient philosophy and proof that philosophy had a project after a “giant thinker” like Aristotle.

The anti-positivism of Marx during the years 1839–1841 shows that even as a young man, Marx was already positioned to disapprove Engels’s “copy theory” of truth. In *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, Engels espoused a copy theory of truth. Sense perceptions imprinted proximate replicas of external objects in our minds. Marx was anti-Engels because he was pro-Hegelian on this score. Engels was a “dogmatist” in the style of Democritus.

Several Notebooks which Marx used as preparatory material for the dissertation contain rather extended comments on the development of ancient Greek philosophy. His specific comments on Socrates, the Greek “wise man,” and Aristotle are consistent with his more general interpretations of the advancement of philosophy. The meaning of Socrates lay in the fact that he was a symbol of the movement from abstract to concrete.

In the second Notebook, Marx presented Socrates as emerging out of Athenian substantiality. In this second Notebook Marx wrote:

Subjectivity is manifested in its immediate bearer [Socrates] as his life and his practical activity, as a form by which he leads single individuals out of determinations of substantiality to determinations in themselves; apart from their practical activity, his philosophy has no other content than the abstract determinations of the good. His philosophy is his transference from substantiality existing notions, differences, etc., to determination-in-itself, which, however, has no other content than to be the vessel of this dissolving reflection.(177)

The Greek “wise man” exemplified that subjectivity must also take a practical turn if progress were to be made. Not only must the source of determinations be changed from the abstract to the subject, but the end of the subject must also be modified. The purpose of the subject must be redirected from theory to critique, to an activity that negates the existing.(178) Marx pictured Epicurus as a “wise man,” or as an individual who practiced critique. As such, Epicurus represented two lessons which could be drawn from the history of Greek philosophy.

First, the perfection of Greek philosophy lay in Epicurus and not in Socrates, Plato, or Aristotle, the Great Triumvirate of Athenian thought. The Great Triumvirate raised philosophical theory to its highest levels, but Epicurus turned Greek thought into practice. Second, Epicurus proved that even after a total philosophic system, philosophy itself had a future. Progressive advancement was continuous, and even after the great age of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, philosophy opened up a new horizon in the figure of Epicurus. In his interpretation of Epicurus, Marx offered a Left-Wing Hegelian agenda for times to come. Hegel had not brought an end to philosophy, but rather the Hegelian Left must take the implements presented to them by Hegel and turn them into practice, or into devices to negate the present social being.

Marx's reading of Socrates, Epicurus, and the figure of the "wise man" showed him in an anti-Hegelian stance. Whereas Marx set forth a complete defense of subjective self-consciousness, Hegel did not. Whereas Marx saw Epicurus as the realization of Greek thought, Hegel saw Greek atomism and materialism as evidence of decline. Whereas Hegel justified the decision of Athens to prosecute Socrates, Marx presented Socrates as a Prometheus. Hegel stayed bound to the abstract, logical, and substantial, while Marx advocated the individual, materialism, empiricism, and self-consciousness.

But Marx's critique of Hegel did not mean that Marx broke with "the Master." On the contrary, even though Marx was aware of the weaknesses of Hegel, he also was convinced of the creative aspects of the ideas of Hegel. In his sixth Notebook, Marx wrote:

But it would only mean that no philosopher had taught philosophy with more religious inspiration [than Plato], (179) that to no philosophy had to a greater extent the determination and form, as it were, of a religious cult. With the more intensive philosophers, such as Aristotle, Spinoza, Hegel, their attitude itself had a more general form, less steeped in empirical feeling . . . and Hegel's inspiration when he expounds the eternal realization of the idea, the magnificent organism of the universe of spirits, is more warm, more beneficial to a mind with a more general education, for that reason the inspiration of Plato culminates in ecstasy while that of the others burns on as the pure ideal flame of science; that is why the former was only a hot water bottle while the later in the animating spirit of the world historical developments. (180)

Regardless of the fact that major differences separated Marx from Hegel, Marx still saw Hegel "as the flame of science" and as an "animating spirit of world-historical developments." Persuaded that Hegel still had much to teach contemporary German philosophy, even the Hegelian Left, Marx defended "the Master" against those who sought to annul Hegel in his totality. For those who saw in Hegel's defense of the Athenian verdict of Socrates grounds for a total

break with Hegel, Marx had only rebukes. For Marx, parts of the Hegelian tradition must be salvaged. There is no break between Marx and Hegel but rather the prolongation of specific aspects of Hegelian thought in Marx.

On the other hand, Marx presented a Bauerian argument in *DDEPN*. Marx interpreted the unfolding of Greek thought from an essentially Bauerian perspective, or as the movement from the panlogical to individual self-consciousness.

Marx's theory of development was based not only on the transposition from abstract to concrete, but also on the dialectic. In the sixth Notebook, Marx stated: "Death and love are the myth of negative dialectic, for dialectic is the inner, simple light, the piercing eye of love, the inner soul crushed by the body of material division, the inner abode of the spirit." (181)

In this 1839–1841 definition of the dialectic, Marx emphasized the "negative" aspect. When Marx used "negation" in this sense, as annulling the existing, he added another dimension to his theory of development. He affirmed that historical progress evolved out of the destruction of the real. This was a Bauerian equation once more.

In the seventh Notebook, Marx set forth a short summary of his theory of development as it existed in 1839–1841.

The concern of philosophic historiography . . . is to distinguish in each system the determinations themselves, the actual crystallization pervading the whole system, from the proofs, the justifications in argument, the self-preservation of the philosophers as they know themselves; to distinguish the silent, preserving mole of real philosophical knowledge from the voluble, exoteric, variously behaving phenomenological consciousness of the subject which is the vessel and motive force of these elaborations. It is in this division of this consciousness into aspects mutually giving each other the lie that precisely its unity is proved. This critical element is the presentation of a philosophy which has its place in history is absolutely indispensable in order scientifically to expounds a system in connection with its historical existence, a connection which must not be overlooked precisely because the [system's] existence is historical, but which at the same time must be asserted as philosophical and hence be developed according to its essence. . . . The proof can be provided only by expounding the "essence." (182)

Marx's theory of development assumes that every philosophical order was a totality. They were organic wholes constituted of individual parts. The operative movement went from the totality, the abstract, to the determinate, the parts.

The function of "philosophic historiography" was to define the parts, or each subjective self-consciousness. The objective of the student of philosophy was to "distinguish" each philosopher, to show how a specific philosopher individualized himself against the whole. Marx's vision was based on the Hegelian concept of whole and parts.

The totality of a philosophical system was driven forward by critique, or critique was the force of negation which created the conditions of progress. Negation was similar to supersession. When one part of a totality was superseded through cancellation, critique, the whole system was moved forward, or underwent transformation.

However, annulment did not mean total disappearance. The dialectic of both Hegel and Marx assumed that negation and retention were not incompatible. The process of subsumption, the act by which an object was cancelled and then absorbed into an organic system entailed the retention of that object. Obviously, the nature of the object would be changed, its individuality was annulled, but it would, nevertheless, be retained in a different status as part of the whole.(183)

In later years, when Marx began his study of socioeconomic totalities, he was predisposed to interpret them as systems which contained inherent contradictions. Schooled by Hegel, Marx acquired a conceptual inclination to interpret social totalities as a clash of opposites. Marx was taught that societies contained inherent negativities by Wilhelm Schulz, who published a book *Die Bewegung Der Produktion*, in 1843, from which Marx quotes in his *Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. In *Die Bewegung Der Produktion* Schulz was the first to describe the development of society as flowing from the contradiction between the forces of production and the mode of production. Marx borrowed this Schulzian paradigm, but Marx's intellectual predisposition to view societies as a clash of opposing forces had already been taught to him by Hegel's theory of contradiction. Marx took the Hegelian dialectic, which Hegel limited to the realm of thought, and applied it, under the inspiration of Schulz, to socioeconomic organisms.

While there are premonitions of Schulz in Marx in 1841, there are no premonitions of Hess or August Cieszkowski or the communist wing of the Left-Hegelians. August Cieszkowski is not mentioned in the bibliography to the *DDEPN*, and the only work of Hess listed in the *DDEPN* is an article entitled "Germany and France in Relation to the Question of Centralization." (184) In 1841 Marx had not yet converted to the proletarian utopianism of Hess or Cieszkowski. From the political perspective, Köppen and Bauer were Liberal reformers, and Marx followed them into the party of moderate reform, as witnessed by his journalism in the *Rheinische Zeitung*.

The presupposition of "philosophical historiography" was the idea of history. For Hegel, history was the gallery of the artistry of thought, such as objective substance. History was not only past, but also the present, and the future of the spirit.

Marx retained the centrality of history but altered the content. In his maturity, Marx was primarily concerned with the genesis of socioeconomic formations. Marx's method of the social sciences was predicated upon the idea

of history. The sharpest arrow of his attack on British Classical Political Economy was aimed at the absence of the historical in Ricardo and Smith. Marx refuted them because they considered economic categories as eternal, whereas Marx presented a historiography of social formations.

In addition, Hegel himself was an expression of the German Enlightenment, of the German Humanist tradition. The aim of this school was moral autonomy and self-determination. Hegel defined these phrases in his own unique manner. German Liberals, as Marx did in his 1843 *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of State*, rejected Hegel's defense of monarchy, attacked his disregard of individual rights. Nevertheless, all of Hegel's books describe the ascent to Freedom, even though differences existed over how Hegel defined Freedom. The *PHS* ended with the "Absolute Knowledge" chapter, the *Smaller* and *Larger Logic* trace the evolution of logic to the Idea, or absolute self-determination. Leaving the issue of content aside, the language that he used, the spirit he perpetuated, contained the traditions of German Humanism.

Although he rejected Hegel's definitions of Freedom and self-determination, Marx himself was a loyal apologist for German Humanism. In this area as well, Marx annulled the Hegelian content, but he did perpetuate the Hegelian spirit which was a reflection of the German Enlightenment. Marx was a continuation of the humanistic heritage of the German Enlightenment.

The ideal of self-determination was central to Marx's ethics. Whereas Hegel understood self-determination as a manifestation of spirit, Marx read self-determination as a human condition arising out of the socioeconomic. But the emancipatory lived on in Marx, and the impulse toward universal emancipation was stimulated by Hegelian humanism.

The impact of Hegelian humanism on Marx was channeled by the influence of Köppen. The book *FGC* instructed Marx on how to direct this German Humanism into the area of political practice, or constitutional reform. Köppen also opened Marx's eyes to the richness of Greco-Roman materialism.

In 1841 Marx was a composite of Hegelian methodology, Bauerian critique, and the political practice of Köppen.

MARX'S METHOD

The shapes and configurations of thought young Marx borrowed from Hegel gave him a methodology for the analysis of socioeconomic formations. In *DDEPN*, Marx applied Hegelian methodological protocols primarily to an examination of the thought of Epicurus, but the same formulas he used in his study of Epicurus he later applied to the investigations of socioeconomic structures.

Marx performed a form-content critique of Hegel. While Marx jettisoned the Hegelian content, he incorporated the Hegelian explanatory forms. This was the central element of Marx's pro-Hegelian moments. The Hegelian content Marx rejected was the spiritual and logical pantheism.

Marx relocated the Hegelian idea of subjectivity. For Marx, subjectivity was human-social action and human-social labor. Marx displaced the explanatory formula of subject-predicate from the panlogical and moved this formula to the individual-social. In Marx's reformulation of Hegelianism, one moved from spiritual and logical universalism to the material particular.

In the dissertation, young Marx was not yet a historical materialist, but Marx became a materialist when he substituted human social activity for self-consciousness. When Marx replaced self-consciousness with material productive forces, he leaped out of the limitations of Bauerian self-consciousness.

Marx's rupture with Bauer also changed the nature of the dialectic in Marx. It was no longer a contradiction between self-consciousness and reality but a conflict between the means and mode of production. The motive force in the dialectic was no longer consciousness but the material forces of production.

Marx aimed the Hegelian methodology at a different object than Hegel. Whereas Hegel applied these forms to the study of the Idea, Marx applied these forms to an analysis of society. The goal for Hegel was to know how the Idea evolved, and he hoped these logical equations would reveal that history. The goal for Marx was to know how a socioeconomic totality evolved, and he hoped these methodological protocols would explain that history.

In order to establish the degree to which Marx absorbed and used Hegelian methodology, I list below all those structures which he employed in his analysis of Epicurus and Democritus. All these structures were utilized in *DDEPN*, and they are also structures which appear again in *Das Kapital*.

A) ORGANIC COGNITION. 1) Totality; 2) Organic; 3) Essence; 4) Immanence; 5) In-Itself and For-Itself; 6) Development, or History; 7) Essence and Appearance; 8) Realization, Actualization; 9) Whole and Parts; 10) Universal-Particular: Structure; 11) Reflection, Mediation.

B) COGNITION OF EXTERNALIZATIONS. 12) Objectification, Predication; 13) Alienation; 14) Dialectic: Externalization; 15) Substance.

C) TOOLS OF COGNITION. 16) Concept; 17) Abstract; 18) Form-Content; 19) Determination; 20) Contradiction, Negation; 21) Dialectic, Cognition; 22) Universal-Particular, Cognition.

In succeeding paragraphs I will offer a brief analysis of each of these modes of cognition. In part 8, "The Theory of Development," I explained Marx's general scheme regarding historical supersession, or "philosophical historiography." The investigation of the particular modes of cognition that

follows should be looked upon as methods which make Marx's general theory of historical evolution, historical materialism, comprehensible.

My analysis of these individual modes of cognition will be brief. Later volumes in this extended discourse on Marx's methodology will both discuss these present modalities of perception in greater detail and add to the list of these methodological categories. Since my intent at this point is only to introduce them, my scrutiny of their content is only aimed at familiarizing the reader with their existence and general purpose.

A). ORGANIC COGNITION

1). Totality

The forms manufactured in history by human-social activity must be perceived as totalities. An atomistic approach to the predications of human activity will only result in a chaotic ménage of historical objectivities, for these objectivities can only be correctly apprehended as aggregate and holistic systems.

2). Organic

These totalities are analogous to organisms. They can be compared to biological systems in which each member contributes to the functioning and preservation of the entire physiology.

3). Essence

Essence is the telos of any totality. Essence is both the seed, which is the point of origin of any unified system, as well as the development of the system which takes place in absolute accordance with the design of the original germ.

4). Immanence

The inherent tendency of a totality to evolve in strict accordance with its original seed. The necessity of a totality to unfold in terms of its presuppositional genus.

5). In-Itself and For-Itself

The in-itself is the essence of the organism; it is a necessary manifestation in accordance with its genus.

The for-itself is the relation of the organism to its surroundings. Nothing stands in complete isolation, and the for-itself is a statement that all particularities exist in relation to another particularity, or as part of a whole.

6). Development, or History

Historicity is the condition of all human and social existence. Existence is historical in nature.

7). Essence and Appearance

This is one of the most important methodologies in Marx's entire scientific repertoire, and it refers to the disjuncture between the inner essence of totality and the outer manifestations of that totality. If essence is the inherent tendency of a system, then essence and appearance relate to the bipolarity between the two. The appearance of a system belies the in-itself of the system.

8). Realization, Actualization

The principle that the in-itself of a system must appear. The inherent tendency of a system to evolve from essence into a presence, an existence.

9). Whole and Parts

Totalities must be perceived as a unity of whole and parts. The parts are subsumed into the whole, are turned into the instruments of the whole, but simultaneously are retained and survive, although in an altered form.

10). Universal-Particular: Structure

The universal-particular is a synonym for the method of whole and parts; the telos of the system defines the parts; the universal subsumes the parts.

11). Reflection, Mediation

Objects never appear in isolation. Objects are always mediated, they are always seen in a context. Indeed, their definition springs from the context.

All these organic categories are devices to explain how a unified system maintains itself or how every part of a unified system works to maintain or reflect the whole.

B. COGNITION OF EXTERNALIZATIONS

12). Objectification, Predication

These categories relate to the productive process of thought. The nature of thought is to consume, and after consumption, thought produces an object. A continuum connects consumption and production, and the process of objectification is never ending.

Another way to describe objectification is the movement from the implicit to the explicit. The in-itself, the implicit, continuously shines forth in the object, or the explicit.

13). Alienation

Once the object is created by thought, it is alienated from its own origin. Once an object is molded by thought, it takes on an existence independent from thought.

14). Dialectic: Externalization

One side of the dialectic is active in the area of externalizations. In this area the dialectic refers to the process by which each objectification is superseded by the next objectification. As mentioned in the paragraph on "Objectification, Predication," the successive realizations of thought are continuous, and so dialectic, when used in the context of externalization, alludes to the constant transcendence of the past objects of thought by the new objects of thought.

15). Substance

Substance is produced by human thought and is therefore external and an objectivity. Substance is the cultural environment in which a person lives, or the result of subjective externalization. Substance is the element that sustains a creative act. In Marx, labor becomes substance.

C. TOOLS OF COGNITION

16). Concept

Concept is the genus, it is the organizing principle that gives meaning to a particularity. Concept is the interpretive device that provides meaning to the particular.

17). Abstract

The abstract is synonymous with the concept. It is the general principle that allows the observer to organize and impart meaning to individuality. Both concept and the abstract played important roles in Marx's methodology, and his theory of science is dependent on them.

18). Form-Content

The modality of the universal-particular was situated in the area of cognition. The content is the particular, sense perception, and this only requires meaning within the form, or the concept. Form-Content refers to the activity of content, the shape imposed on the external by the concept.

19). Determination

Not only does concept consume but it also particularizes itself. Every concept is fashioned on the model of genus-species, and because the concept is the genus, so the concretization or the particularization of the genus leads to a species.

20). Contradiction, Negation

Contradiction and negation mean exclusion, or an object cannot assume individuality unless it excludes an otherness. The individuality of an object arises when it is seen as distinguishable from the Other, and this act of distinguishing is only possible by the contradiction or negation of the other.

21). Dialectic, Cognition

As it unfolds in cognition, the dialectic is the upward spiral of thought as it negates earlier determinations. As a tool of cognition the dialectic forces one to perceive reality as a series of transformations in which one determination is negated and transcended by another.

22). Universal-Particular, Cognition

As a mode of cognition the universal-particular is two-thirds of the syllogism. In the syllogism, the basic motor of historical movement, the universal, is contradicted by the particular, but this negation reaches a compromise in the individual in which both the universal and particular are reconciled. Cognition, for young Marx, means the apprehension of reality as seen as a field of clashing forces, a region of mutually negating propositions.

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About the Author

Norman Levine has devoted his work to the study of Marxist thought, and he contributed two major breakthroughs in Left political theory. He argues that vital differences separate the thought of Marx and Engels, and he maintains that Marx absorbed and continued key elements of Hegelian philosophy. In the exposition of his analysis Professor Levine published four books: *The Tragic Deception: Marx Contra Engels*, in which he breaks the hyphenation between Marx and Engels; *Dialogue Within the Dialectic*, a demonstration of the transformations dialectics underwent in Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Mao; *The Process of Democratization*, an analysis of Lenin's *State and Revolution* and Georg Lukacs's political philosophy; and the current work, *The Hegelian Foundations of Marx's Method*, a description of the influence Hegel exerted on the early work of Marx, 1839–1841. Professor Levine is currently writing a second volume, to be completed in 2008, on the Marx-Hegel symbiosis that traces the Hegelian presence in the work of Marx from 1841 to 1848.